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## A Letter from the Editor

*H*istoria, the peer-reviewed student history journal of

Eastern Illinois University and the Epsilon Mu Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, began publication in 1992 and continues to provide a strong tradition of exemplary academic excellence. This collection of essays represents the continued achievements of undergraduate and graduate students. Ranging across several disciplines, it is my belief that historical scholarship inspires great interest and solid research within a range of academic disciplines. This scholarship has left an indelible mark in the historical profession as well, which continues to expand its boundaries through the integration of interdisciplinary approaches. In this spirit, all of our authors are to be congratulated on making our selection process a difficult and thought-provoking task.

This year's volume contains articles of a vast temporal and chronological scope. From the jungles of Mesoamerica, to the shores of Algiers, to the crowded pubs of Ireland, we find a number of interesting analyses of sporting events and nationalist movements alike. From turbulent Latin American rebellions, Christian missionaries in Korea, and slanderous political cartoons in the Chicago Times, we can appreciate the breadth and depth of this journal's impressive range. We have also included four book reviews that cover each author's primary field of research. We hope that the presence of reviews will establish a tradition and that will be followed in future volumes of *Historia*.

I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Joshua Birk, who will be leaving Eastern for Smith College in the fall. His time, effort, and patience as our adviser not only helped make this journal a reality, but has left his mark in a short time as an exemplary teacher and colleague to our department. I would like to thank the patience and participation of the editorial board, which was at times, a difficult task to select nine articles. Finally, I would like to thank the faculty of the history department, whose leadership and guidance continue to promote the best scholarly work possible. I hope this year's journal continues what has become a solid tradition for the history department and the university.

Chad R. Cussen, Editor

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## **Oppression in the Defense of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Freedom of the Press during the Civil War**

### **Brandon Johnson**

*Brandon Johnson is an undergraduate student in Business from New Lenox, IL. He wrote this paper for Dr. Leslie R. Hyder in EIU 4158, Freedom of Expression: Dissent, Hate, and Heresy, during the spring 2009.*

The founding fathers of the United States of America knew that the value of free press brought to a democratic society was both immeasurable and undeniable. Without a means to disseminate relevant political and social information to the voting public, the power of elected officials would likely run unchecked and threaten to destroy the historic work of the Constitutional Convention. For that very reason, freedom of the press was fused into the bedrock supporting the nation by enshrining it in the first amendment in the Constitution's Bill of Rights.

Despite its prominent position in the country's founding, many groups throughout United States' history have challenged freedom of the press. In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that America is run by a government "of the people, by the people, for the people." True to Lincoln's statement, the citizens of America during the 1860s had an enormous impact on the interpretation of civil liberties as laid out in the Bill of Rights. The following paper explores some of the prevailing public attitudes, professional beliefs, and governmental actions affecting freedom of the press under the Lincoln Administration during the Civil War. During this time period, public citizens and newspaper professionals had at least as much to do with shaping the freedom of the press as government officials.

Although the Constitution has always guaranteed certain rights to all citizens, the interpretation and limit of those rights has evolved within American society over more than two hundred years. Close scrutiny into the evolution of our civil rights is an excellent way to fully appreciate their application to modern society, which in turn fosters understanding of the potential impact of governmental and societal restrictions of these rights.

The free speech limitations imposed by Abraham Lincoln, news editors, and public citizens in the name of preserving the Union illustrate the difficulty of protecting civil rights in a complicated landscape like the one created by the Civil War.

There is no doubt that the 1860's press played a vital role in both the social and political landscape of the nation. The number of newspapers in circulation grew rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century until "there were almost 2,500 on the eve of the Civil War."<sup>1</sup> Newspapers during this time were often associated with a particular political party, and generally put forth no claim of impartiality. Despite the unabashed political motivation that existed amongst most editors during the 1860s, "the ability of a newspaper to expose hypocrisy or express an opposing view was as vital as it is today."<sup>2</sup> The abundance of print-worthy news created by the outbreak of war in 1861 fueled the first industry-wide use of the telegraph; used extensively by field reporters to send accounts of battles and other news back to their home offices in large cities like New York and Chicago. Telegraph rates were high, but so was the potential for profit by being on the leading edge of a story.

This unprecedented use of communications technology to speed the rate at which stories went to press resulted in some serious and valid concerns for the military. If news stories could be reported from the battlefield, transmitted to the printer in a matter hours, to be printed the next day, then any mention of troop movements or other vital strategic information in the articles could provide crucial information to the enemy. It became common practice to require military officials to approve outgoing telegraph messages before transmission. Such military officials had broad legal authorities due to the implementation of martial law by Lincoln during the war.

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<sup>1</sup> Brayton Harris, *Special!: Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War* (New York: Potomac Books, 1999), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey Manber, *Lincoln's Wrath: Fierce Mobs, Brilliant Scoundrels and a President's Mission to Destroy the Press* (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2005), 8.



There are some historians who portray President Lincoln as a villain, claiming that he actively manipulated the press throughout his political career. In their book, *Lincoln's Wrath*, Jeffrey Manber and Neil Dahlstrom comment on some of the acts of vandalism targeted against printing presses during the Civil War and conclude that it is "not as outrageous as it may initially seem to believe that the destruction of dissenting voices was in accordance with the wishes of the president."<sup>3</sup> While Lincoln's actions during the Civil War were extraordinary, not all historians view him so negatively. In fact, according to an article written by Stephen Towne in a journal titled *Civil War History*, "most historians... have argued that in the North under Lincoln's leadership, no concerted, official policy of governmental interference with the press existed."<sup>4</sup> Those who defend Lincoln's actions point to his unenviable task of conducting a war based upon civil liberties for slaves while combating sedition and insurrection by secessionist citizens of the Union.

Even critics of Lincoln like Manber and Dahlstrom have cited the fact that Lincoln and many of his cabinet appointees owed much of their political success to positive, long-standing relationships with newspaper editors. Lincoln, like many of his political contemporaries, realized that newspaper editors were the gatekeepers in any effort to relay political ideas to the public. The President himself had been quoted saying "no man be he citizen or president of the United States, can successfully carry on a controversy with a great newspaper, and escape destruction, unless he owns a newspaper equally great, with a circulation in the same neighborhood."<sup>5</sup> Lincoln had a profound respect for the ability of the press to rally the public to a cause.

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<sup>3</sup> Manber, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen E. Towne, "Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863." *Civil War History* 52, no. 1 (Mar. 2006): 4.

<sup>5</sup> Manber, 8.

The question then becomes whether Lincoln's respect for an association with the press motivated him to support or hinder it during his time in office. The truth of the matter remains open for debate among historians. Even so, it is clear that Lincoln possessed an iron-willed determination to both win the war and reunite the country. To this end, he took unprecedented measures to stamp out dissidence and protect the Union during the Civil War.

An unparalleled level of animosity among American citizens shaped the political landscape during the Civil War. The nation had literally been torn in half along political lines between the anti-slavery Union to the North and the pro-slavery Confederacy to the South. The separation was not a clean break, however, as there were many citizens of the Union who sympathized with the cause of the South. Further, there was a prominent anti-war movement in the North that supported the creation of a sovereign Confederacy if it would bring peace.

As the head of the Union, President Lincoln acted as a lightning rod for political dissidents in the press who wished to attack the leadership of the North. Lincoln "was mercilessly lampooned, viciously libeled, and relentlessly satirized in his own time."<sup>6</sup> Newspapers throughout the country attacked the president both for political reasons and out of malice. Press criticism rarely intimidated Lincoln during this troubling time. Lincoln took no notice of the personal attacks on his character during his time in office. There were, however, several events and circumstances during the war that did motivate him to lash out against the press.

Due to the nature of the Civil War, enemies of the Union were sprinkled throughout the North. There was no easy way to track down these southern sympathizers and deport them. Thus, sedition was one of President Lincoln's primary concerns throughout the conflict. "Lincoln had

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<sup>6</sup> Harold Holzer, "Lincoln Takes the Heat," *Civil War Times Illustrated* 39, no. 7 (Feb. 2001): 44.

little tolerance for anything that smacked of dissidence.”<sup>7</sup> One common form of sedition during the war was to attempt to persuade soldiers to desert their posts. Desertion was a serious crime during the war that was dealt with quite harshly by the government. Lincoln, therefore, did not hesitate to strike out against individuals who interfered with military discipline; claiming that he found it “incongruous that he ‘must shoot a simpleminded soldier boy, who deserts, while he must not touch a hair of the wily agitator who induces him to desert. I think...to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but...a great mercy.’”<sup>8</sup> Maintaining the integrity and reliability of the military remained a focus of Lincoln’s policies throughout the war.

In September of 1862, Lincoln issued an executive order suspending the writ of habeas corpus for “not only rebels and insurgents but also abettors who were ‘discouraging volunteer enlistments’ or ‘resisting militia drafts.’”<sup>9</sup> In addition to the suspension of habeas corpus rights, Lincoln declared that people arrested for these seditious acts were “subject to ‘martial law’ and... ‘liable to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military Commission.’”<sup>10</sup> The legal implications for members of the press were enormous. Military officials could now decide to imprison members of the press through accusations of sedition with no habeas corpus protection. Given the level of distaste that many generals had for the coverage that they received from the press, it is not surprising that the fear of imprisonment led to a certain level of self-censorship by some reporters.

The press had routinely clashed with military commanders since the onset of the war. One well documented example involved General Halleck in mid-1862. While many Union officers were respectful of and even friendly with members of the press, there were some who chafed under

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<sup>7</sup> Wyatt Kingseed, “The Fire in the Rear,” *American History* 42, no. 3 (Aug. 2007): 48.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>9</sup> Sean Mattie, “Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency,” *Review of Politics* 67, no. 1 (2005): 98.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

the glare of constant public attention that embedded reporters inevitably brought to the battlefield. Halleck “was becoming increasingly impatient with the reporters who hung around headquarters,” and goes on to say that Lincoln “was also under considerable pressure from several of his division commanders and certain staff officers who resented the needling criticisms of the reporters.”<sup>11</sup> In May of 1862, Halleck issued Field Order No. 54, which called “for the expulsion of all ‘unauthorized hangers on’ from his army.”<sup>12</sup> When questioned about the definition of the phrase “unauthorized hangers on,” by his subordinate commanders, Halleck made it clear that he considered newspaper reporters to be unauthorized. Most field reporters were expelled from the ranks of Halleck’s forces and denied first-hand access necessary to report on battles and troop morale. Although there were several examples of broad-based military suppression of the media, many actions were aimed at smaller groups or individuals.

When targeting reporters or newspapers proved ineffective at squelching damaging coverage, members of the military were quick to arrest and prosecute private citizens suspected of providing information to the press. As in most American wars, there arose a vocal anti-war political movement, the Peace Democrats, during the Civil War. Peace Democrats, referred to as “Copperheads” by Republican newspapers, “wanted to end the war, even if it meant continued slavery. They held little sympathy for blacks and believed that Lincoln had consistently acted unconstitutionally in conducting the war.”<sup>13</sup> Ohio Congressman Clement Vallandigham, a very vocal critic of Lincoln and his policies, lead Copperhead movement. In fact, “in December 1862, he had boldly introduced a congressional resolution calling for Lincoln’s imprisonment.”<sup>14</sup> Although such a resolution had little chance of being taken seriously in the House of

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<sup>11</sup> J.C. Andrews, *The North Reports The Civil War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), 183.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>13</sup> Kingsseed, 47.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

Representatives, Vallandigham had a large public following and strong associations with several newspaper editors, including the editors of the *Columbus Crisis* and *Chicago Times*.

Vallandigham, through both newspapers and public speeches, vehemently criticized both the Lincoln administration and the war. As he traveled across the North, “he articulately and energetically pushed the envelope in speech after speech, encouraging soldiers to desert and inciting weary crowds, all the while knowing he enraged official Washington.”<sup>15</sup> The huge influence of this congressman meant that any attempted prosecution under sedition laws risked turning him into a martyr, which caused Lincoln to remain cautious in the hope that success on the battlefield would turn the tides of public opinion away from Vallandigham. The unofficial policy of Lincoln was to avoid drawing attention to the outspoken critic.

Unfortunately for the president, General Ambrose Burnside had no such reservations. In April 1863, Burnside “threw down the gauntlet and issued Order No. 38, threatening death or banishment to anyone committing treason... A military tribunal would try perpetrators.”<sup>16</sup> Vallandigham, who by this time was running for governor in Ohio, saw an opportunity to get some much needed publicity. A few days after Order No. 38 was issued, Vallandigham gave a speech “at Mount Vernon, Ohio, aware that undercover officers stood ready to record his every word.”<sup>17</sup> Vallandigham proceeded to declare his disdain for President Lincoln, General Burnside, and Order No. 38 in very plain and inflammatory language.

Four days later Vallandigham was arrested in the middle of the night by military authorities. The congressman was escorted to Cincinnati, where a military court convicted him of inciting the public in an attempt to

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

undermine the government. Since Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus, the gubernatorial hopeful had little recourse when “Burnside ordered Vallandigham imprisoned for the duration of the war.”<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately for Lincoln, the result of the military trial played into the plans of his congressional nemesis.

Though imprisoned, “Vallandigham watched a firestorm of protest rise throughout the North in an 1860s media frenzy. Free speech and the right to a fair, civilian trial were the crucial issues.”<sup>19</sup> In imprisoning the influential congressman, Burnside had unwittingly created the political martyr that Lincoln had hoped to avoid. Protests after the arrest of Vallandigham were widespread and sometimes violent. Mob actions included the destruction of the offices of a Republican newspaper, the *Dayton Journal*. Although Lincoln believed that military justice had fittingly punished the actions of Vallandigham, he knew swift action was needed to staunch the political bleeding. Lincoln had Vallandigham banished to the Confederate States, where he would be unable to rabble rouse the northern population. Through this creative response, Lincoln diffused the situation and eliminated a dangerous political rival.

Angry mobs frequently destroyed newspaper offices and printing presses during the Civil War. As with the occurrence at the offices of the *Dayton Journal*, attacks were often politically motivated and targeted newspapers that were perceived as intolerably critical of the war. In August of 1861, mobs descended upon and destroyed the offices of “the Bangor (Maine) Democrat, August 11; the Easton (Pennsylvania) Sentinel August 19; the West Chester (Pennsylvania) Jeffersonian, August 20; the Cumberland (Virginia) Alleghanian, August 23” and several other newspapers for printing material considered to be in opposition of the Union cause.<sup>20</sup> Although most efforts to suppress newspapers during the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>20</sup> Brayton Harris, *Special! : Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War* (New York: Potomac Books, 1999), 98.

Civil War involved government sanctions, the public had a hand in “censoring” newspapers as well. If enough people believed that a specific newspaper was lending an inappropriate level of support to the enemy, then protests were likely.

Not all public action against newspapers culminated in the destruction of property. Angry groups of citizens often sent strongly-worded messages to the editor, “encouraging” the self-censorship of potentially offensive articles. But there was seldom any hesitation to employ more “aggressive” means of persuasion. In Massachusetts a mob targeted the editor of the *Haverhill Essex County Democrat*. The unfortunate victim “was ‘forcibly taken from his house by an excited mob, and refusing information, was covered with a coat of tar and feathers, and ridden on a rail through the town.’”<sup>21</sup> After enduring this painful demonstration of civic displeasure, the editor apologized for the material that he had printed and swore to never again print articles advocating secession. Other editors throughout the Union, in the face of similar reprisals, either abandoned their presses or agreed to “swear allegiance to the U.S. Government.”<sup>22</sup>

Although mob violence occasionally targeted editors who supported Union forces, a far more pervasive source of suppression was self-imposed. Even as secessionist publications criticized and condemned every move the North made during the war, anti-secessionist editors often spoke out regarding the importance of censoring material considered “damaging” to the Union cause. On June 12, 1863, Joseph Medill, editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, wrote:

It is license they want, not liberty! License to stab the bosom of the Republic – our beautiful mother! And drag her corpse to be trampled upon by the blaspheming South – to the end that they may set up in her stead the loathsome harlot of the Confederacy. If

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

ruffians like these are not to be arrested and punished with severe penalties, there is no reason in our fighting the rebels at Vicksburg.<sup>23</sup>

Editors supporting the Northern cause frequently spoke out in against any newspaper deemed to have printed unpatriotic material. Medill's statements "typify what most of the editors wrote."<sup>24</sup> In addition to the censorship imposed by the public at large, the editorial profession itself suppressed the publication of anything considered too provocatively critical of government policy.

The freedoms of speech and the press, enshrined in our Constitution, act as the cornerstones of our liberty. Throughout our country's history, public and governmental interpretations of these rights have continued to shape and evolve. It is illuminating to look beneath the surface narrative of a famous historical event like the American Civil War and discover that the war itself was not the only conflict raging at the time. The actions of key players on the battlefield like Generals Halleck and Burnside, along with political leaders in Washington like President Lincoln and Congressman Vallandigham, helped to shape attitudes and set precedents that affect both our perception and the government's enforcement of our constitutional rights.

Historians have tended to be pragmatic in their assessment of the appropriateness and scope of media suppression by the government during the Civil War. Menahem Blondheim write:

The record does show dozens of wartime incidents that could be considered substantive infringement of press freedom, even by nineteenth-century standards. However, when weighing the

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<sup>23</sup> Hazel Dicken-Garcia and Giovanna Dell'Orto, *Hated Ideas and the American Civil War Press* (New York: Marquette Books, 2007), 159.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*



number of the violations and the limited and temporary nature of most of them against the long duration of the war, the huge number of Northern newspapers, and the enormous volume of public information, not to mention the vehemence of opposition speech, the significance of those isolated, unsystematic infringements would appear minimal.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to previous conflicts in the history of the United States, in which the government took an active role in suppressing the media, the opposition press was given an enormous amount of latitude during the Civil War. President Lincoln focused his media suppression efforts toward specific publications actively damaging the war effort, rather than against the industry as a whole. Even then, governmental actions were often temporary and rarely heavy-handed.

Public sentiment during the 1860s tended to mirror the actions of the government. Union judges generally agreed that rulings imposing shut-downs of secessionist newspapers were rarely necessary. Public protests and mob actions would often shut these presses down faster than official sanctions. The patriotic attitudes of most Union editors often resulted in a cautious approach toward the publication of information that might hinder the North's war effort. These factors rendered broad-based government suppression of the media largely unnecessary.

The United States has come a long way since the onset of the Civil War. Landmark Supreme Court cases, public protests, and the proliferation of advocacy groups have advanced the causes of free speech and free press greatly over that last 150 years. However, thoughtful inspection of the not-too-distant past provides valuable insight into the evolution of these rights since the Civil War era.

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<sup>25</sup> Menahem Blondheim, "Public Sentiment Is Everything: The Union's Public Communications Strategy and the Bogus Proclamation of 1864," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 3 (2002): 871.

## **A Democratic Impulse?: Political Institutions in Early New England Towns**

### **Jason Miller**

*Jason Miller of Tolono, Illinois wrote this essay for Dr. Foy's Seminar in Early American History in Fall 2008. He completed his Bachelor of Arts in history at the University of Illinois in December of 2007 where he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi. Currently, he is buried in research for his thesis project, a social history of political violence and the Copperhead movement in Illinois during the Civil War.*

Thirty-nine years after its initial publication, Kenneth Lockridge's *A New England Town* remains a staple in graduate level courses covering the colonial period. Exploring Dedham, Massachusetts from its inception in the first half of the seventeenth-century to the midpoint of the eighteenth-century, Lockridge has posited that during the first one hundred years of its existence great changes within Dedham's political community had taken place. In his depiction, the townsmen metamorphose from an almost slothful political entity during the seventeenth-century to dyed in the wool democrats in the eighteenth-century. For Lockridge, this change occurred because of the shifting socioeconomic, geographic, and political facets of a growing society in which a populace that once occupied a small, close-knit community became an enlarging and continually expanding community with disparate interests.

At its inception, Dedham's political culture centered upon the all-powerful town meeting and its townsmen. These townsmen, largely occupied by their agricultural pursuits, did not want to spend time at the town meeting, the political body that decided every issue by a majority vote. Encumbered by a myriad of issues demanding the townsmen's attention and vote, they created the position of selectmen to administer the town's will on a day-to-day basis. From this point forward, an elite cadre of comparatively wealthy selectmen elected by the townsmen ruled Dedham. These selectmen exercised all the power that the community of townsmen could exercise at their meetings, but on a day-to-day basis. The townsmen, as Lockridge accounts, could have exercised greater control over the selectmen, but because of the deferential nature of Puritan society's belief in

the “natural inequality of men,”<sup>1</sup> allowed them to operate largely unimpeded. This deference to authority and political harmony died with the founding generation. With their deaths and subsequent issues of a growing population, shrinking land availability near town, and a myriad of conflicts based on sectionalism within the township, Dedham’s residents increasingly turned upon one another. The result was political infighting leading to attempts at secession and equally vigorous attempts to maintain the town proper. This, for Lockridge, was evidence to the rise of an “active democratic behavior” within early eighteenth-century New England.<sup>2</sup>

It is an impossibility to explore the primary sources from which Lockridge drew his conclusions. *A New England Town* is a social history based upon town records that still affords an opportunity for reinterpretation, though a guarded one. Contingent on Lockridge’s faithful representation of sources, it is possible to draw alternative conclusions from his evidence and propose a new model that not only explains the early political stability of New England towns, but also the fractious nature of politics during the eighteenth century. Imposing the model of Communal Authoritarianism, in which a community that is active in policing itself to ensure communal adherence to and progress towards commonly held values, beliefs, and ambitions, upon seventeenth-century, Dedham reveals that the townsmen are not as deferential as they appear. Creating the position of, and investing their power in, the selectmen, New England townsmen exercised ultimate control and oversight. They actively policed the selectmen’s actions and their repercussions, creating the peaceful political existence that Lockridge mistakenly attributed to political deference. At the inception of the eighteenth-century, population pressures began stressing their political system because of the relative ease at which they could be corrupted.

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<sup>1</sup> This view held that the more prosperous members of society were blessed by God and should serve as an example to be followed by those who were not. Kenneth Lockridge, *A New England Town* (New York: Norton, 1970), 10.

<sup>2</sup> Lockridge, 138.

### **Dedham During the Seventeenth-Century**

The Puritan settlers of New England sought to establish a stable society within the howling wilderness of the North American continent. Through the creation of covenants, town meetings, and selectmen, their investment paid immediate dividends. In comparison with early Virginian settlers, inhabitants of the early Puritan settlements enjoyed remarkable stable social and political lives. Lockridge has proposed the model of “Conservative Corporate Voluntarism” as an explanation of how this stability was achieved at the local level. Key to this local stability was the wise and judicious use of power by the towns’ selectmen operating within the construct of a covenant and a largely passive populace. The selectmen routinely settled disputes in such a manner both beneficial to the individuals involved and the community. The routine manner in which they settled disputes is irrefutable. However, the downplaying of the town meeting and of the agency of individual townsmen within Dedham’s political culture overshadows a more promising way of understanding just how and why towns such as Dedham achieved social and political stability. It is difficult to fathom that a community so devoted and fervent in their desire for stability, and a peaceful Christian existence, would be so passive. The proposal here is to adopt a different model that reinvests the power into the people in a way that fits the evidence Lockridge presented.

This proposed model is what can be termed Communal Authoritarianism. Communal Authoritarianism can be defined as a community that is active in policing itself to ensure communal adherence to and progress towards commonly held values, beliefs, and ambitions. An easy way of envisioning this model is through a set of isosceles triangles in a position so that they form a figure similar to an X. The populace with its beliefs and values would be positioned at the base of one triangle and the selectmen at the junction between the two triangles. The investment of the populace’s power is represented by a vertical line from the midpoint of the base of the triangle rising towards the juncture between the triangles. Once that power reaches the juncture (the selectmen) the power is then redistributed on the other side. If the two triangles match in size the community’s needs and aspirations have been met. If, however, the other triangle’s base is too large or too small, their needs and wants have not

been met, resulting in a refusal to reinvest their power into the group, making individual or whole sale changes where necessary.

This model is predicated on a commonly held mindset among the community. Though there existed some stratification in the distribution of wealth, the community was based upon commonly held values and external pressures which bound them together. New England towns of this period were based on “covenants or mini-constitutions that directed who was allowed to live there and how they were supposed to conduct themselves.”<sup>3</sup> In early Dedham, every male resident bound himself to a covenant that promised to “receive only such unto us as may be probably of one heart with us.”<sup>4</sup> Through the exclusion of those who were “contrary minded,” Dedham’s villagers ensured a common ideological bond among its members. During a dispute the covenant required villagers to turn towards their neighbors for a resolution.<sup>5</sup> Villagers needed assurance that the neighbors shared a common mindset. The social contract was not the only factor contributing to group cohesion. The passage of the litmus test determining their moral fitness to join the community, the common experience of an Atlantic crossing, residence in an isolated town near wilderness, close proximity to Amerindians believed to be devil worshipers, and the shared experience of oppression in England collectively acted as a trial by fire in which the residents of Dedham drew their motivation and strength to remain in and at peace with the group. Dedham’s first generation was devoted to their community and its utopian vision is evident in “the overwhelming majority of the settlers came to Dedham to stay. They neither ranged restlessly west nor sought wealth in the developing metropolis of Boston.”<sup>6</sup> Willingness to stay in one area was not a passive acceptance of their lot, but a coherent and intensive attempt to create that “city upon a hill.”

The town of Dedham was settled in 1635. In March of that year the General Court of the colony gave the assembly of townsmen in Dedham

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<sup>3</sup> Steven Sarson, *British America, 1500-1800: Creating Colonies, Imagining an Empire* (Great Britain: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 128.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Lockridge, 6, 5, 4.

<sup>6</sup> Lockridge, 63.

and elsewhere authorization “to make bylaws not repugnant to the laws of the colony and to ‘choose their own particular officers.’”<sup>7</sup> Though Lockridge states that it was “shortly” after this that Dedham elected a board of selectmen, this ignores four years of rule by the town meeting. Over those four years they had not been able to expediently use those meetings to resolve their problems. It was not until May 1639 that the townsmen established the board of selectmen. This is what they meant by the “long experience that the general meeting of so many men in one [assembly to consider] [...] the common affairs thereof has wasted much time to no small damage.”<sup>8</sup> The men of Dedham had not been passive in the administration of their local government, or the course by which they sought to achieve their utopian vision. If they had been passive, then there would never have been the need for the selectmen. Furthermore, the fact that the executive powers were not wholly surrendered to these selectmen and that the town meeting acted as an oversight is indicative that the townsmen had a stake in Dedham’s future and felt the need to ensure that their vision was fulfilled.

The selectmen were under the watchful eye of the populace. As noted by Lockridge, many of the selectmen began their political careers in lower positions of government such as a fenceviewer or hogreeve. Only after each had “submitted himself to the town’s watchful eye” could he have gained or lost the “necessary respect” to become a selectman.<sup>9</sup> Once in this position, a selectman would find himself in day-to-day contact with his fellow citizens. In these daily encounters he would have to assign guilt or innocence to a party, negotiate the location of public roads, or a whole assortment of other issues. In fact, “It was a rare townsman who did not find himself either wanting or having to attend the selectmen at several of their meetings each year, and it was a rare selectman who did not find himself judging most [of] his fellow townsmen in the course of a year.”<sup>10</sup> It is in these disputes, such as John Gay’s request for town land to build a barn or the punishment of men who took wood from public lands, that

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.,38.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.,46.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.,40.

illustrate the political agency of the community through the actions of the selectmen. The selectmen had to be fair in their response to these requests and illegal activities. They could neither deny out of hand a request or overreact in cases in which punishment was necessary, and expect to maintain the peace. The selectmen shared a common ideology and goal with the people they served and therefore sought to act fairly within the perceived parameters of that goal. If they did not, they were deemed unrepresentative of the communal ideology and removed from their position as the bureaucrats for the aggregate dictator that was the Dedham population.

It comes as no surprise that the wealthier members of this society dominated the position of selectmen. While they may have been wise and judicious in their use of power, this can just as easily be attributed to the process described above as it can to Lockridge's unspoken acceptance of the Great Person Theory. The Great Person Theory is based on the belief that exceptional leaders possess extraordinary qualities and skills.<sup>11</sup> Recall that the town was based on an exclusionary principle, only those who passed a rigorous personal examination were allowed to stay and there were many similar experiences which created a common mindset. This is not to say that the inhabitants of the town were exactly alike and did not have differences of opinion, they all shared a common history and ideological background that informed the way they related to the community and treated their neighbors. That the wealthy were in the position of leadership more often can more likely be ascribed to the Situational Approach to Leadership from Social Psychology. This theory holds that external, situational factors can and do influence who will become the leader of a group.<sup>12</sup> The townsmen did not simply elect the wealthy because of divinely ordained reasons—that they were blessed, therefore, possessed superior morals—nor does it mean that the voters necessarily “liked to elect the most substantial of the mature townsmen,”<sup>13</sup> rather, because of their isolation, labor intensive occupation, and a whole host of other factors, the

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<sup>11</sup> Steven J. Breckler, James M. Olson, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, *Social Psychology Alive* (USA: Thomson, 2006), 594, 597.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 597.

<sup>13</sup> Lockridge, 43.

wealthier members of the community were the logical choice for leadership. Their slightly higher appointment rate allowed the less wealthy to focus upon everyday tasks with some assurance their desires and views were being upheld consistently throughout the community.

