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Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

As the editor-in-chief of the 27th edition of *Historia*, I am proud to introduce this year's volume to the Eastern Illinois University community. What you are about to read is the result of many months of arduous work and dedication from the students enrolled in HIS 4800: Historical Publishing course, and Professor Edmund Wehrle. We approached the process of selecting a wide array of fascinating topics from a healthy division of both undergraduate and graduate students with great care and consideration. Out of seventy submissions, we were tasked with choosing only 18 for publication. While many outstanding papers were regrettably not published, we are satisfied that we have upheld *Historia's* considerable reputation and honor with our selections. Once we made our selections, we immediately began working with our authors to ensure that each chapter in this journal was indeed ready for public consumption.

Following contemporary trends, we included papers related to history, but also essays for other disciplines related to history—again a reflection of the depth of intellectual query on our campus. We would like to thank Dr. Edmund F. Wehrle who, for the second year, supervised the publication of *Historia*, serving as our guide throughout this sometimes-taxing process. Without his guidance and patience, this issue would not have been possible. We also thank Ms. Donna Nichols and Dr. Nora Pat Small who proved to be invaluable resources throughout the publication process. Sara English, a department graduate student, also provided essential help in the final stages of publication. Finally, the Eastern Illinois History Department faculty were vital in inspiring students to dig through history's back pages, of which the results are contained within. Without their mentorship, the worthy papers in this volume would never have been produced. We would like to extend our thanks to the authors whose works make up this year's *Historia*.

Finally, we wish to thank Thomas Hardy for this year's cover. As 2018 marks the centennial of World War I and the State of Illinois' bicentennial, Mr. Hardy has created a vivid contrast of our nation's moods during the Great War.

-Jonathan M. Williams, editor-in-chief, *Historia* (vol. 27)

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Gods, Armies, and Tax Collectors: Cultural Connection in Roman Egypt

Thomas A. Hardy

Thomas Hardy is a senior history major from Derry, New Hampshire. He wrote this paper for Dr. Lee Patterson's HIS 3120: Ancient Egypt. After graduation Mr. Hardy will be pursuing a master's degree in history at Eastern Illinois University.

The Egypt of Antiquity has been in the forefront of European imagination for thousands of years. Its exotic landscape and amazing structures have fascinated visitors and scholars alike. Roman Egypt is no different; the province fed Rome and its ever-growing empire for centuries. The transition from the Ptolemaic Kingdom to the Romans was not a clean one, nor were the changes or continuities static; however, by observing what changed and what stayed the same, one may have a deeper understanding of Egypt and its place in the larger Roman Empire. The introduction of Roman rule changed the lives of the people in Egypt through government, religion, and culture.

Scholars have debated the assimilation of Egyptians into the Roman system, and this paper aims to demonstrate the ways in which Egyptians assimilated, but also retained their culture, while adapting to the Roman system. David Peacock, in his chapter of *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*, argues that Egypt was distinct from the rest of the provinces. Egyptians rejected Roman culture and maintained Pharaonic traditions. "Egypt was a land apart – an exotic and distant part of the empire, perhaps more bizarre than any other province. Here, pharaonic culture thrived and a visitor to Roman Egypt would have found himself in a time capsule," he insists.¹ For Peacock, the distinct nature of Egypt caused it, in turn, to be so distant from the rest of the empire that it was declared an Imperial province, and was established as having a unique place in the imagination of the world. Peacock's chapter suggests some hostility in Egypt against Rome, where otherwise it seems like a stable province in comparison to a place like Judea or Gaul. Scholars like Ramsay MacMullen, however, claim otherwise, that Egypt had been in line with the rest of the empire until later periods of Roman Egypt, when Egyptians felt weakened by the occupation and therefore resentful of Roman's presence in Egypt.² Other revisionists find that the Roman aspects of Roman Egypt outweigh the pharaonic traditions; but, an argument can be made for assimilation and diffusion of Roman ideas into the Egyptian culture.

The measure of Romanization and the assimilation of Egypt into the Roman system is a complicated matter, as many of the scales used are dependent on infrastructure: the remaking of cities in the Roman style, roads, trade networks, etc. The extent of changes can tell several things about the nature of the province in the larger empire; this becomes very important to understanding the way that the Empire shared resources and wealth with Rome. Warwick Ball in his book *Rome in the East: The Transformation of an Empire*, while not talking specifically about Egypt, suggests one can infer the same patterns. Large cities, such as Alexandria and Thebes, were great examples of the importance of Egypt in the Roman period. Alexandria was a hub of trade, culture, and therefore was a great fortified city that withstood the ages until Egypt's fall to the Muslims. The Roman re-founding of a city to fit a Roman city plan was a way of maintaining control and was "both the

¹ David Peacock, "The Roman Period (30 BC - AD 395)," in *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*, ed. Ian Shaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 414.

² Ramsay MacMullen, "Nationalism in Roman Egypt," *Aegyptus* 44, no. 3/4 (1964): 191.

cornerstone of Roman rule there and their main legacy.”³ Since the Romans used these methods across their empire, and the amount of change speaks to the province’s importance, and therefore its Romanization, Egypt must be an integral part of the Roman economic machine. Trade routes from the Red Sea moved to the Mediterranean. Goods and luxuries arriving from India and beyond drove the importance of Egypt as a provider of goods, including trade goods from Asia, Grains, and stone.⁴ Some historians do interject that urbanization is not the same as Romanization, and that it was “merely an enhancement of local urban achievements.”⁵ Understanding the significance of Egypt in regard to the empire informs us about how the government and society changed to preserve those goods and Rome’s access to them.

The government under the Ptolemies was court based and continued to grow weaker as the years passed. When Pompey, the Roman Consul, fled to Egypt to escape Julius Caesar after a civil war, the Ptolemies began losing their grasp on the country. Once Egypt was formally annexed into the Empire and made an Imperial province by Augustus,⁶ many things changed. One of the major changes was taxation. Collecting taxes was a skill that Rome had honed over the years, and Egypt did not escape the tax collectors. “No ancient government and a few modern ones have had a tax structure rivalling in intricacy that of Roman Egypt,” concluded one historian.⁷ The Ptolemies could not compete with Rome for taxes, and while the Ptolemies had made sure all the wealth of the land was sent to their coffers, it did not work in their favor in the end. Changing the tax system puts the burden of state support on the everyday people of the province, which could sow resentment as it did in other provinces. To protect these tax collectors, Rome had multiple legions of soldiers in Egypt at any given time ready to take the offensive against enemies both external and internal. Like most provinces in the Roman Empire, Egypt had a garrison of multiple legions that dealt with the day-to-day operations of the society. The military presence was felt throughout society as they protected the tax collectors as mentioned; but, also they were stationed to escort grain shipments and protect the mines in Egypt, which were still major economic assets for Egypt.⁸ The army was a distinct faction that protected the interests of Rome; but also, it policed as normal troops might, and overall Egypt was not as heavily raided as Peacock seems to suggest.⁹

Egypt was also the main source of food production, especially for the city of Rome itself, for its population did not allow it to produce enough food to sustain the city with upwards of a million inhabitants. Augustus brought 20,000,000 *modii*¹⁰ of grain from Egypt alone per year, accounting for one-third of the grain needed to feed Rome annually.¹¹ Access to grain made Egypt an economic and agricultural necessity for Rome; it fed the capital city, and this continued to be true even into the Byzantine era, as Egypt sent food to Constantinople until Muslim forces conquered Egypt in the 7th century. Egypt, the breadbasket of the Mediterranean, had been incredibly important to Rome before it had become a province. Rome, an enormous city, could not provide for itself without help from the outside. Egypt, with its regular harvests and fertile lands, was the perfect place to find the grain necessary to sustain a population growing to over a million. Treaties had been made between

³ Warwick Ball, *Rome in the East : The Transformation of an Empire* (London: Routledge, 2000), 149.

⁴ Richard Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt : A Social History* (London: Routledge, 1995), 80.

⁵ Lee E. Patterson, review of *Rome in the East: The Transformation of an Empire. Second Edition.*, by Warwick Ball, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* (January 2017).

⁶ Augustus Caesar, or Octavian, was the adopted son of Julius Caesar and his heir. He took control of Rome and after a civil war against Mark Antony, became the First Citizen, beginning the Roman Empire.

⁷ Naphtali Lewis, *Life in Egypt under Roman Rule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 159.

⁸ Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt*, 80.

⁹ Peacock, “The Roman Period (30 BC - AD 395),” 419.

¹⁰ A modius, or modii, was a unit of Ancient Roman measurement for dry goods and equated to about ¼ of a bushel or a peck. Merriam-Webster, “Definition of Modius,” *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, n.d., accessed April 26, 2017.