Despite the power the selectmen held in Puritan society, they were still accountable to the town meeting. Though the General Court of the colony regulated who could and could not vote, a clear majority of the male taxpayers in the town were eligible to vote in these meetings throughout this period.<sup>14</sup> As Lockridge argues, these men were just as powerful as the selectmen and more influential in the sense that they also functioned as an oversight committee. Every so often the town “would reaffirm the broad mandate of power given to the board” of selectmen and through this reaffirmation “confirm the ultimate power of the meeting.”<sup>15</sup> They also had the power to vote a selectman, the whole board of selectmen, or the very position in and of itself out of political existence. Outside of an incident in 1660 when the whole town voted to “withdraw the power of the selectmen,” Lockridge portrays this meeting as passive, content with leaving the running of the town to the selectmen.<sup>16</sup> One possible explanation for this supposed passivity can be found in the day-to-day interactions in which deals between the town, represented through the selectmen, and individual residents resolved personal disputes amicably for the needs of the town and the individuals involved. Personal quarrels, because of these interactions, were funneled away from the town meeting and did not become political disputes. Another explanation for Lockridge’s conclusion can be found in a close perusal of his math in relation to the 1666 tax list and the number of terms served by men of different rank. Assuming that wealthy selectmen could be considered “wealthy” during all their terms, for the 25 years between 1639 and 1666 the wealthy served a total of 14 years for an average of 3.5 terms for man. The middling and the poor served for a total of eleven years with an average of terms served for the middling sort around 5.8 terms.<sup>17</sup> Of course, averages in government

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>17</sup> These statistics are derived from information presented by Lockridge on pages 42-44.



representation are by no means definitive. This pattern suggests a higher turnover rate than Lockridge asserts, with the board of selectmen being anchored by those few individuals who were steadfast and appealing to the community's wants and desires. If this would hold up to higher historical scrutiny, the town meeting would have to be reclassified as an active and vengeful polity asserting its vision of society.

### **Dedham and other New England Towns in the Eighteenth-Century**

By the last decades of the seventeenth-century, the utopian ambitions of New England towns were beginning to wear away. Victims of population growth and its subsequent dispersal, the deaths of their founders, and the Great Awakening of the early half of the next century eroded the towns' singular communal ambition and created factions vying for political power. For Lockridge, these factions were the humble beginnings of "an active democratic behavior" where residents would come to "accept the vocal and sometimes violent conflicts that give rise to that kind of democracy."<sup>18</sup> Yet, as with the early exploration of Lockridge's seventeenth-century Dedham, there is an alternative explanation for their behavior based on the central thesis posed earlier—Communal Authoritarianism. Though the utopian ambition of this model imposed by their founders was lost, its political institutions of the town meeting and selectmen as well as the political relationship between the two survived well into the eighteenth-century. Factions existed within Dedham and other towns such as Concord, but they were not operating under some before-its-time democratic impulse. Rather, they were operating within the political framework and constraints of Communal Authoritarianism.

As they had during the seventeenth-century, eighteenth-century New England townsmen centered their social and political lives on their town. Most, if not all, towns still politically communicated with the outside world solely through their delegate to the General Court. This delegate was expected to follow his own discretion in representing a town's interests *unless* instructed otherwise by the town meeting.<sup>19</sup> With limited political

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<sup>18</sup> Lockridge, 138.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Gross, *Minutemen and Their World* (USA: Hill and Wang, 2001), 34.

contact the townsmen still held the ultimate power within their isolated community. If they did not make people sign the covenant, they still actively “warned out” those who were undesirable. Conversely, if a newcomer to town was deemed to be a hardworking, productive individual they would be allowed to stay, provided they could afford to setup shop or buy land. In effect, while no longer necessarily tied to one another by affections of love in the sight of God or a common migration experience, many communities still exercised their right to exclusive residency. This was important because, the town’s political power still lay with the enfranchised townsmen who either by their own rule or through their appointed bureaucrats—the selectmen—“claimed authority over anything that happened within [...] [the town’s] borders” from moral transgressions of members of the town to the building of roads, levying of taxes, and religious and property disputes.<sup>20</sup>

With the growth in population, the resolutions to disputes that were acceptable to both the town and the individual that had characterized these communities in the seventeenth-century became nigh impossible in the eighteenth-century. At their inception, towns such as Dedham, Andover, and Concord had formed a central village around the meetinghouse. From this village, farmers would journey to work their fields that lay just beyond the limits of the village. As the community granted subsequent land holdings to its men, the distance a farmer had to travel to his lands grew. In the early days, problems such as these were resolved by land swaps negotiated between the town’s selectmen and the individual farmer. As more and more land came to be distributed, landholding townsmen found themselves increasingly hemmed into the village and isolated from their landholdings. Many of these men, or their sons who were coming of age and stood to inherit land from their fathers, took it upon themselves, for the sake of convenience, to leave the village and plant their roots closer to their landholdings. As more and more men began to settle these regions, the seeds of discord were being sewn one settler at a time.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Gross, 90, 10.

<sup>21</sup> Lockridge, 94.

Eventually, these seeds would sprout and blossom into highly divisive political issues. As Robert Gross notes, “With town government affecting so much of daily life, no New England community could escape political conflict. A road urgently needed by a man at the outskirts was often a wasteful expense to an inhabitant near the center, while one churchgoer’s learned preacher was another’s prideful sinner on the way to hell.” Problems such as these, and larger issues such as secession tied directly to them, were rampant throughout eighteenth-century New England towns.<sup>22</sup> During the early period of these town’s existence, when the founders as well as their ideologies were still alive, most townsmen continued to live in or in close enough proximity to the village that everyone was likely to see the need for a road or to support a single preacher. During the eighteenth-century in towns such as Dedham and Concord, the population of townsmen and thereby the controlling power remained concentrated in the original village. The townsmen were largely able to elect men with whom they had daily contact and shared their local concerns. However, the numbers of those living in the periphery continued to grow. These “outliers” began to “wonder whether their interests were fully considered” when these selectmen met or when the town meeting gathered and repeatedly denied their petitions over a myriad of issues deemed by the village dwelling townsmen as against the interests of the town.<sup>23</sup> In Dedham and Concord, these residents of the periphery who were outnumbered and seemingly politically disfranchised and neglected sought to gain control of their political lives. They did so by appropriating and abusing the political system under which their ideologically united ancestors had lived.

To demonstrate this trend , it is paramount to explore specific examples within New England society. As early as 1704, signs of the larger conflict between the village and periphery were surfacing in Dedham. After building a coalition of townsmen in the outlying areas and townsmen living in the village, and after three highly contentious votes over the month of March, the board of selectmen that had been dominated by men from the

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<sup>22</sup> Gross, 11.

<sup>23</sup> Lockridge. 103-107.

village was replaced by a board in which men from the periphery dominated by a four to one margin. These new selectmen from the periphery kept their political intentions quiet during the election. Once they assumed their positions and they attempted to win political concessions for the outlying section of town they were soundly defeated by the townsmen on repeated occasions. Some amount of political trickery must have occurred because why would a majority of townsmen vote in a slew of candidates over the objections of the incumbent board if they knew they were going to oppose their policies in the first place? They must have been tricked. Once they realized this deception the townsmen sprung into action and checked their selectmen's power. Over the next couple of years the peripheral influence "gradually lost control of the board of selectmen" and the village was once again in control.<sup>24</sup>

Twenty-three years later an alliance of men of the outlying areas around Dedham again sought to "control the mechanisms of town government and this time [meant] to force the town to grant independence to several of the outlying sections."<sup>25</sup> Men of the outlying areas had realized the basic weakness of the founders' political system. The position of selectmen had arisen in the early years of colonial settlement when it became clear that townsmen could not effectively administrate their own town or deal with day-to-day issues in an efficient manner. The selectmen were invested with the town meeting's powers to resolve these disputes. The community at this time was a relatively small group of people where everyone was attending the same social functions and, likely, expressing the same general desires for the betterment of the town. In this small community, the selectmen and their actions were on display for everyone to see and were responsible to the town meeting. Only those townsmen that attended the town meeting could vote or exercise the townsmen's oversight of the selectmen. If the townsmen were the aggregate dictators and the selectmen their bureaucrats, the peripheral men realized that they could seize control of the town meeting by stuffing it with men sympathetic to their cause thereby forcing the town into acquiescing to their demands and

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 106.

into electing a sympathetic board of selectmen. In 1727, this tactic succeeded in winning a board of selectmen full of peripherally inclined men. With that accomplished these men then moved the meeting towards recognizing the petitions of independence for the outlying areas of town. Men from the village, realizing the tactic that had brought this about and appropriating it for their own means, exited the meeting and quickly rounded up “lazy yeomen” who had not attended the meeting “to restore their majority” and defeat the petitions.<sup>26</sup> Though the board of selectmen lay in league with the peripheral area, the awakened body of townsmen from the village successfully thwarted petitions for independence during subsequent meetings. In March of 1728, when the election of selectmen was once again up for consideration by the townsmen, the faction in support of secession rushed through a resolution that “amounted to a declaration that, contrary to province law, a man with any taxable property at all could vote in the meeting.”<sup>27</sup> Being that the men in the outlying areas were far less likely to meet the provincial requirements for the vote, this resolution was designed to enfranchise men from the peripheral regions and ensure the reelection of selectmen sympathetic to secession. These men were duly elected, but the moderator, apparently sensing what had happened, “expressed his doubts or even tried to adjourn the meeting” and a confrontation ensued that resulted in a brawl.<sup>28</sup> The next day the town meeting reassembled and finished electing selectmen sympathetic to secession, but defeated the resolutions that would have allowed secession to come to fruition. In the next year, the town reestablished its control of the selectmen and the fractious debate seemed to be on a course of continual discord.<sup>29</sup> The General Court, however, stepped in. By 1748, after twenty plus years of continued political discord, the General Court did not recognize the independence of any outlying areas but instead created four precincts within the town of Dedham. With the status of precinct, each area could elect and support its own minister. In the end, the political discord within this community was apparently ended by the assignment of a

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 111-112.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid..

selectmen's post to each of the precincts and special interest groups. As Lockridge notes, "Neither side's definition of community had won and neither would ever win. The battle had ended in a cease-fire, an armistice, a truce."<sup>30</sup>

Particularly with the secession of outlying areas, such occurrences were not limited to Dedham. Similar events with similar outcomes occurred throughout New England up to the American Revolution. In the case of Concord, the debates revolved around religious strife caused by the reverberations of the Great Awakening, the building of roads, the positioning of the school house, and secession of outlying areas. Here, as in Dedham, the delegation of "controversial issues to selectmen proved to be no solution to strife. Indeed, the policymaking failures of the town meeting simply intensified an ongoing struggle among sections to dominate the selectmen." And, like Dedham, "the outcome of annual elections turned principally on which quarter of town could jam more inhabitants into the town hall."<sup>31</sup> Both like and unlike Dedham, who eventually succumbed to political compromise imposed from the General Court, Concord townsmen cut the number of selectmen down to three—one for each faction of the debates. The townsmen, however, continued to debate the issues in the town meeting.<sup>32</sup> Though Lockridge's account ends in the 1740s and never states whether townsmen still contested political power in the town meeting, it can be assumed that like the case of Concord, they still met and debated the issues of their day.

In all of the cases discussed above, factions within the town sought to gain a political advantage by taking control of a political system that had been formed under the auspices of a unifying ideology in small communities with watchful neighbors. Communal Authoritarianism did not exist in the eighteenth-century. The communal ideology and ambition had gone. However, the political structure, born in the exigencies of the town's infancy, where the townsmen invested their power into the selectmen but exercised political oversight of their actions persisted. Understanding that the town meeting represented an empty political shell devoid of any

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>31</sup> Gross, 16-17.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

unifying ideology outside of section, townsmen actively sought to use the meeting itself, where only votes counted, to gain the advantage for one side or the other. To do so, factions within New England towns used the political existence of their ancestor's model to impose their will upon everyone else by stuffing the town meeting with sympathetic townsmen. It was a non-democratic, non-republican political maneuver made by factions that understood the political system under which they were operating. This resulted in a deadlocked political system that could not resolve itself. A majority of townsmen could deny the independence of a secessionist section while the selectmen could be of that secessionist mindset. This polarization is evidence of the continued political structures that had resided in these towns during the seventeenth-century in which townsmen did not defer to selectmen's judgment lightly, but actively monitored their every move in day-to-day interactions and at the town meeting in a very small community. What had changed in the eighteenth-century, however, was that there were geographically defined self interests that pulled the bonds of unity apart.

### **Toward A New Narrative**

Communal Authoritarianism within early New England ultimately relied upon consent from the populace of any given town. The communal spirit of early Dedham was held together by shared experiences and the belief and hope that it was possible to create a more perfect society based upon pure devotion to God and group piety. Dedham was exclusive in that no one could become a member unless they passed a rigorous test of their character. If they were deemed to be "one heart with us" they were admitted. Through the selection process, the town created a group cohesive in their outlook on the proper role of society and individuals within that society in achieving their ultimate utopian community. Though they attempted to administer their own affairs as a group, it became difficult because of unknown doctrinal arguments or personal property disputes. In order to facilitate the implementation of their master plan for their town, they invested all the power of the general town meeting into a group of selectmen to administer day-to-day and very specific problems. The effect of this concentration of power was returned to the populace on a day-to-day basis. The townsmen expressed whether they felt that these selectmen

ruled justly or unjustly, or in accordance with their general desire for a utopian community, at the next town meeting. If their truly was an absence of political discord it does not necessarily mean that the townsmen were passive. It could also mean that the selectmen were fulfilling their obligations to the community amicably. After all, they were Puritans who lived in fear of a vengeful God. When there was discord, and the selectmen removed, it can safely be assumed that the selectmen had not fulfilled their obligations or had exercised some perceived abuse of power. Otherwise, year after year the townsmen reinvested their power into the seven selectmen to administer in day-to-day affairs. The townsmen's needs and wants were regularly reconciled with the greater utopian vision of the community. Thus, their needs and wants, such as land and the issue of the placement of public roads did not assume the size of a large, destructive political fight. Through the years in which the founders lived, this model of Communal Authoritarianism worked like a well-oiled political and social machine, keeping the peace until the next generation rose to power.

With changing attitudes towards religion, land pressures, and other socioeconomic pressures the utopian ambition was lost in the eighteenth-century. What was not lost, however, was the political structure laid out by their forefathers. As the expansion of the town roceeded, interests between geographically defined sections with disparate, antagonistic interests arose. Each side, knowing the nature of the political structure bequeathed to them, sought to exploit it for their factional gain. Perceptive that only those who were in attendance at the town hall would be considered the electorate, the factions sought to pack the meetings with as many sympathetic townsmen as possible. The result was political deadlock and far short of democracy.

The date in which Communal Authoritarianism ceased to operate remains slightly ambiguous. In towns like Concord, that largely maintained their political autonomy and integrity from outside influence, the taxation from Britain following the Seven Years War and, more importantly, the revocation of their right to assemble in town meetings without permission from British officials stirred them from their self-contained political shell and hastened the creation of a polity that was increasingly aware that their livelihood, both politically and economically, was tied to the outside world. During the economic crisis that accompanied



the War for Independence, they would become fully aware how much their livelihood depended upon the outside world. With the British defeat, the political system in which Communal Authoritarianism had existed within was gone. The townsmen, now largely aware and concerned with their new connections to the outside world, and with the knowledge from Communal Authoritarianism of just what mob rule by people with unlike interests could do to their lives, were among the first to step towards a modern form of democracy. Thus, just as Communal Authoritarianism had been born in extreme political circumstances, it died in extreme political circumstances.

Despite any reservations, the birth of a republic in the 1780s does not necessarily mean that all of the inhabitants of that new republic had been undergoing an evolution preparing them for this new political existence. The people of New England towns, like most people, had clung to their past more readily than they had embraced an unknown future. In the end, this interpretation is hampered by the fact that it has relied largely on Lockridge's evidence. Not only is it hampered by his evidence, but it is also hampered by the way in which Lockridge represents his evidence. One can glean an alternative explanation from his work suggests that the experience of Dedham and other New England towns is not an open and shut case for "Conservative Corporate Voluntarism" or some before its time democratic impulse. Instead, it is a topic that is in need for new investigations by a new generation of historians.

## The Transatlantic Slave Trade and the Creation of the English *Weltanschauung*, 1685-1710

### James Buckwalter

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At the turn of the-eighteenth century, the English public was confronted with numerous and conflicting interpretations of Africans, slavery, and the slave trade. On the one hand, there were texts that glorified the institution of slavery. Gabriel de Brémond's *The Happy Slave*, which was translated and published in London in 1686, tells of a Roman, Count Alexander, who is captured off the coast of Tunis by "barbarians," but is soon enlightened to the positive aspects of slavery, such as, being "lodged in a handsome apartment, where the *Baffa's* Chyrurgions searched his Wounds: And...he soon found himself better."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Bartolomé de las Casas' *Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours* (written in 1552, but was still being published in London in 1689), displays slavery in the most negative light. De las Casas chastises the Spaniards' "bloody slaughter and destruction of men," condemning how they "violently forced away Women and Children to make them slaves, and ill-treated them, consuming and wasting their food."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Thomas Southerne's adaptation of Aphra Behn's *Oroonoko* in 1699 displays slavery in a contradictory light. Southerne condemns Oroonoko's capture as a "tragedy," but like Behn's version, Oroonoko's royalty complicates the matter, eventually causing the author to show sympathy for the enslaved African prince.

After 1688, the public sphere expanded to enormous proportions and the English could read about the slave trade through the works of

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<sup>1</sup> Gabriel de Bremond, *The Happy Slave: a Novel in Three Parts Compleat /Translated from the French by a Person of Quality* (London: Gilbert Cownly, 1686), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Bartolome de las Casas, *Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours, or, A faithful narrative of the horrid and unexampled massacres, butcheries, and all manner of cruelties, that hell and malice could invent, committed by the popish Spanish party on the inhabitants of West-India* (London: R. Hewson, 1689), 5. While the reproduction of Casas' work mainly portrays English attitudes toward the Spanish, it represents one facet of the English *Weltanschauung* which abhorred slavery and the slave-Trade.

popular scholarship and Royal African Company publications. The works of the Company contained surprisingly detailed accounts of the trade that focused on business, economics, and numbers. And yet, the validity of the information attained by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal African Company, and the rest of England, proved questionable. This information often excluded Critical details about African society and the human aspect of the slave trade. Popular writers and scholars, who created a speculative view of the slave trade, filled this void in the Company's accounts of the slave trade. Moreover, the sources available to the English failed to hold the standards of validity needed to build a complete understanding of race and slavery. Royal African Company (RAC) publications left out the human aspect while popular scholars and authors artificially created a human aspect. This process would have disastrous effects for the collective English *Weltanschauung* (German word, literally translated as "world-view"). Similarly, the conflated the meanings of words like "slave" and "negro" in RAC correspondence and pamphlets created a society that would eventually treat all "negroes" as "slaves," and help delay British abolition.

In order to determine the changes that the English *Weltanschauung* underwent during this period, this essay seeks to investigate the factors contributing to decisions made by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal African Company) and how these decisions may have shaped Englishmen's conceptions of Africans and slaves.<sup>3</sup> Three separate steps are required, namely, ascertaining who the leaders and stockholders of the RAC were and how they got their information, determining how information was conveyed to the wider society, both through the Company and through popular literature, and analyzing the use of the words "slave," "negro," and "native," and the contexts in which they were used in correspondence and pamphlets. English society at the turn of the eighteenth-century had not yet fully assumed that all Blacks were inherently slaves; it was well on its way.

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<sup>3</sup> Of the three essential avenues for exploring the English Slave Trade (official internal papers, documents of the Royal African Company, popular scholarship/literature, and pamphlets of the Royal African Company), I have access to the latter two. Because internal documents of the Royal African Company do not deal directly with the transfer of information to the public, they are less important for this study.

The need for discussing the English slave trade from such a vantage point emerges from the well-established, but still lacking, historiography of the slave trade. Historians from Philip Curtin, K.G. Davies, Elizabeth Donnan, and Eric Williams to the more recent works of William A. Pettigrew, Susan Amussen, Kenneth Morgan, David Eltis and David Richardson have adequately mapped most areas of the trade.<sup>4</sup> Each of these works touches on important aspects of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, but leaves some questions unanswered. Pettigrew's works focus on the political and legal aspects of the changes that occurred in 1688 as they relate to the slave trade, leaving questions about the social environment of England and the West Indies. "The Costs of Coercion," brings economic factors into the discussion, but likewise leaves social effects of the slave trade unexamined. Davies' *The Royal African Company*, on the other hand, touches upon the issues of communication and efficiency within the Company, but creates effects on the greater society out of the discussion. Finally, Amussen makes powerful connections about the effects of the trade as they relate to the structure of work, gender, and law, but ignores a discussion of the larger society as a whole. With this in mind, the current scholarship fails to make fundamental connections between the slave trade and its influence on the collective English *Weltanschauung*.

### **The Organization of the Royal African Company**

The RAC's organization remained much like that of other joint-stock companies of the eighteenth-century. Its chief officers included a

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<sup>4</sup> William A. Pettigrew, "Free to Enslave: Politics and the Escalation of Britain's Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1688-1714," *William and Mary Quarterly* 64, no. 1 (January 2007): 3-38 and William A. Pettigrew "Parliament and the Escalation of the Slave Trade, 1690-1714," *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007): 12-26; Ann M. Carlos and Jamie Brown Kruse, "The Decline of the Royal African Company: Fringe Firms and the Role of the Charter," *Economic History Review* 49, no. 2 (May 1996): 291-313; Stephen D. Behrendt, David Eltis and David Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion: Agency in the Pre-Modern Atlantic World," *The Economic History Review* 54, no.3 (August 2001): 454-476; K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (New York: Atheneum, 1957); Kenneth Morgan, *Slavery, Atlantic Trade, and the British Economy, 1660-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Susan Dwyer Amussen, *Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society: 1640-1700* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Governor, Sub-Governor, Deputy Governor and twenty-four elected Assistants. The charter required Assistants to hold at least £400 of stock. Moreover, they were elected by shareholders who received one vote for every £100 of stock. The Assistants met twice a week to guide the day-to-day business of the Company and twice a year—once to elect a Governor, Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor and once to announce a statement of the Company's stock.<sup>5</sup> Assistants initially served for only three consecutive years, but after 1691 this rule was dropped. At the same time, the Company decided to raise the minimum stock holdings for Assistants from £400 to £1,000, with no more than £250 being previously-owned stock. Sub and Deputy Governors were limited to one consecutive two-year term; however, influential people often rotated between the positions of Assistant, Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor, creating a stable group of decision-makers.<sup>6</sup> Whereas the entire Court of Assistants met about once a week, the Company established a number of Sub-Committees to assist in the duties of running the Company. Davies notes that Assistants served on one or more sub-committees.<sup>7</sup> The Company pushed the entire burden of executive decision-making to the Assistants and their sub-committees.<sup>8</sup> What emerges from Davies' description is an extremely large company ran by twenty-four of its most wealthy investors, who met multiple times a week, and were responsible for nearly every decision the Company made. Because these twenty-four Assistants met so often, they were London-bound and found little time to travel to the places where the Company purchased slaves. Assistants rarely acquired knowledge of the slave trade from firsthand experience.

In addition, those who ran the RAC had several common characteristics. First, most of the influential members of the Company obtained multiple investment interests. Most of the officials of the RAC established interests in the British East India Company. For example, Sir John Banks, a wealthy merchant, financier, and director of the Royal

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<sup>5</sup> Davies, *Royal African Company*, 153-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 157. In one instance, Sir Benjamin Bathurst was continuously elected from 1677-95 by being rotated between the three positions. He served thirteen times as an Assistant, twice as Deputy Governor, and four times as Sub-Governor.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 157-8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 154, 159.

African Company, likewise served as a director of the East India Company and was involved with the Levant Company.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, George Berkeley, an influential politician and founding member of the RAC, was a member of the East India Company in 1680 and a governor of the Levant Company in 1681.<sup>10</sup> Sir Josiah Child represented a “passive investor” whose central interest remained with the East India Company, despite being an early Assistant of the RAC.<sup>11</sup> Jeffrey Jeffreys, Assistant of the RAC in the 1680s, participated in the tobacco trade, established business relations with the East India Company in the 1690s, and became a licensed Separate Trader, someone who traded separately from the Company, in the early 1700s.<sup>12</sup> Sir John Moore participated in both the Royal African and East India Companies around the time of the revolution, being an Assistant for the former and the second largest shareholder in the latter.<sup>13</sup> Sir Dudley North served as Assistant, Sub and Deputy Governor of the Royal African Company, Governor of the Russia Company, and involved in the Levant Company.<sup>14</sup> In short, many of the Assistants of the RAC struggled with the demands of multiple different companies.

Similarly, those who ran the RAC tended to be wealthy individuals with deep-rooted political interests. For example, D.W. Hayton’s *The House of Commons, 1690-1715* lists twenty-five individuals who were both Members of Parliament and holders of significant offices within the RAC. Many of these, such as Sir Thomas Cooke, Sir Francis and Sir Samuel Dashwood, Nathaniel and Frederick Herne, John and Jeffrey Jeffreys, and Sir William Pritchard, also held significant interests in the East India

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<sup>9</sup> D.C. Coleman, “Banks, Sir John,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/38265?docPos=2>.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Warmington, “Berkeley, George,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2209?docPos=2>.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Grassby, “Child, Sir Josiah,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5290>.

<sup>12</sup> Jacob M. Price, “Jeffreys, Jeffrey,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49858>.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Grassby, “Moore, Sir John,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19125?docPos=1>.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Company.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, Davies notes that in the first two decades of its existence, the Company listed nearly fifteen peers or associates of the Company.<sup>16</sup> Once again, many of the most influential members of the RAC displayed significant interests elsewhere.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the most influential members of the Company were passive investors who had little real world experience in Africa, the West Indies, or anywhere else in the Atlantic world. For example, Sir Dudley North, at the time of his investments with the Royal African Company, was a passive investor.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, Sir Josiah Child, founding member and Assistant of the RAC, was a passive investor who believed that trade should be controlled from a central location, London.<sup>18</sup> Only a select few, such as Sir William Hedges, Charles Hayes, and Sir Dudley North had any significant experience away from England. Sir William Hedges owned one of the first shares of the Company and was a multiple-term Assistant in the 1690s. He was heavily interested in the East India Company and traveled to the Bay of Bengal, where he acquired knowledge about Islamic languages and customs.<sup>19</sup> Sir Dudley North was sent abroad to Russia, Smyrna, Italy, and Constantinople, which certainly made him a more informed controller of his interests in the Russian and Levant Companies, but probably added little benefit for his interests in the Royal African Company.<sup>20</sup> Charles Hayes, a widely known mathematician

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<sup>15</sup> David W. Hayton, *The House of Commons, 1690-1715*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 736; Jacob M. Price, "Jeffreys, Sir Jeffrey," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49858>; and Gary S. DeKrey, "Pritchard, Sir William," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/22825>.

<sup>16</sup> Davies, *Royal African Company*, 64-5; Other prominent men in English society, such as King James, Sir Edmund Andros, and Sir George Carteret had associations with the Company. John Locke was also loosely associated with the Company. It is also important to note that the Royal African Company was not entirely made up of politicians; in fact, the majority of the Company's investors were businessmen, rather than members of Parliament.

<sup>17</sup> Richard Grassby, "North, Sir Dudley," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20297?docPos=1>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Gary S. DeKrey, "Hedges, Sir William," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/12860>.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Grassby, "North, Sir Dudley," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20297?docPos=1>.

and geographer, traveled to Africa before his days as Sub and Deputy Governors of the Royal African Company.<sup>21</sup> In short, it appears that some portion of the most influential members of the Company possessed little experience in the Atlantic world.<sup>22</sup>

### **The Transfer of Information Concerning the Slave Trade**

With some of its major investors being passive, holding investments in multiple companies, and having political obligations, RAC investors relied heavily on outside forces to bring them information about what was happening in the Atlantic World. With reliance this in mind, information was acquired through three avenues. First, the members gained information through the frequent meetings of the Royal African Company. While they took copious notes of these meetings, these documents represent the transfer of information within the Company and tell us little about the proliferation of information to the greater society. Next, Englishmen gained information through published works of the Company and through records of the Privy Council and House of Commons. This avenue is, in some sense, more important because it remained accessible to the wider society; the pamphlet wars between the Company and the separate traders were directed towards wider groups of Englishmen as the ability for commoners to influence government expanded. Finally, they received information from popular literature. This avenue also affected the rest of society.

Popular literature and scholarship helped frame the most basic assumptions about slavery and the slave trade for all Englishmen. Aphra Behn's *Oroonoko*, published in 1688 lies at the heart of these assumptions. Behn noted the tale of the African prince who is forced from his homeland

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<sup>21</sup> R.E. Anderson, "Hayes, Charles," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/12755>.

<sup>22</sup> I have access to records for approximately 40 individuals involved with the Company from 1685-1710. Given the fact that there are 24 Assistants and 3 elected governorships, and that most of the people that held these positions were rotated frequently in order to keep them involved in the company, I have access to somewhere around 5% of the total number of people involved with the company. Given the frequency of characteristics in each of the stories I examined, I surmise that, as far as my data allows me to, the majority of influential people in the Company had little personal experience in the Atlantic World.



into slavery in Surinam, where he reunites with his love, Imoinda, and battles the assumptions of slavery, arguing that he cannot possibly be a slave because of his royalty. The idea that Oroonoko, a slave, should be glorified rather than chastised, presents an interesting idea for this time. The author claims that, “The whole proportion and air of [Oroonoko’s] face was so noble...that, bating [except for] his colour, there cou’d be nothing in nature more beautiful.”<sup>23</sup> Moreover, John Trefry, manager of Lord Willoughby’s estate, upon hearing Oroonoko claim to be, “above the rank of common slaves,” exclaims, “[Oroonoko] was yet something greater than he confess’d.”<sup>24</sup> This idea—that there are distinctions between various types of slaves—is contrasted by the idea that Africans represented an inferior race. For example, the owner of the plantation holds Oroonoko as a slave, after which he is attacked by Whites. Similarly, the leaders eventually decide to hang Oroonoko as a warning to the other slaves. Thomas Southerne’s adaptation of *Oroonoko*, which premiered in November, 1695, projected the dual views of slavery. Additionally, one of Southerne’s modifications involved Oroonoko’s suicide rather than enduring the struggle, indicating that he may have tried to represent Africans as cowards.

*Oroonoko* fits into the larger group of Atlantic Creoles, who were able to capitalize on their ability to speak African and European languages to, in some cases, gain small measures of freedom. Atlantic Creoles were often African traders or their sons, who held high positions in African society.<sup>25</sup> In 1767, European slave traders captured members of one ruling family in Old Calabar, which facilitated a seven year journey wrought with disappointment and disaster. As a result, the two young African Creoles attempted to return home. Cases like this were complemented by Africans being sent to England to receive an education and Atlantic Creoles securing freedom and property in America. These situations, which occurred with

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<sup>23</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko; or, The Royal Slave*, in Catherine Gallagher, and Simon Stern, eds., *Aphra Behn: Oroonoko; or, The Royal Slave* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 44.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>25</sup> Randy J Sparks, “Two Princes of Calabar: An Atlantic Odyssey from Slavery to Freedom,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (July, 2002): 559, 562. Sparks indicates that as the slave trade grew, wealth replaced age as the determiner of rulers in Efik communities. Sons of wealthy African traders, therefore, were often considered royalty.

some frequency in the early days of the slave trade, became less common as time wore on. By the 1730s and 1740s, Atlantic Creoles in America began to lose their socioeconomic standing at the hands of increasingly strict legal codes.<sup>26</sup> These codes, which shrank the ranks of the Atlantic Creole, reflected the English *Weltanschauung*, which increasingly focused on reducing the African to sub-human levels.

Compared to *Oroonoko*, Gabriel de Brémond's *The Happy Slave*, translated from French in 1686, presents a decidedly more pleasant view of slavery. The novel tells of a young Roman, Count Alexander, captured near Tunis. While in captivity, Alexander realizes the lighter side of slavery. In fact, the author declares that Alexander, "having happily fallen into the hands of so good and generous a patron, began to recover."<sup>27</sup> Brémond's work emphasizes the "benevolent master" concept, which may have impacted how Englishmen chose to see themselves in relation to African slaves. The essence of Brémond's stance on slavery is evident from the very beginning, when he exclaims, "Africk...where the people were no less cruel than the lions and tigers that fill the desarts of the countrey: But since the discovery of Love there, it hath appear'd, that as love grows in all Countreys, so barbary itself hath nothing of barbarous but the name."<sup>28</sup> In short, the translation and publication of Brémond presents Englishmen with an overwhelmingly positive view of slavery and the slave trade in which the slave trade appears as a civilizing process.

On the other hand, publication of the works of Bartholomew de las Casas at this time emphasized slavery as a barbarous institution. De las Casas presents a systematic description of the various cruelties committed in the new world in *Popery Truly Display'd in its Bloody Colours*. In this work, slaves and natives are shown as, "being oppressed by such evil usage," and "afflicted with such great torments and violent entertainments"<sup>29</sup> by their Spanish masters. De las Casas argues that the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 555-84; Ira Berlin, "From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American Society in Mainland North America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (April, 1996): 277, 279. Berlin highlights the case of Anthony Johnson, an Atlantic Creole who was able to amass a 550 acre estate in the 1650s.

<sup>27</sup> Brémond, *The Happy Slave*, 9.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>29</sup> Casas, *Popery Truly Display'd in its Bloody Colours*, 5.

slave trade not only abuses the slaves, but Native Americans as well. Again, the publication of de las Casas' work also reflects English competition with Spain; however, the anti-slavery message of *Popery Truly Display'd in its Bloody Colours*, distributed at a time when the English were so engulfed in their own slave trade, further illustrates the diversity regarding English attitudes toward the slave trade. Moreover, when combined with *Oroonoko* and *The Happy Slave*, three distinctly separate views of the slave trade emerge in English popular literature.

Like popular literature, popular scholarship, most importantly the voluminous works of Nathaniel Crouch, help convey information about the slave trade to the English. Crouch was a bookseller and writer who published a number of pocket-sized, informational books written under the pseudonym of Robert Burton (often abbreviated R.B.). Between 1666 and 1725, Crouch published some seventy-five books, which were written in simple English and sold for one shilling. Although he published many novels that dealt with religion, he is best known for his historical works, which he himself wrote. After his death in 1725, Crouch's works continued to sell well for the remainder of the century.<sup>30</sup> In *English Acquisitions in Guinea and East-India*, Crouch displays an overview of the customs, religions, wildlife, trade patterns, and marriages of the natives near each English fort or settlement in Africa. Nowhere does Crouch explain how he received such information, and it is unlikely that he observed these things himself, especially considering the number and frequency of his publications. In addition, Crouch conveys some degree of disdain for the natives, questioning the viability of their religion, calling them treacherous, and describing their feeding habits like those of swine.<sup>31</sup> Crouch declares that the people of Guinea "are handsome and well proportioned, having nothing disagreeable in their Countenances, but the blackness of their Complexion."<sup>32</sup> In describing the natives around James Fort, Crouch claims that they "are Envious, curiously Neat, Thieves."<sup>33</sup> Unreliable information

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<sup>30</sup> Jason McElligott, "Crouch, Nathaniel," in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/52645>.

<sup>31</sup> Nathaniel Crouch, *English Acquisitions in Guinea and East-India*, (London: Nath. Crouch, 1700), 8, 9, 12.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

conveyed in popular literature, such as Crouch's works, shaped Englishmen's conceptions of the slave trade.

Equally important were the pamphlets and publications of the RAC and the separate traders, which had considerable implications for the transfer of information on the slave trade and the shaping of slavery in the minds of many Englishmen. During the pamphlet wars between free traders and monopolists in the 1690s, which continued in the public sphere until the 1720s, a number of publications attempted to convince Englishmen to support either side. *Reflections of the East India Company and the Royal African Company*, authored by Roger Coke in 1696, chastises the Company for being a monopoly and yet allowing foreign protestants to trade within its limits.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, *Considerations Concerning the African Companies Petitions* (1698) and *Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the Planters* (1698) argue against the Company's monopoly for imposing on Englishmen's liberty and failing to provide enough slaves to the West Indian plantations.<sup>35</sup> *Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the Commons of England*, written sometime in the 1690s, argued that Jamaica needed more "negroes" to work the plantations.<sup>36</sup> In *Considerations Relating to the African Bill* (1698), separate traders argue that a continuation of the monopoly would further endanger relationships with Africans and other Europeans, which would be detrimental to the trade.<sup>37</sup>

Like the separate traders, the Royal African Company chose pamphlets as the main medium of transferring information to the general public. *True Account of the Forts and Castles Belonging to the Royal African Company* (1698) presents valuable information concerning the status of the Company's installments in Africa. The pamphlet provides the public with concrete numbers of men and guns, as well as comments on the state of

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<sup>34</sup> Roger Coke, *Reflections upon the East-Indy and Royal African Companies with animadversions, concerning the naturalizing of foreigners*, (London: [s.n.], 1695).

<sup>35</sup> Anon., *Considerations Concerning the African Companies Petitions*, (London: [s.n.], 1698); and Anon., *Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the Planters*, (London: [s.n.], 1698).

<sup>36</sup> Anon., *Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the Commons of England*, (London: [s.n.], 1698-?).

<sup>37</sup> Anon., *Considerations Relating to the African Bill Humbly Submitted to the Honourable House of Commons*, (London: [s.n.], 1698).

each of the Company's forts. This pamphlet concludes that the forts and castles were "sufficiently provided with small arms, powder, and other necessities of war...built of Stone and Lime," and that an adjoining factory was, "covered with lead, and in very good repair."<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the pamphlet claims that the data was "taken from Sundry Persons," which implies that the Company had multiple sources to acquire information.<sup>39</sup> In short, this pamphlet shows that the English public was being given fairly detailed accounts of the slave trade.

Further accounts of the forts, relationships with Africans, and the ability of the separate traders to supply slaves to West Indian plantations are found in *Some Observations on Extracts Taken out of the Report from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations*, authored by the Royal African Company in 1708. This document contains information from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations and includes the number of slaves brought to the West Indies by the separate traders and a list of the RAC's forts in Africa. Additionally, the document argues that the forts and castles are the best foundation for continued friendship, justice, humanity, and honesty in English relationships with Africans.<sup>40</sup>

Moreover, *The case of the Royal African Company* (1709) provides readers with a complete summary of the free trade debate as it applied to the RAC through 1709. *The Case* provides details of the RAC's trade with Africa, but leaves out human or social aspects. For example, *The Case* describes the forts and settlements in Africa as a place to, "stipulate the price of the merchandize with the natives," rather than hold prisoner hundreds of slaves until the next slave ship appeared.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, *The Anatomy of the African Company's Scheme for Carrying on that Trade in a Joint-Stock Exclusive* (1710) provides a balance of the Company's books along with a claim that the benefits of the African trade are due solely to the efforts of the RAC, the overall goal being to get their subscribers to loan the Company ten percent of their payment. Additionally, *the Anatomy*

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<sup>38</sup> Anon., *A True Account of the Forts and Castles belonging to the Royal African Company*, (London: [s.n.], 1698).

<sup>39</sup> Anon., *A True Account of the Forts and Castles*; "Sundry," in the Oxford English Dictionary.

<sup>40</sup> Royal African Company, *Some Observations on Extracts Taken out of the Report from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations*, (London, 1708).

<sup>41</sup> Royal African Company, *The Case of the Royal African Company*, (London, 1709).

provides the number of forts (“14”) and the amount of land they take up (“100 miles space on the Gold Coast”), but fails to describe any non-business related aspect of the trade.<sup>42</sup> In other words, the content of such pamphlets tended to focus on the business aspect, rather than the human, or emotional aspects of the slave trade. These gaps would be filled by popular literature and speculation.

In addition to the publications of the separate traders and the Royal African Company, political writers such as Daniel Defoe and Charles Davenant frequently issued pamphlets articulating a particular stance on the slave trade. In *Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the Trade to Africa* (1709), Davenant sets forth the position of the RAC by examining memoirs, declarations, accounts, and other official papers. Like most other pro-Royal African Company texts, *Reflections* claims that the Company was extremely successful before 1698 (before the separate traders were allowed to trade with the payment of a 10% duty). Similarly, it uses numbers from the Navy Office of Barbados to disprove many of the separate traders’ claims. Likewise, the article provides information about Africa and the Company’s holdings in Africa.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, *A Clear Demonstration, from Points of Fact, that the Recovery, Preservation and Improvement of Britain’s Share of the Trade to Africa, is Wholly Owing to the Industry, Care and Application of the Royal African Company* (1709), as the title might suggest, claims that the benefits of the slave trade are due to the efforts of the RAC and that a monopoly is better suited to fit the needs of England and its subjects than free trade. Once again, Davenant uses RAC records to both prove his assumptions and discredit the separate traders.<sup>44</sup> These works provide critical insight into the information that was conveyed between the RAC and ordinary Englishmen because they were designed solely for the purpose of galvanizing the support of the people in England. They show that Englishmen had a wealth of detailed information about the business

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<sup>42</sup> Royal African Company, *The Anatomy of the African Company’s scheme for carrying on that trade in a joint-stock exclusive*, (London, 1710).

<sup>43</sup> Charles Davenant, *Reflections upon the constitution and management of the trade to Africa*, (London, 1709).

<sup>44</sup> Charles Davenant, *A clear demonstration, from points of fact, that the recovery, preservation and improvement of Britain’s share of the trade to Africa, is wholly owing to the industry, care and application of the Royal African Company*, (London, 1709).

aspect of the slave trade at their disposal, however, pamphlets often left out information about the social aspects of the slave trade.

Information was transferred between the RAC and its smaller shareholders through a series of meetings that occurred in the first years of the new century. Ultimately, these meetings were the result of the ever-worsening fortunes of the Company at the hands of the separate traders. As the separate traders began to infringe upon the RAC's market, especially after 1698, the Company found its finances increasingly in danger. In order to keep afloat, the Company repeatedly asked its shareholders for loans in the first years of the new century. In March 1701, the Company sent out a request of £4 per share from its shareholders. Similarly, in 1702 the request increased to £6 per share, in 1704, £7 per share, and in 1706, another £4 per share.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, in September, 1706, the Company sent out a public request for an increase in subscription.<sup>46</sup> These public requests show that the Royal African Company's smaller shareholders were frequently called upon by the RAC during the "pamphlet wars" with the separate traders. Additionally, they suggest that smaller shareholders were given frequent meetings where information concerning the Company was passed along. The information being passed along related solely to business and economics.

K.G. Davies' *Royal African Company* provides a few hints about the Company's official correspondence. Sir Dalby Thomas, Agent-General of the RAC from 1703-1711 and Assistant for four years prior to that<sup>47</sup>, corresponded frequently with the RAC. For example, Sir Thomas corresponded with the RAC concerning prices of gold, deaths, "coast charges," relations with the French, Portuguese, and Dutch, and tax

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<sup>45</sup> Royal African Company, *African-House. At a General Court of the Adventurers of the Royal African Company of England, held the 27th. day of March, 1701*, (London, 1701); Royal African Company, *At a General Court of the Adventurers of the Royal African-Company of England, held at their house ... the 15th day of December, 1702*, (London, 1702); Royal African Company, *At a General Court of the Adventurers of the Royal African Company of England, held at their house ... the 1st day of June, 1704*, (London, 1704); and Royal African Company, *African House At a General Court of the Adventurers of the Royal African Company of England, held the 26th. day of June, 1706*, (London, 1706).

<sup>46</sup> Royal African Company, *At a General Court of the Adventurers of the Royal African Company of England, held the 18th day of September, 1706*, (London, 1706).

<sup>47</sup> Perry Gauci, "Thomas, Sir Dalby," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

systems with the natives.<sup>48</sup> The RAC corresponded frequently with its other agents. Like the correspondence with Sir Thomas, correspondence with other agents spanned any number of topics. Those topics included shipping, sloop trade, and, as most often was the case, the productivity of a particular area.<sup>49</sup>

From these observations, we can construct a number of assertions concerning the operation of the Royal African Company at the turn of the Eighteenth Century. First, by wealthy, prominent investors who often held multiple business and political interests controlled the RAC. There were minimum amounts of shares that a person needed to hold in order to be elected to an official position within the Company.<sup>50</sup> Many of the investors were passive; they had not been actively involved in the trading of slaves, opting instead to remain in London.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the frequency of the Company's meetings ensured that its leaders had little time to travel the world or become active in the trade.<sup>52</sup> *Observations on a Guinea Voyage*, written nearly a century later by James Field Stanfield, asserts that a true understanding of the Slave Trade could not be achieved without a personal experience on a slave ship, thus inferring that many RAC decision-makers of had little understanding of the human aspect of the trade.<sup>53</sup>

Much of the information that was circulating within the Royal African Company and in the wider society left out a crucial humanitarian perspective that represented the foundation of future abolitionist writings. Popular literature and scholarship, in an attempt to fill the void left by pamphlets and official papers, often portrayed Blacks and the slave trade in less than accurate ways. For example, *The Happy Slave* suggests that the slave trade could be a civilizing process aided by benevolent slave masters. Similarly, both Behn's *Oroonoko* and Southerne's adaptation question the sub-human nature of royal Africans, while at the same time reaffirm the

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<sup>48</sup> Davies, *Royal African Company*, 216, 226, 257, 259, 269, 274, 280.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 217, 219, 223, 227-8.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 153-4, 157.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 154, 157-9.

<sup>53</sup> James Field Stanfield, *Observations on a Guinea Voyage, in a Series of Letters Addressed to the Rev. Thomas Clarkson* (London: James Phillips, 1788), 30, in Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (New York: Viking, 2007), 156.



sub-human nature of non-royal blacks. Moreover, writers of popular history, such as Nathaniel Crouch, surely did not possess an unbiased, objective and factual basis for their assertions. Crouch, for example, published nearly seventy-five books in just over half a century, a fact that calls into question where he obtained information on such a short notice. Moreover, pamphlets that circulated at the turn of the century solely addressed the economic and business aspects of the slave trade, leaving out critical issues such as the living conditions on board slave ships, an issue that would make Thomas Clarkson famous in the last two decades of the eighteenth century.

### **Implications for the Collective English *Weltanschauung***

With this in mind, the complex, yet haphazard, transfers of information concerning Africa, Africans, slaves and the slave trade during this time affected English society in a very profound way. This change can be seen by a consideration of the various meanings of the three most common words used to describe Africans: “native,” “slave,” and “negro.” Two of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of the word “negro,” states that “a person of black African origin or descent” and “a slave (or enfranchised slave) of black African origin or descent.”<sup>54</sup> The use of the word “negro,” as either the former or latter meaning, provides a clue into the degree in which English society equated the words “negro” and “slave” during this period. Moreover, the convergence of the two words shows one effect of the lack of cultural and societal information concerning the slave trade, despite the relatively detailed economic accounts of the trade.

In some cases, the English used the word “negro” to describe Africans before their enslavement in the West Indies, either in Africa or in the process of being sold into slavery (the middle passage). In *Considerations Concerning the African Companies Petitions* (1698), the author claims that “no good negroes” reside in the most remote areas of Africa.<sup>55</sup> Similarly, *Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the Planters* (1698) refers to a lack of “negroes” supplied to the West Indies.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> “Negro, n. and adj.,” in the Oxford English Dictionary.

<sup>55</sup> Anon., *Considerations Concerning the African-Companies Petition*.

<sup>56</sup> Anon., *Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the Planters*.

*Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the Commons of England* (1690-1699), too, claims that Jamaica needs more “negroes,” thus using the word to describe pre-West Indian Africans. Finally, on December 26, 1695, the Calendar of State Papers notes that, “the factors of the Royal African Company picked out the best negroes.”<sup>57</sup> In 1698, the Privy Council gave the RAC the authority to export beans as a means to feed “negroes” on board their ships. In 1693, they requested that the Company send more “negroes” and goods in order to help furnish the West Indian plantations.<sup>58</sup> In each of these cases, the documents used the word “negro” to describe Africans in the process of being sold into slavery.

On the other hand, the English sometimes referred to Blacks in Africa as “natives.” *Considerations Relating to the African Bill* (1698) refers provides one such instance. Similarly, in *Some Observations on Extracts Taken out of the Report from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations* (1708), the Royal African Company discusses friendly relationships with “natives” through permanent forts and settlements.<sup>59</sup> One year later, the Company explained how separate traders gave the “natives” more leverage in their relationship with Europeans.<sup>60</sup> In a letter to the Royal African Company from Captain Bernard Ladman in 1701, Ladman refers to “blacks being afraid to come aboard English ships,” that were docked off the coast of Africa.<sup>61</sup> In this case, “blacks” instead of “negroes” was used to refer to Africans who the British traded with. Interestingly, Ladman later refers to his coming away from the site with “24 Negroes,” thus referring to Blacks on board trans-Atlantic ships as “negroes.” In each of these cases, the word “native” is used when referring to African trading partners of the English. In other words, the British still expressed some distinctions between

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<sup>57</sup> J. W. Fortescue, ed., *Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series, America and West Indies, January, 1693-May, 1696* (Burlington: TannerRitchie, 2004), 249, 343-4.

<sup>58</sup> W. L. Grant, James Munro, & Almeric L. Fitzroy, eds., *Acts of the Privy Council of England: Colonial Series Volume 2: A.D. 1680-1720* (Burlington: TannerRitchie, 2005), 134, 187.

<sup>59</sup> Royal African Company, *Some Observations on Extracts taken out of the report from the lords commissioners for trade and plantations*.

<sup>60</sup> Royal African Company, *The Case of the Royal African Company*.

<sup>61</sup> Elizabeth Donnan, *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century*, (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 1.

African trading partners, captured Africans, and slaves; however, they considered the majority of Africans “negroes,” rather than “natives.”

On the contrary, some writings blurred the line between “negroes” and “slaves,” in which case a document might use the word “slave” to describe an African in Africa or the word “negro” to describe a slave in the West Indies. Some of these, however, provide a clear distinction between the words “negro” and “slave.” On June 10, 1693, for example, the Calendar notes a slave uprising in the West Indies and refers to the aftermath in which soldiers, “fell upon all the negroes, free as well as slaves.”<sup>62</sup> In this instance, although the author refers to slaves as “negroes,” he notes that the existence of a difference between free and enslaved Negroes. Moreover, on September 14, 1693, a Committee discussed rewarding “freedmen and slaves who behave well against the enemy.”<sup>63</sup> Once again, the document notes a clear difference between emancipated Negroes and enslaved Negroes.

Moreover, using the word “negro” to mean the word “slave” represents one effect of the comparative lack of cultural and societal information about Africans. The Calendar of State Papers notes one instance in which a ship, “shipped 700 slaves at Guinea,” and a disagreement between the Company’s agents and a planter over how much the planter owed the agent for “negroes.”<sup>64</sup> In a letter from Sir Dalby Thomas to the Royal African Company in 1704, Thomas referred to purchasing of both “slaves” and “negroes.”<sup>65</sup> A treaty between the Royal African and French Senegal Companies claims that both companies would assist each other, “against the Negros,” using the term in a very general manner. Moreover, the “Project of the Assiento for Negroes Made between England and Spain, 1707” provides a great example of the development of the words by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century. To begin, the document is described as a “Contract for Blacks or Negroes,” thus leaving ambiguity in the meaning of both terms. Next, it attaches the two words, declaring that it is an “Agreement to import Negro slaves,”

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<sup>62</sup> Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers*, 82-3.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 223, 288-9.

<sup>65</sup> Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: The Eighteenth Century*, 6.

showing some convergence in the meanings of both words.<sup>66</sup> A Report on the Trade to Africa in 1709 presents a similar pattern. At one point, the document comments, “the Charges of their working Negroes, employed in carrying the Goods of the Company and other Matters relating to their Trade, and in looking after their Slaves.”<sup>67</sup> In this example, the document used both “negro” and “slave” in the same sentence to mean the same thing.

The Calendar of State Papers presents the words “negro” and “slave” as having similar meanings. In the minutes for November 14, 1693, it refers to the “negro trade,” when referring to the slave trade. Moreover, the same entry uses the word “slaves” when talking about blacks in the West Indies. On November 9<sup>th</sup>, they once again referred to the trans-Atlantic slave trade as the “negro trade.” In all, the writings of the Calendar of State Papers, letters between factors and the Company, and pamphlets portray Africans as slaves, whether they use the word “negro” or “slave;” they represent a converging of the words “negro” and “slave” and are emblematic of a lack of cultural information concerning Africans.

### Conclusion

As we have seen, the convergence of the words “negro” and “slave” coupled with pamphlets and literary works which viewed the slave trade from an exclusively economic standpoint suggest that the English *Weltanschauung* underwent a significant change at the turn of the eighteenth century; however, any study concerning the British slave trade would be incomplete without a connection to British abolition. Put another way, the developments occurring in the British *Weltanschauung* in the decades enveloping the year 1700—in which the concept of race was being solidified so that Africans were viewed primarily as slaves—may have clouded the vision of Englishmen, helping delay a widespread moral inquiry until the end of the eighteenth century.

One way historians have explained this “delayed abolition” holds that the profits of the slave trade during previous years overshadowed the moral questions that surrounded it, an assertion that historian Eric

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 16-21.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 53.

Williams championed.<sup>68</sup> In other words: willful ignorance. While the correspondence concerning the slave trade available in Donnan's *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America* falls short of explicitly stating willful ignorance, such sentiments can be inferred from their writings. In "The Slave Trade at Calabar, 1700-1705," the author describes the "brutish creatures" that occupy the slave ships, as "cruel and bloody in their temper, always quarrelling, biting and fighting, and sometimes...murdering one another." Moreover, the author declares that slave captains "need pray for quick passage," in order to avoid losing too many slaves, and thus, "turn'd to a very bad market."<sup>69</sup> In this case, the author hints that the health and well-being of slaves should be considered only in relation to the economic health and well-being of the captain and merchant. Numerous petitions to the House of Commons cite professions in England, Gun-makers, Cutlers, Powder-makers, Dyers, Packers, Setters, Drawers, Shipwrights, and Sail-makers, just to name a few, whose livelihoods have been "supported by Sale of their Goods, usually exported by the Royal African Company."<sup>70</sup> In this case, Gun-makers, Cutlers, Powder-makers, etc. failed to question the morality of the slave trade because of its economic benefits.

Philip Gould hints at another possible aspect of delayed abolition in *Barbaric Traffic*; the enlightenment. Those few criticisms of the slave trade that did exist in the early eighteenth century focused on the literal inconsistency of the trade with biblical law. In the latter part of the century, this idea "gives away to the contemporary standards of enlightened civilization."<sup>71</sup> In other words, the ideas of an enlightened civilization implied just commerce, which was used instead of biblical law to combat the slave trade.

When integrating the content revealed in this study, it becomes apparent that another explanation is possible. In other words, the changes

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<sup>68</sup> Williams, Eric, *Capitalism and Slavery*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

<sup>69</sup> Donnan, *Documents Illustrative*, 14-15.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 96-99.

<sup>71</sup> Philip Gould, *Barbaric Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 19. Gould includes a further discussion of early inquiries into the slave trade during the period I focus on on pages 14-15.

occurring in the collective English *Weltanschauung* at the turn of the eighteenth-century clouded the English mindset, which may have delayed an inquiry into the slave trade. As we have seen, many accounts of the slave trade tended to emphasize the economic aspect of the trade. The origins of this can be found in RAC correspondence with Sir Dalby Thomas, which reveals discussions that focused almost entirely on international competition and prices of gold and slaves.<sup>72</sup> Sir Thomas' *Weltanschauung*, therefore, clearly viewed the slave trade through an economic lens. Moreover, those who read pamphlets based on information conveyed by Sir Thomas and his counterparts would have experienced the slave trade through an economic lens. To add, pamphlets reflected correspondence in that they began to confuse the meanings of the words "negro" and "slave." When this happened on a grand scale, as it did during the pamphlet wars of the 1690s-1720s, the collective English *Weltanschauung* underwent a critical change. The end result was a generation of Englishmen who's first experience with the slave trade was through a businessman's rather than a humanitarian's perspective; Africans were slaves first and humans second, rather than the reverse. Consequently, when the British slave trade expanded exponentially in the first decades of the eighteenth century, the English were well prepared to accept the institution, instead of question it. That would be left for the women and men of a later generation.

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<sup>72</sup> Davies, *Royal African Company*, 216, 226, 257, 259, 269, 274, 280.

## **Vietnam's Changing Historiography: Ngo Dinh Diem and America's Leadership**

### **Derek Shidler**

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The Vietnam War has certainly produced burgeoning scholars and literature. In the decade or so after the Vietnam War ended, most scholars wrote critically of the United States' intervention in Indochina. Heated debates began to take place within books, articles, and conferences. Given the lavish attention, three scholarly views have arisen and become increasingly heated. Orthodox scholars follow the traditional doctrine that America's involvement in the war was unwinnable and unjust, while the revisionists believe that the war was a noble cause and Vietnam, below the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel, was a viable and stable country, but policies and military tactics were improperly executed. The heated debates have focused on two central issues—Ngo Dinh Diem and his reign over South Vietnam and poor leadership by American presidents and top officials. Orthodox scholars argue that Diem was a corrupt tyrannical puppet, while revisionists believe Diem was an independent leader who knew what was necessary to allow his young country to survive. According to the orthodox scholars, American presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson and other top officials did their best to control the situation in Vietnam, though the war was doomed from the beginning. Revisionists do not believe the war was lost on the battlefield but was lost due to poor decisions and lack of attention to the war. Recently, another group of scholars have weighed in on this subject. These scholars, post-revisionists, do not even admit defeat—arguing that the United States won the war by late 1970. The goal of this paper is to give insight on orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist views.

### **Ngo Dinh Diem**

In Philip Catton's book, *Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam*, he does not attempt to whitewash any of Diem's faults but does portray Diem as a modern nationalist, determined to follow his own

agenda. Diem's desire to build his own South Vietnamese state led to a coup, which the Kennedy administration supported. Catton explains that in an attempt to find a reliable president in South Vietnam, the United States assumed the position of kingmaker. Diem and his key advisers' feared that the perception of their dependence on the United States tainted their credentials as nationalists, playing into the hands of the regime's enemies. Catton points out that Diem feared the Americans nearly as much as they did the Communist insurgents. Implementing his own vision of a sovereign national entity, Diem assembled the South Vietnamese peasantry for support while reducing the regime's reliance on the United States. Catton goes on to argue that the strategic hamlet program was intended not only to defeat the National Liberation Front (NLF) but also to further free the South Vietnamese from the overbearing American control. In addition, Catton explains that Kennedy, Johnson, and top American officials did not fully understand Diem's intentions or the social and cultural situations in South Vietnam. Diem understood the necessity of American assistance, but he knew the intrusive American support would make him a puppet of Washington. Catton finally suggests that the overthrow of Diem prompted the Americanization of the war in Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

Keith Taylor, a leading revisionist, sparked the reevaluation of the Vietnam War in an article entitled "How I began to Teach About the Vietnam War." Taylor aims to debunk three axioms regarding the war. The first is the idea that there was not a legitimate noncommunist government in Saigon. The second misconception he addresses is the belief that the United States had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnam, while the third focuses on the assumption that the United States could not have won the war under any circumstance. Taylor explains that Diem was actually a competent leader—not an American lackey. Made into a scapegoat for American frustrations and misguided American advisors, Keith portrays Diem as understanding what was necessary for South Vietnam's survival, but the U.S. sponsored assassination cut his leadership short.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Catton, *Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> Keith Taylor, "How I Began to Teach about the Vietnam War," *Michigan Quarterly Review* 43 no.4 (2004): 637-647.