¹¹ Whitney J. Oates, “The Population of Rome,” *Classical Philology* 29, no. 2 (1934): 104.

the Ptolemies and Rome for shipments of grain,¹² but now Rome could take the grain that it needed without worry of interference. The Roman administration in Egypt was not unique to Egypt, but it did use the Ptolemaic structure on its own.

Rome administered Egypt as an imperial province, a different system from a senatorial province where proconsuls were the governors. In Egypt, leadership came by strict appointment from the Equestrian class, from which Augustus emerged. Augustus hoped to bolster his support structure within the Equestrian class and keep hold of what became one of the wealthiest provinces in the Empire and keep it out of the hands of the senatorial class. The senatorial class was not allowed to enter Egypt without express permission by the Princeps. The structure of the administration, based on the Ptolemaic structure of Nomes, or districts, divided Ancient Egypt into the Roman Period. Each Nome had a Metropolis that served as the administrative center.¹³ The government of the Metropolis and civil administration was increasingly Roman in manner. Positions on the top were reserved for Roman citizens and those connected to the Prefect, while those below were locals, be they Greek or Egyptian.¹⁴ Local affairs in the records conducted in Greek, and not in Latin, show the influence of Greek society on Roman Egypt through the Ptolemies. This may indicate a shift away from pharaonic tradition and hieroglyphics, which were absent in administrative documents, or they may have been simply removed for convenience of the mostly Greek and Roman administrators. These changes show a distinct trend of shifting away from the pharaonic traditions and a shift in the lives of those living in now Roman Egypt. Greek and Egyptian traditions continued into the Roman period; however, Egypt showed Romanization in different ways.

Religion can be an effective way to control a population for centuries, creating a connection between the citizen and the state. Roman Egypt was no different in this way, using the state pagan religion to create a bond between the Empire and the Egyptian people. There also was a continuity with the old pharaonic traditions in several ways. Like many of the Pharaohs before them, Roman emperors did not stop or discourage the deifications of the emperors. Emperors like Augustus and men like Caesar are examples of this, but, emperor worship became much more prevalent in Roman Egypt, which suggests a continuity between that of Pharaonic Egypt and the Roman Period. The Ptolemies also claimed divinity.¹⁵ How much of this was a strategy to assimilate Egyptian culture or how much was real Roman belief is a matter of debate; yet, it is clear in the iconography and cults that these emperors were worshiped. Temples, dedicated with images of the Roman Emperors dressed like pharaohs and performing like pharaohs of the Dynastic periods, were common. The connection of the emperor, the head of the government, to the religion of Egypt was not only an integral part of Egyptian culture, but it also gave Romans a way to provide legitimacy for their rule in Egypt. To the Egyptians the message was: Rome is not taking over: Horus and the gods approved of Rome. Later centuries saw the rise of Christianity, and Rome again used it to assimilate Egypt, this time with less success.

Christianity grew immensely throughout Egypt; there was a locational connection between the land and the faith. The Jewish community that became Christian swelled in Egypt. Monasticism and Aestheticism found their roots in the first monasteries of Egypt, and the Bishopric of

¹² Ptolemy IV's grain shipments to Rome were most likely done in business to continue an amicable, yet not close relationship. See Arthur M. Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).


¹³ Peacock, "The Roman Period (30 BC - AD 395)," 416.

¹⁴ Alan K. Bowman and Dominic Rathbone, "Cities and Administration in Roman Egypt," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992): 107–27.

¹⁵ Alan B. Lloyd, "The Ptolemaic Period (332 - 30 BC)," in *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*, ed. Ian Shaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 403.

Alexandria¹⁶ held tremendous sway in the growth and flowering of the faith. Ramsay MacMullen argues that the introduction and growth of Christianity and Coptic Christians in the late Empire changed the political relationship between the now Byzantine Empire and Egypt in that their nationalist identity began to show through during this period. “[O]pposition to the imperial orthodoxy of Constantinople, to a large extent inspired ‘nationalistic,’ or anti-Roman, or anti-imperial urges.”¹⁷ The growth of Christianity in Roman Egypt and the breakdown of native religion created a rift between Egypt and the Roman Empire in a way that was not present before.

Compared to other colonized areas, in Egypt, Roman assimilation achieved its greatest success. The iconography of the Roman Emperor as Pharaoh, gods taking on Roman forms, and the continuation of Graeco-Roman traditions from that of Pharaonic Egypt display Egypt’s integration of Roman ideals into their society. Art, religion and the relationship between the government and the governed is intrinsically important to understanding how the society adapted to Roman rule. In terms of art, one may believe that there was a distinct continuity from that of Dynastic Egypt and that the iconography rarely changed; while this may be true regarding traditional and ceremonial art, it is not as true regarding other forms. In sculpture, one can easily see the connection between the Greco-Roman world and Egypt in the statues of Horus.¹⁸ Horus is seen in several sculptures depicted as a Roman Emperor, the outfit of a Roman general supports the idea that Egyptians began to associate themselves with Romans by the way that they were depicting their gods.¹⁹ This could also demonstrate a shift from the uniform idealization of many Egyptian sculptures toward a Roman emphasis on realistic features. The cultural assimilation is complicated, yet certain instances paint a picture of Egyptian integration to Roman culture. When scholars wish to show continuity between the Dynastic period and the Roman period, they show the images of Augustus as an Egyptian pharaoh in traditional adornments; but, it can also suggest cultural diffusion. As the



Representation of: Horus 1

Egyptians came to terms with their new foreign rulers, they used iconography and cultural norms that resonated with their people to explain the world around them. Making Augustus a pharaoh only makes sense in the context of the Egyptian experience. Using their iconography and understanding of the world around them, making Augustus the Pharaoh, and therefore a living God as seen by cults dedicated to the emperors, shows how Egypt fit into the scheme of the Roman Empire. They assimilated with the Romans, and while they did preserve some of their culture and practices, their administration, religion, and culture became diffused with that of the Romans.

Ancient Egypt has fascinated the European world for centuries and continues to provide fascination to scholars and non-scholars alike. For thousands of years, people had dreamt and thought about Egypt and

how the Great Pyramids came to be. Movies are made, and historical inaccuracies run rampant—all to feed public fascination with this most ancient civilization. Roman Egypt too fascinates, as scholars see the continuation of pharaonic and Ptolemaic traditions, but also the distinct change to a

¹⁶ The Christian faith was divided into multiple bishoprics that hoped to bring unity and structure to the Christian religion, such as bishoprics eventually divided into many different denominations, including Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.

¹⁷ MacMullen, “Nationalism in Roman Egypt,” 199.

¹⁸ Ancient Egyptian god, generally depicted as a falcon.

¹⁹ *Representation of: Horus*, Figure, Roman Period.

Roman province. The change of administration, religion and art culture demonstrate how the Romans affected and changed Egyptian society for centuries. Cities like Alexandria and Oxyrhynchus give tantalizing clues as to the daily lives in Roman Egypt and what changed forever under Augustus and later Roman Emperors.

The Abandoned War: Henry Kissinger's Vietnam

Jonathan M. Williams

Jonathan Williams is a first-year history graduate student from Palestine, Illinois. He wrote this paper for Dr. Edmund Webrle's Diplomatic History seminar. Mr. Williams is also completing a Master's in political science.

Introduction

The Vietnam War remains a controversial subject in every way. Whether historians choose to examine the European colonialization of the country, American intervention, or, especially public support for the war, endless debates will be encountered. In the case of the latter, there is little doubt that American public opinion played a role in President Richard Nixon's 1973 decision to pull American troops from active combat. Despite this, the war dragged on for another two years, with a minimized American presence. Many historians simply shrug their shoulders at the war's dramatic end, satisfied with the belief that the war was unwinnable. However, there is a deeper reason why the house of cards, which was the American presence in Vietnam, ended in such an undignified manner. As America's role in Vietnam dwindled, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's political prospects climbed. While the blame for the South Vietnamese defeat in 1975 cannot be thrown solely upon Kissinger's shoulders, there is a case to be made that Kissinger's flawed counsel and his dismissive opinions of the Vietnamese, influenced both President Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford to shift American attention away from the jungles of Vietnam.

When President Nixon resigned the presidency in August 1974, Vice President Ford, who had been in office for less than one year, assumed the nation's highest office. From the moment Ford took the oath, a plethora of controversies and woes fell upon his shoulders. Stagflation, Watergate's aftermath, and the associated distrust in government were front and center for the new president; but another headache, one that had plagued every American president since Dwight Eisenhower, still hung like a noose around the Oval Office.