While Keith Taylor sparked the reevaluation of the Vietnam War, Mark Moyar continued to push this debate further. Moyar's book, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*, explains how the United States' government failed South Vietnam morally and politically by allowing Diem's assassination. His death put an end to his successful prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong, which obviated the controversial incursion of American troops from 1965 to 1973. Generally, Moyar says, historians view Diem as an authoritarian Asian dictator who became an oppressor as he solidified his family's stronghold over South Vietnam's government, thus becoming a less effective leader. Moyar, however, fiercely disagrees with these statements. He acknowledges the authoritarian nature of Diem's leadership, but argues for its necessity. South Vietnam was fighting for survival and needed a dictator-like leader; Diem governed in an authoritarian manner because of the unsuitability of Western-style democracy for a country dominated by a totalitarian culture. According to Moyar, in 1962 and 1963, the South Vietnamese army became increasingly skillful in intelligence gathering and in fighting under Diem's leadership. Consequently, until he was assassinated in the November 1963 coup, Diem successfully prosecuted the war to the verge of victory over the Viet Cong. Moyar's last chapter, "Betrayal: August 1963," states that after the assassination, everything fell apart in Vietnam. Diem's death was a tragedy for South Vietnam as well as for American policy.<sup>3</sup>

On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the orthodox scholar Robert Buzzanco and his article, "How I Learned to Quit Worrying and Love Vietnam and Iraq." Buzzanco argues that Diem engaged in an assortment of corrupt activities that included placing his family into high political positions, dealing in the black market, and firing roughly 6,000 army officers and replacing them with more loyal but less qualified soldiers. He imprisoned over 40,000 political prisoners and executed more than 12,000, and took control of 650,000 hectares of land, which denied peasants of their livelihoods. Buzzanco also writes that if the South Vietnamese wanted Americans in their country, why were there several coups d'état to oust the Americans? To counter this fabricated belief, Buzzanco suggests

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<sup>3</sup> Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

that in fact, the South Vietnamese did not want American support, and that the United States' sole motivation was imperialism. In support of Buzzanco's arguments is David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*. Halberstam and Buzzanco's perceptions about Diem are closely related. Both historians believe the Diem regime lacked legitimacy and stunk of corruption.<sup>4</sup>

Historian Edward Miller's, *War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco Debate and How We Think About the Vietnam War*, is an article trying to separate historians Keith Taylor and Robert Buzzanco's ideas about Diem's legitimacy. Miller disagrees with Buzzanco's critical depiction of Diem as a spineless American puppet with no agenda other than appeasing American leaders. According to Miller, Buzzanco believes that Diem was "hand-picked" by American leaders in order to Americanize South Vietnam. In addition, Miller argues that Diem actively pushed for a modernized nation in South Vietnam. Diem's determination to follow this vision made him much more autonomous than Buzzanco recognizes. According to Miller, Buzzanco quotes Wesley Fishel, an American advisor to the South Vietnamese leader, saying that the government was "shaky as all hell."<sup>5</sup> Buzzanco believes that Diem's only agenda was to increase his family's power, however, Miller contends that no credible evidence exists that implicates Diem as a "hand-picked" or excessively corrupt leader.<sup>6</sup>

Miller moves on to explain that Diem showed his independence by redistributing land. Diem, lacking interest in American land reform, pushed for his own ideas of land distribution. Instead of America's proposal of dispensing landlord's property, Diem wanted to redistribute people by transporting thousands of peasants to Land Development Centers in lightly populated areas in South Vietnam. Miller acknowledges and supports Philip Catton's study of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Diem's last

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<sup>4</sup> Robert Buzzanco, "How I Learned to Quit Worrying and Love Vietnam and Iraq." Counterpunch, <http://www.counterpunch.org/buzzanco04162005.html>; and David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1973).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Edward Miller, "War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco Debate and How We Think About the Vietnam War," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 1, no. 1-2 (2006): 453-484.

modernization project. Miller notes that Diem was trying to modernize South Vietnam and had no dependency upon the United States.<sup>7</sup>

While Miller tries to separate Taylor and Buzzanco, though siding with Taylor, Gabriel Kolko's orthodox view portrays Diem as a corrupt and tyrannical leader. Kolko explains that by the early 1960s the United States could not overlook the increasing threat that Diem's blatant corruption and oppression posed. Kolko writes that the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, addressed the dilemma the week after Kennedy took office, saying that the United States was "caught between pressing Diem to do things he did not wish to do and the need to convey to him American support."<sup>8</sup> By 1961 Diem fully appreciated and relied on the Kennedy administration's reliance on his regime. Moreover, Diem ignored America's modest proposals, Kolko says, "at best [only] agreeing to study them."<sup>9</sup>

Well on his way toward self-destruction, Diem began arresting thousands of civilian non-NLF critics, political threats, and military officers—enemies that, according to Kolko, only existed in his head. Diem's oppression did not stop there. On May 8, 1963, Diem ordered the killing of nine Buddhist protesters at an anti-Diem demonstration in Hue. While the orthodox view of Kolko condemns Diem for his murder and oppression of Buddhists, Mark Moyar disagrees. Moyar writes that reporters developed friendships with Buddhist leaders—Buddhists gave reporters tips, carried protest signs in English, and made the young men feel significant. The correspondents, in return, favored stories about the Buddhist protesters. Moyar also contends that Diem gave Buddhists permission to carry out many activities that the French and Ho Chi Minh had prohibited, but animosity still loomed. Moyar goes on to explain that the Vietnamese Communists had a history of posing as monks and infiltrating Buddhist organizations, since a Vietnamese man only had to shave his head and wear a monk's robe to be considered a monk. However, Kolko argues that only a few Communist documents have been captured revealing Communist participation in the Buddhist demonstrations.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 115.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

Controversy looming around Diem still remains. Orthodox scholars adhere to the traditional views of Diem, while revisionists are trying to investigate and reevaluate Diem's role during the Vietnam War. Both sides of this debate have credibility, however, the public and most historians would agree that the corrupt nature of Diem's authoritarian regime only hindered America's progress in Vietnam.

### **Poor Leadership**

In the 1990s, historians began to reevaluate John F. Kennedy's role in Vietnam, leading to their argument that the young president, had he not been assassinated, would not have escalated the conflict into a major war. Kennedy supporters like Arthur Schlesinger, Howard Jones, Fred Logevall, David Kaiser, Lawrence Freedman, and others have also made this claim. Furthermore, the 1991 Oliver Stone film, *JFK*, portrays Kennedy as a dove in regards to Vietnam, and alludes to the idea that Lyndon Johnson was responsible for the escalation of the conflict. More recently, the revival of the war has gone further with Philip Catton, Keith Taylor, Mark Moyer, Ed Miller, and others claiming that America's top officials, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and the Joints Chiefs of Staff lost the war due to poor decisions, lack of attention, and separate agendas.

Buzzanco, agreeing with the revisionists, states, "I believe that Kennedy made bad decisions about Vietnam because he was not paying sufficient attention and Johnson did so because it was not his priority."<sup>11</sup> Buzzanco explains that the sheer mass of documents, interviews, and oral histories pertaining to the war provide sufficient evidence that Kennedy and Johnson regarded the Vietnam War as a solemn and significant matter. However, Buzzanco also argues that the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries contain millions of pages of reports and analyses from an array of agencies, military branches, and diplomatic officials, all of which avidly demonstrate the dedication of both administrations to substantial levels of attention to the war. In addition, Buzzanco questions Taylor's notion of Johnson's limited war, asking, "Should he have sent 500,000 men to Vietnam then?" He argues that the American public and congress would not have supported

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<sup>11</sup> Taylor, 637-647.

such a sizeable commitment, while other orthodox scholars would agree that both Kennedy and Johnson were incorrect in their policy-making,<sup>12</sup>

Harry Summers, a revisionist, published *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* to defend and find a more plausible interpretation of the Vietnam War. Summers contends with the notion that Vietnam was lost as a result of the poor training of American troops rather than strategy. He supports his ideas by arguing that, at the time of the Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong possessed twenty-percent of their original power. He claims that the Tet Offensive and the 1972 invasion were both horrible failures for the North Vietnam forces. Also, Summers argues that it was not until the United States pulled out of Vietnam in 1972 that North Vietnam succeeded in victory. Bad tactical and logistical planning did not lead to the fall of South Vietnam, but rather the inadequate leadership of top American officials. The United States had done everything it set out to do, according to Summers. Providing supplies, munitions, and shelter for more than a million personnel several thousand miles from home, the United States' military also fought and won almost every engagement with the enemy. However, the United States' presidents and top officials provided only a vague and generic expectation of victory. Summers and other conservative historians, such as Lewis Sorley, Michael Lind, Edward Miller, Keith Taylor, and Mark Moyar, contend that the United States actually won the war militarily, but because of poor decisions and pathetic politicians, the war was lost.<sup>13</sup>

Revisionists believe that the Kennedy administration quickly began plunging deeper into the morass of the Vietnam War, while George C. Herring, an orthodox scholar, characterizes Kennedy as a cautious, hesitant, and improvisational leader. Kennedy postponed a firm commitment for nearly a year, and he only acted because of the pressures of a collapsing Diem regime. Wary of international and domestic consequences but unwilling to introduce a full-scale war, Kennedy chose a careful course, thus expanding the United States' role in Vietnam.

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<sup>12</sup> Buzzanco, "How I Learned to Quit Worrying and Love Vietnam and Iraq." Counterpunch, <http://www.counterpunch.org/buzzanco04162005.html>; and David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1973).

<sup>13</sup> Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (California: Presidio Press, 1983).

Kennedy's unprepared and dangerous policies encouraged Diem to continue on his corruptive path. The reluctant president rejected Walt Whitman Rostow's proposal to put pressure on the Soviet Union to stop sending troops and supplies to North Vietnam, therefore entrapping the United States in a "long drawn out indecisive involvement."<sup>14</sup> Herring points out that Kennedy became frustrated with the unmanageability of the War and never devoted his full attention to Vietnam or the potential consequences of his actions. The President and his advisors' preoccupation with day-to-day events led to shortsightedness that encumbered the formulation of a long-term solution in Vietnam. Kennedy believed that the United States knew what was best for Vietnam, and this arrogant mentality pushed the United States farther into war.<sup>15</sup> To reinforce Herring's ideas, historians James S. Olson and Randy Robert provide further descriptions in *Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995*. All three historians believe the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were ill-prepared, hesitant, and unable to comprehend the conflicts of the Vietnam War. Consequently, Kennedy and Johnson were willing to use heavy firepower to overwhelm and insert American policies.<sup>16</sup>

Herring explores President Lyndon Johnson's deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, mimicking Larry Berman's book, *Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam*. Between 1963 and 1965, Johnson transformed a limited war into an open-ended commitment within Vietnam, Herring explains. Frightened that a large-scale involvement might endanger his chances for re-election, Johnson expanded American advisors and assistances until 1965 when it appeared that South Vietnam might collapse. Over the next six months Johnson ordered a ground and air offensive against North Vietnam—pushing the United States into a major war in Indochina. After America began attacking the North Vietnamese, Johnson publicly committed the United States to defending South Vietnam from the defiant North Vietnamese. Moreover, operation Rolling Thunder, implemented by Johnson, grew from an infrequent effort

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<sup>14</sup>George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 101.

<sup>15</sup> Herring.

<sup>16</sup> James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, *Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).

into a determined program. Herring explains that questions of Johnson's comprehension of foreign policy circulated from the moment he took office. Consequently, Johnson regarded the Vietnam conflict as part of Kennedy's program he was sworn to defend.<sup>17</sup>

Agreeing with Herring's view is Fredrik Logevall's book, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam*. Logevall proves that Johnson had a variety of options that could slow or stop the escalation of the war, but the president and his advisers chose to increase the number of American troops in Vietnam, pushing America further into a war with appalling consequences. In addition, Logevall argues that both Kennedy and Johnson had stepped away from opportunities for disengaging from the involvement in Vietnam for domestic and political reasons, for example the 1964 election. Johnson's actions after Kennedy's assassination prove his desire to escalate the war secretly. Meanwhile, world leaders dissociated themselves from American involvement, and privately counseled Johnson to "cut and run." Unwilling to admit defeat, Johnson lost numerous opportunities for *détentes* and improved relations with China and the Soviet Union. Logevall also gives convincing evidence proving that individuals like Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and General William Westmoreland haughtily chose to pursue a war that many around them inquired and discouraged. Nevertheless, Johnson's own agenda and the bad counsel of his military advisors followed a disastrous path of further escalation, condemning about 59,000 American soldiers to premature death.<sup>18</sup>

The policies of American presidents and top ranking officials sucked America into an unwinnable war, H.R. McMaster argues in his revisionist based book, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. McMaster analyzes the decisions and viewpoints of the Johnson administration through 1966 by which time American troops were heavily engaged in Vietnam. McMaster explains that Johnson and McNamara

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff from all major decisions on the war. Both Johnson and McNamara believed that analysis and statistics could resolve any situation in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the two men got approximately 59,000 soldiers killed in a war they all knew proved unwinnable, according to McMaster. Johnson and McNamara created a barrier which shielded them from professional counsel. As political bullies and manipulators of intelligence, Johnson and McNamara were solely responsible for bad advice from their advisors.<sup>19</sup>

Johnson was determined to commit to a limited war without the approval of Congress and hid the war's escalation from the American people. McMaster believes Johnson based all of his decisions on his domestic program—the Great Society. He goes on to argue that in late January 1965, Johnson authorized American destroyers to patrol the Gulf of Tonkin, in hopes of provoking a North Vietnamese attack. In February of that same year, Johnson introduced American ground troops into Vietnam, an irreversible commitment to the war. McMaster made an alarming assertion explaining how the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the president's policies as essentially flawed, but nevertheless acted to support and reinforce it—contributing to Johnson's and General Westmoreland's disastrous strategy of attrition in South Vietnam.<sup>20</sup>

McMaster challenges McNamara's critics saying that McNamara never had a good relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of their inability to respond fast enough, while their ignorant administration exacerbated the Johnson administration's opinion of them. According to McMaster, McNamara lost patience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff impassiveness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that McNamara's strategies would be inadequate to turn the tide against the North Vietnamese. After Johnson's approval of McNamara's plan to escalated pressure on the North Vietnamese, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's desire to further their own agendas hindered their cooperative ability to provide military advice. By the summer of 1964, according to McMaster, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been reduced to serving "more as technicians for

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<sup>19</sup> H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*



planners in the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] than as strategic thinkers and advisers in their own right."<sup>21</sup> He concludes that the war in Vietnam was lost in Washington, D.C., long before Americans realized the country was at war and assumed the sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965. Logevall and McMaster's beliefs mirror the evidence presented in other recent books such as Kaiser's *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origin of the Vietnam War*<sup>22</sup>

Pressed by many advisors to pursue an aggressive course in Vietnam, the Kennedy administration followed suit. Kasier, a recent revisionist, believes that Robert McNamara misled Kennedy as to the status of ongoing efforts. As a result, Kennedy died believing the circumstances in Vietnam were much more manageable than what it really was. With Kennedy's assassination in 1963, the conflict began to move much more quickly toward a full blown war. Johnson wanted to be a great domestic president, however, he was less experienced in foreign policy, thus pushing the United States further into a quagmire. Unlike Logevall, Kaiser believes Kennedy's confidence and skepticism led him to resist suggestions for major involvement. According to Kasier, Kennedy was reluctant to commit American ground forces in Vietnam, while Johnson was determined to confront North Vietnam with ground forces and bombing campaigns. Johnson lacked Kennedy's sophisticated foreign policy, Kaiser says, and did not understand or value the extraordinarily negative effects that war would have on "our" relationship with the rest of the world. Kasier's book is a worthy companion piece to David Halberstam's book, *The Best and the Brightest*. Halberstam argues that it was a number of specific individuals with their own private agendas and belief systems that led to the deepening investment in the Vietnam War. Halberstam, like Kasier, notes that Kennedy purposefully denied repeated attempts by his senior advisors and the military to drastically widen actions in Vietnam. According to Kaiser, while Kennedy did allow escalation by sending military advisors, he repeatedly and quite specifically denied, both verbally and by way of documented meetings with advisors, authorization to escalate by introducing direct combat involvement. Still, this is not to suggest that

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 233.

<sup>22</sup> McMaster.

Kaiser either agrees with Halberstam's thesis or to argue that he has nothing new or worthwhile to reveal—similarities do run through both books. Kaiser argues that the Vietnam War was neither necessary nor winnable, but the greatest American policy failure in foreign relations.

In contrast to Kaiser, Michael Lind's revisionist book, *The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict*, describes the United States' involvement as a proper response to communist aggression and a need to assert America's strength. Lind also debunks the liberal mythology that the United States missed opportunities to befriend the North Vietnamese Communists. He asserts that there was no opportunity for a Coalition Government in South Vietnam; and the South Vietnam's government was at least as legitimate as the North's and undoubtedly preferable.<sup>23</sup>

In accord with Kaiser and Halberstam, Lawrence Freedman's *Kennedy's War: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* and Howard Jones's *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War* argues that Kennedy would never have turned Vietnam into an American war, with a huge deployment of American forces, the way Lyndon Johnson did in 1965. Both Freedman and Jones argue that Kennedy did increase the number of advisers, who sometimes assisted the South Vietnamese in battle, but never favored deploying significant ground forces. Also, Kennedy had a plan to eventually withdraw all American troops when the South Vietnamese army became more capable of controlling their government.<sup>24</sup>

Daniel Ellsberg covers much of the same material that appears in David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*, but, begins his examination of the war with President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara claiming unprovoked enemy aggression and threats to American interests instigated the war. Within twenty hours of starting his new job at the

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<sup>23</sup> David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origin of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge Belknap Press, 2000); Michael Lind, *The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1999); and David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*.

<sup>24</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's War: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford Press, 2000); and Howard Jones, *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Pentagon, and referring to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Ellsberg writes that he already knew that each one of the assurances given by the President and Defense Secretary was false. Ellsberg explains that the intelligence did not fail in Vietnam since Presidents do get good advice from top officials, but that the position of the President combined with executive secrecy as an enabling condition permitted irrational and ineffective policies. Even before the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson Administration was determined to start a war with North Vietnam, unbeknownst to the American people or Congress. With the full knowledge of the President and Secretary of Defense McNamara, massive covert operations were carried out. Again, lies covered any of this up. As a result, no one could be honest. Johnson would never entertain any negative reports, nor would McNamara and the military.<sup>25</sup>

Moyar depicts Johnson as a figure trapped by circumstance, quoting Johnson as saying, "It's like being in an airplane and I have to choose between crashing the plane or jumping out. I do not have a parachute."<sup>26</sup> Moyar argues against the orthodox school's view of American involvement in the war as "wrongheaded and unjust."<sup>27</sup> The main villains are former Vietnam War correspondents David Halberstam and anyone else who had anything negative to say about the South Vietnamese premier Ngo Dinh Diem and positive things to say about Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. Moyar declares that after Diem's assassination, Johnson had at his disposal numerous aggressive policy options that could have allowed South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive American troop involvement, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence. Therefore, Johnson had to fight a defensive war within South Vietnam's borders in order to avoid the dreadful international consequences of abandoning the feeble country. Johnson had always wanted to avoid American ground troop intervention, but most of his advisers doubted that ground force involvement would produce an easy victory, believing instead that it would result in a long and agonizing political struggle against an

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<sup>25</sup> Daniel Ellsberg, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers* (New York: Penguin Group, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Moyar, 409.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, xi.

enemy who might never give up. Furthermore, in June 1965, Moyar states that Johnson and his military advisers concluded that only the use of American ground forces in major combat could stop the Communist conventional forces from finishing off the South Vietnamese Army and government.<sup>28</sup>

As Johnson contemplated whether to send American troops into battle, overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that South Vietnam's defeat would lead to either a Communist takeover or the switching of allegiance to China. Information that became available subsequently has reinforced this conclusion. The Johnson administration could have negotiated an American withdrawal from Vietnam that would have preserved a non-Communist South Vietnam for years to come, but evidence from the Communist side reveals North Vietnam's complete refusal to negotiate such an agreement. While this may have failed, top American officials did miss some strategic opportunities of a different sort, opportunities that would have allowed them to fight from a much more favorable strategic position. Following Diem's ouster, the United States' military leaders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly supported an invasion of North Vietnam, however, Johnson and his civilian advisers rejected this advice. Also, Moyar notes that Johnson's failure to attack North Vietnam worked to the enemy's advantage by assisting an enormous Chinese troop deployment into North Vietnam.<sup>29</sup>

Another missed opportunity was the destruction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Johnson ignored many recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put American ground forces into Laos in order to carry out the destruction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Viet Cong insurgency could not have brought the Saigon government close to collapse without the support of North Vietnamese men and equipment funneled into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Orthodox historians, like Halberstam, have argued that an American ground troop presence in Laos would not have stopped most of the infiltration, but new evidence proves that the United States missed some important opportunities to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Moyar.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Unlike all of the above authors, Lewis Sorley, a post-revisionist, does not even admit defeat. In his book, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam*, he argues that General Creighton W. Abrams had succeeded in effectively winning the war by 1971, however, this victory was giving away by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the bargaining table in Paris in 1972-1973. Sorley claims that General C. Westmoreland focused on "search and destroy" missions that neglected the pacification program, but after General Abrams took over, it was "a better war." Also, Westmoreland failed to provide the effective training crucial to the South Vietnamese army's ability to take the lead in the war effort. The result was an escalation of the war with heavy casualties and a rising protest in the United States.<sup>31</sup>

It is often said that time is the greatest healer of pain. However, even today, the Vietnam War continues to be a difficult and sore subject. As stated earlier, orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist scholars offer three differing views regarding this challenging period of American history. The general public and orthodox scholars seem to dispute the revisionist and post-revisionist views, partly because they are less published and carry fewer supporters in the academic world. However, the public and historians are still learning new information about the war with each passing day, and this new information will continue to give fresh insight and produce more revisionist and post-revisionist historians. The contentious debate over the Vietnam War is far from over. While the Vietnam War debate continues to loom around these three academic views, new attention has been brought to the Vietnamese side of the story. Literature regarding the war has been dominated by American scholars searching through American produced documents. As historian Huynh Kim Khanh argues, Vietnam is regarded as "a battlefield or a piece of real estate to be fought over" and its people "as passive bystanders in a historical process engineered elsewhere."<sup>32</sup> New declassified information will continue to raise questions among historians, which will push this debate far into the future.

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<sup>31</sup> Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harvest Book Harcourt, 1999).

<sup>32</sup> Huynh Kim Khanh, "The Making and Unmaking of 'Free Vietnam,'" *Pacific Affairs* 60 (Fall 1987): 474.

## Ancient Ballgames of Mesoamerica

### Melissa Ortiz

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When the Spanish first sailed to Latin America they found several large, well organized civilizations occupying the land. In the late 1500s several Spanish accounts describe a game played by the native peoples of Mesoamerica. Their interest in the game arose from a bouncing hard ball. Franciscan monk, Fray Toribio de Benavente, stated that “the balls of this land are very heavy, and the Indians run and jump so much that it is as if the balls have quicksilver within.”<sup>1</sup> Pedro Martir de Angleria Spanish royal historian from 1520-1526, wrote that “I don’t understand how when the balls hit the ground they are sent into the air with such incredible bounce.”<sup>2</sup>

The Mesoamericans played the game on a ballcourt designed to correlate with their religious and astronomic beliefs. Even the most insignificant items, such as the equipment worn by the players, had specific meaning. These games were more than just a sport. The ballgame could replace full-scale war, determining the winner of a conflict, based solely on the outcome of the game. The games signified important forms of both entertainment and ritual, in which lives and honor were gambled along with money and material goods. The losers of the game were expected to die with honor; and crying and begging for their lives was unthinkable. The idea of the losers’ honor, how they portrayed themselves as they died, remained of great import in the minds of the Mesoamerican people. The ballgames incorporated religious beliefs about immortals, creation, and

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<sup>1</sup> “Explore the ballgame.” An online educational companion to the traveling exhibition of The Sport of Life and Death: The Mesoamerican Ballgames. <http://www.ballgame.org>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

various myths, to formulate the rules and traditions of the game. These games proved an important part of Mesoamerican culture.<sup>3</sup>

### **Types of Ballcourts**

Masonry courts were only built in the largest cities and the main trading centers. The upper class built ballcourts near ceremonial locations or markets. Various types of courts were found in large and smaller cities throughout Mesoamerica. Ballcourts were often “I” shaped, with two tall structures forming the top and bottom lines of a letter “I.” However, there were simple linear courts, which did not have the “I” shaped structures.<sup>4</sup>

### **The Ballgame**

Scoring depended on the game. There were several rings which, like basketball, could give the team points when participants threw the ball through them. In some places, corncobs were used to keep track of points; whoever had the most at the end won.<sup>5</sup> However, if participants threw the ball through a ring mounted on the wall of the court, immediate victory would result.

Both young and adult men played the game, and, on the ballcourt, class divisions disappeared.<sup>6</sup> When on the field the men were equal. The teams would consist of “teams of two, three, and occasionally as many as nine to eleven players.”<sup>7</sup> Usually, they played in two teams of two.<sup>8</sup> Various rules governed the ways in which the players could touch the ball.

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<sup>3</sup> Mary Ellen Miller, “The Ballgame.” Record of the Art Museum, Princeton University 48 (1989): 22.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> John Gerard Fox, “Playing with Power: Ballcourts and Political Ritual in Southern Mesoamerica.” *Current Anthropology* 37 (June 1996): 493.

<sup>6</sup> Vernon Scarborough and David Wilcox, *The Mesoamerican Ballgame* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991): 9.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> Miller, 22.

Players could use only the buttocks, hips and knees to hit the ball. The restricted means of striking the ball lent the game the name hip ball.

Many Mesoamerican myths talk about dividing the body into upper and lower parts. The ball could only be hit where these two parts connected. At this connection, players often wore a yoke, which separated these two parts, and was believed to put a player in and out of the Underworld at the same time. The courts themselves were usually divided into two or four parts, representing the two or four divisions of the body, constellations, or the four parts of earth. Furthermore, this separation was represented in the courts between the north nations, the sun, and the southern nations, the moon.

One group of people went a step further and incorporated this division to the initiation of boys. The Apinaye of South America held the games for boys undergoing their initiation into adulthood.<sup>9</sup>

### **Equipment of Ancient Ballgames**

According to tradition, when the Hero Twins fought the gods, in the Underworld, they only used what items they had from the living world. Depending on the variation of each region's myths, these items became the role for the equipment used in the Mesoamerican ballcourts. The sort of clothing and equipment used, even the ball, varied by region. Most of these items no longer exist and their exact use and significance is not clear. Yet, there are some clues in the form of figurines, found in excavations, and depicted in written documents. Some figurines have protective gear on, such as "a yoke at waist, a wrap on the left hand, and a pad on the left knee onto which they would fall when striking the ball."<sup>10</sup> In their original form, these pads were probably made of reed, wood, or cloth.<sup>11</sup> Some types of pads may have been for certain ceremonies or as markers of victorious

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<sup>9</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 328.

<sup>10</sup> Miller, 25-26.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 26.



ballplayers. Although restricted to use their hands, they did have hand protectors. It is not certain why they needed hand protectors, except to protect the bones in the hand. Usually only three fingers would fit in the handle. In addition, there are some headstones, which could have been awarded to the winning side.<sup>12</sup>

### **Roles of the Ballgames in Mesoamerican life**

The Mesoamerican ballgames were used for many purposes, from simple games in the dirt to complex ceremonial rituals in large cities. Evidence shows that there was a great amount of food involved in the games. Moreover, archaeologists uncovered many utensils, such as empty plates and bowls, which probably contained food in them, now long since decomposed. Scholars believed that Mesoamericans used food dedication rituals of the ballcourts.<sup>13</sup> Numerous artifacts indicate that Mesoamericans also used ballcourts for sacrificial burials. In the supernatural courts, items like precious jewels would take on symbolic meanings. For example, a greenstone and a Spondylus shell could be the universe. In the Tikal's Triple ballcourt, there is evidence that "two females were placed within the benches of the two central structures in the seated positions, facing each other across the ballcourt alley."<sup>14</sup> Such sacrifices honored the dead, for it was believed that the life of the people killed gave life to the newly dedicated building, which in turn meant that it was also giving life to the whole community.

The ballgame created extensive connections for communication and trade. Villages competed against each other, which involving men and women. These competitions were not just in the ballcourts. There were contests of many kinds between the people within their village. Feasting, dancing, singing, and mock warfare ensued:

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>13</sup> Fox, 486.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 487.

When the two groups came together, they began to dance. The dancing was continued for three hours. The songs this first night gave their reasons for being joyful. The second night, the songs told of the valor and agility of their ball players. The following day, the women occupied themselves in preparing a feast for the day of the contest. If the challenging village won, the visitors were given a great feast, but, if it lost, the visitors were given nothing, the losers consoling themselves by eating the feast alone.<sup>15</sup>

The games were a social event. People mingled and enjoyed themselves, often casting bets in attempts to gain wealth.<sup>16</sup> For most Mesoamericans, the games served as a form of entertainment. For elites, the ballgames presented an opportunity to increase personal power and prestige, or to negotiate with other leaders. Depending on the amount of wealth, and the rank of a particular person in society, elites might wager vast amounts of wealth.<sup>17</sup> "Spectators wagered their finely woven mantles, with losers fleeing the courts leaving a trail of garments behind them."<sup>18</sup>

Ballcourts also served as a fertility ritual. Because of such extensive feasting, historians believe these events were set around harvest time, when food supplies would have been most abundant. With these harvest feasts, negotiations about village relationships could take place.

Ballgames were a way for two rivaling villages to compete and fight without having to engage in traditional warfare. The outcome on the field represented the outcome of the battle; some would lose wagers and honor, while the losing team would lose their lives. In addition, the

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<sup>15</sup> Fox, 493.

<sup>16</sup> Miller, 22.

<sup>17</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 14-17.

<sup>18</sup> Miller, 22.

ballcourts were used as a “public reenactment of warfare.”<sup>19</sup> In this case, prisoners from a defeated enemy were forced to play ballplayers from the city of the victors. Thus, the ballgame signified ways to portray the victory of a battle.

The ballgames were seen as a replication of the movements of the planet Venus, the moon, and the sun. Ballcourts were pathways to the underworld. One story, *Popol Vuh*, written by a Mayan noble in Central America, narrates the tale of two sets of twin brothers and underworld gods. The brothers go to the underworld and the first set of them are killed and given to the gods, but the second set of brothers defeat the underworld gods several times. The brothers travel to heaven and now represent the planet Venus and the Sun.<sup>20</sup> Walter Krickeberg developed one idea centered on the story of *Popol Vuh*. He states that the games represented “a symbolic reenactment of the struggle between day and night, between light and darkness. It therefore symbolized the daily and seasonal journey of the sun and other celestial bodies, and their cyclical descent through the Underworld, and ascent into the sky.”<sup>21</sup>

### **Origin of the Ballgames**

Each village contained its own legend about the foundation of the ballcourts; therefore, each ballcourt represented the village’s identity. Two examples follow:

After the Mexica had reached Coatepec and established their villages and the temple of their patron god, Huitzilopochtli, they were instructed by that god to build a ballcourt. In these migration legends, the transformation of the wild, uninhabitable spaces into

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<sup>19</sup> Miller, 23.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>21</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 319.

controlled, social places was partly accomplished through the imposition on the landscape of public, ritual architecture.<sup>22</sup>

Another legend stated the following:

In another Central Mexican account, the native chronicler, Ixtlilxochitl, cited in Leyenaar, tells us that Topiltzin, the ruler of Tula, proposed to his three rivals that the four of them rule his realm together and presented them with a model of a ballcourt made of four kinds of precious stone. In this case, the ballcourt symbolically represented Topiltzin's domain and all of its wealth and resources.<sup>23</sup>

### **Winners and Losers**

While in society the players were separated by rank, blood, and class; in the ballcourts they were divided into winners and losers. The winners would finish the day in victory, living on to play another game, while becoming champions for their village. The winners were also given the honor of being able to drink Chicha, a fermented drink typically made of maize.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, Mesoamericans often sacrificed the losers to their gods, generally by decapitating them. In the Great Ballcourts of Chichen Itza, serpents or squashed plants depicted the neck of a person, once the decapitation finished.<sup>25</sup>

### **Sacrifice and the "Rolling Heads" Myths**

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<sup>22</sup> Fox, 485.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 485.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 493.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 493.