Considering Ford's lack of foreign policy experience, and his decision to keep most of Nixon's cabinet in place, in terms of diplomacy Secretary of State Kissinger carried a great deal of weight. This was also true during Nixon's presidency; and despite Nixon's decision to pull active ground troops from Vietnam, American personnel and supplies remained heavily invested in prolonging South Vietnam's struggle for independence from the communist North and insurgent National Liberation Front. However, the Kissinger-led State Department was no longer as invested in winning a war that seemed ever less necessary to fight, especially considering recent American rapprochement with communist China. It can be argued that the decision to allow South Vietnam to fall to Communism was determined out of pragmatism and a sense of realpolitik. The American people were disillusioned and tired of the war, while members of Congress saw a revamped Vietnam engagement as political suicide. Additionally, the Ford Administration, which by 1975 was preparing for a tough election contest, clearly wished to prioritize domestic issues, while Kissinger hoped to rebuild America's foreign policy gravitas elsewhere in the world. The powerful secretary of state worsened this situation with his demonstrated bias against the Vietnamese people, and his lack of patience in reaching a settlement that benefitted the South Vietnamese government. Therefore, the South Vietnamese government proved unable to hold onto its fleeting hold over their country.

Methodology

A great amount of literature exists on the war's final months. Even more significant, key American leaders have written extensively within their personal narratives on this crucial period in U.S. diplomatic relations. This study relies on American sources, including Kissinger's account of the war's final months, titled *Ending the Vietnam War*; Nixon's *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*; and Ford's memoir, *A Time to Heal*. I also consulted State Department documents related to the Vietnam conflict during Kissinger's reign as U.S. secretary of state.

These sources provide clues as to the inner workings of American officials, while also illustrating the outside forces that led to the American abandonment of the Vietnamese cause. Of course, American sources, especially the memoirs of Kissinger and Ford, are not free of self-serving hyperbole aimed at shifting blame for a reduction of American aid to Vietnam on Congress, and ultimately, the American people. This is why political leaders write such memoirs on controversial subjects for which they face blame. Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger were at the helm of American decision making in the 1970s, and ultimately it was their decisions to abandon the South Vietnamese cause that hastened the Southern defeat. This historian's task is one of separating the hyperbole from the kernels of truth that can be found within their statements, and within the works of prior historians.

My argument will be broken into two parts—the first, detailing Kissinger's role in the 1973 peace agreement that led to the withdrawal of American combat troops. The second part examines how Kissinger influenced the ultimate fall of the South Vietnamese government two years later. The crux of the case against Kissinger as an effective diplomat in the Vietnam conflict is that the secretary of state was dismissive of the Vietnamese people, and therefore gave little consideration as to the policy outcomes the South had hoped to achieve.

Historiography

There exist two camps of published works on the end of the Vietnam War, the orthodox view and the latter revisionist camp. Some historians simply include the war's conclusion as an epilogue of a larger narrative of the Vietnam War, in which poor decisions led to an inevitable defeat for the American and South Vietnamese forces. Revisionists, on the other hand, claim that ulterior motives intentionally handicapped the U.S. mission in Vietnam.

Two important works that take the earlier path are John Prados' *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* and Steven Vlastos' "Losing the Vietnam War." Prados traces the entire history of the second Vietnam War, which technically began in the 1940's. What results is a wide view of American war policy over a thirty-year period, and how each presidential decision essentially limited the options for his successor. While the war reached its height of public interest during the Johnson and Nixon years, Prados is especially critical of Dwight Eisenhower and Cold War politics. According to Prados, the American obsession with discrediting communism (or more to the point, the Soviets) led to an unnecessary commitment of American resources to Vietnam. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon would go on to deepen the level of American involvement in the war, until Nixon, facing impeachment charges over the Watergate affair, attempted to appease public opinion by withdrawing forces (after he further escalated the war during his first term in office). By the time Ford became president, there was little, if anything he could do to reverse the inevitable defeat in Vietnam.¹

¹ John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013).

Stephen Vlastos in “Losing the Vietnam War” claims that the United States failed in Vietnam because the fight was more of a revolution than a fight with solid objectives. Vlastos essentially claims that the American government became so obsessed with the war that the policy became a mindless display of terrorism, as opposed to a sound military endeavor.² Essentially this orthodox camp suggests that the period between 1973 and 1975 was driven by the consequences of a decade of poor ideologically-driven political and military decisions.

The remaining scholarship relating to the war’s conclusion focuses on the impact of the war upon President Ford and his successors, and how a changing world rendered the outcome of the war less consequential to American interests. Robert J. McMahon and later, journalist Marvin Kalb, examined how the Vietnam experience impacted presidential decision-making in future conflicts. Meanwhile, Kalb uses the war to make a political point. Kalb claims that the United States was careless in choosing when to engage in foreign conflict, demonstrating that the global superpower is not invincible. While not exactly a work of history, Kalb does examine how Vietnam era presidents such as Lyndon Johnson underestimated the North Vietnamese forces.³

On the revisionist side, James H. Willbanks and J.M. Carland claim in “Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War” that historical studies of the war’s end are heavily flawed, as both American and South Vietnamese leaders genuinely hoped to “win” the war, but proved incapable of determining a winning strategy.⁴ More recently, Christopher T. Jasperson writes in “The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration, and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975-76,” that the loss in Vietnam was due both to a lack of effort on behalf of the American forces, and a consequence of a faulty governmental system in South Vietnam. Jasperson argues that while the South Vietnamese government was both corrupt and unresponsive to the needs and desires of their citizenry, the war’s sudden end in 1975 can be traced to a conspiracy between Ford and Kissinger, as they attempted to shift the blame from their own failed policies, toward Congress.⁵ A revisionist perspective also is apparent in Michael Lind’s *Vietnam: The Necessary War*, which lays claim to the idea that the Cold War was essentially World War III, fought through proxy conflicts in Asia. While Lind concedes that the war in Vietnam was essentially unwinnable, it was still, he claims, a vital part of the U.S. victory in the overall war against the Soviet Union.⁶

Kissinger and Nixon: Impatience and Orientalism

In a 1975 post-mortem on American involvement in Vietnam, which U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prepared for President Ford, the secretary concluded that “We paid a high price, but we gained ten years of time and we changed what then appeared to be an overwhelming momentum (of communist influence). I do not believe our soldiers, or our people need to be ashamed.”⁷ These words were written at the very moment the dust of war was settling over what had been a traumatic and embarrassing chapter in American diplomatic history. Kissinger acknowledges that the Vietnam War had been the most divisive military entanglement the United States had faced

² Stephen Vlastos, “Losing the Vietnam War,” *Radical History Review* 55 (Winter, 1993): 165-74.

³ Marvin L. Kalb and Deborah Kalb, *Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2012).

⁴ James H. Willbanks and J.M. Carland, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

⁵ Christopher T. Jespersion, “The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration, and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975-76,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 2 (April, 2000): 265-93.

⁶ Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War - A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2003), 560

since the Civil War, yet he was still not willing to concede that the U.S. government had erred in taking on the South Vietnamese cause.⁸

Over time, Kissinger's views on the war's end would evolve into a more defensive position, which placed the lion's share of blame onto the South Vietnamese government, stating "the United States owed the peoples of Indochina a decent opportunity for survival; its domestic divisions made it impossible for the United States to pay this debt."⁹ Kissinger has remained consistent in his view that American involvement in Vietnam was a worthy cause, in line with America's modern foreign policy principals. However, the insistence that the South Vietnamese government was ultimately responsible for its collapse, appears suspect considering the heavy role that the United States placed in pushing both North and South Vietnam to the bargaining table, in hopes of reaching a settlement favorable to the west.

By 1972, the Nixon administration, like much of the American people, was tired of fighting over Vietnam. Peace talks in Paris had accomplished little over the past four years, and President Nixon was ready to send the South Vietnamese government an ultimatum; agree to something, anything, or face American abandonment. In December of that year, one month after Nixon's landslide re-election over anti-war Senator George McGovern, the president sent Secretary of State Kissinger to Vietnam to force the point on the South Vietnamese. Before departing for Vietnam, Kissinger expressed optimism over his ability to persuade the South Vietnamese government to accept an agreement like that which was reached in the October talks that led to a temporary bombing halt.¹⁰

However, Kissinger was instead blindsided by North Vietnamese chief negotiator Le Duc Tho's refusal to consider even previously agreed upon points, while issuing several new planks that Kissinger knew would never be accepted by the South. This frustration led Kissinger to concede that the only options available to the United States was to either accept the unaltered terms set forth in the October talks, or to shut down the Paris talks entirely. Over the next few days, Nixon and Kissinger reconcile themselves to the probability talks would not continue, but quarreled over how to respond to this unfortunate development. Kissinger urged Nixon to reach out to the American people for renewed support of the bombing effort, while Nixon preferred to shock the North with unannounced bombings. Ultimately, Nixon ignored Kissinger and deployed his secretive bombing strategy.¹¹

The bombings did succeed in bringing the North back to the bargaining table, although the South Vietnamese government continued to drag its feet in reaching a compromise. This especially annoyed Nixon, who wanted Vietnam off his plate before his second inauguration on January 20th, 1973. Fortunately for the president, the renewed peace talks finally yielded an agreement, but one that heavily divided the South Vietnamese government, gave the North an upper hand, and, most telling, revealed Nixon's ignorance as to South Vietnamese politics. In terms of the South, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky felt as though current President Thieu sold his country out to the North, as Hanoi could continue a military presence in parts of the South. Ky felt that this severely weakened the South's case for independence. But perhaps the most egregious aspect of these negotiations was Nixon's complete lack of knowledge of the South Vietnamese government, and his reliance upon Kissinger, whose expressions of "orientalism" all but dismissed the South Vietnamese of whom he was charged with aiding. Nixon admitted to Kissinger that he was unaware of any office holders in the South Vietnamese government beyond Thieu and Ky, and Kissinger revealed his

⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁹ Ibid, 560-61.