Researchers believe the rubber ball was created in the tropical lowlands, where rubber sources grew naturally and existed high supply.<sup>26</sup> In places where no rubber balls existed, documents show that human heads were used instead. One Seneca myth describes this:

A cannibal killed a woman and ate all but her head, breasts, and the boy twins she was pregnant with, which he placed in a hollow tree. The boys survived on the milk in the breasts and were later discovered by their father, who made them ball clubs and a ball to play with. The mother's skull was still alive, and in fear of it the boys and their father fled. The father, helped by his invisible brother, was chased by his wife's flying skull until it was finally killed. After the skull was dead, it was used as a ball in a game.<sup>27</sup>

Sacrifice played an important role for the ballgames. There are many accounts from art pieces, artifacts, and bones to confirm this practice. However, Mesoamericans used various means of execution, the primacy of decapitation in the act of ritual sacrifice remains uncertain. In *Popol Vuh*, many references to decapitation exist, though not for sacrificial reasons. For example, one person did not die when losing his head and the other was already dead.<sup>28</sup> The actual deaths were by other means. One set of twins were killed before the ballgame, but the method was unknown. In another story, from the same sacred source of the Mayas, another twin's head was cut off, but his twin brother gave him a pumpkin as a replacement. This second set of twins won the game, but allowed themselves to be put into a

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<sup>26</sup> Vernon Scarborough, Beverly Mitchum, Sorraya Carr, and David Freidel, "Two Late Preclassic Ballcourts at the Lowland Maya Center of Cerros, Northern Belize," *Journal of Field Archaeology* 9 (Spring 1982): 21.

<sup>27</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 327-328.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 321-328.

stone oven and burned to death, by their enemies. They were revived and killed again; this time with their limbs were scattered and their hearts and head removed. Removing the heart represented the most important act of sacrifice in several Mesoamerican regions. Many mythical stories portrayed the head living without the rest of the body.<sup>29</sup>

There is evidence to suggest that some nations used human heads instead of a rubber ball. Many paintings and stories offer examples of heads used for balls and games in which the balls have faces. Since the purpose of the game was to keep the ball moving, the bouncing behavior of rubber made it a perfect material for ball construction. Several myths depict heads that could move on their own. In this respect, decapitation would “bring about not a lifeless head, but a head that, once freed from the body, could jump, roll, and fly.”<sup>30</sup> Thus the term, *rolling heads*, or *rolling skulls*, are found in many stories throughout the New World. The Apinaye, in South America, only played ballgames for a boy’s initiation. To coincide with the *rolling heads* legend, they used rubber balls based on a myth:

A man who attacked people at night with his sharpened leg-bone was beaten to death by villagers, who cut off his head. His head jumped away, and returned in the daytime to attack the people, but they tricked it into falling into a hole and covered it with dirt. Later, youths going through their initiation came across the spot and noticed a rubber tree growing out of the head’s grave. Using the sap from the tree they made the first rubber balls for the rubber-ball game.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 321-328.

<sup>30</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 326.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 328.

There are also stories where rubber balls represented the moon, constellations, or the Sun. In addition, some believe that the loss of a game was a symbolic severing from society. Therefore, decapitation and dismembering of body parts portrayed this disconnection. Not only does the person lose life but also the connection to the body, which in turn represents the larger disjunction of culture, and a link to the constellations. These ideas can be used to describe aspects of the harvest and fertility. Both social interaction and agricultural fertility remained two of the central roles of the games. The myths associated with decapitation and these two themes correlate together.<sup>32</sup>

### **End of the Ballgames**

People played ballgames all over Mesoamerica. Although each area had slight variations to the game, the overall definition of what a ballgame was and how it was to be played remained fairly similar. Ballgames had such an impact on the lives of the Mesoamerican world, and were so popular, that the gulf coast nations sent a tribute of 16,000 rubber balls a year to an inland king.<sup>33</sup> The ballgames were tightly interwoven into the everyday life of society. The ballgames incorporated the culture of Mesoamerican societies, which now aids archaeologists with learning about forms of Mesoamerican entertainment. The ballgames displayed the power, prestige, honor, and beliefs of these people. The games proved how complex these societies, later called savage and uncivilized by foreign invaders, really were at the height of their rule. These games are no longer played. Ultimately, the Mesoamerican civilization would fall to disease and Spanish conquerors.

When the Spanish came, with their Christian beliefs, any practice that worshiped any creator but the Christian god was prohibited, which, of course, meant that the act of sacrifice was not tolerated. The game which

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 325-330.

<sup>33</sup> Scarborough and Wilcox, 9.

had been played for 3,000 years ended not long after the Spanish invasions.<sup>34</sup> By 1589, all the ballgames had ended, although a few Spaniards wrote accounts of a few games, and some artifacts have been preserved. These are mere glimpses at the earliest form of organized sport in Mesoamerica.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Miller, 22.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.



## The Many Faces of the Cristero Rebellion

### Sonya Leigh Scott

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The power struggle simmering between the Catholic Church and the Mexican national government erupted with Catholic bishops and priests suspending religious worship in protest of the anticlerical policies of the Calles administration on July 31, 1926.<sup>1</sup> President Plutarco Elias Calles called for “submission to the law,” known as Calles Law, that implemented anticlerical conditions set forth in the Constitution of 1917.<sup>2</sup> Laws that controlled property rights in Article 27 of the Constitution forbade Church ownership of property and limited foreign ownership. All land served the public interest by the protection of communal rights of indigenous groups and redistribution of land under control of a strong national government.<sup>3</sup> Under Calles’ Law, the government nationalized all church buildings, outlawed religious houses, banned public religious functions, and required priests to register in order to avoid severe fines or imprisonment.<sup>4</sup>

Examination of the Cristero Rebellion as simply a conflict between church and state misses the many faces, or nuances, that surrounded the uprising. In the work of historians from Jean Meyer, in the 1970s, to Ramon Jrade in the 1980s, and more recently the works of Jennie Purnell and Adrian Bantjes, reveals a multilayered portrait of the rebellion. The secular nature and the anticlerical position of the Calles administration are clear. What proves more complex, however, is how the conflict is defined. Was the rebellion a “holy war” with religious motivations? Was the conflict based in an economic struggle between a variety of peasant groups

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<sup>1</sup> Matthew Butler, “The ‘Liberal’ Cristero: Ladislao Molina and the Cristero Rebellion in Michoacan, 1927-9.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, no. 3 (October, 1999): 645; Jennie Purnell, *Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), 72.

<sup>2</sup> Purnell, 76.

<sup>3</sup> Earl Shorris, *The Life and Times of Mexico* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 272; Purnell, 76.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew Butler, “The Church in ‘Red Mexico’: Michoacan Catholics and the Mexican Revolution, 1920-1929,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 55, no. 3 (July, 2004): 530.

and the policies of a strong national government? Was the rebellion the culmination of long-standing grievances between the Church and the state? Or, as Purnell suggests, was the rebellion the articulation of factional conflicts between various communities that included economic, political, regional, and community concerns?<sup>5</sup>

This paper examines the complexities of the Cristero Rebellion, exploring the motivations of the many factions that emerged on both sides of the conflict and the many faces of the participants. The rebellion cannot be characterized as purely a battle between two dominating forces. Like much of Mexican history, the story of the rebellion is one of continuing struggle for political, economic, and regional autonomy among a variety of groups. Indeed, the portrait of the Cristero Rebellion has many facets, each with its own interests, ideologies, hopes, and dreams.

### **The Face of the State**

In 1925, Tabasco *cacique* Tomas Garrido Canabal criticized Catholic clerics and stated that “the cassocked vultures have seized their prey, digging their talons into the heart of the Indian, who is less prepared than any other race to resist the seduction of the whole ritual farse.”<sup>6</sup> President Plutarco Elias Calles, like Canabal, believed that the power of the Church obstructed modernization and that he must eliminate the power of the Church and its domination of the peasantry.<sup>7</sup> Calles wanted absolute control and was suspicious of the politicization of the Church after the creation of a fairly successful Catholic Party in 1912. Although the party had dissolved, Calles sought to rid Mexico of the potential for Church control.

The origins of the ideology of de-fanaticization were found in radical liberalism of the nineteenth-century scientific positivism, Marxism, and Protestantism. Mexican revolutionaries understood the revolution as more than an economic struggle, but also one of spirituality. They considered religion, like many of their Russian counterparts, a “drug” and the “Catholic ritual [...] a seductive trick designed to exploit ignorant

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<sup>5</sup> Purnell, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Manifiesto a los obreros organizados de la republica y al elemento revolucionario* (Villehermosa, Tabasco, 1925), 9-10 in Adrian A. Bantjes, “Idolatry and Iconoclasm in Revolutionary Mexico: The De-Christianization Campaigns, 1929-1940.” *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 13, no. 1. (Winter, 1997): 94.

<sup>7</sup> Butler, 520.

peasants 'hallucinated by floats, adorned with clouds, little angels, chalices and all the artifice the clergy uses to cheat them out of their last penny.'"<sup>8</sup> They clerics accused of sustaining the "backwards" nature of rural peasantry and presenting an obstacle to the formation of a modern state.

However, the development of a secular state was not the only motivation for Calles' actions toward the Church. Following the February 1926 proclamation of the "primate of Mexico" in which he "repeated a 1917 declaration that the Church did not recognize the constitution," Calles proceeded to fully implement all the provisions of the Constitution regarding the Church.<sup>9</sup> He called for "submission to the law" that would be required anywhere and explained that this did not indicate the 'decatholicisation' of Mexico.<sup>10</sup> The Church antagonized Calles who already sought its end, or at least minimizing its strong presence in Mexico.

The State sought to end what they believed to be the hegemony of the Church over the Mexican people, in particular, indigenous and rural populations. In order to modernize, the secular state must rid Mexico of fanaticism and mysticism that kept the people 'backwards' and without a national identity. The Mexican government wanted absolute control over the social, cultural, economic, and political lives of the people, and the Church was considered a significant obstacle.

### **The Face of the Church**

The Catholic Church, although present in the daily life of many Mexicans and a fixture in many rural communities, was noticeably absent from the rebellion. The majority of priests, according to Jean Meyer, were quite hostile to the *cristeros*. Meyer found that in January 1927, out of 3,600 priests, only five were participated in the rebellion. One hundred priests were "actively hostile," sixty-five were neutral but provided support to the *cristeros*, forty were "actively favorable," and 3,600 priests left their parishes.<sup>11</sup> The Vatican had forbade bishops and priests aiding the insurgents and demanded that they follow the law of the land. Many feared persecution as priests had been attacked and murdered and so fled to the

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<sup>8</sup>Guanajuato Vecminos Moroleon, to Sec. Gob., 31 December 1934, DGG 2.347, exp. 2.347(8)15257, AGN in Bantjes, 96.

<sup>9</sup> Butler, *Church*, 521.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Meyer, 75.

cities or went into hiding in the hinterlands of Mexico under the protection of their parishes.<sup>12</sup>

Mexican clerics suspended of worship on 31 July, 1926, in order to encourage private worship. This was “an attempt to put the sacraments and the clergy beyond the reach of civil law.”<sup>13</sup> However, the “majority of clergy withdrew from rural areas and sought refuge in the big towns under the control of the Government.”<sup>14</sup> Not only did the majority of priests withdraw from their parishes, they encouraged nonviolence, patience, and humility. According to Aurelio Acevedo, one of the *cristero* rebels, “the very Fathers forbade us to fight for Christ, for the religion our fathers taught us and then reaffirmed for us in baptism, confirmation and our first communion.”<sup>15</sup> Many priests offered sermons opposing the *cristeros*, calling them ‘cattle-thieves’ and discouraging parishioners from participation in rebel activities.<sup>16</sup>

A few priests, such as Fr. Adolfo Arroyo, the vicar of Valparaiso, stayed with his parishioners and joined the rebellion in defense of the Church. Fr. Arroyo criticized his fellow priests and wrote, “The overwhelming majority of the bishops and priests, displaying a criminal degree of conformism, wallowed in an accursed inertia, all expecting sheer miracle from Heaven to give liberty to the Church.” They were content to give exhortations and say a few prayers. The priests had recourse to theology and, without further consideration, announced the illicit nature of the violent struggle in defence of the Church.<sup>17</sup> Msgr. Gonzalez y Valencia, Archbishop of Durango wrote in a pastoral letter on February 11, 1927, “We never provoked this armed movement. But now that this movements exists, and all peaceful means have been exhausted, to our Catholic sons who have risen in arms for the defence of their social and religious rights ... we must say: be tranquil in your consciences and receive our blessing.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 69.

<sup>13</sup> Butler, 531.

<sup>14</sup> Meyer, 70.

<sup>15</sup> Interview of Meyer with Aurelio Acevedo, in Meyer, *Cristeros*, 70.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Archives of Aurelio Acevedo, notes on the religious persecution, armed defense, and agreements, by Fr. Adolfo Arroyo, MS of 8 pp., 24 January 1934, in Meyer, *Cristeros*, 69-70.

<sup>18</sup> “Outside the Flamimian Gate,” pastoral letter of Msgr. Gonzalez y Valencia, 11 February 1927. Original sheet in the possession of Jean Meyer (double sheet written on recto and verso), in Meyer, *Cristeros*, 67.

Because of Vatican-issued orders that bishops and priests abandon their parishes and spiritual duties, and submit to the mandates of the Constitution, priests rarely supported the rebellion. Fear of persecution and death also created a barrier to clerical support, although many priests found ways to remain with their parishioners as spiritual leaders and conduct the sacraments covertly. The face of the Church was not represented among the *cristeros*, only the presence of a few priests who felt they could not and would not abandon their charges. If the rebellion was a conflict between the Church and the state, the Church was missing.

### **The Faces of the Cristeros**

In ideological, socioeconomic, and geographical terms, the *cristeros* were the most diverse of all the actors in the rebellion. They were, in other words, not engaged in a large collective action, rather the *cristeros* represented numerous causes and concerns, not all of which were religious. Jennie Purnell writes that “communities did not rebel *en masse* during the *cristiada* unless revolutionary anticlericalism and agrarianism attacked local resources, values, and institutions that had been successfully defended until the revolution itself.”<sup>19</sup> In fact, the peasants were deeply divided on the issue of rebellion and their opinions reflected their economic interests, the impact of agrarian reform on their villages and towns, and their feelings toward local authorities. Although various communities and factions shared religious beliefs, there were differing political viewpoints.<sup>20</sup> The rebellion acquired the name *cristero* because of the battle cry “¡Viva Cristo Rey!” and not necessarily because they shared a single view.<sup>21</sup>

Some *cristeros* engaged in rebellion for purely political and economic reasons. Ladislao Molina, a large landowner in Michoacan, did not demonstrate any religious motivation, and was known to embrace liberal ideology first, and Catholicism second.<sup>22</sup> According to Jose Perez, a delegate to the National League for the Defence of Religious Liberty (LNDLR), writing to his superiors, “he is not a *cristero*: whilst he is a Catholic, he is also a liberal, and does not fight for the same reasons as the

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<sup>19</sup> Purnell, 19.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Ramon Jrade, “Inquiries into the Cristero Insurrection against the Mexican Revolution.” *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 2. (1985): 54.

<sup>22</sup> Butler, 645.

Catholics. He has his own point of view, but it is personal.”<sup>23</sup> In the case of Molina, and most likely others like him, “Catholicism served as a dissident ideology for resisting state encroachments on his sphere of influence.”<sup>24</sup>

Some of the *cristeros* focused their revolutionary efforts on the local *agraristas* who benefited from Cardenas-era land reforms.<sup>25</sup> Agrarian land reform created sporadic problems throughout Mexico as villages and towns lost territorial autonomy. However, the problem for the *cristeros* did not necessarily revolve around the *agraristas*, it revolved around religion with political overtones. *Cristero* Jose Gonzalez Romo wrote in a letter to *agrarista* Jesus Morfin, “Tell the agraristas that we are not fighting them because they are agraristas, but because they support the tyrant who is trying to wipe out the religion of our country and hand us over to the Protestant Gringos.”<sup>26</sup> Government control over land distribution often meant foreign ownership and control, the previous statement suggests that some *cristeros* saw a connection between elimination of the Catholic Church, and the introduction of liberal, state-controlled, and foreign-based exploitation.

Despite the economic and political tones of the rebellion, defense of religion still motivated many of the *cristeros*. Because of their commitment to Church restoration, they often defied the Church’s instruction to obey the laws and observe restraint and non-violence. In a letter to the parish priest, the Quintanar Brigade wrote, “without their permission and without their orders we are throwing ourselves into this blessed struggle for our liberty, and without their permission and without their orders we will go on until we conquer or die.”<sup>27</sup> Many *cristeros* “believed they were fighting a ‘holy war’ against an anticlerical government frequently depicted as the Anti-Christ.”<sup>28</sup>

According to Javier Villa-Flores, during periods of “accelerated cultural, political, and economic change,” increased religious and spiritual

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<sup>23</sup> Archivo Aurelio Robles Acevedo, Mexico City, caja 20/expediente 90/foja 14117, Perez to Guerrero, Morelia, 22 February 1929, in Butler, *Molina*, 646.

<sup>24</sup> Butler, 649.

<sup>25</sup> James Krippner-Martinez, “Invoking ‘Tato Vasco’: Vasco de Quiroga, Eighteenth –Twentieth Centuries,” *The Americas* 56, no. 3. (January, 2000): 23.

<sup>26</sup> Archives of the Society of Jesus, Mexican Province, 9 April 1929 in Meyer, *Cristeros*, 107.

<sup>27</sup> Archives of Aurelio Acevedo; collective letter of the Quintanar Brigade to the parish priest of Mesquitic, Norberto Reyes, in Meyer, *Cristeros*, 71.

<sup>28</sup> Javier Villa-Flores, “Religion, Politics, and Salvation: Latin American Millenarian Movements,” *Radical History Review* Issue 99 (Fall, 2007): 246.

participation is common.<sup>29</sup> He suggests that the *cristeros*, in response to crisis, mobilized around a religious belief that served as a source of motivation.<sup>30</sup> Alliances and grassroots defense of the Church solidified in response to the rapid changes the government attempted to impose.<sup>31</sup> In fact, *cristeros* were not only found in peasant communities and rural villages, but in urban areas as well, although their character and composition were significantly different.

In the cities, large urban networks formed. They engaged in clandestine operations collecting taxes for supplies, obtaining ammunition and food to sustain the rebels, and formed elaborate communication networks. Workers and artisans, along with professionals filled the urban ranks of the *cristeros*. Women played a critical role as *cristeros*. They carried messages, ammunition, obtained and delivered food, among many other duties, at great peril.<sup>32</sup> What united the *cristeros* was their need to cope with and respond to government controls over every aspect of their lives. Government attacks against the Church mobilized the *cristeros*. The Church, in many ways, was the symbol of autonomy, of cultural identity, an institution that sustained the people through decades of turmoil.

### Conclusion

The question remains, after this short discussion of the actors of the Cristero Rebellion, was this a conflict based on religion, or was it more a conflict between competing factions based on economic and political interests? We have seen that the Church as an institution played a very minor role, if any role at all. We have also seen that economics and local interests figured strongly in mobilizing the *cristeros* as in the ongoing conflict between the *agraristas* and the peasants. Agrarian and land reform provided much of the fuel for the *cristiada*.

Religion served as a common denominator mobilizing the lower and middle class against the elite. Devotion to the church bound diverse anti-government sentiments, and the government's action against the Church and religious freedom were springboards that propelled the *cristiada*. In the Cristero Rebellion a variety of concerns converged, and the Church served as a symbol and catalyst for anti-government expression. The desire of the

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 243.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 242.

<sup>31</sup> Butler, 525.

<sup>32</sup> Meyer, 95, 128-130.

government to inflict its control over Mexican life and create a new national identity based on secular terms intensified the commitment of many Catholics to practice their religion, with or without clerical guidance or support.

Religion ultimately served as the spark that set the wheels of rebellion in motion. But religion was not the sole motivation for the rebellion. In the end, it appears the Cristero Rebellion was not a conflict of the Church and the state, rather a power struggle between the autonomy of peasants, workers, and the middle class against the elites and the government.



## Fractured Fraternity: *Altérité* and the FLN

### Chad R. Cussen

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*...Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and would not blush as if I had committed a crime...However, I will not die for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist.*<sup>1</sup>

Ferhat Abbas

*...Par delà la légende politique et les fictions juridiques de l'Algérie « terre de France en Afrique », notre pays est une colonie, dont l'originalité est d'être à la fois d'exploitation et de peuplement.*<sup>2</sup>

Hocine Aït Ahmed

*...Si la peur donne des ailes et fait perdre tout jugement, elle fait dire aussi des bêtises. C'est ainsi que la période héroïque de 1936, au cours de laquelle la conscience nationale a été éveillée par le venue de l'Étoile Nord-Africaine en Algérie, est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.*<sup>3</sup>

Declaration by followers of Messali Hadj, spring 1954

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<sup>1</sup> Ferhat Abbas, *La Nuit Coloniale* (Paris: René Julliard, 1962), 19.

<sup>2</sup> Hocine Aït Ahmed, *Memoires d'un Combattant: L'Esprit d'indépendance, 1942-1952* (Paris: Sylvie Messinger, 1983), 55. Unless otherwise noted all translations are my own. (Beyond the political legend and legal fictions of Algeria 'Land of France in Africa,' our country is a colony, whose originality is of being both for exploitation and for [French] settlement.)

<sup>3</sup> Followers of Messali Hadj, "Le Point de Vue Messaliste: Le Congrès Nationale Algérien," *Le FLN Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962*, Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier eds. (Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 25. (If fear takes flight and makes one lose all judgment, it also makes one say stupid things. Thus, the heroic period of 1936, during which national conscience was awakened up by the arrival of North-African Star in Algeria, was described as a period of fratricide). The North-African Star formed in 1926 under the auspices of Algerian workers in Paris. Messali Hadj became its president in 1927 and "superimposed" proletarian doctrine over the early religious and liberal nationalist movements. This form of popular socialism became a staple component of Algerian politics in the FLN and after independence.

In 1954, Algerian leaders of the *Front de Libération National* (FLN) joyously declared independence from metropolitan France and aspired for a unified Algeria. French colonialism, however, created deep divisions within the FLN. These divisions were not formed spontaneously in 1954, but through a long process and relationship with metropolitan France. Algerian leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Ahmed Messali Hadj, experienced French colonialism differently, and formulated their own visions of an independent Algeria. Some, like Hocine Aït Ahmed, exposed French imperialism and conceptualized perceptions of the “other.” For others, like Ferhat Abbas, *altérité* (otherness) remained a foreign concept and demanded French citizenship status. Still, indigenous leaders came together and formed the FLN on November 1, 1954. Political unity remained ambiguous and Algerian leaders adopted distinct language that worked for, but also against, independence. Algerian political leaders were more fractured than united, partly as a result of the imperial legacy and partly due to an assimilation of ideas, permeated through the adoption of specific language that proved unable to solidify Algerian leadership. This paper seeks to tease out the various perspectives held by the FLN leaders, and in that way to present the viewpoints of the “other.”

### **Colonial Context: French Imperial Legacies and Nationalist Formation**

French imperial authorities entered Algiers in 1830 and promised quiet occupation while respecting indigenous society, culture, and religion. Algerian had, then, two distinct ethnic groups: Berbers and Arabs. Berbers, the country’s indigenous population, constituted roughly thirty percent of the population—Arabs seventy percent.<sup>4</sup> After 1830, Algerians competed with a third group: *ped noirs*, or *colons*.<sup>5</sup> A diverse group, the *ped noirs* settled Algeria under the encouragement of metropolitan French authorities. The *ped noirs* were not, however, ethnically homogenous. Spanish, Italian, Maltese, and French constituted a large portion of those

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<sup>4</sup> Henry Jackson, *The FLN in Algeria* (London: Greenwood Press, 1977), 3-5.

<sup>5</sup> This literally translates “black feet” for French military boots. *Colons* will also be used as an interchangeable term.

who emigrated and settled in Algeria. The French imperial army famously coined the term *méditerranéens-et-demi* (half Mediterranean) to describe the *ped noirs*.<sup>6</sup> In 1841, 37,374 *ped noirs* occupied Algeria.<sup>7</sup> In only ten years, this number grew to nearly 131,000.<sup>8</sup> Only one European in five constituted as ethnically “French” in 1917.<sup>9</sup> Regardless, the French presence in Algeria supported these colonial ventures and reinforced *ped noir* supremacy over Algerian Arab and Berber populations. *Pied noir* settlement coincided with French aspirations and new imperialist values even before the scramble for Africa. Napoleonic war veteran Thomas-Robert Bugeaud stated to the French National Assembly that ‘wherever there is fresh water and fertile land [in Algeria], there one must locate *colons*, without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong.’<sup>10</sup>

Thus, France proclaimed Algeria an essential component of its empire. While Bugeaud lamented Algeria’s strategic and practical value, French authorities immediately recognized Algeria’s value as something uniquely “French.” In 1848, the French government officially departmentalized Algeria, giving it distinct “French” qualities.<sup>11</sup> The French colonial press antagonized this uniqueness as well. Jonathon Gosnell noted this influence: “the printed word indeed helped to redefine the meaning of the nation as one no longer restricted to one particular geographic body of group of people.”<sup>12</sup> Colonial newspapers dominated Algeria from 1830 to 1965, and inundated “Frenchness” into Algeria. More importantly, French rhetoric and action signified Algeria as an extension of France itself. Imperial authorities divided the country into three *départements*, thus using distinct metropolitan terms to define Algeria.<sup>13</sup> French assimilationist policies fomented early Algerian nationalist

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<sup>6</sup> Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: The New York Review of Books, 1977), 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>8</sup> Jackson, 5.

<sup>9</sup> Horne, 51.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>11</sup> Jonathon K. Gosnell, *The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria: 1930-1954* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 73.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>13</sup> Horne, 30.

movements, but these early nationalists sought integration rather than divorce. From 1830 to the Great War, Algerian nationalism remained relatively quiet and undeveloped—partly the consequences of assimilationist policy. This changed by the 1920s and 1930s. In 1938, Rabah Zenati echoed Ferhat Abbas: “it is, in short, inadmissible that it [the Algerian administration] should pretend to continue treating today’s native, especially when he has been educated in the great French schools, like his grandfather of one hundred years ago.”<sup>14</sup> Such sentiment reflected assimilationist legacies, which stemmed from metropolitan legislative measures during the late nineteenth century. The French National Congress adopted these measures *en masse*:

[France should] inspire French sentiments among the natives, to favor French colonization by all possible means, to assimilate the European foreigners [...] [and adopt] a special naturalization compatible with the maintenance of their personal statuses (under Moslem law) to those who fulfill certain conditions and offer certain guarantees [...] to become entitled after a delay of ten years to occupy a place in the metropolitan chambers [...] [and] sufficient financial resources should be created [...] [and] accessible to the entire school-age population.<sup>15</sup>

As incipient nationalist forces digested these promises, important discourse resulted that developed, transformed, and permeated various nationalist conceptions of “Algeria.” While other French colonies also experienced assimilation, Algeria represented something unique, at least for the metropolitans. French metropolitan rhetoric exemplified these sentiments. Early Algerian nationalist forces recognized this uniqueness; however, Algerian voices became increasingly emphatic after important international crises exploded during the early twentieth century.

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<sup>14</sup> Rabah Zenati, *Le Problème Algérien vu par un Indigène* (Paris: Comté de l’Afrique Française, 1938), 31. Also quoted in *A Savage War of Peace*, 15.

<sup>15</sup> Robert O. Collins, ed. *Historical Problems of Imperial Africa* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 150.

With Franz Ferdinand's assassination at the hands of proto-nationalist Serbs, Europe spent the next four years destroying one another. In Algeria, French authorities drafted 173,000 *indigènes* into the metropolitan army, and they fought and died as temporary French citizens.<sup>16</sup> In 1911, only one percent of the French immigrant population was Algerian. By 1918, Algerian immigration numbers had risen twenty percent, only second behind Spanish immigrants which increased by thirty five percent.<sup>17</sup> Others migrated and replaced metropolitan factory workers. Exposed to the propaganda of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, Algerians emerged from war empowered, if only psychologically. Attempts were made, however, to reform France's imperial system. In 1915, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and former Overseas Minister Georges Leygues introduced legislation that gave "Muslims [...] a second electoral college and the right to elect half the members of the consultative assemblies."<sup>18</sup> The bill finally passed in 1919. Still, French *colons* retained majority power in the first electoral college, and through incessant opposition gained considerable concessions. Consequently, nationalism strengthened within the French *colon* community. In 1930, centenary celebrations blossomed throughout Algeria with grandiose and copious declarations: if Muslims knew then, in 1830, what they know now "they would have loaded their muskets with flowers."<sup>19</sup> The perfect storm brewed for those native Algerians seeking independence. Future FLN leaders carried these burdens for the next thirty-five years. Metropolitan politicians, unwilling to challenge *pied-noir* obstinacy and confidence, ultimately antagonized and nourished Algerian nationalism.

Nationalist movements erupted during the Interwar period. Various groups displayed deep divisions, however, in their respective visions for an independent Algeria. Three distinct groups formed: Ben Badis' religious movement, Messali Hadj's proto-communist movement,

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<sup>16</sup> Horne, 36.

<sup>17</sup> Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control Between the Wars* (London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 115.

<sup>18</sup> Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (London: Indiana University Press, 1972), 7.

<sup>19</sup> Horne, 36.

and Ferhat Abbas' liberal movement.<sup>20</sup> Ben Badis, born in 1889, created the influential *Association des Ulema* in 1931. While Badis himself never directly or personally influenced the FLN, largely because he died in 1940, the Ulema fomented and legitimized pan-Arabism in Algeria.<sup>21</sup> This puritanical Islamic force declared 'Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Algeria is my country.'<sup>22</sup> Many contemporary Algerian elites ignored Ben Badis' message, secluding it from mainstream politics. Algerian pragmatists regarded Badis' religious doctrine as counterintuitive to social and political change.

Messali Hadj created the radical nationalist movement, supported by the *Étoile Nord Africaine*—the first radical socialist organization in Algeria. Born in 1898, Hadj migrated and worked in France after World War I. He briefly studied political theory at the Sorbonne, and while there married a French communist.<sup>23</sup> Messali had become Algeria's first true revolutionary by 1933 and called for property redistribution from the *piéd noirs*. After failed reform under Leon Blum's popular front government, the ENA disbanded; however, Messali regrouped and created the *Parti Progressive Algérien* (PPA), which then dissolved and became the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe de Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD).<sup>24</sup> Many early FLN leaders supported these organizations but often disputed the fine details. Messali's appeal, however, remained ambiguous because he never embraced violence as an acceptable option. Rather, Messali urged to achieve reform through strict legal frameworks, but he continued to emphasize popular socialism as the preferred alternative to both French imperial structures and the liberal nationalists' call for further assimilation and integration. In 1947, Messali garnered little support within the MTLD convention on his proposed non-violent reform.<sup>25</sup> Algerian liberals countered Messali with

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>21</sup> William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria: 1954-1968* (London: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 36-37.

<sup>22</sup> Horne, 38.

<sup>23</sup> Jackson, 10.

<sup>24</sup> Horne, 38-40.

<sup>25</sup> Jackson, 17.

their pro-assimilationist ideology, which ultimately reinforced French imperial policy.

The liberal nationalists' undoubted leader, Ferhat Abbas, called for increased negotiation between Algerian and French leaders. Abbas' underlying belief, however, remained pro-assimilationist and aspired for provincial status in Algeria. Educational experience provided Abbas with opportunities most Algerians never realized. Abbas entered regional politics after becoming a pharmacist in the 1920s; moreover, he formed the *Fédérations de Elus Musulmans d'Algérie* (FEMA) in 1929—a group primarily comprised of Algerian intellectual elites.<sup>26</sup> Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Abbas, along with R. Zenati, called for “the crystallization of an Algerian national “consciousness” through popular press outlets, like the newspaper Abbas edited: *Egalité*.<sup>27</sup> Printed issues peaked from 1944–45, and produced 30,000 print copies per day.<sup>28</sup> Zenati, too, published and edited *La Voix Indigène* from 1929 to 1942. In its inaugural issue, Zenati declared ‘*L’Algérie doit devenir française*.’<sup>29</sup> In the September 12, 1929 issue, Zenati acknowledged that “*nous avons le devoir de faire remarquer la contradiction d’un pareil système*.”<sup>30</sup> For Algeria to become France, Liberals believed assimilation policies such as education, language reform, and intermarriage, transformed Algerians into Frenchmen. Such egalitarian promises remained political rhetoric for most of the Algerian population. Critics, often future leaders of the FLN, chastised Abbas and Zenati for their refusal to acknowledge a preexisting Algerian identity. While Zenati died before the FLN emerged, Abbas remained a prominent figure and voice for that movement, and legitimized the FLN during the late stages of the Algerian War when he joined the FLN in 1956. Abbas reflected these volatile issues in 1962: “*Ce sont malheurs de notre pays qui m’ont jeté dans l’arène politique. Si la France avait trouvé des solutions équitables aux problèmes qui se sont posés chez*

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<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>27</sup> Gosnell, 105-106.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 113. Translation is in Gosnell: “Algeria must become French.”

<sup>30</sup> “La Propriété Indigène,” *La Voix Indigène* September 12, 1929, page 1. Page one is reproduced in Gosnell, 111. (We have the duty to point out the contradiction of such a [French] system.)

*nous, il est probable que je me serais contente de « cultiver mon jardin ».*<sup>31</sup> Liberals never realized their goals, primarily because French authorities never intended Algerians to assimilate into metropolitan society and culture—Algerians into Frenchmen represented a romantic ideal, but ultimately naïve and impractical.

We should not underestimate these variant and often divisive visions. Nationalist movements remained inchoate. Indeed, independence leaders never created monolithic nationalist movements. Early leaders and their ideologies, however, remained paramount in the development of the FLN. French imperial legacies, especially through Algeria's unique status, created nationalist discourse, but more importantly *transformed* discourse that seemed to represent Algerian solidarity. Algerians never escaped the perpetual *altérité* (otherness) that French imperial legacies ingrained into native society; and neither did the eventual FLN leaders who adopted the same divisive discourse that Baddis, Messali, and Abbas displayed twenty years earlier. Exploring the complexities and dynamics of the emergent FLN will further emphasize these points. By 1954, FLN leaders promoted so called “Algerian” and “Muslim” unity, but remained internally and politically fractured.

### **Sétif and the FLN Perspectives**

The Second World War further complicated Algeria's eventual course to independence. France's humiliating defeat profoundly affected the Algerian psyche: were Algerians still “French” or did they owe their allegiance to Germany? What about the national *père de France*, Marshal Pétain? Indeed, Algeria remained officially pro-Vichy during most of the war. Abbas seized this opportunity. In 1943, Abbas declared, ‘the French colony only admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level [being the] sacrifice on the battlefields’ in the famous “Manifesto of the Algerian

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<sup>31</sup> Abbas, 107. (The misfortunes of our country threw me in the political arena. If France had found equitable solutions to the problems that have arisen among us, it is probable that I would have been happy to ‘cultivate my garden.’) Abbas referenced Voltaire's short story, *Candide*, as a philosophical analysis of his early ideas. To cultivate one's garden refers to the daily activities of life, which Abbas would have been willing to do if not for French imperialism.



People.”<sup>32</sup> Abbas appeared to abandon the pro-assimilationist rhetoric; however, he still called for direct peaceful negotiation with metropolitan France. At war’s end, Algerian nationalism escalated. On May 8, 1945, demonstrations erupted in the town of Sétif. The day began to celebrate VE Day, but tensions had risen over the treatment of Algerian veterans and the imprisonment of Messali. Algerian workers took to the streets with banners that stated ‘Vive Messali’ and ‘Long Live Free and Independent Algeria.’<sup>33</sup> Algerians demanded social reform and the release of Messali, who spent numerous occasions in prison for his rancorous behavior. Although it is not clear who fired the first shot, the incident left thousands dead.<sup>34</sup> No other event had such a profound impact on the development of the FLN. French imperial authorities subsequently suppressed both Abbas and Messali—Abbas was forced into house arrest and Messali was exiled to the Congo.<sup>35</sup> A small group of young Algerians, many who fought for France in World War II, emerged as the leaders of Algeria through the FLN. Many of these leaders participated in the Sétif incident.

Nine principle Algerian nationalists, ranging from ages 27 to 42, founded the FLN in 1954: Ahmed Ben Bella, Ali Mahsas, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Belkacem Krim, Omar Ouamrane, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mohamed Khider, and Hocine Aït Ahmed. These members originated from socially diverse backgrounds. Boulaid came from Aurés and was previously employed as a common miller.<sup>36</sup> Hocine Aït Ahmed, born in 1926, grew up in a small *Kabyle* village with few opportunities, and where infant mortality rates remained high—Ait Ahmed attributed this to the French colonial system.<sup>37</sup> None of the *neuf historiques* supported Abbas’ liberal ideology. Rather, most gravitated towards Messali’s socialist leaning ideas. Gilbert Meynier noted, however, that the eventual leaders of the FLN carried different concerns and visions for an independent Algeria,

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<sup>32</sup> Horne, 42.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 25, 41-43.

<sup>34</sup> French sources placed the number of dead Algerians at 1,300. Algerian sources noted 45,000 dead. Moderate historians commonly place the number at 6,000.

<sup>35</sup> Horne, 73.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>37</sup> Aït Ahmed, 9-10.

which countered Messali's leftist leaning ideology: "*Indépendantisme et aspiration de classe ne sont donc pas des vecteurs de sens oppose, mais des vecteurs de même sens. Si tout 'nationalisme' est 'transclassisme,' le 'transclassisme' ne doit rien à un common dénominateur social sur le long terme.*"<sup>38</sup> The FLN founders were not, as Meynier stated, unified in ideology for Algeria's future, whether through Abbas' liberalism or Messali's socialism. Moreover, the colonial system affected each in very personal ways, often impeding on the family structure. Thus, each carried his respective visions of revolutionary goals, that is, what should and could be achieved through Algerian independence.<sup>39</sup>

By the late 1940s, one figure emerged who influenced the FLN more than any other: Ahmed Ben Bella. Bella's immediate influence into what would become the FLN proved most important. Born in 1918, Bella grew up in Marnia, a small town west of Oran. His father worked in minor commercial ventures and sustained the family with a small farm. Three of Bella's brothers died early, one of whom died under the French flag during the Great War. By 1940, Bella joined the French army and received the Croix de Guerre. After Germany's *blitzkrieg* and France's subsequent surrender, Bella joined the French Moroccan resistance army. At war's end, Charles de Gaulle personally awarded Bella with the Médaille Militaire, unaware of the young Algerian's future. Dismayed over the Sétif massacre, Bella went underground within Messali's MTLD movement in 1947. With Messali exiled, Bella broke from traditional MTLD doctrines and created the OS (Organisation Spéciale), which claimed to fight French colonialism 'by all means,' violent and non-violent alike.<sup>40</sup> Messali's MTLD continued to work within the system; however, Bella represented the first clear break from the old vanguard of Messali and Abbas. Armed confrontation became increasingly inevitable for Bella and his new followers. Indeed, Aït Ahmed and Bella formed an important alliance in

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<sup>38</sup> Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire Intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2002), 136. (Independence and class aspiration are not therefore the vectors of opposite direction, but the vectors in the same direction. If all 'nationalism' is 'transclassism,' 'transclassism' owes nothing to a common social denominator in the long term.)

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 134-135.

<sup>40</sup> Horne, 74.

1949 and attacked a post office in Oran. Consequently, French authorities issued outstanding warrants for both. Aït Ahmed evaded capture, but French police apprehended Bella in 1950 and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment. Bella escaped from prison, along with fellow FLN founder Ali Mahsas, in 1952. The period from 1950 to 1954 remained largely chaotic, and the principle nationalist groups (UDMA and MTLD) splintered further into separate spheres. A core group of nationalists broke from the radical side of Messali's MTLD and called themselves "centralists." The most important point with this remained with Bella's call for a third party. By early 1954, Bella, Mahsas, Didouche and Boudiaf secretly collaborated in Paris and outlined the FLN's initial formation. This third party unequivocally advocated overt violent action against metropolitan colonial authorities.<sup>41</sup>

#### **1954: The FLN United?**

Detailed information about the inner circles of the FLN remains problematic at best. Ben Bella and Aït Ahmed wrote extensively after Algeria gained independence in 1962; however, both attained principle positions of power (or opposition power) with the newly formed Algerian government. Several other founders were either assassinated or exiled; therefore, our understanding of events must be seen in this context. Official FLN documents must be examined with caution, as these documents emphasized solidarity through FLN propaganda.<sup>42</sup> Despite Frantz Fanon's arguments, FLN leaders remained, as they had before and after independence, deeply divided over political, social, and cultural issues. Frantz Fanon argued in *Wretched of the Earth* that leaders unite through "the practice of violence [which] binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain."<sup>43</sup> Fanon was heavily invested in the FLN cause, primarily as a member himself. Terrorism certainly played an important role, as it often does. This paper attempts,

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 74-77, and Besma Lahouri, "Ahmed Ben Bella (1916-)," *L'Express*, December 18, 2003, 1.

<sup>42</sup> See Mohamed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, *Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962*, "Information et propagande du FLN/ALN," 110-136.

<sup>43</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 73.

however, to distinguish these perspectives, and echoes William Qaundt's analysis that "contrary to Fanon's prophecy [...] it is simply untrue that the Algerian revolution produced unity within the political elite."<sup>44</sup> Indeed, we must deconstruct both early Algerian reactions and official FLN documentation in order to fully tease out and distinguish divergent FLN perspectives. In many ways, *altérité* (otherness) remained an important, perhaps ingrained, concept within the FLN hierarchy. This was not only directed at metropolitan France, but became an important distinction from an internal point of view.

On November 1, 1954 (All Saints Day), the leaders of the FLN officially proclaimed their sovereignty as a political and military independence movement with the following objectives:

Our movement of regeneration presents itself under the label of Front de Liberation Nationale, thus freeing itself from any possible compromise, and offering to all Algerian patriots of every social position and of all parties...the possibility of joining in the national struggle.

Goal: National independence through:

1. restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam;
2. preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion.

#### INTERNAL OBJECTIVES

1. political house-cleaning through the destruction of the last vestiges of corruption and reformism, the causes of our present decadence....

#### EXTERNAL OBJECTIVES

1. internationalism of the Algerian problem;
2. pursuit of North African unity in its national Arabo-Islamic context

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<sup>44</sup> Qaundt, 11.

3. assertion, through the United Nations Charter, of our active sympathy towards all nations that may support our liberating cause.<sup>45</sup>

The “political house-cleaning” served formal acknowledgment of divided leaders within both the FLN and other nationalist groups. It also offered a warning to those individuals or groups not aligned with the FLN. Only months earlier, the Messalists issued their own proclamation to the National Algerian Congress, which echoed 1930s North African Star ideology that “est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.”<sup>46</sup> Not all nationalist members agreed with the FLN agenda, thus creating their own internal fratricide. Still, fratricide became an available and conceptualized term which carried both pragmatic and psychological meaning into the formation and fate of the FLN. This concept may be compared, in theoretical framework, to a Norbert Elias idea that “seek[s] the conditions for transformation in psychic economy in changes in ways to exert power and exist in society.”<sup>47</sup> Goals of the FLN appear to have retained much of this thinking.

FLN leaders portrayed these goals as the only true, legitimate cause—success depended primarily through violent military actions. For example, early FLN propaganda utilized excessive military idioms. Leaflets issued in November 1955, titled *La Bataille de Djorf vue par Le Patriote*, galvanized the FLN’s intrepidity: “Nous chargeons avec cœur, le choc est irrésistible.”<sup>48</sup> Further leaflets, issued in 1955 or 1956 throughout the Oran region, portrayed notions of FLN unity through military rhetoric: “Le moment de l’action nous attend maintenant et nous ne pouvons obtenir des résultats [à travers] [...] les méthodes, les objectifs, l’emploi du temps et

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<sup>45</sup> Horne, 95.

<sup>46</sup> Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, *Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 25. (...is described as the period of fratricide.)

<sup>47</sup> Roger Chartier, *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 108.

<sup>48</sup> Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, *Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 110. (We charge with heart, the shock is irresistible.)

faisant preuve d'esprit de sacrifice, de courage et de foi."<sup>49</sup> However, the FLN remained at the outset, fragmented both strategically and logistically. Propaganda illustrated clear common objectives, motives, and ideology. It serves important evidence that shows perceived, whether subconsciously or deliberately, notions of unanimity with monolithic features, like war or religion. On the contrary, it may prove more accurate to propose that FLN leaders knowingly manipulated these ideas in order to form a broad movement.

The FLN struggled to appeal to Algeria's diverse populations. The popular French news press, *L'Express*, echoed this statement in a 1954 article that discussed how French, Arab, Jewish, Mozabite (Berber), Italian, and Spanish groups lived together, since colonial conception, with much suspicion.<sup>50</sup> Diverse ethnic groups interfered with the FLN's "solidarity" rhetoric. Algerian populations became increasingly fragmented and separated. Popular support waned in the beginning, only slowly gaining wider revolutionary participation by war's end. Indeed, Algeria's majority illiterate population could not process the information, which came from Cairo radio broadcasts and pamphlets similar to the noted examples broad enthusiasm over FLN actions initially resulted in the Aurès region. Why, then, did Algerians slowly but surely gravitate towards FLN ideas? Alf Andrew Heggoy proposed evidence to answer such a question. Rather than the FLN's attempts to foster widespread violent nationalism, Heggoy argues that native Algerians participated for numerous reasons, but particularly through French rifle restrictions. This "legal" restriction embodied the larger colonial system of inequality. French colonialism assaulted pre-established Berber traditions that included the rifle. Heggoy noted that "Kabyles gladly tell a folk story which illustrates [...] a [...] man, according to this homily, owns a wife, a dog, and a gun. He can dispense with the wife and, if need be, do without the dog. But to have no gun is to have no honor."<sup>51</sup> Others, when asked why they joined the FLN,

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 111. (The moment for action awaits us now and we can not achieve results [through] the methods, objectives, schedule and in showing a spirit of sacrifice, courage, and faith.)

<sup>50</sup> "La France peut gagner en Algérie," *L'Express*, November 13, 1954.

<sup>51</sup> Heggoy, 131.

provided no answer.<sup>52</sup> This suggests individuals joined for reasons other than stated in official FLN propaganda. An often-overlooked explanation was simply the idea of group conformity, influenced on Algerians through word of mouth. Psychological sociality, that is the nature and tendency to mobilize along socially similar grounds, may have been more important than the FLN. Colonialism, in its much broader understanding, adversely affected native culture and society. Both Heggoy and Pierre Bourdieu noted the importance of the Algerian family structure where “the misery and insecurity have been made even worse by the distress resulting from the loss of the group ties on which the individual’s psychological and social stability was based in the old communities. One can imagine how precarious family unity must be in such a context.”<sup>53</sup> Is it a coincidence that the term “fratricide” is found in much of the FLN documents and personal writings of the various national leaders? This term implies a complete breakdown of family solidarity within the colonial structure. It seems, rather than a unified FLN message, Algerians participated, if at all, in the independence movement for personal reasons. The grandiose principles of FLN propaganda recruited some individuals; however, this evidence suggests Algerians never thought of themselves within those terms. The FLN leaders, too, brought these different life stories and experiences into the party. Those leaders attempted to create and legitimize its fledgling position in 1954, despite their competing visions for an independent Algeria. Deconstructing this evidence has shown that FLN leaders and many Algerians were not united in 1954—just as they had not been in 1930 or 1962.

### Conclusion

The Algerian War increasingly demonstrated intense violence between both parties. For the FLN, internal division plagued its overall efforts. By 1955, the FLN core in Aurès deposed its military general, Bachir Chihani, and executed him. Moreover, Ben Bella remained in self-imposed exile in Cairo in attempts to form broad international coalitions.

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerian* Alan C.M. Ross trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 141.

In 1956, the FLN leadership in Algeria issued an “ultimatum” to Bella: “If you cannot do anything for us outside, come back and die with us.”<sup>54</sup> Indeed, Bella found little logistical support for the Algerian cause outside of the country. Internal quarrels increasingly divided FLN leadership. Things became so desperate for the FLN that they welcomed Abbas into the party by spring of 1955. Abbas continued his moderate positions—exemplified by his numerous international trips to France and the United Nations assembly. His clarion call for equitable solutions ultimately fell on deaf ears.<sup>55</sup>

The war continued with numerous cases of overt terrorism, by both sides, and widespread torture. The Battle of Algiers ensued in 1956, leaving thousands dead and countless more homeless. By 1962, the war ended with Charles de Gaulle’s concession and decision to “grant” Algeria’s independence. Indeed, the war’s conclusion ultimately rested with his decision, influenced, nonetheless, by the growing metropolitan dissent. In Algeria, the FLN emerged victorious and transformed itself from a revolutionary movement into a legitimate, albeit unitary, political party.<sup>56</sup>

Evidence of FLN divisions quickly formed once again in Ben Bella’s new authoritarian government. From 1962 to 1965, Bella utilized the army to remove and oppose the other existing founders of the FLN—Aït Ahmed, Khider, and Boumedienne among others. Bella’s excessive authoritarianism could not sustain itself, and he was removed in a relatively non-violent coup in 1965. Houari Boumedienne claimed the presidency and remained in office until his death in 1978.<sup>57</sup> Ironically, Abbas, Aït Ahmed, and Bella all fled to France and Switzerland in exile. Abbas retired to a Paris suburb until his death in 1985.<sup>58</sup> Aït Ahmed and Bella remain active voices in Algerian politics. Thus, Algeria’s immediate post-war history exemplified the same divisions that plagued nationalist leadership in the 1920s to 1940s and in 1954. The imperial legacy created *altérité* (otherness)

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<sup>54</sup> Horne, 143.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 140-141.

<sup>56</sup> See Horne, 505-515.

<sup>57</sup> Quandt, 234. Also see chapter 11.

<sup>58</sup> See Horne, 555-559.



in which FLN leaders never fully detached themselves, clearly evident in the post-war struggle for stability.

Independence movements, especially in the colonial world, often portray unanimity. This paper has shown, however, the Algerian perspective proved much more dynamic and convoluted. We often understand the colonial system in these terms. The Algerian story is one of deep-rooted conflict, created and nourished by the French imperial system. The process proved gradual, but ultimately chaotic and violent. Liberal and moderate leadership simply could not sustain its call for assimilation. Indeed, not just French authorities invested these ideas into Algeria, but a core group of individuals—initially led by Zenati and Abbas—accepted the assimilation doctrine, including the idea of fratricide. French leadership never intended, however, for Algeria to assimilate French culture and society. It served, rather, an important convenience to apply such rhetoric and facilitate an efficient colonial system. French imperialism applied the concept of *altérité* in order to instill pragmatic and psychological inferiority. This came through the adoption of specific French linguistic ideas that FLN leaders carried and employed during the independence movement. The unintended consequences worked two fold. First, Algerian nationalism strengthened. Secondly, Algerian nationalist leaders never agreed on a monolithic path for Algeria. The evidence presented highlights the intense internal conflict between the original FLN founders; however, these disputes devolved from decades of linguistic assimilation that worked in contradiction. While Algeria achieved its independence, it carried the imperial burden beyond 1954 and arguably to the present. Algerian fraternity proved too weak to sustain the imperial weight; instead, it fractured and divided them. The symbolic power of November 1, 1954 will always represent a better, independent Algerian future. Beneath it all, however, FLN leaders engaged in a storm of ideas, and remained politically fractured and incapable of shedding one hundred twenty-four years of French imperial domination.

## A Mission of Education and Creation: The Work of Christian Missionaries in Korea from 1882 Through 1910

**Brendan Hughes**

*Brendan Hughes, a senior Theater Arts major from Charleston, IL, wrote this paper for Dr. Jinhee Lee in History 4870, The Two Koreas, during the fall of 2008.*

When Kim Dae-jung completed his term as the Republic of Korea's President, the government constructed a presidential library in his honor. The library was built at Yonsei University, a private college with a history leading back to the dawn of western-styled education within Korea. Interestingly, Kim Dae-jung never studied at Yonsei. So why build the library at this private, well renowned university? Perhaps because they represented "firsts" for their nation: Kim Dae-jung as the nation's first Roman Catholic President and Yonsei University as the first hospital to provide Western medical education in Korea. By the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Western missionaries founded schools in Korea to spread Christianity. These schools and hospitals provided new, modern access to education for the people of Korea. Christian missionaries played a significant role in developing Korea's education system and medical infrastructure from 1882 to 1910. Without the works of these individuals, a "modern" educational system would not have evolved on the peninsula until the occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910.

Before examining the work of Christian missionaries and their efforts to establish schools and hospitals on the Korean peninsula, we must explore the context in which Christianity arrived and became available to the Korean people. Takemichi Hara notes that one of the first significant ways that Western influence reached Korea was through the annual tributary missions to China by emissaries of the Korean Kingdom during the eighteenth-century.<sup>1</sup> Even though the emissaries were theoretically forbidden to enter Peking, little stopped them from intruding into the city to search for entertainment, shopping, or conversation. Korean emissaries regularly visited the *Nan-t'ang*, or South Church, where resident Jesuit

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<sup>1</sup> Takemichi Hara, "Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea," *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 2 (May 1998): 393.

priests of the Manchu court provided the visiting Koreans with scientific works or Christian writings translated into Chinese.<sup>2</sup> When these writings returned to Korea they found a receptive audience in the *Sirhak*<sup>3</sup> crowd, leading to academic interest and conversion among many of the intellectual elite. This new religion was so attractive to Korean emissaries that the first recorded baptism occurred at Peking in 1784.<sup>4</sup>

Individuals who returned from Peking and converts among the *Sirhak* movement continued to spread Christianity in Korea without any official missionaries until 1794, when Chou Wen-mo became the first Catholic Priest in Korea. When Chou Wen-mo, a young Chinese man entered the country he found at least four thousand converts.<sup>5</sup> Wen-mo became the first Catholic priest in Korea. So pervasive was this new teaching, that it attracted followers from the late King Chǒngjo's political faction. In 1801, Queen Reagent issued the *Shinyu* proclamation, authorizing a large scale persecution of Christianity as an "evil teaching" in Confucian tradition. Despite this government sponsored persecution of Christianity, its religious base continued to grow. These trends continued to influence the peninsula as the isolationist policies of Korea began to crumble when Korea opened to Western powers by signing the United States–Korea treaty. Christian persecution calmed in 1886 after Korea signed a treaty with France containing a remarkably vague clause that allowed missionaries to spread Christianity in Korea. The ending of official persecution of Christians allowed for the entrance of many Protestant missionaries into Korea who not only spread the word of God, but also created schools and hospitals.

The brief observance of Christianity's history in Korea is important for two reasons. First, it exemplifies how the religion arrived on the peninsula as a byproduct of the tributary missions between Korea and

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Translated as "practical learning."

<sup>4</sup> "Yi Süng-hun, who had accompanied his father in a diplomatic entourage, returned from Peking after being baptized by a Western Catholic priest." Carter J. Eckert, ed., *Korea Old and New: A History*, (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 170.

<sup>5</sup> Hara, 394.

China. It spread among the academic population, partially through the *Sirhak* movement, before being persecuted by royal mandate in 1801 by the *Shinyu* proclamation. Second, the end of official persecution in 1882 opened the door for the missionaries to come to Korea, bringing their Western knowledge that changed the face of Korean education and medicine forever. These two reasons prove critical to understand and contextualize the history of Christian missionaries in Korea.

With the treaty signed in 1882, the United States began their missionary work in Korea by building hospitals and schools. Although a pre-established form or practice of individual education existed within Korea, especially through male dominated Confucian traditions, it remained inaccessible to many individuals. Missionaries brought accessibility to Korean education by creating an educational system for everyone at every level. Prior to the establishment of missionary schools, Korean education centered upon private primary and secondary education. State controlled public schooling focused on college education. Sungho Lee summarizes these ideas:

The state run institutions were mostly those of higher learning, which opened their doors only to the selected youths of the privileged upper class. The primary purpose of higher learning was to acquaint the students with Confucian philosophy and ethics through a course of study composed of Chinese classics, which were thought to be a guide for the bureaucracy. [...] the private institutions of education were for primary and middle levels of education. The formal general education for people was generally a private matter, while higher education for the ruling class was a public one.<sup>6</sup>

In Korea, before the introduction of missionary schools, schooling for all levels of education did not exist, either private or public.

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<sup>6</sup> Sungho Lee, "The Emergence of the Modern University in Korea," *Higher Education* 18, no. 1 (1989): 88.

Complicating this problem, the state provided the only one form of higher education. American missionaries created a system of public and higher education outside of the Korean government's public style. They founded schools with the intention of upgrading them to junior colleges and to "extend every effort to eventually create Western four-year colleges."<sup>7</sup>

In less than two years after the signing of the first United States-Korea treaty, countless missionaries had arrived on Korea's shores. Among them, Dr. Horace G. Underwood, published the first Korean-English and English-Korean dictionaries. The Reverend Underwood would later create the Chosŏn Christian College in 1915. In addition to schools, many missionaries came to Korea to establish hospitals that not only provided Western medicine, but taught willing students different forms of medicine. Dr. Horace Allen and Dr. O.R. Avison opened the first hospital to provide and teach Western medicine in Seoul in 1885. This hospital, Gwanghyewon, was the forerunner to Yonsei University. With the assistance of Ohio industrialist L.H. Severance, the college eventually opened a medical school: the Union Medical College and Hospital and the School of Nursing. This, too, eventually consolidated into Yonsei University.<sup>8</sup> Such a prestigious university has roots in the missionary schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Missionary schools revolutionized the quality of Korean education and medicine.

Missionaries founded schools and institutions founded with two primary differences from the Korean private and public schools systems. These schools taught Korean Hangul and provided an educational system for women. Sungho Lee reveals the greatest strength of these mission schools:

[T]he Western missionaries introduced Western higher learning in the Korean language, "Hangul." They did away with Chinese classics. They were first class Korean speakers and scholars in Korean studies. They wrote the history of Korea and studied Korea's traditional religions.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 93.

Rather than teach Confucian traditions by using Chinese Confucian texts, the missionaries broke these constraints upon higher learning in Korea by using Hangul, making them pioneers of education within Korea. The idea that Koreans could receive a higher education in their own language without the use of Confucian texts was new. Its popularity trickled downward into the primary and middle levels of education provided by the missionaries. By establishing this new education in Korean, and not in Chinese, the doors of opportunity were opened to all Koreans who wanted to pursue an education.

The attention devoted to women made mission schools indispensable to the Korean educational system. Traditionally, the education system in Korea was exclusive to men, and those women of the upper *yangban* class who did receive some education did so in the *onmun* vernacular script.<sup>10</sup> This practice would change soon after 1882 when Mrs. Mary F. Scranton arrived in Korea. She began a women's school, Ewha Haktang, in 1886 with just one student. She created the school with the full blessing of Queen Min<sup>11</sup>, a renowned and infamous monarch with a very anti-Western background. Ewha Haktang struggled at first. Initially, the people of Korea believed that the missionaries intended to abduct their daughters for service as slaves in foreign countries. Ewha Haktang, however, began accepting orphaned girls from backgrounds of extreme poverty some of whom, when given a chance, excelled.<sup>12</sup> Ewha Haktang developed quickly and Sungho Lee notes that it was a "pioneer" of progress:

[T]he girls of Ewha Haktang in 1898 asked that the teaching of Chinese characters be included in the curriculum. This was a reflection of the new spirit that education for girls should not in any way be inferior to that of boys', knowledge of Chinese characters and

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<sup>10</sup> Jihang Park, "Trailblazers in a Traditional World: Korea's First Women College Graduates, 1910-1945," *Social Science History* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 535.