¹⁰ Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 724.

¹¹ Ibid, 728-41.

feelings as to the South's Minister of Information as a "little bastard," while summing up the process of negotiating with the Vietnamese as "training rattlesnakes."¹²

Sadly, there is a storied history of westerners dismissing oriental culture as inferior to western norms that seeps into foreign policy decisions. Edward Said famously rebranded "orientalism" as the west's tendency to make foreign policy gains through the establishment of negative global attitudes toward oriental cultures; while rendering western cultures as the correct standards.¹³ Furthermore, American culture tends to genuinely subscribe to the idea that foreign ways of life contain radical elements, simply because these cultures do not align with American views.¹⁴

Kissinger's dismissive attitudes of the Vietnamese, and his assertion that he needed to "train" the Vietnamese, both North and South on the art of negotiation, points to Kissinger's own faults as a diplomat. In a forthcoming book critiquing Kissinger's diplomatic service, historians Robert Brigham and Michaela Coplen argue that Kissinger was "handicapped by a superiority complex that led him to think that he was right and everyone else was wrong... He consistently made value judgments that had no basis at the time and were contradicted by facts found in State Department files."¹⁵ Kissinger issued questionable statements about the Vietnamese people, in his book *Ending the Vietnam War*, which illustrate his biased judgment against what was supposed to be a valuable American ally. Kissinger claimed that the Vietnamese lacked the "humanity" that was inherent in the people of Laos, while also lacking the "grace" of the Cambodians. Kissinger wrote in the context of explaining why the Vietnamese were in nearly constant conflict for much of the twentieth century. Even more, Kissinger believed that the Vietnamese had a contempt for all things foreign. However, one must wonder if constant occupation might influence a nation's views as to foreign influences.¹⁶ Kissinger's one-sided observations cast him as a questionable choice to lead America's longest running war (at the time). While Kissinger's views may have helped him curry favor with an American administration that now sought a speedy end to the war, these views no doubt left the South Vietnamese at a disadvantage.

Kissinger and Ford: The Final Chapter

On August 9th, 1974, Gerald Ford took the oath of office as the 38th President of the United States, following Nixon's resignation in the wake of insurmountable evidence of political corruption. As much of Congress and the American people's attention was tuned to Nixon's Watergate scandal through 1973 and most of 1974, America scaled down assistance of South Vietnam was barely an afterthought. When considering Nixon's left-over budget for FY 1975, congressional leaders of both parties slashed the proposed defense budget. Of course, this reflects a thawing of Cold War tensions, and the will of the American people to move beyond the traumas of the Vietnam War.¹⁷

Kissinger, although annoyed with the South Vietnamese government, was still a "cold warrior," and he hoped to provide Ford with an opportunity to salvage the South Vietnamese government. If the southern government folded, then the historical narrative on the war would be one of total loss by the Americans, who in 1973 viewed the negotiated settlement, which

¹² Robert Dalleck, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 452-453.

¹³ Andrew Rotter, "Saidism Without Said: Orientalism in U.S. Diplomatic History," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (October, 2000): 1205-1217.

¹⁴ Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, "Journeys for Peace and Liberation: Third World Internationalism and Radical Orientalism During the U.S. War in Vietnam," *Pacific Historical Review* 76 no. 4 (November 2007), 575-584.

¹⁵ As quoted in Larry Hertz, "Looking for the Real Henry Kissinger," <https://history.vassar.edu/news/stories/2015-2016/160808-ford-kissinger.html>, accessed August 8, 2016.

¹⁶ Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War*, 434.

¹⁷ Ibid; 493-95.

commenced at the end of the American ground and air war in Vietnam, as a dignified settlement which would allow South Vietnam to live free of communism. This would not be the case, however, if the North succeeded in overthrowing the government in the South. In *Ending the Vietnam War*, Kissinger again stated his belief that what he saw as the cartoonish actions of both North and South Vietnam ultimately led to the continued stalemate between the two by late 1974.¹⁸

The confidence demonstrated by the North Vietnamese government also appears to have been a motivating factor for Kissinger's renewed focus on fortifying the South Vietnamese government. Kissinger expressed ire following a statement by North Vietnamese President Le Duc Tho, in which the leader boasted responsibility for Nixon's political downfall, while at the same time warning of the same outcome for Ford. Tho added a pointed insult directed at Kissinger, stating that the secretary had dishonored his own "signature and commitment" to Vietnamese peace. Kissinger, in turn, viewed this as supreme arrogance on the part of Tho, which no doubt spurred Kissinger's jealousy¹⁹

In response, Kissinger doubled down on his insistence that Ford implore Congress for additional political and military support for South Vietnam. The ammunition that Kissinger would use in defending monetary support from Congress, came from James R. Bullington, a low level State Department employee who had just recently returned from a brief visit to South Vietnam. Upon his return, Bullington claimed that without at least \$1.3 billion dollars over each of the next two years, the United States would have no choice other than to cut ties with the South Vietnamese government. Additionally, the United States would need to use its resources to offer aid and asylum to as many South Vietnamese citizens as they could, following the inevitable conquering by the North.²⁰

What resulted was a maneuvering to buy enough time to safely remove American personnel, and critical South Vietnamese allies from the country, before the North could attack the heart of Saigon. Ford addressed Congress in April 1975, in hopes that he could secure funding for this exercise, without giving too much strategic information away. Unfortunately for the administration, Congress balked at the suggestion of further aid for Vietnam. As a result, South Vietnamese President Thieu resigned.²¹ The remaining choice for Ford was to put as positive of a spin as possible to the war's sad end, which he did in a public address at Tulane University on April 23.²²

"Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence."

On April 30th, 1975, helicopters lifted remaining American personnel from the rooftop of the sieged American Embassy in Saigon, all the while leaving behind millions of dollars' worth of military machinery to either rot, or be repurposed to the advantage of the now fully united communist Vietnam. To add insult to injury, the following day, Congress rejected the additional funds that Ford had requested on behalf of the mission in Vietnam. While by this point, there was little hope that the United States could alter the outcome of the war; the ultimate failure of the United States government to protect its ally in South Vietnam represented the final failure of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which Kissinger was all too eager to push through. The United States,

¹⁸ Ibid, 500.

¹⁹ Ibid, 502.

²⁰ Ibid, 502-503.

²¹ Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 253-57.

²² Gerald R. Ford, "Speech at Tulane University," April 23, 1975, Historyplace.com, <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/ford-tulane.htm>, accessed April 15, 2018.

operating almost solely under the direction of Secretary Kissinger, promised then to intervene in the case of any hostile actions undertaken by the North or anyone else. But now, in the Spring of 1975, Kissinger learned the harsh realities of divided government. Kissinger, who conducted himself as though he were smarter than the Vietnamese, and more influential than Congress, suddenly appeared meek and powerless as South Vietnam fell to the communists.²³

Conclusion

Henry Kissinger remains alive and well at the time of this writing, at the age of 94. While he remains an extremely controversial figure, he also maintains the respect of the Washington establishment. Had last year's U.S. presidential election ended as the American political establishment likely expected, his counsel would no doubt have been valued by President Hillary Clinton.²⁴ However, the anti-establishment sentiments of the American proletariat carried the day and awarded to a political and foreign policy novice to the presidency. In the context of the Trump administration's attitudes on foreign policy, there is little room today for the pragmatism and realpolitik espoused by Kissinger and his contemporaries.

However, Kissinger's record suggests that his time in power did little to endear the United States to the rest of the world. Beyond his embarrassing behavior in underestimating the political goals of both North and South Vietnam, Kissinger has even been accused of war crimes throughout his eight years in the Nixon and Ford administrations.²⁵ I will leave it to other historians to detail these accusations and their standing in the international courts. But this paper aims to contribute to the scholarly debate regarding Kissinger's role in the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War; exposing Kissinger's failure to see beyond oriental stereotypes, and the role that a superiority complex played in further torpedoing twenty years of American policy in Vietnam.