<sup>11</sup> Lee, 89.

<sup>12</sup> Park, 540.

classics being the traditional hallmark of a good education given only to boys.<sup>13</sup>

Ewha Haktang would continue to pioneer in the area of women's education when it offered its first college courses in three departments—literature, music, and home economics—in 1910 for fifteen female students. The pioneering work of schools like Ewha Haktang brought greater educational equality and inspired generations of women, regardless of economic background to pursue an education.

In addition to creating an educational structure for higher education for both genders, missionaries also worked to develop a medical infrastructure. Missionaries founded numerous hospitals and schools for nursing. Another hospital of note was the East Gate Women's Hospital founded in Seoul by Dr. Mary Cutler in 1886. In 1905, Dr. Cutler and Margaret J. Edmunds, a nursing graduate of University Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, began the first training school for nurses. Frances Lee Whang, former director of the Severance Hospital School, notes in an article from *The American Journal of Nursing* that:

The School admitted only Christian applicants, on their parents' written consent, and their pastors' or teacher' recommendation... the school provided books, shoes, uniforms, citizen's clothes, bedding, food, room, light, fuel, summer vacations and at graduation a handsome diploma and gold school pin.<sup>14</sup>

Korean female nurses often came from poor backgrounds, much like the girls of Ewha Haktang, and relied heavily upon the scholarship and charity of the nursing school. The missionaries that came after the signing of the first United States-Korea treaty strengthened the educational background of these girls and, by extension, the nursing infrastructure of Korea. These missionaries were the first group to establish a complete curriculum for

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<sup>13</sup> Lee, 91.

<sup>14</sup> Frances Lee Whang, "The Advance of Nursing in Korea," *The American Journal of Nursing* 54, no. 7 (July 1954): 818.

Korea, from kindergarten to college, which brought a modern approach to education by including the study of science and medicine.<sup>15</sup> Establishing schools, of all levels, and hospitals became the focus of many missionaries in Korea.<sup>16</sup>

By 1910, when the Japanese annexed Korea as a colony, Missionaries operated about one-third of all schools.<sup>17</sup> The large proportion of mission schools in Korea shows the demand for, and quality of, the education that these schools provided. The establishment of nursing schools, hospitals, and expansion of medical instruction by missionaries vastly strengthened the medical infrastructure of the country.

By establishing these schools and hospitals, the missionaries set a precedent for future generations of Koreans that can be seen in the educational attainment of Christians in Korea today. In the article “Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: a Sociological Survey,” a Gallup Korea survey revealed that about one-fourth of Korean Protestants and one-fourth of Korean Catholics surveyed had university degrees, compared to only seven percent of the Buddhists surveyed. Thirty percent of Korean Buddhists had only an elementary education or less, compared to the three and eleven percent of Catholics and Protestants who had the same educational achievement.<sup>18</sup> This shows the impact that these missionaries had on their converts; they took the need for an education which they found in Korea, created a modern system of education, and established an educational system that served generations of Koreans, even during the Japanese occupation.<sup>19</sup> Lillie Ora Lathrop, in a letter to the editor of *The American Journal of Nursing*, provides a candid assessment of the situation and desire for education in Korea in 1922. While discussing the celebration of Korean Thanksgiving, the anniversary of Christianity’s arrival in Korea, she talks about women attending night school in order to learn to write and

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<sup>15</sup> Andrew Eungi Kim, “Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: a Sociological Survey,” *Review of Religious Research* 43, no. 4 (June 2002): 301.

<sup>16</sup> Keith Pratt, *Everlasting Flower*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), 202.

<sup>17</sup> Lee, 90.

<sup>18</sup> Kim, 298.

<sup>19</sup> Lee, 96. The mission schools which closed or lost college status under the Education Ordinance of 1911 were reinstated as colleges by the Government General of Korea in 1925.



read so that they may educate their children “who all, now, seem to want an education.”<sup>20</sup> These missionaries had changed Korean society by combining their evangelism with a desire to provide and create a passion for education and training. When the Japanese closed these missionary schools, claiming they wished to purge Western influence from their new colony, they did not expect an outcry over the loss of educational opportunities provided by the missionaries. Christian missionaries provided the means, education, and training, to be successful in post 1882 Korea, and many Koreans embraced these opportunities regardless of the political climate.

The relationship between Christian missionaries and the dynamic changes that occurred in Korea during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century, affected the policies of Meiji Japan in Korea. The influence of Christianity continued to affect the peninsula during the twentieth-century, even after World War II, as one-fourth of Koreans today identify themselves as Christian. During the decades prior to the occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910, Christianity and the mission work of missionaries played a significant role in developing the Republic of Korea’s education system and medical infrastructure. The history of Christianity in Korea highlights how early converts and missionaries were the victims of persecution until the first United States-Korea treaty in 1882 and the Korea-France treaty in 1886. In the late nineteenth-century missionaries founded multiple institutions to provide a beneficial education system to Korea through the establishment of a curriculum that spanned from kindergarten to college. This curriculum employed Hangul as the language of instruction and provided an expansion of educational opportunities for women, and established nursing and medical schools to provide Western medical instruction and training to Koreans. One-third of the formal schools within Korea adopted this educational system which illustrates the impact of religion on educational attainment in Korea today. After the missionary schools closed in 1911, Koreans voiced their need for this education which was not fulfilled until the reopening of Korea in 1925. Connecting the efforts of missionaries with Korea’s future leaders reveals

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<sup>20</sup> Lillie Ora Lathrop, “From Korea,” *The American Journal of Nursing* 22, no. 6 (March 1922): 465.

the true impact of the mission work of Christian missionaries in Korea. Without their work creating a complete educational system, schools, and hospitals, the face of Korea today might look very different.

## The Burden of Factionalism in Nineteenth-Century Irish Nationalist Movements

### Josh Robison

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*They saw that now they lacked their full strength and great name, no one took notice of them or spoke to them. When they saw this, they lay down on the side of the hill at Tara, put their lips to the earth, and died.<sup>1</sup>*

In the spring of 1866, less than a year after the end of the American Civil War, veteran combatants from both sides of that conflict invaded the British North American territory of Canada. These soldiers staged a two-pronged attack: one from Buffalo, New York, and the other from St. Albans, Vermont. They planed to use a vanquished Canada as a bargaining tool to coerce the British Empire into releasing its grip on Ireland, creating a sovereign Irish Republic.<sup>2</sup> The invasion failed, however.

These soldiers were members of an Irish-American nationalist organization known as the Fenian Brotherhood, a society dedicated to the establishment of an independent Irish state through the violent removal of British influence. Fenian Brotherhood adopted their name from the Fianna, an ancient band of Celtic warriors led by the mythological folk hero Fiona Mac Cumhaill, who earned fame throughout Gaelic culture as the defender of Ireland. The exiled Irish nationalist, John O' Mahoney founded The Fenian Brotherhood in New York City in 1858. Fellow expatriate James Stephens led The Irish counterpart, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood.<sup>3</sup>

From a geopolitical standpoint their failure is not surprising. St. George's Channel separates the southeastern edge of Ireland from England by less than one hundred miles. The proximity of the islands, however, along with the intense disparities between their martial capacities, is only

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<sup>1</sup> One account of the end of the Fianna, legendary Celtic folk warriors and defenders of Ireland. Fergus Fleming and Shahrukh Husain, *Heroes of the Dawn: Celtic Myth* (London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 1996), 68.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas N. Brown, *Irish-American Nationalism* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1966), 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

part of the equation. Another crucial component relates to the problem of Irish identity itself, not only as to how the British viewed the Irish, but how the Irish viewed themselves. The British considered the Irish as the “other” despite their shared histories. The British portrayed the Irish as hovelling, Catholic barbarians ill-suited for self-rule. While the British saw *themselves* as “British,” the Irish defined themselves in ambiguous terms; no all-encompassing “Irish” identity existed.

The Fenians failed, in part, because they struggled against near insurmountable odds. However, the Fenians also failed, as did many Irish nationalists before and after them, due to a lack of a coherent strategy. They failed due to infighting and bickering and ill-defined objectives. The Irish nationalists failed because they saw themselves as the other, much like the British.

English antagonism towards Ireland has long historical roots. In the 1530's, Protestant rulers, beginning with King Henry VIII, attempted to subjugate the Catholic population. William of Orange's victory at the Battle of the Boyne in 1688 solidified Protestant English control of Ireland. By this time, most of the Catholic ruling families were either dead or living in exile on the Continent.<sup>4</sup> Thus began a period known as the Protestant Ascendency, when colonists, reinforced by the might of the English government, imposed a crippling system of social, political and economic controls against the Catholic majority. The English confiscated most of the land and reallocated it to approximately ten-thousand Protestant families, reducing the vast majority of the Catholic population to the level of peasant laborers.<sup>5</sup> The English established Penal Codes, which prohibited Catholics from buying or inheriting land, in the late 1600s.<sup>6</sup> Driven by the need to raise livestock or cash crops, Catholics with larger farms exploited those of lesser means. While the English treated Catholic tenant farmers poorly, these farmers treated their Irish agricultural laborers in an even worse fashion.<sup>7</sup> Catholics could not participate in the English controlled

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<sup>4</sup> Kerby Miller and Paul Wagner, *Out of Ireland: The Story of Irish Emigration to American* (Washington: Elliott and Clark Publishing, 1994), 18.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Edward M. Levine, *The Irish and Irish Politicians* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 4.

<sup>7</sup> Miller and Wagner, 19.

parliament in Dublin.<sup>8</sup> However, from this very Parliament the seeds of Irish nationalism began to take root as the increasingly revolutionary-minded eighteenth-century drew to a close.

With British soldiers busy in the American colonies, Irish Protestants decided to form themselves into companies of armed volunteers in an effort to defend the island from the potential of opportunistic Continental exploitation. Two parliamentary leaders, Henry Flood and Henry Grattan, opted to use the offensive capabilities of this body, which numbered forty-thousand by 1780, to insist on economic and political reforms, particularly legislative independence from England. Grattan succeeded in this venture in 1782, when the English government granted the Dublin body partial parliamentary autonomy. However, even in “Grattan’s Parliament,” British government patronage controlled nearly two-thirds of the elected members.<sup>9</sup>

Within this relatively relaxed political environment, the Society of United Irishmen formed, first in Belfast, then in Dublin, in 1791. The Society, led by Protestant lawyer Theobald Wolfe Tone, sought to end British rule. The success of revolutionary efforts in France increased both the boldness of the Society and the attention of their opponents, and in 1794 the organization was declared illegal and driven underground. As a result, the United Irishmen reorganized themselves into a secret, oath-bound society whose goal was to create a nationwide, military network in preparation for an insurrection that now seemed inevitable.<sup>10</sup>

The rebellion that began on May 26, 1798 in Wexford, failed to meet its objective.<sup>11</sup> Unlike the Young Ireland insurrection of 1848, however, or any of the Fenian exercises in the 1860's, this uprising, led by Catholic priests and acted out by thousands of pike-wielding peasants, was particularly brutal and relatively long.<sup>12</sup> An estimated 30,000 people were

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<sup>8</sup> Brown, 4.

<sup>9</sup> Roy Douglas, Liam Harte, and Jim O’Hara, *Ireland since 1690: A Concise History* (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press Limited, 1999), 20.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>11</sup> Miller and Wagner, 21.

<sup>12</sup> Brown, 6.

killed before the six-week ordeal was finally snuffed out on June 21.<sup>13</sup> The rebellion failed for a number of logistical reasons: poor organization on the part of the rebels, vastly superior strength on the part of the government, and inadequate aid on the part of the French. Ideological differences between the combatants themselves also contributed to the failure of the insurrection. Whereas Protestant aristocrats revolted against British political control, Catholic peasants fought and died in an attempt to alleviate social grievances.<sup>14</sup> Rather than uniting Irish patriots in a common cause, the Wexford uprising antagonized tensions between these factions. Even more damning, it also led to increased British control of Ireland through the Act of Union in 1801.

William Pitt, the Prime Minister, believed that the Act of Union would allow Westminster to govern the island more efficiently and also alleviate at least some Catholic animosity toward the Protestant Parliament in Dublin. Pitt succeeded in his efforts, but not without considerable effort and loss of political capital on both islands. Many Britons, for example, saw Ireland as a useless liability, whereas Irish Parliamentarians were concerned by what they saw as the waning of their political clout. The Union and the violence that preceded it soon found a place within the ideological framework of later nationalists, men who saw the destruction of the Act as their paramount objective, and the use of violence as a historically justifiable means to an end.<sup>15</sup>

For the half a century 1798 uprising, there would be no more large scale violence against the British, due, in part, to the efforts of Daniel O'Connell. O'Connell, a Catholic born in County Kerry in 1775, dedicated himself to the cause of Catholic emancipation. Both a staunch royalist and social conservative, O'Connell had no interest in the revolutionary theatrics of the United Irishmen, instead advocating peaceful coexistence within the larger British Empire. He created the Catholic Association in 1823, arguing that his countrymen could be loyal subjects even to a Protestant king if they were given representation in Parliament.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Douglas, Harte, and O'Hara, 20.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

In 1828, O'Connell brazenly stood for election to Parliament against a government candidate. As a Catholic, he was barred from civil service and thus the results would only be relevant if he lost. But O'Connell won the election. Fearing increased animosity from angry Catholic peasants, however, Parliament relented and passed the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829, which allowed Catholics to enter Parliament and hold high civil and military office. Flush with victory, O'Connell formed a second organization, the Society for the Repeal of the Union, in 1830, again arguing that such legislation would strengthen Irish loyalty to the British crown. Unsuccessful in this venture, he nonetheless continued his efforts and finally, after ten years, founded the Loyal National Repeal Association. This organization was strengthened in 1842 by the addition of a new group of allies who called themselves the Young Irelanders.<sup>17</sup>

Led by Thomas Davis, a Protestant barrister from Cork, the Young Irelanders were middle class intellectuals who sought a pluralist, non-sectarian movement to remove British influence in Ireland.<sup>18</sup> The Young Irelanders were also cultural and religious purists. They supported a revival of the Gaelic language and believed in a devote adherence to strict moral standards.<sup>19</sup> O'Connell, in contrast, carried his Catholicism loosely, had little interest in the promotion of the Gaelic language, and frowned upon the revolutionary zeal which he considered to be plaguing the rest of Europe.<sup>20</sup> Thus, while their ultimate goals and tactics were never entirely synchronized, these forces nonetheless saw themselves on the same side in a larger struggle against a common opponent. These ideological differences may have been overlooked had O'Connell's political authority not been seriously compromised by events which occurred in October of 1843.

O'Connell had scheduled a "monster meeting" near Dublin. These immensely popular, open-air gatherings gave O'Connell the chance to use his impressive speaking abilities to invigorate massive crowds of already dissatisfied Irish. Despite his alleged loyalty to the throne, the government became less enthusiastic about such gatherings as they grew in popularity

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 35, 36.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>19</sup> Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16.

<sup>20</sup> Brown, 7.

and eventually decided to ban them altogether. Reluctant to risk violence, O'Connell cancelled the meeting, a decision Young Ireland leaders saw as a weakness. Eventually O'Connell began to move toward more conventional parliamentary tactics in his efforts, even going so far as to forge an alliance with the Whig party that came to power in June of 1846.<sup>21</sup>

Such tactics did not sit well with the increasingly impatient Young Ireland leadership, who saw a permanent fracture between Irish and British society as the only way to achieve their goals. As they declared in *The Nation*, the Young Ireland journal, "To make our people politically free but bond slaves to some debasing social system like that which crowds the mines and factories of England with squalid victims, we would not strike a blow."<sup>22</sup>

The inevitable break with the O'Connellites came in 1846 when the Repeal Association officially condemned violence as a political tool. While no such violence was being planned, the Young Irelanders withdrew from the organization. They shared the view with most romantic nationalists that the forceful removal of a corrupt government was a justifiable course of action.<sup>23</sup>

In early 1847, Young Ireland leader Smith O'Brien formed the Irish Confederation, which sought the immediate restoration of Irish government. O'Connell's death that same year accelerated the development of this more radical ideology amongst nationalists. Another such radical, John Mitchell, left the Irish Confederation in February of 1848 to focus on *The United Irishman*, a newspaper devoted to revolutionary rhetoric.<sup>24</sup> The relatively bloodless removal of the French monarchy that same month convinced many Irish nationalists that such success could be duplicated on their island.<sup>25</sup>

On March 2, British authorities arrested Mitchell, O'Brien and others on charges of sedition, and two months later declared their organization illegal. This declaration led to the Ballinacorney insurrection, where Young Irelanders attempted to initiate a revolution by leading a

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<sup>21</sup> Douglas, Harte, and O'Hara, 37, 38.

<sup>22</sup> Brown, 8.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Douglas, Harte, and O'Hara, 38, 39.

<sup>25</sup> Brown, 12.



handful of starving Munster peasants into armed conflict with British government officials.<sup>26</sup> The so-called rebellion ended in disaster, and on October 9, 1848, O'Brien was sentenced to the standard rebel fate. However, before he was decapitated and his limbs given the standard British tour, O'Brien, a romantic to the end, declared, "Having failed, I know my life is forfeited [...] for Ireland I shall carefully surrender life itself."<sup>27</sup>

Thus, it was not lack of enthusiasm that kept Irish nationalists from success. Perhaps Thomas N. Brown offers the most thorough analysis of the Ballingarry fiasco:

These events pointed to the difficulties nationalists faced in trying to overthrow so resolute and confident a people as the British with so divided a people as the Irish. The richest and most powerful Irish—the Anglo-Irish—were committed to the British connection. The middle classes were too few in number and too unsure of themselves to go it alone. Peasant support was imperative [...] but hard to command [...] peasant and nationalist conceived of Ireland in different ways. The Young Irelander wanted the peasant to act in the name of an abstraction called the Irish nation, but his loyalties inhered in more concrete relationships—those of the family, the parish, the village and Whiteboy society. The peasant followed leaders, not principles [...] and looked to the priest or the landlord or both for leadership.<sup>28</sup>

The British, of course, disagreed with each other over multiple issues and they represented, at the time, one of the most socially stratified nations on Earth. However, like a moody family capable of pasting on a smiling face while dining in public, Great Britain in the nineteenth-century confronted the outside world behind a unified front. No such uniformity

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<sup>26</sup> Douglas, Harte, and O'Hara, 39.

<sup>27</sup> Robert Sloan, *William Smith O'Brien and the Young Ireland Rebellion of 1848* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, Ltd., 2000), 295.

<sup>28</sup> Brown, 12, 13.

existed in Ireland between the Catholic peasant and the middle-class Protestant.

Though the failures of 1848 did spell the end of Young Ireland as a political force, blood was not spilt entirely in vain. Veterans of the uprising moved further underground for the time being and began to plot their revenge.<sup>29</sup> In time the uprising, despite its lack of success, assumed an almost mythic significance as a bridge gapping the history of revolutionary nationalism, from those involved in the 1798 insurrection to the movement that came next.

Before discussing the Fenian movement in depth, one must examine the way in which intense Irish migration to North America, along with the horrific suffering that exacerbated such an exodus, affected these Irish-American nationalists. Descendants of Protestant colonists owned almost all the farmland in Ireland. These landowners rented out their plots to Irish Catholics of middling means, who in turn sublet smaller plots to poorer and poorer farmers. By 1841, a population of eight-million Irish were plugged into a social pyramid that consisted of an often absentee-landlord at the top, tenant farmers that rented out smaller parcels to cottiers in the middle, who in turn offered work to landless agricultural laborers, peasants who barely grew enough food to survive.<sup>30</sup>

Almost half the population of Ireland depended on the potato for existence. Nutritious and simple to grow, the success of the crop in most years allowed for rapid population growth amongst those most dependent. When the crop failed or succumbed to blight, the results were cruel. Though there were actually a number of potato famines throughout the nineteenth-century, between 1845 and 1848 the disease became especially virulent. The death rates became so terrible that mass burials became commonplace. Due to the Act of Union, the famine was, legally, just as much a British problem as an Irish one. Such legislative technicalities were not born out in practice. While the government provided some aid relief, help was laughable at best; the British government eventually apologized for its neglect of the dire situation.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Jackson, 17.

<sup>30</sup> Douglas, Harte, and O'Hara, 40.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 40, 41, 45, 50.

The famine exacerbated migration and increased Anglophobia among the Irish. Like pouring a can of petrol on an already angry flame, British reaction to the famine provided more than enough evidence for many nationalists that the Act of Union was insincere and that British influence on the Island had to be ended. Many Irishmen and even some members of Parliament saw in British famine policies as more than mere neglect.<sup>32</sup> Those Irish who did migrate to North America carried with them a considerable amount of anti-English sentiment.

The Irish, of course, has been immigrating to the United States well before the 1840s. As a democracy, the United States was an obvious choice for political refugees from both the 1798 uprising and the insurrection of 1848. By 1860, these refugees and their descendants, coupled with famine survivors, numbered more than 1.6 million, with the overwhelming majority of them arriving between 1847 and 1854, the height of the famine-induced misery.<sup>33</sup>

However, these large numbers do not indicate American hospitality. Though many politicians welcomed the Irish for their votes and capitalists welcomed them for their labor, many Americans were unimpressed by the arrival of people they deemed “unruly.” Harsh treatment from families who had been living in the country for over one generation only strengthened Irish-American nationalism. Like all immigrants, loneliness played a key role in the Irish-American experience, and this loneliness led to the establishment of Irish-American social clubs and fraternities.<sup>34</sup> Outside of Ireland, a common “Irish” identity was beginning to strengthen.

The leaders of both the American and Irish branches of the Fenian movement were Young Ireland exiles. John O’Mahony journeyed to the United States after the uprising in 1848 while Stephens escaped to mainland Europe only to return to Ireland in 1856. Correspondence between the Fenians in the U.S. and the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in Ireland, indicate that, while the actual rebellion would take place in Ireland, support for the venture, both financial and military, would come from the United

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>33</sup> Brian Jenkins, *Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction* (London: Cornell University Press, 1969), 6, 23.

<sup>34</sup> Brown, 18.

States. Stephens met with O'Mahony during a tour of America, and, before he returned to Ireland in January, he delegated his old ally as "supreme organizer and Director of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in America." American Fenianism began in New York, but O'Mahony was charged with the laborious project of extending the movement throughout the United States.<sup>35</sup>

"It is but natural that our progress should be slow at first," O'Mahony wrote in April of 1859, "particularly as our finances do not yet warrant us in sending round agents to the different centres of the Irish-American population...We must calculate upon a certain amount of opposition from some of the priests...Those who denounce us go beyond their duty as clergymen."<sup>36</sup>

The controversy between the Fenians as a secret, oath-bound society and the Catholic Church had followed the nationalists to America, much to the chagrin of the Brotherhood.<sup>37</sup> No insurrection could succeed without vast numbers, and, since the church was closely linked to the lives of most Irish-Americans, these numbers would be difficult to accumulate.

Many rebels in Ireland wanted to strike immediately, and it was not long before similar impatience spread to the United States. As a result, O'Mahony traveled to Dublin in 1860 to examine how the funds he had sent across the Atlantic were being spent. The two leaders sat down and discussed specifics: The revolution needed at least 5000 disciplined men,, complete with competent officers leading them, and the Brotherhood must acquire at least 50,000 rifles and muskets. However, considerably more guns than this would soon be in the hands of even more Irish-Americans fighting in the Civil War, a dilemma that struck both men as a disaster.<sup>38</sup>

Ironically, in the long run, the American Civil War did more to help the Fenian cause than hinder it. Despite the lament of the Boston Pilot on May 4, 1861, "The first enemies the 69<sup>th</sup> will encounter will, in all probability, be Irishmen...what a spectacle this is. There they

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<sup>35</sup> William D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement in the United States: 1858-1886* (New York: The Catholic University of America Press, 1947), 12.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>37</sup> George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 180.

<sup>38</sup> D'Arcy, 16-18.

stand...thousands of miles from the land which it would be their common pride to defend,” Fenian membership expanded during the Civil War.<sup>39</sup> And, despite nativist concerns to the contrary, Irish-Americans joined the ranks in droves. The impetus was both financial, many enlistees were offered bounties of 600 dollars or more, and ideological, particularly after Great Britain lent support to the Confederacy. Army recruits focused on this British involvement, arguing that the military training soldiers would receive would prove invaluable in the “coming struggle” for Irish freedom. Estimates indicate that anywhere from 150,000 to 200,000 Irish-Americans served in the Union armies alone.<sup>40</sup>

In the mean time, however, Fenian leadership believed that something was needed to keep the Brotherhood on the minds of Irish-Americans who might otherwise be tempted to focus on more obvious concerns. Another veteran of 1848, Terrence McManus, played his role in the patriotic drama by dying in San Francisco at the beginning of 1861. McManus’s funeral procession, from California to Chicago to New York and finally to Dublin, became a mass Fenian demonstration. How cruel a fate, the nationalists decried, that such a man should die so far from his ancestral home. On September 18, the well-traveled remains of Terrence McManus were placed onto the steamship “Glasgow” and set off to Ireland. Fate smiled again on the nationalist cause when Archbishop Colton refused to offer mass for the rebel. Now the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood was more than just another secret society; they were patriots whom the Church persecuted by the Church in their valiant fight to free Ireland.<sup>41</sup> Stephens could not have designed a better recruitment tool.

O’Mahony took advantage of the increased Anglophobia in the United States to continue his recruitment efforts. Under normal circumstances Washington would not have tolerated such behavior, particularly during wartime. However, with the British building Confederate warship, Washington not only allowed but encouraged Fenian activity. Members of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac and the

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<sup>39</sup> Brown, 38.

<sup>40</sup> John Duff, *The Irish in the United States* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), 20, 21.

<sup>41</sup> D’Arcy, 19.

Tennessee were allowed to travel to Chicago in 1863 for the very first Fenian convention.

The movement started to take on a more “American” tone. Delegates drafted a constitution that created an Irish government in exile.<sup>42</sup> Some believed that O’Mahony’s power was still too centralized, however, and he himself was too hesitant to act, thus another convention was held in Philadelphia two years later. At the 1865 convention, the office of the Head Centre was abolished and replaced by an elected President answerable to a General Congress. O’Mahony left the Philadelphia convention with much of his autocratic influence gone, and two months later the Senate deposed him as President, insisting he step aside. He refused.<sup>43</sup>

“Cut and hack the rotten branches around you.” Stephens wrote to him, infuriated by the Americanization of the cause. Once again the burden of factionalism crept into the movement. Invoking the Chicago constitution, O’Mahony commanded one wing of the movement while the Senate led the other, which was now more popular with Irish-Americans because its form of government was more American in nature.<sup>44</sup>

The Civil War ended in April of 1865, and thousands of Irish-American soldiers who had fought and survived the violence focused their energies on a common enemy. Enthusiasm was high, as many Fenians, soldiers and leaders, assumed that once the war ended, the United States would naturally take Great Britain to task for its belligerent support of the now vanquished Confederacy.<sup>45</sup> However, this would not be the case. The Fenians had mistaken the prevailing anti-English mood of the last half-decade as pro-Irish sentiment, while most Americans, were not too impressed with either group. While Americans focused their animosity toward the English government and not necessarily its citizens, the exact opposite was true for the Irish.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the best the Fenians could hope for on the part of the U.S. government was to let them exist unhindered, and, because the Irish-American population represented such a powerful voting block, Fenian activity was allowed to flourish.

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<sup>42</sup> Jenkins, 28.

<sup>43</sup> Brown, 38.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>45</sup> D’Arcy, 63.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 64.

At this point in time, the Catholic church could no longer justify its animosity toward the Brotherhood due to its status as a “secret-society,” as very little about the nationalist movement was secret. A *New York Times* article from September 15 of 1865 explained, “...it will be seen the British government are becoming so alarmed at the progress of Fenianism in Ireland that they have determined to increase the military force stationed in that portion of the United Kingdom.”<sup>47</sup> The January 12, 1866 edition of the *Chicago Tribune* reported that the Fenian congress “has elected a Central Council to take the place of the Senate...at the Senate headquarters, President Roberts has sent instructions to the Brotherhood to purchase arms for their members. The arms which the circle are to procure are Springfield muskets [...] It is reported that preparations are being made for the purchase of large quantities of war material at seventy-five percent less than the usual cost.”<sup>48</sup>

It is difficult now to imagine the boldness with which the Fenians then acted. Here was an Irish-American government acting within the U.S. government, openly making military preparations against a sovereign world power. We can only conclude that the attack on Canada, though certainly a bold course of action, was not as quixotic a plot as one might assume. Many influential Americans considered the annexation of Canada as a reasonable compensation for British behavior during the course of the last half-decade. William R. Roberts, a wealthy American merchant and leader in the Fenian movement, believed that an invasion of Canada might instigate actual war between the United States and Great Britain, thus paving the way for Irish independence.<sup>49</sup>

Evidence indicates that senior members of the American government knew about the Fenian plot, and that a Fenian “diplomat” broached the subject with both President Johnson and Secretary of State Seward themselves and was told that while the U.S. government could not officially condone such behavior, it would “acknowledge accomplished facts” as it pertained to the potential success of such a venture.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> *New York Times* (New York, NY), September 15, 1865.

<sup>48</sup> *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago, IL), January 12, 1866.

<sup>49</sup> Brown, 39.

<sup>50</sup> D’Arcy, 84.