²³ Larry Berman, "No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam," *New York Times*, August 12, 2001.

²⁴ Amy Chozik, "Hillary Clinton's Ties to Henry Kissinger Come Back to Haunt Her," *New York Times*, February 12, 2016.

²⁵ Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Verso, 2001); Alex Gibney, *The Trials of Henry Kissinger*, DVD (2003; New York: First Run Features, 2002).

Guns and Skirts: Chicago's Policewomen and the Press

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During the Progressive era, newspapers were filled with headlines and articles meant to reflect and shape public opinion about the present state of America. There was an overall sense that control was slipping away as women marched in the streets demanding the right to vote, immigrants flooded cities, and young men and women explored new independence. Cities scrambled to gain control over ever increasing populations, as great debates took place surrounding the methods by which cities should police their citizens. Men and women alike hotly debated issues in the press. Pessimism about the state of Chicago and other American cities was met with equally fervent Progressive-era positivity that improvement was possible and that women had a role in creating progress. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century police matrons and female officers for the city of Chicago often understood their role as central to the improvement of their city and society as a whole. As an extension of popular culture, the press often flip-flopped on whether or not they supported the appointment of women to policing roles. It was a divisive issue closely tied to debates about women's rights and pay, and so the press was divided over whether to embrace or exploit matrons and officers. The commentary surrounding women's roles, uniforms, and training show that, at times, women's views of their roles were in line with that of the press, and, at times, they were at odds as women increasingly took positions in law enforcement.

The press played a very important role in shaping public views and opinions of women entering police work. The general consensus was that it would be very difficult for a woman to be both an effective police officer and feminine. Either femininity was emphasized or masculinity played up when women were placed in police roles. One camp of thought in support of police matrons rationalized them as women simply filling a nurturing role, similar to nursing. Because police matrons were working with authority over arrested women and girls, there was little for men to oppose. Some men claimed that women should be protected from seeing the uglier side of humanity, but it was difficult to say that a woman caring for the needs of other women was unladylike.

Opposition to police matron appointments also was blunted by the fact that women were not being given authority over men. Police matrons were responsible for the care of arrested women, but they were unable to make arrests. The *Friend's Intelligencer* reported in 1882 that Chicago, in particular, needed police matrons because 1881 had seen "over 5,000 arrests of women or girls."¹ One Chicago police station, a newspaper reported, had brought on a police matron "and after a few months' experience the officials heartily endorse the change which they scarcely believed feasible... This success has caused an effort to have matrons admitted at the other three stations."²

As early as 1880, there were calls for women police officers. Suffragist Mrs. Lillie Devereux Blake told the *Chicago Daily Tribune* that she wanted "policewomen to be employed at the police

¹ "Report of The Committee on Prison Affairs," *Friends' Intelligencer (1853-1910)*, October 21, 1882.

² *Ibid.*

stations in New York ... strong, healthy women of good physique, and paid the same as policemen.”³ In 1910, the National Probational Officers’ Association Convention in St. Louis concluded that “women police officers are the logical solution to the question of handling girls who have “gone wrong... a girl should have sympathetic treatment, such as only women can give. She should not be subjected to the brutalities of a criminal handler.”⁴ This call, however, was not widely accepted by the public, and women who aspired to be police matrons and police officers were often mocked or belittled. “A big part of the problem was that the widespread employment of policewomen across our nation began at nearly the same time that the Suffrage Movement reached its height. ... Many individuals in the United States saw these events as radical changes to a way of life they wanted to maintain, and they were prepared to fight these changes with all of their strength and will,” stated historian Robert Snow.⁵

The rapid inclusion of women into the police force at the turn of the century is often attributed to the suffragist movement. While many women were fighting for equal pay and the right to vote, some women were now being hired, at a generally lower pay rate, to incarcerate them. The hiring of women to accompany male officers and granting authority to women to make arrests themselves was meant to drastically reduce the risk of harm coming to detained women and girls. “It was considered inappropriate for any man, other than a family member, to touch a lady. But then suddenly, because of the Suffrage Movement, upper-class women were being physically hauled away to jail by policemen,” explained Snow.⁶ The general safety and well-being of women was certainly of significant concern as “women held at police stations often suffered sexual abuse.”⁷ Lieutenant Mina Van Winkle of the women’s bureau defined one of the duties of policewomen as addressing “the future social status” of the arrested, rather than simply “the physical wants of the women in her care.”⁸ The most vocal opposition to the appointment of female officers grew out of resistance to giving women roles with arresting authority. Full arresting authority would give women the right to arrest men— this was the most disputed facet of policewomen’s roles— something which went against seemingly every behavior and attitude prescribed to women. Seen as unladylike and outright dangerous for the policewomen, full arresting authority was withheld for a number of years.

Generally, Alice Stebbins Wells of the Los Angeles police department is considered the first



female policewoman. Wells was sworn in in 1910 as a kind of civil service/ police officer.⁹ Yet, clearly women served as part of police forces, including in Chicago, well before Wells arrived on the scene. Mrs. Marie Owens, for instance, attained the rank of Sergeant Detective in the Chicago Police Department several years before Wells’s swearing in. In 1904, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* printed a feature on Owens, the headline claiming she was “the Only Woman Police Sergeant in the World.”

³ “Policewomen,” *Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922)*, April 2, 1880.

⁴ “About Women,” *Zion's Herald (1868-1910)*, June 8, 1910.

⁵ Robert L. Snow, *Policewomen Who Made History: Breaking Through the Ranks* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁸ Allan T. Duffin, *History in Blue: 160 Years of Women Police, Sheriffs, Detectives, and State Troopers* (New York: Kaplan, 2010), 51.

⁹ Kerry Segrave, *Policewomen: A History*, 2nd Ed (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2014), 57.



“THE ONLY WOMAN POLICE SERGEANT IN THE WORLD.” *Chicago Daily Tribune* (1872-1922), Aug 07, 1904.

The article explained how Owens earned her title. After serving as a “special health officer” for women and children for some time, Owens was given the authority to enforce child labor by being put on Chicago’s police payroll in the detective department as “Sergeant No. 97.” The police lieutenant over her considered her another patrolman saying “Mrs. Owens... is a patrolman, gets the salary, has the rank and all. ... So what’s wrong with ‘patrolman’ for Mrs. Owens?” Owens began her role as a special officer in 1901. Interviewed later, she said, “Of course I have full police power, but I find myself more than busy rounding up truants, looking after cruel parents and preventing violations of the child labor law.”¹⁰ In 1906, the *Chicago Tribune* published another article on Owens, this time featuring her work as a detective.¹¹ Echoing the first story, the article highlighted her modesty and femininity

while quoting higher ranking men praising her work. A few years after the piece on Owens, in 1909, *Zion’s Herald* reported that Josephine E. Sullivan, who had “been an employe[e] of a detective agency for 6 years,” had been hired as Chicago’s “first policewoman.”¹² Sullivan’s ‘beat’ was limited to the main shopping street of Chicago, where she was assigned to prevent shoplifting and theft.

Finally, in response to various calls for more female police, in July of 1913, the police department announced that Chicago would be hiring *ten* women as police officers. In August, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* listed the officers as Mrs. Anna Loucks, Miss Clara Olsen, Miss Fannie Willsey, Miss Margaret Wilson, Mrs. Lulu Parks, Mrs. Margaret Butler, Mrs. Alice Clement, Miss. Emma Nukum, Mrs. Nora Lewis, and Mrs. Mary Boyd.¹³ Since the department made the hires a trial basis only, no uniforms were made for the women. The ten female officers were meant to patrol Chicago’s “dance halls, bathing beaches, and small parks and playgrounds” at first. The *Tribune* named Owens again at this point as the “general detective” assigned to the management of the female officers.¹⁴ The female officers found themselves limited to handling cases related to morality for most of their work. It was not until 1914 that female officers were included in more general duties.

One subject which seemed of particular interest to the public was the physical appearance of a policewoman. What would it look like for a woman to be a police officer? Policewomen themselves were divided on the issue. One suggestion was that women should wear a long gray skirt, short enough to run in, a white shirtwaist, a gray sombrero, and boots.¹⁵ Historian Allan Duffin notes that, “a proposed uniform for Chicago’s policewomen featured a long jacket and a skirt with a pistol pocket sewn into the right side in the event that the policewoman carried a sidearm.”¹⁶ Papers often featured such stories for various cities’ policewomen. As women were being given policing positions, several women insisted on remaining in plainclothes. The push for uniforms came mostly from outsiders who hoped to avoid being surprised by a policewoman in plainclothes. Others still

¹⁰ Ibid, 49.

¹¹ “The Only Woman Detective on The Chicago Force,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, 1906.

¹² “About Women,” *Zion’s Herald*, June 16, 1909.