As mentioned, however, the Fenian invasion of Canada failed, and U.S. troops did, in fact, arrest the combatants once Canadian troops had driven them back.<sup>51</sup> The quick defeat had as much to do with the earnestness with which the British and Canadian governments took Fenian activity in the days leading up to the attack as it did with the audacity of the initial plot. The British had heard rumors of an invasion as early as 1864, and had deployed additional troops along the Canadian border.<sup>52</sup> Here is an excerpt from a *New York Times* article from March 10, 1866, mere days before the invasion, "The government buildings and all the banks in Ottawa have been placed under military guard at night. There has been a most enthusiastic response throughout Canada to the call for volunteers, and ten thousand men are already marching toward the frontier."<sup>53</sup> A month before, another article from another American newspaper commented on the approaching invasion. It merits inclusion here at length due to its discussion of Fenian infighting:

In the Fenian addresses recently delivered, both by the O'Mahony and Roberts leaders, it appears that the true reason of the division between the Roberts and O'Mahony factions is that the former proposes to invade Canada and the latter would make the campaign direct against Ireland...General Sweeny, President Roberts, and the Senate, confess that they have arrived at the conclusion that the original plan of freeing Ireland by raising the standard of revolt in that country would be insane. Probably the O'Mahony faction perceive[s] that the plan of invading Canada is still more insane. In Ireland the invading force might possibly be joined by a considerable portion of the people. In Canada it would be met by a resistance as united as it would encounter on the coast of Cornwall or Wales. The invaders would probably be disposed of as summarily as were the Filibusters under Lopez in Cuba. The project of conquering Canada with 16,000 men as a base of operations from which to attack Ireland, is worthy of that rich Irish imagination from which it emanates. Meanwhile, it seems

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<sup>51</sup>Brown, 40.

<sup>52</sup>Jenkins, 34.

<sup>53</sup>*New York Times* (New York, NY), March 10, 1866.



very clear that such projects are a palpable violation of our neutrality laws.<sup>54</sup>

A final raid on Canada was attempted in 1870, but by this time the political winds had shifted. The incoming President Grant informed his cabinet that he would no longer offer the Fenians the privilege of the “organization of a government within the U.S.” The Fenian Senate was now reluctant to commit the Brotherhood to battle, fearing the erosion of their political clout. As Brown writes: “Irish-American nationalism was directed chiefly toward American, not Irish, ends. A free Ireland would reflect glory on the Fenians, but of more immediate and practical value was use of the Brotherhood as an American pressure group.” Wealthier American-Irish became even more opposed to the violence because it kept the Irish viewed as “a distinct nationality in the midst of the American population.”<sup>55</sup>

The Irish transformed into the “*other*” for many Irish-Americans who were becoming more and more determined to create a new life for themselves in the United States. That Irish immigrants or their children did not forget about the homeland, as donations towards the burgeoning Home Rule movement and other nationalist groups continued throughout the rest of the century and up until 1916.<sup>56</sup> However, the battle to purge British influence from Irish soil would be fought *on* Irish soil, by Irishmen. The zenith of Fenianism was over.

As Irish nationalism twisted its way toward the violence of 1916, the Fenians played the part of martyred patriot-ghosts in much the same way as did Wolfe Tone and Smith O’Brien and other dead nationalists from 1798, 1848, 1867, and beyond. The Home Rule Party in Ireland, though it lacked the martial vigor of earlier nationalists, still looked to these figures as inspiration for their cause.

In the end, it was not the Home Rule Party who brought Great Britain to the bargaining table after years of violence and agitation. It was Sinn Féin, who, after winning nearly every election in 1918 in Ireland’s Catholic constituencies, refused to take their seats in a British Parliament.

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<sup>54</sup> *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago, IL), February 13, 1866.

<sup>55</sup> Brown, 41.

<sup>56</sup> Miller, 111.

Uninterested in co-existing within a large British empire, Sinn Fein, like the Fenians and Young Irelanders before them, insisted on total Irish independence.

In December of 1921, after two years of guerilla warfare against Great Britain, a half-century after the Fenian revolts, seventy-three years since the debacle at Ballingarry, and a hundred twenty-three years following the violence at Wexford, such independence was won. The fighting was not entirely over, however, because the Irish still were not certain as to what, exactly, such a Republic was to look like, or where, precisely, its borders were to fall. Sinn Fein translates into “Ourselves alone.” By 1921, Great Britain was finally ready to leave the “*other*” alone, and thus, the Irish “*other*” became the Irish Free State.

One should not conclude that the primary reason it took Irish nationalists so long to secure their independence was their inability to get along with each other. The British were numerically superior, possessed technological superiority, and used both advantages to create one of history’s most successful war machines. One might just as easily analyze the reasons Great Britain relented to the nationalists so *soon*. However, factionalism *did* take its toll on Irish nationalist goals. Be it the religious animosity between Catholic and Protestant, the class struggle between landlord and peasant, the ideological differences between political parties, or merely the universal disagreements among personalities, for years the nationalists suffered for these divisions. Taking into account the modern day borders of the island and its violent 20<sup>th</sup> century history, it is reasonable to conclude that Ireland still suffers from this factionalism; that even today the specter of “*the other*” exists, always too close for comfort.

Eric Foner, ed., *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008)

**Reviewed by Jason Miller**

*Jason Miller of Tolono, Illinois completed his Bachelor of Arts in history at the University of Illinois in December of 2007 where he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi. Currently, he is buried in research for his thesis project, a social history of political violence and the Copperhead movement in Illinois during the Civil War.*

Divided into four parts, *Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World* offers new insights into Abraham Lincoln's life. Divided between Lincoln as President, as the Great Emancipator, as Family Man, and in Memory, these essays span from revisionist efforts to wholly new contributions to the historiography of Lincoln and the world in which he lived. Contributors include such household names as James McPherson and Eric Foner as well as names recognizable to specialists of the Civil War Era such as David Blight, Mark Neely Jr., Lincoln specialist Harold Holzer, and up and comer Manisha Sinha. Acting in his role as editor, Foner excels illustrating coherent themes that run through the volume while allowing each essay to stand on their own.

The first two sections of this compilation, "The President" and "Great Emancipator," contained some of the most interesting, illuminating, and convincing articles. Leading off part one is James M. McPherson's "A. Lincoln, Commander in Chief." Using an interdisciplinary approach of studying politics, strategy, and tactics to explore wartime Presidential leadership, McPherson seeks to fill the gap left by Lincoln's biographers—Lincoln's relationship with his armies. McPherson argues that Lincoln "took a more active, hands-on part in shaping military strategy than presidents have done in most other wars."<sup>1</sup> Through his well known correspondence pushing McClellan to take the initiative in spring 1862 to other lesser known examples of Lincoln's prodding his generals, McPherson portrays Lincoln as actively espousing his own strategic outlook. The hesitancy of his generals troubled Lincoln, especially the commanders of the Army of the Potomac, until he finally found his kindred spirit in U.S. Grant in 1864. Anyone who may have heard McPherson speak over the past year will recognize this article and recall specific passages if not entire pages from his speaking engagements. If one were to buy this solely for McPherson's article they would be better advised to purchase his recently released book length exposition on this topic: *Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief*.

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<sup>1</sup>James McPherson, "A. Lincoln, Commander in Chief," in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 28.

Anyone interested in Lincoln and his questionable actions in relation to the Constitution during the war would benefit from Mark Neely Jr.'s article. Neely argues that while it is widely known that Lincoln was attempting to expand his Presidential powers through the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, what has remained unacknowledged is that Supreme Court Justice Taney's *Ex parte Merryman* decision was also an unconstitutional position aimed at increasing the Supreme Court's power. In his zeal Taney had not formulated his argument completely. His "overeager acceptance of the jurisdictional gift of Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789" points to the "aggressive nature" of Taney's rulings and the willful expansion of his powers to protect Southern rights that began to turn reckless in his *Dred Scott* decision.<sup>2</sup> Sean Wilentz's article portrays Lincoln as a Whig that "had always been more egalitarian than that of other Whigs" and had some Jacksonian tendencies. While an otherwise well argued article, Wilentz does not seem to take into account that Lincoln, as a western Whig, may have differed from eastern compatriots solely due to regional interests.

Part Two begins with an James Oakes' "Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States' Rights, and Black Rights: Another Look at Lincoln and Race." Historians have long struggled with the issue of Lincoln's racial views. As Oakes points out "The evidence for Lincoln's views on the equality of blacks and whites is hopelessly contradictory. String together one set of quotations, and Lincoln comes off as a dyed-in-the-wool white supremacist. Compile a different body of evidence, and Lincoln reads like the purest of racial egalitarians."<sup>3</sup> Oakes divides Lincoln's views into three levels: constitutional natural rights, privileges and immunities of citizenship, and race relations at the local level. Only this third division pertained to matters such as voting, jury duty, and marriage that, according to Oakes, Lincoln made "every concession" to "racial prejudice".<sup>4</sup> Conversely, according to Oakes, Lincoln consistently upheld the natural rights and privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed to all citizens in the Constitution.

In "Lincoln and Colonization," Foner points out that most historians believe Lincoln adhered to Colonization of freed blacks for reasons of political pragmatism. According to this view, he did not want to alienate the less radical antislavery members of the Republican Party's

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<sup>2</sup> Mark E. Neely, Jr., "The Constitution and Civil Liberties Under Lincoln," in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 45.

<sup>3</sup> James Oakes, "Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States' Rights, and Black Rights: Another Look at Lincoln and Race," in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 109-110.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 110-111.

antislavery coalition. He, therefore, held up the promise of exporting the “problem” of freedmen outside of the boundaries of the United States as a way to keep potential detractors within his ranks. For Foner, Lincoln was a true believer in colonization. He demonstrates that the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation contained references to colonization and that Lincoln’s embrace of colonization did not reconcile him to opponents of emancipation during the elections of 1862.<sup>5</sup> Even on New Year’s Eve 1862, the day before Emancipation Proclamation was to go into effect, Lincoln signed a contract with Bernard Kock to help settle freed blacks on Cow Island in the Caribbean and, even though he never spoke publicly of colonization after January 1 of 1863, Lincoln continued to look into schemes of colonization. For Foner, Lincoln’s “long embrace of colonization suggests that recent historians may have been too quick to claim him as a supremely clever politician who secretly but steadfastly pursued the goal embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation or as a model of political pragmatism in contrast with the fanatical abolitionists. For what idea was more utopian and impractical than this fantastic scheme?”<sup>6</sup> As Foner argues that, if Lincoln truly was a political pragmatist, he seriously misjudged the Border States’ embrace of emancipation, the willingness of blacks to leave the country of their birth, and the “intractability of northern racism as an obstacle to ending slavery.”<sup>7</sup>

Foner’s provocative and convincing essay is followed by Manisha Sinha’s equally provocative but less convincing “Allies for Emancipation?: Lincoln and Black Abolitionists.” Like many historians, Sinha upholds the view that Lincoln’s time in the Oval Office changed his perception of his role and the conflict’s role in American history. Moving from a war of reunification to a war of emancipation, Lincoln came to see the conflict as part of a millennialist divine plan for the nation and the ending of slavery. Yet, from this basis she overstates the influence that black abolitionists, including Douglass, had upon the president. It is likely that black intellectual leaders of the abolitionist movement influenced Lincoln, but her argument does not show a causal link between their influence and Lincoln’s views. In fact, if one was to accept the view of James Oakes’s essay, Douglass and other black abolitionists were preaching to the choir. Her essay, like her book *The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina*, seems to garner its main force from the restatement of her thesis throughout the work. That, however, does not make it convincing.

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<sup>5</sup> Eric Foner, “Lincoln and Colonization,” in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 159.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 166.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

Part Three of the compilation investigates Lincoln “The Man.” This section begins with Andrew Delbanco’s exploration of what meanings may have been lost and wrongly attached to Lincoln’s words over past 140 years. It is an intriguing read for anyone concerned with the meaning of Lincoln’s words in Lincoln’s world. For this reader, most impressive within this section is Richard Carwardine’s “Lincoln’s Religion” which traces Lincoln’s religious beliefs from his days as an “infidel’ politician of the 1830s” to an evangelical Protestant during his stint in the White House in which he looked for signs from God.<sup>8</sup> In his early political days in Illinois, Lincoln was well aware that religion played a significant role in people’s lives as well as their political motivations—different sects usually voted certain ways. Though Lincoln was an inconsistent attendee at Church, he garnered a reputation as an ethically earnest person that followed him from his early days and into the White House. Over the next four years, Lincoln would transform from that infidel of the 1830s into an intensely religious man and, finally, following his assassination, a Christian martyr.

Closing out Part III is Catherine Clinton’s “Abraham Lincoln: The Family That Made Him, the Family He Made.” As Clinton establishes that we still know very little about his family and those who shaped him, especially his mother. Her intervention, however, has very little to do with exploring and speculation on these unknowns. Instead, she offers the use of current scholarship on family honor in southern households to explore Lincoln’s “complex personal character.”<sup>9</sup> Her exploration holds promise, but relies heavily on theories of cause and effect especially in regards to Lincoln’s relationship with his mother and his treatment of women throughout his life.<sup>10</sup>

The book closes with an article in the vein of recent scholarship exploring the memory of the war and its appropriation. David Blight’s “The Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship, Politics, and Public Memory” should serve as the beginnings of new facets directed towards understanding the memory of the war and its leaders in modern society. For Blight the Lincoln myth is just as tenacious as that of the Lost Cause, but maybe a bit more malleable. As he points out, the Republican National Committee recently has been reminding the electorate that it “is” the “Party of Lincoln.” Such claims, Blight points, misrepresent Lincoln’s character and the Republican Party’s beliefs of the time period that serve to create a

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<sup>8</sup> Richard Carwardine, “Lincoln’s Religion,” in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 248, 232.

<sup>9</sup> Catherine Clinton, “Abraham Lincoln: the Family That Made Him, the Family He Made,” in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 251.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

direct, albeit fictitious, tie with the Republican Party of today.<sup>11</sup> Other examples abound, Blight's work is an important reminder that it was not just the losers of the Civil War that created myths.

The strength of this compilation is its holistic approach towards Lincoln. While there are no direct disagreements between scholars within the volume, one can draw distinctions between the different approaches, interpretations, and uses of sources in the volume. Despite some shortcomings, this volume is a worthy edition to any Civil War scholar's library and has the potential to reopen some old and create some new debates.

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<sup>11</sup> David W. Blight, "The Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship, Politics, and Public Memory," in *Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World*, Eric Foner, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 270-275.

John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

**Reviewed By Derek Shidler**

*Derek Shidler, who earned a B.A. in History from Southern Illinois University, is now a graduate student at Eastern and a member of Phi Alpha Theta, where he is researching the Vietnam War.*

Bayard Rustin's long and tumultuous life was shrouded in successes and setbacks. John D'Emilio's book, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin*, explores these two issues. D'Emilio explains how leading activists such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X overshadowed Rustin, making him a lost prophet. Rustin's successes seemed small, but the combination of his remarkable gifts and talents, along with the brave supporters of America's radical movements, enabled him to leave his mark on the American pacifist tradition, campaigns for economic justice and international peace, and the Civil Rights Movement. However, Rustin's homosexuality and paradoxical silence on the Vietnam War tarnished his career.

Rustin's successes stemmed from his early childhood as a Quaker with a mother who instilled peace and equality in the community. When Rustin became an active member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), he quickly became renowned as a remarkable orator. Dave McReynolds, a UCLA student, attended one of Rustin's lectures in the late 1940s and said, "You would see people with tears coming out of their eyes. He could respond to a group or get in touch with them because he was a likeable creative person."<sup>1</sup> His ability to influence and accumulate admirers was inspiring. Nevertheless, Rustin's ideas, modeled after those of Gandhi, and his superb speaking skills followed him to prison from 1944 to 1946. However, unwilling to fight, Rustin and many other nonviolent activists refused to serve their country in World War II. Those who declined the draft were sentenced to prison. While Rustin's imprisonment initially seemed to have been a setback, it proved to be a stepping stone to his success. His pacifist ideas helped push for desegregation in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. Rustin acquired a number of followers within Lewisburg, and some of these supporters would provide assistance for future protests. During these two years, correctional officers kept an attentive eye on Rustin. He began to lead strikes where black inmates refused to leave their cells for work assignment, recreation, and meals. Most of Rustin's protests within the jail received recognition from people within and outside the walls of the penitentiary.

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<sup>1</sup> John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 126.



Several years before the Montgomery Bus Boycott and a few years after Rustin's release from prison, he and George Houser devised a plan to abolish the racial segregation on the public transit system. The Journey of Reconciliation, Rustin and Houser called it, included an array of groups like CORE, FOR, NAACP, WRL, and veteran COs. After twelve arrests, due to the Journey of Reconciliation, thousands of black and white Southerners engaged in discussion about the Jim Crow laws. Rustin and Houser's attempt to bring desegregation to the public sphere worked. The *Baltimore Afro-American* newspaper reported, their movement "knocked several props from beneath the already tottering Jim Crow structure."<sup>2</sup> Also, the Journey of Reconciliation achieved a high profile in black press, seeping the model of nonviolent action further into the consciousness of African Americans.

However, seventy-five years of setbacks seemed to outweigh Rustin's successes. During a time in American history when segregation and inequality towards blacks was prevalent, Rustin also endured criticisms for being a homosexual. D'Emilio explains that Rustin's first problem with his sexuality was in Lewisburg Penitentiary. One officer observed Rustin with another inmate, saying, "sitting with different other inmates, his arms around them, rubbing their legs and other parts of their bodies, while rubbing his cheek against theirs."<sup>3</sup> Another officer observed Rustin "walking around the yard with his arms around several different inmates, in a very loving and personal manner."<sup>4</sup> On August 18, 1945 two inmates described to Captain Huntington an incident in which Rustin was caught performing oral sex on another inmate behind a curtain on the stage of the prison auditorium. Rustin's denial and eventual confession of the ordeal created conflict within his prison movements. The once admired pacifist was now shrouded in suspicion and disgust. After learning about Rustin's betrayal, Abraham Muste, leader of the FOR, sent him a harsh letter, saying, "You have been guilty of gross misconduct, specially reprehensible in a person making claims to leadership."<sup>5</sup> After his release in June 1946, Rustin found himself in trouble again because of his sexuality. Davis Platt, his lover for several years, kicked Rustin out of the house because of his sexual escapades became unbearable. A few years later, in January of 1953, after a lecture at the American Association of University Women at the Pasadena Athletic Club, police caught Rustin performing oral sex on two young men in a parked car. Yet again, Rustin was imprisoned and his creditability was severely damaged. Near the end of Rustin's life he "lost" his voice precisely when the most potent anti-war movement in modern American history crested. Rustin's conspicuous record as a pacifist puzzled

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 95

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 102

activists since he did not play a major role in the Vietnam-era antiwar movement.

At the outset of his book, D'Emilio stresses that Rustin's ideas and movements were relative obscure in the popular memory of the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, Rustin paved the way for the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. His pacifist ideas may have been radical to the public eye, but the combination of Rustin's remarkable gifts and talents crept into future civil rights activists. Rustin left a profound mark on the Civil Rights Movement with his lectures, penitentiary movements, bus boycotts, and assistance in the development of Martin Luther King's movement. E'Dmilio agrees, noting that "Rustin was as responsible as anyone else for the insinuation of nonviolence into the very heart of what became the most powerful social movement in twentieth-century America."<sup>6</sup> Rustin's career of pacifism and conservatism helped define the Civil Rights Movement.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 237.

Sandra Ott. *War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderland, 1914-1945* (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2008).

**Reviewed by Chad R. Cussen**

*Chad R. Cussen is a graduate student from Roann, Indiana. He graduated with a B.A. in History and International Studies from Indiana University in 2008 and studied at the University of Strasbourg's affiliate Institute of Human Rights in France. Chad's research interests include the cultural and political history of nineteenth and twentieth-century France.*

Historians incorporate interdisciplinary approaches to history with various degrees of intensity and effectiveness. Is the historical discipline a social science or is it confined solely within the humanities? Historians find numerous answers to this question. Perhaps hesitant to admit, historians rely on interdisciplinary approaches regardless of their methodological biases. Sandra Ott's *War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands* offers another work to bring together various approaches into what can be defined as broad historical research in a specific regional locale. Ott's book is a regional study that effectively integrates larger national trends. While combining heavy doses of anthropology, social history, and cultural history, Ott examines a minute Basque community nestled in Southern France within the Western Pyrenees: Xiberoa (Soule in French).<sup>7</sup> Ott argues that Xiberoans carried defined terms of social and cultural legitimacy through judicial and behavioral judgments in wartime experiences, including occupation and resistance among others. Ott defines these social and cultural dynamics as a moral community: "distinctions between insiders and outsiders defined the boundaries of the moral community in spatial and linguistic terms, in social and symbolic acts, in customary law, in trans-Pyrenean treaties, and in popular culture. Membership in a moral community entailed a shared habitus, compliance with certain moral codes and behavioral norms, and validation by public opinion."<sup>8</sup> Thus, Ott employs these techniques within Xiberoan experiences during wartime (both World Wars) and how these experiences shaped their identity in the years after, including memory.

Divided into thirteen chapters, Ott produces a solid organizational structure to the book. Chapters one and two trace relational developments Xiberoa's diverse social makeup. Xiberoa's inhabitants shared "long-standing traditions of trans-Pyrenean migration, immigration, and human displacement [...] although Xiberoa was relatively isolated geographically, even its most secluded inhabitants had contacts with the world around them."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, it is here that Ott establishes the moral community,

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<sup>7</sup> Sandra Ott, *War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands* (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2008), xii-xiii.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

formulated, in part, from anthropological structures developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Despite the traditions of contact between diverse social groups, Ott argues that Xiberoans formulated their communities around “house” inhabitants and strangers, or simply those who emigrated from abroad.<sup>10</sup> , Ott shows that Xiberoans carried a strong regional identity into the Great War, the Second World War, and beyond.

Ott supports these conclusions about local identity within the context of war. Echoing much of Eugen Weber’s ground-breaking work *Peasants Into Frenchmen*, Ott explores Xiberoan obstinacy, reluctance, and difficulty in defining themselves as “Frenchmen” during the Great War.<sup>11</sup> Wartime desertion or conscription evasion proved a common feature within Xiberoan communities. For those who did serve on the Western front, language difficulty proved an immense problem for Xiberoans. French military leaders used this to their advantage by promoting regional identity within the military. For example, military leaders created competitions between Bretons and Xiberoans—either group would attempt to prove their physical superiority on the battlefield.<sup>12</sup> During the Interwar period, class conflict over returned veterans, commune workers, and factory owners dominated Xiberoan communities. Ott shows that Xiberoan communities proved dynamic and abrasive, which resulted, at least in part, by the combination of regional and newly conceived notions of national identity.

The central chapters emphasize Xiberoan’s experience under Vichy rule and German occupation. Xiberoan authorities, coupled with public sentiment, generally supported Pétain’s Vichy in the early stages of the Second World War. However, Ott shows that Xiberoans became discontent with the status quo. Although many Xiberoans displayed conservative tendencies, Ott argues that Xiberoans displayed sentiments more closely aligned with xenophobic tendencies, although Ott never employs the term. Perhaps a more appropriate observation shows that Ott’s analysis relies heavily on ideology. Xiberoan communities, from the outset of Spanish Civil War refugees, were characterized as largely hostile towards communist affiliates. Authorities in Béarn, the province bordering Xiberoa to the east, constructed the important Gurs concentration camp in the late 1930s, which held nearly nineteen-thousand prisoners at its height including communists and Jews. Anti-Semitism, however, proved a relatively quiet issue, at least presented by Ott. Again, ideology takes precedence in this analysis.<sup>13</sup> Important for Ott is the way the moral community challenged Xiberoan communities through complaisance,

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 34-36.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., see chapters 3 and 4.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., see chapters 6-10.

resistance, and denunciation, especially the latter two. The moral community, through human communication, rumor, and imagination, proved highly malleable in these situations.

Ott finishes the book with an exploration of divided memories. Commemoration, through ritual and communication, played an important role in understanding the Xiberoan experience. Such issues surfaced as late as 2004 with the sixtieth anniversary of Xiberoan resistance. As Ott shows, such commemorations proved highly contentious for current inhabitants and remaining survivors. Family members and supporters of distinct resistance groups—Secret Army, CFP, FTP, International Brigade, and Guérilleros—all vied for adequate representation in public commemorations.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, each group, or rather its representatives, asserted their long-established traditions and values within the structure of the moral community. Divisions within the moral community remained well intact into the twenty-first century.

Ott concludes that Xiberoa's moral community remained divided through its experiences before, during, and after wartime. Even though resistance groups coalesced during German occupation, Xiberoans were torn over how each represented themselves and conducted their resistance. In other words, conceptions of the moral community were never fully integrated and unified.<sup>15</sup> Ott's analysis proves intriguing and important for our understanding of regional and national identity. Ott suggest that regional identities operate over national identity, at least in this case. Divisions apparent before the world wars remained within Xiberoa's moral community. Expanding from past works, like Weber's *Peasants* and Gildea's *Marianne in Chains*, Ott expands our understanding of regional/national dynamics and argues that these go well beyond the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. Ott integrates archival research, memoirs, and a strong emphasis on local ethnographic fieldwork into a well-balanced and nuanced study. At times, Ott fails to adequately address how these sources mesh and support one another. Oral testimony in 2004 can be quite contentious for events that originate at the turn of the nineteenth-century. It is difficult to see how one can make such connections without an adequate explanation which is lacking in this study. Critics of anthropological studies may latch on to this fact. Regardless, Ott should be commended for making broader connections between the past and present and between the region and nation. Expanding our understanding of such social and cultural complexities proves an asset for historians attempting to bridge memory with the past.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 182-184.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 210.

Kathryn A. Bard, *An Introduction to the Archaeology of Ancient Egypt* (Malden, Ma: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).

**Reviewed by Jeff Cutright**

*Jeff's interests include the relationships between the Roman and Parthian Empires and the interactions between an assortment of ancient and early medieval cultures along frontier regions. After completing the M.A. here at EIU, he will attend Louisiana State University to begin work on a Ph.D. in ancient history.*

In her preface, Kathryn Bard states the impetus for writing this book was that there was “no one text that covered everything ... in a comprehensive survey.”<sup>1</sup> Attempting to incorporate everything she ever “wanted to know about ancient Egypt” when first beginning her study, Bard’s first three chapters include the background necessary to understand the survey of Egyptian archaeology and history.<sup>2</sup> These initial chapters focus on the ecology, geography, and natural resources available in Egypt. The following seven chapters offer a detailed analysis of Egyptian archaeology on a chronological foundation beginning with the Paleolithic, around 500,000 years ago, and extending through the Greco-Roman Period. While textbooks on Egyptian history discuss the archaeology to supplement the history, Bard explicates the history based in, and extracted from, the archaeology of Egypt, not the other way around. Throughout the book, Bard narrates a thoroughly detailed and thoughtful history of Egypt. Bard devotes the final chapter to a summary of the current applications and potential implications of ancient Egyptian archaeology. In keeping with her stated goal of writing a textbook designed for classroom, Bard includes a set of chapter summaries and review questions in the back. Finally, Bard provides a glossary of terms as well as an extensive “suggested readings” list.

Bard discusses Egyptian history from an archaeological point of view, and utilizes an assortment of tools to aid the reader. She presents the panorama of Egyptian historical periods, which are derived from cultural and political considerations based on the important remains dating from that period. In the section on the pyramid of King Khufu at Giza, Bard provides a detailed map of the Giza Pyramid Complex.<sup>3</sup> The map includes the three largest pyramids built by Khufu, Khafre and Menkaure, and the excavated subsidiary buildings such as mortuary temples, workers’ quarters and the boat pits. Bard gives illuminating descriptions of the buildings and

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<sup>1</sup> Kathryn A. Bard, *An Introduction to the Archaeology of Ancient Egypt* (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), xvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

artifacts. She goes into ever-increasing detail on the excavations at Giza and finally explores the statues discovered at the various parts of the site.<sup>4</sup>

One of the most impressive works of art in the ancient world originates from the Giza Pyramid Complex. The life-size statue of King Menkaura and his wife Khamerernebty II is shown in Plate 6.5. Bard notes that the statue bears traces of the original paint, so what we see today is a dull reflection of the original. Bard notes that fifteen statuettes of the king existed at various stages of completion. Indeed, the pyramid itself was not completed. This king was the last to build at Giza and his pyramid is tiny compared to his father's and grandfather's.<sup>5</sup> She further comments that the incomplete pyramid, royal statuettes, and the relatively small size of Menkaura's pyramid point to possible economic difficulties, changes in the religious practices of the time, or space on the Giza plateau. While discussions of the current debates in Egyptian archaeology are outside the primary purpose of her book, Bard believes the value of including such material, if only in passing. This analysis of the implications for Egyptian cultural, social and political history is founded on the examination of the excavated objects. The archaeological discoveries spotlight the content of the book.

To the student of ancient Egypt, justification for its study seems superfluous. Nonetheless, in chapter eleven Bard spends some time and effort illustrating the applications of Egyptology to other questions and problems which lie outside the scope of ancient Egyptian studies. For example, ancient Egypt provides both material remains and textual evidence for the "earliest large territorial state" which "unlike most early states...was a stable one, in existence for over 800 years, from Dynasty 0 to the end of the Old Kingdom."<sup>6</sup> One such link is the study of the unification of Egypt which illuminates the study of primary state formation.

Another example of the applications of archaeology is that it yields information on environmental problems pertinent to the present day. Bard notes that over its long history, Egypt became increasingly arid. The way the Egyptian government and people reacted to, or failed to react to, these environmental changes remains of great interest to modern researchers.

Comparing this textbook to others in the field would be useful. However, as John Baines states on the back cover, no other scholarly introduction to Egyptian archaeology exists that was also intended for classroom use. One might compare Bard's text with Nicholas Grimal's *A History of Ancient Egypt*, which presents Egyptian history as a coherent narrative but does not generally link the history with archaeology in such a

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 143.

<sup>5</sup> Kings Khafre and Khufu, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 324. The approximate time interval here is about 3100 – 2181 BC. See Bard, 42.

direct way.<sup>7</sup> While Bard's text emphasizes the archaeology, she makes a clear connection with the history. Bard has filled the need for a single text integrating Egyptian archaeology and history into a pedagogically useful textbook while maintaining a scholarly approach to the subject matter.

Bard's discussion of the influence of Ancient Egypt on modern day fiction and cinema represents a potential point of contestation regarding the relevance of present-day pop-culture and archaeology. Her rationale was that Egyptian archaeology and archaeologists exert an important influence on society as a whole today. It has the beneficial effect of encouraging the general public's interest in ancient Egypt. Movies such as *The Mummy* series, though obviously intended to entertain and not inform, opened the door to more accurate portrayals of Ancient Egyptian society. Indeed, a Hollywood rendition of *Cleopatra* stirred the first interest in Egyptian history and archaeology in the author of this review.

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<sup>7</sup> Nicolas Grimal, *A History of Ancient Egypt*, (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell Publishing, 1994).