¹³ Segrave, *Policewomen: A History*, 81-2.

¹⁴ “Ten Policewomen Chosen by Mayor; On Duty Monday,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 2, 1913.

¹⁵ “Women Police Qualities Given,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 9, 1913.

¹⁶ Allan T. Duffin, *History in Blue*, 48.

argued that uniforms should be given only to men on patrol. As late as 1917, years after female officers in Chicago had been appointed, debate continued over how women officers should be dressed. “Cleveland Health Commissioner, A.L. Bishop, is strongly urging the adoption of trousers for policewomen as a health measure,” reported the *Tribune* in 1917. Chicago’s chief of police quickly shot down Bishop’s suggestion when interviewed, saying, “policewomen are valuable to a department for the reason that they are women, modest women. In this, and this only, lies their ability to accomplish what men detectives fail in.”¹⁷ Contemporary sources implied that wearing pants would instantly make a woman manly and immodest. After all, the difference between men and women was the main cause for there to be women police in the first place, in the minds of many.

The movement from moral care to general police work might be regarded as a step toward equality today, but at the time, both men and women protested the shift. In 1914, the Women’s Athletic Club of Chicago decried the decision to put women on patrol. Mrs. Joseph T. Bowen’s statements in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* made clear that many of the women in the club believed that “the head of the police does not care for policewomen. So he has taken them from the morals section of the department and put them out to do patrol. I contend that the work of a policewoman is not to regulate traffic but to serve as chaperones at the dancehalls and other places where the city’s unprotected daughters gather.”¹⁸



As far as general reporting on Chicago’s policewomen, it seemed that the press was just as confused as the public. 1914 proved an especially rocky media year for Chicago’s policewomen. The press depiction and public opinion of female officers flip-flopped drastically over the course of the year. During the waitress labor boycotts in 1914, violence sparked between crowd members and male and female police officers alike. The *New York Times* reported these incidents in an unflattering light for all involved. In response to concerns female officers looked physically weak and woefully unprepared for conflict, female officers were taught jujitsu and armed with pistols.¹⁹ When the *Chicago Daily Tribune* announced this training and the transfer of women into different departments at police stations, the article was largely a puff piece meant to show the public that the Chicago police department was dedicated to having the best of the best officers. The article bragged that “The policewomen are better marksmen than the men.”²⁰ However, the very next month, an article poked fun at one of the

female officers, calling her “afraid to go home in the dark” for asking a male officer to escort her home.²¹ In fact the female officer, trained to identify threats to her safety, perhaps was acting with prudence in asking for a male escort. Instead, the press made light of the situation and teased the

¹⁷ “Police Women Wear Trousers? Nix, Says Chief,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 21, 1917.

¹⁸ “Club Women Protest Transfer of Feminine Cops,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 4, 1914.

¹⁹ “Policewomen Apt Pupils with Pistols and Jiu Jitsu,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 10, 1914.

²⁰ “Policewomen Go to Stations,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 8, 1914.

²¹ “She’s Afraid to Go Home in the Dark,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 25, 1914.

officer for trying to secure her safety. One short article in *The Youth's Companion* also mocked policewomen by saying that the husband of one applicant for the Chicago police force sabotaged his wife when she was trying to lose weight to meet the physical requirements of the job. After losing 5 pounds, “her husband, who disapproved of her ambition and her efforts, inveigled her into a restaurant, and had a porterhouse steak put before her.”²²

Despite erratic press coverage, women applied for police positions in droves. One article from 1914 reported that three-hundred women applied for the seven “temporary appointments” in Chicago.²³ By 1916, Chicago had the most female officers out of the nation’s cities at twenty-one officers, according to the *Chicago Daily Tribune*.²⁴ When America entered World War I in April of 1917, things took a difficult turn for women police once more. By 1917, Chicago city officials and judges began to publicly question the hiring and retention of policewomen. In response, Chief of Police Herman F. Schuettler put forward statistics in the *Chicago Tribune* that backed his assertion that policewomen were “invaluable” and “efficient in a marked degree . . . deserving of praise from

both him and the citizens of Chicago instead of censure.”²⁵

The press and the public only served to heighten the expectations placed on women. Early female officers seemed to be forced by American culture at large into the cookie-cutter form of the feminine-yet-“husky,” soft-yet-sharp, compassionate-yet-forceful.²⁶ Every policewoman was a walking dichotomy. Marie Owens was a mother of five, successful policewoman, and role model for those who next took their place on the force. Other officers were expected to be modest, compassionate, and strong but submissive. Alice Clement, who had been hired back in 1913, became Chicago’s next famous police detective, breaking molds by embracing her role as the ever-clever, outspoken, feminine detective, yet mother of three.²⁷ History forgot these active policewomen for the better part of a century as women’s roles as officers were continuously restricted in different ways across the country. The history of police was told about men and told, for the most part, by men.

The matter of unequal pay and unequal work remained an issue well into the twentieth century. Between its circulation wars and deadline pressures, the press rarely took a consistent line. The impulse which would have journalists report objectively was drowned out by the need to print stories which sell, time and time again. Political and economic power drive the media. The removal of women from police roles during the Great Depression and later the emerging women’s movement certainly had an enormous impact on the roles women police played for the greater part of the twentieth century. Issues over equal employment and pay for female officers still remain today, over a century after the first policewomen were sworn in. “Before 1968, no major city in the United States had given the idea of policewomen on street patrol any really serious consideration,”



"Woman Members of Chicago Police on First Day of Duty." Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922), Aug 06, 1913.

²² "Fact and Comment," *The Youth's Companion* 88, no. 33 (Aug 13, 1914): 416.

²³ "Thirteen Women In 300 Pass Police Examination," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 19, 1914.

²⁴ "Fair Cops," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 1, 1916.

²⁵ "Chief Declares His 29 Copettes Are Invaluable," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 4, 1917.

²⁶ "Women Police Qualities Given," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 9, 1913.

²⁷ "Alice Clement, Policewoman, Is Taken by Death," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 27, 1926.

according to Robert Snow. Female officers were still given roles very similar to those of the very first policewomen. “Policewomen were stuck either in the juvenile aid office or secretarial spots, with their chances for promotion seriously hampered. Their future in the department was dramatically denied.”²⁸ Perhaps by reclaiming the history of Chicago’s policewomen, America’s policewomen and policewomen around the world, this generation and the next will push against the next wave of anti-policewoman and anti-woman rhetoric. Recognizing women’s historic role in policing is a good beginning.

²⁸ Snow, *Policewomen Who Made History*, 5.

American Women in the Fight for Lasting Peace

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Shortly before the end of her life, Jane Addams addressed a banquet of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom which presented a tribute in her honor. She thanked the speakers for their loving descriptions of her kindness and fortitude. "I do not know any such person as is described here this evening," Addams said, "I think I have never met her...I have never been sure I was right. I have often been doubtful about the next step. We can only feel our way as we go from day to day."¹ Despite her doubts, when the war in Europe broke out in 1914, Addams found herself shifting priorities from her social work at Hull House to the more immediate cause of the peace movement. For Jane Addams, pacifism was at once international and intensely personal. The Great War shifted her focus from more local issues to questions of the international success or failure of reform in a world at war. Addams saw the war as an ideological shift away from human nature, a movement shaped by industrialization, militarism, and racialized nationalism. While President Woodrow Wilson's ideologies initially reflected a pacifist stance on international relations, by 1917 he shifted towards militancy, leaving peace organizations like the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) as minority movements in foreign policy. A clash between president and prominent reformer was inevitable.

Women's reform movements, prohibition, education, and other social initiatives typically took place in areas of social consciousness considered to be the women's sphere. "The doctrine of woman's sphere," argues historian Nancy Cott, "opened to women (and reserved for them) the avenues of domestic influence, religious morality, and child nurture."² Women reformers believed in moral responsibility, not only of women, but of the middle class – a belief which translated to their work in social reform and political movements. Like other Progressive-Era reformers, women reformers believed in the power of education to enact change. With the increasing number of new immigrants, Addams and others became concerned with preserving immigrant culture, while giving immigrants the education and opportunity necessary for success in America. Some programs for immigrant success that Chicago's Hull House offered were adult-English language classes, citizenship classes, and the use of Hull House as a polling place for new citizens of the precinct. Her work with the immigrants of Chicago is part of what opened Addams to a more internationalist perspective.³

It was in the same hall at Hull House where Addams worked with immigrants that she felt a chilling shift in 1917. With Wilson's declaration of war, the hall was used to register men of the Hull House district for the draft.⁴ She recognized many of the men who were there to register as many

¹ Jane Addams, "Response Made by Jane Addams at a Banquet of the WILPF, May 2, 1935," in *Jane Addams: A Centennial Reader*, ed. Emily Cooper Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 325.

² Nancy F. Cott, *The Bonds of Womanhood* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977), 200.

³ Louis K. Knight, *Jane Addams: Spirit in Action* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2010), 66-67, 148-150.

⁴ Addams, *A Centennial Reader*, 291-292.

had been involved in programs at Hull House. “I really have you to thank if I am sent over to Europe to fight,” confessed one of the new citizens to Addams, “I went into the citizenship class in the first place because you asked me to. If I hadn’t my papers now I would be exempted.”⁵ This shift in the use of Hull House from a bulwark of democracy for new immigrants, many of whom hoped to escape wars in their homeland, to a vanguard of militarism shipping those same immigrants, now citizens, to the battlefield, greatly affected Addams. Having consistently asserted her pacifism,⁶ previously secondary to her social activism, the personal and international nature of the war drove Addams now to put peace at the forefront of her vision for the world.

Other prominent women involved in social reform movements also shifted their attention to the peace movement as US involvement in the war in Europe became inevitable. Julia Ward Howe, a prominent member of the women’s rights movement, was among the first of that group to promote a separate women’s peace movement.⁷ Members of the Anti-Imperialist League also joined; not for the moral reasons of social reformers, but for the continuation of their own moral mission against imperialism. In late 1914, Lillian Wald, founder of New York’s Henry Street Settlement, became the first president of the Union Against Militarism, while Jane Addams became chairman of the Women’s Peace Party (WPP).⁸ As US participation in the WPP grew, so did international women’s peace organizations. In March 1915, the WPP received an invitation to bring a delegation to “an International Congress of Women to be held at The Hague.”⁹ With Addams at its head, the WPP sent forty-seven delegates. It was out of this early international women’s conference that the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom emerged.

A sense of moral responsibility drove progressive reform causes. President Wilson, who viewed himself as a progressive, greatly sympathized with the causes and ideals of progressive reformers. “Wilson’s communion with the American left,” argues historian Thomas Knock, “exerted a profound impact on his diplomacy and, especially, the League of Nations movement.”¹⁰ When the war first broke out in Europe, pacifist progressives were shocked at the violence, but pleased to find that they had a president who did not want the United States to enter the war. Despite these early areas of agreement, differences soon emerged.

Race and ethnicity, an enormous concern of women activists and members of the WILPF, became the dividing line between the administration and the liberal left. Women like Rachel Dubois, Emily Greene Balch, and Anna Melissa Graves – all influenced by the work of Jane Addams – advanced their vision of “an interdependent world humanity,” disputing the view of “race as biology and as a prescriptive determinant of social relations.”¹¹ This view of humanity as interconnected through social and economic problems and systems, regardless of race, ethnicity, or nationality, was in direct conflict with the view of the federal government on national and international affairs.

Despite Wilson’s call in early January of 1916 for a Pan-American Scientific Congress to “settle all disputes arising between us by investigation and arbitration,” the actions of his administration continued along imperialistic lines.¹² The 1916 treaty with Haiti came under heavy

⁵ Ibid., 292.

⁶ Jane Addams, “Newer Ideals of Peace,” 1907, in *The Social Thought of Jane Addams*, ed. Christopher Lasch (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 219-20.

⁷ Marilee Karl, *Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision Making* (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1995), 25-26.

⁸ Jane Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1945), 6.

⁹ Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁰ Thomas J. Knock, “Wilson’s Battle for the League: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, 4th ed., vol. 2, eds. Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co., 1995), 62-63.

¹¹ Melinda Plastas, *A Band of Noble Women: Racial Politics in the Women’s Peace Movement* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press: 2011), 84.

¹² Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 53. Addams felt at this time that “we had a right to consider the Administration committed still further to the path of arbitration upon which it had entered in September, 1914.”

investigation of the WPP, led by Sophonisba P. Breckenridge, for its human rights and sovereignty violations. Although the United States had guaranteed Haiti “territorial and political independence,” U.S. Marines had occupied Haiti since 1915, and “had set up a military government, including strict military censorship.”¹³ Borrowing on their approach to domestic social reform, the women of the WPP led careful analytical investigations into U.S. diplomatic relations. Emily Greene Balch worked tirelessly “to expose US imperialism and racialized nationalism” in collaboration with Jane Addams and WILPF membership and worked to educate the nation on “the folly of race-tainted politics.”¹⁴ In their study cities, Chicago and New York, progressive reformers had seen the devastating effects of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Jim Crow Laws throughout the nation, and anti-immigrant labor policies. Now, with an eye towards peace, reformers in the WPP and WILPF were examining the broader picture of racial and ethnic prejudice in the world at large.

Shortly after the start of the war in Europe, Balch and others began connecting racialized nationalism to the war. In a 1915 article for the *Survey*, Balch argued that “national vanity and national greed,” as well as the promotion of “contempt for those who differ from us” stemmed from a “philosophy of racialized exceptionalism” and contributed to the “defensive and aggressive nationalism” which was taking over war-ideology in Europe.¹⁵ Balch was not the only one to connect nationalism and the war in Europe. Early studies conducted by Addams and Alice Hamilton for the WILPF found that young men were “bidden to go to war on a purely national issue.”¹⁶ Addams and Hamilton also found that there was a significant number of soldiers and civilians who found themselves in opposition to the war, but unable to openly oppose it due to national fervor. This was a revolt “not of nationalist feeling nor of patriotism, but of human nature itself as of hedged in, harassed peoples.”¹⁷ Although Addams admitted that there were probably more soldiers and civilians willing to fight than there were in opposition, she still found these numbers significant enough to report to Washington and the WILPF. With a general consciousness of the racialized nationalism which had consumed Europe, the WILPF was now set to find a way to make a lasting peace. In her 1915 survey of civilian populations, Addams found that there did not exist “an outlet into the larger life of the world” for peaceful, humanitarian sentiments as “no great central authority had been dealing with this sum of human goodwill.”¹⁸ This idea of an international organization for peace is where Wilson’s plans and the plans of the WILPF and WPP intersected.

The WPP, founded by Jane Addams, was created in 1915 with ideals and a platform remarkably similar to many of Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Points. In fact, both platforms called for a convention for peace and a sense of partnership among nations, a “Concert of Nations.”¹⁹ However, there were many points which the WPP viewed as important which were not addressed by Wilson, more specifically peace, education and international women’s suffrage.²⁰ Here is where the doctrines of progressive reformers differed from Wilson. Where progressive ideology was based on moral responsibility, for Wilson, moral responsibility was based on Christian values. Though he often seemed to be a moralist, historian Arthur S. Link argues, “Wilson’s “higher realism” was the product of insight and wisdom informed by active Christian faith.”²¹ Where moralists believed that positive values could be learned and instituted by legislation and education, Wilson saw positive values as an

¹³ Ibid., 54.

¹⁴ Melinda Plastas, *A Band of Noble Women*, 103-4.

¹⁵ Ibid., 113.

¹⁶ *Jane Addams: A Centennial Reader*, 268-69. This survey was conducted in 1915 by Jane Addams, Dr. Alice Hamilton, Dr. Alletta Jacobs, and Madame Palthe.

¹⁷ Ibid., 272.

¹⁸ Ibid., 275.

¹⁹ Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 7-8.

²⁰ Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points, 1918,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Vol. II: Since 1914*, 38-39.

²¹ Arthur S. Link, “Wilson’s Higher Realism,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Vol. II: Since 1914*, 52.

extension of faith. Although Wilson recognized the dangers of militarism, he also felt that nationalizing peace education and the armament industry would not make a difference in the prevention of future wars.

The WPP recognized Wilson's Fourteen Points, whatever his views on peace education and suffrage, as a tacit support for a peaceful reordering of the world. As the war progressed, censorship of anti-war organizations grew, making surveys of the civilian population, as well as international communication, more difficult and often impossible.²² For this reason, the WPP, the domestic branch of the WILPF in the United States, became the main organ of women for peace in the U.S. The WPP advocated for a type of international political system similar to the international fiscal system which had "already been organized...by its bankers."²³ Addams and the WPP believed it "unspeakably stupid that the nations should fail to create [such] an international organization."²⁴ Although the peace crowd widely supported Wilson's call for a League of Nations, some in the WPP, including Addams, believed that such legislation would be better implemented by a neutral party. By the time of Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, the United States had been a belligerent party in the war in Europe for nearly a year, and Americans began looking towards the end of the war.

Although the WPP continued to support Wilson's League of Nations despite the declaration of war, there were many who felt a deep sense of betrayal at the president's declaration, as well as at established peace parties supporting Wilson's war doctrine. These established peace parties, Addams explained, "extolled the President as a great moral leader because he was irrevocably leading the country into war," truly believing that "the world's greatest war was to make an end of all wars."²⁵ Wilson was a prolific speaker, and his consistent support of a peaceful means to ending the war in Europe prior to his April 2, 1917, declaration of war led many in traditional peace organizations to believe that he was still a pacifist in spite of his policies. "The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might," Wilson stated, "for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace that she has treasured."²⁶ Addams, upon hearing Wilson's war declaration, asked Professor Hull, a former student of Wilson's, to prepare a historical record of American shipping leading to American involvement in European wars. "The President was, of course, familiar with that history, but he brushed it aside," Addams stated.²⁷ For Wilson, war had become inevitable.

The argument presented by the president to the WPP, however, was more concerned with the negotiations of peace than the war itself. The idea of giving the United States a "seat at the table" by entering the war, rather than, as a neutral country calling "through a crack in the door," was a phrase used by Wilson which "stuck firmly" in Addams' memory.²⁸ As a neutral party, the United States would have little say in peace negotiations. It needed to be an active participant, according to the president. To have any hope of realizing Wilson's fourteen points, the United States would have to become a belligerent party in the war in Europe. "Was it a result of my bitter disappointment," Addams asks, "that I...asked myself whether any man had the right to rate his moral leadership so high that he could consider the sacrifice of the lives of thousands of his young countrymen a necessity?"²⁹ Addams and other WILPF and WPP members were deeply disappointed, not only in Wilson's betrayal of pacifism, but also of the lax anti-war measures of the League of Nations. Pacifists had believed that Wilson "expressed their own abhorrence" for the war,

²² Jane Addams: *A Centennial Reader*, 284.

²³ Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 51-52.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁶ Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson's War Message, 1917," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, 37.

²⁷ Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 63.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 64-65.

but when the time came for him to act on his words, militancy won out.³⁰ This shift may simply have been a continuation of Wilson placing morality over peace, as was seen in Haiti, rather than a pro-war shift.

In any case, WILPF members were able to work through their disappointment and distrust of the American administration and continue to work towards peace along with the League of Nations. Both Wilson and the WILPF were disgusted by portions of the Versailles treaty, particularly with the reparations required of Germany and the lack of teeth given to the League of Nations. Addams believed that the League of Nations did not receive the expected support “not because it was too idealistic or too pacifistic but because it permitted war in too many instances.”³¹ In many ways, the social reform movements of the progressive era shaped the ideologies and actions of the WILPF in the First World War.³² Wilson’s ideological shift from pacifism to militarism was the result of a desire to bring about a moral good and a lasting peace through whatever means necessary, an option which the WILPF and other pacifist organizations were unwilling and unable to consider. Failing to keep the United States out of World War I, the WILPF continued to work for international peace, influencing both the isolationist movements of WWII, as well as the Vietnam War protests, as Americans continued to pursue peace as a political responsibility. On May 2, 1935 at the end of her speech at the banquet of the WILPF, Addams espoused Wilson’s statesmanship. “Woodrow Wilson said,” she quoted: “No issue is dead in the world so long as men have courage.’ It would be a great glory if the United States could lead in this new type of statesmanship.”³³

³⁰ Ibid., 67-68.

³¹ Ibid., 67-68.

³² Melinda Plastas, *A Band of Noble Women*, 137. “the lingering power of the Progressive ideals”

³³ Addams, “Response Made by Jane Addams,” in *Jane Addams Centennial Reader*, 325.

The Forbidden Water: San Francisco and Hetch Hetchy Valley

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Northwest of the Yosemite Valley, Half Dome, and other iconic landmarks at Yosemite National Park in Northeastern California is a small valley known as Hetch Hetchy. This was a quiet spot that Sierra Club founder, nature lover, and preservationist John Muir described as "a grand landscape garden, [and] one of Nature's rarest and most precious mountain temples."¹ At the beginning of the 20th Century, this beautiful expanse drew the attention of the city of San Francisco, which planned to dam the area to create a reservoir to use as a water source. Unfortunately for San Franciscans, this would not be an easy journey because of the stiff opposition to the city's plan. This resistance would primarily be spearheaded by Muir, whose actions would ultimately not be enough to quell the city's desire for this new water source. In late 1913, Congress would grant the city permission to begin building a reservoir in Hetch Hetchy Valley. Some of the few instrumental people in this effort to build the dam included: chief forester and conservationist Gifford Pinchot, and James Phelan, the mayor of San Francisco and a dam supporter from the time when the application was first submitted. The battle over the Hetch Hetchy Valley raises questions about how far Americans were willing to go for the sake of progress, and it enflamed a generation who were willing to go above and beyond to protect National Parks as a whole.

This study relates to the emerging field of environmental history, which began around the late 1950's and 1960's with the publication of two books that set the standard for the decades to follow. Two prominent environmental historians, Samuel P. Hays and Roderick Nash published *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* in 1959 and *Wilderness and the American Mind* in 1967, respectively. These historians focused on conservation and preservation, in particular on figures like Gifford Pinchot and John Muir who shaped the environmental movement, with Muir specifically capturing attention.² This can expressly be seen in the 2009 documentary by Ken Burns on National Parks, which venerates Muir and his "environmental crusade." In dealing with the Hetch Hetchy controversy, Burns spends little time looking at the legitimate concerns of Pinchot and San Francisco in their drive to build a dam in Hetch Hetchy. To Burns, they appear the villains. As I will argue in this study, this villainization is too simplistic and a more neutral approach allows us best to understand both sides in the debate.


Usually, when the Hetch Hetchy controversy is discussed, it is because of preservation and John Muir's ideal of keeping National Parks, like Yosemite, pure and sacred. The focus is rarely centered on the side that is branded the villain, which in this controversy is San Francisco. However, there is merit to discussing the city's side in this pivotal debate. There was clearly a reason for the city to choose the Hetch Hetchy Valley as a potential water source. For example, the location in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, the cleanliness of the water, and the potential for hydroelectric power all made the site attractive. It seems unlikely that it was to spite the preservationists. One must consider the importance of the two larger forces on a collision course at this valley, conservationism and

¹ John Muir, *My First Summer in the Sierra and Selected Essays* (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2011), 310.

² Richard White, "American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field," *Pacific Historical Review* 54, no. 3 (August 1985): 297-315.

preservationism. The Hetch Hetchy controversy was not between the city of San Francisco and the valley or John Muir and Gifford Pinchot, but what these two conflicting views represented in the larger picture.

San Francisco had an ongoing issue with the sourcing of water long before the controversy with the Hetch Hetchy Valley. With the gold rush of the 1850s, tens of thousands flocked to this ever-growing city. This caused water shortages from the beginning, a struggle that continues to this day. Shortly after San Francisco was founded, merchants began selling water on the streets to take advantage of the thirsty residents. Eventually, “water was being shipped by barge from Marin County while other firms competed with one another and the city to increase the yield from local sources with dams, flumes, and reservoirs.”³ At the height of the water shortages, the city of San Francisco was constantly plagued with fires. Water peddlers and merchants consolidated and offered to contract out their water to the city. This group became known as the Spring Valley Water Works or Company, and it played a key role in the controversy of the Hetch Hetchy reservoir.⁴ Scholars like Norris Hundley Jr., Kendrick Clements, and others would agree that the Spring Valley Water Company was the real villain in the Hetch Hetchy controversy, especially given that the Spring Valley Water Company was one of the sole reasons why San Francisco had to search for a new



water source in the first place. The water company had bought all the usable watershed: springs, areas around rivers, etc.; San Francisco had no choice but to use the water supply that was in the hands of this company.

In 1900, San Francisco finally found the opportunity for which it had been so desperately looking. The city “obtained the state legislature’s approval of a new city charter that mandated municipal ownership of utilities.”⁵ Now the city could own a water supply. City officials set out to find the best private and non-private places to purchase land and break away from the grip the abhorrent Spring Valley Water Company had on San Francisco. Having tried once before to purchase Spring Valley Water Company without success, San Francisco moved on, considering other, more remote regions to purchase land. After considering multiple options, such as Lake

³ Norris Hundley Jr., *The Great Thirst: Californians and Water 1770's-1990's* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 169.

⁴ Kendrick A. Clements, “Politics and the Park: San Francisco's Fight for Hetch Hetchy, 1908-1913,” *Pacific Historical Review* 48, no. 2 (May 1979): 187.

⁵ Hundley Jr., “*The Great Thirst*,” 170.

Tahoe, Mount Shasta, or the Sacramento River,⁶ they finally decided on the Tuolumne River.⁷ The river flows through the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range and went through a smaller valley less than two hundred miles from San Francisco, the Hetch Hetchy Valley.

San Francisco's mayor, James Phelan, saw the potential of the dam, not only for the reservoir itself, but also for hydroelectric power, and he "quietly filed rights for the river" in fear of the Spring Valley Water Company hearing of the transaction and trying to purchase it for themselves.⁸ The valley was property of the federal government as part of Yosemite National Park, which could be a potential issue. Officials thought that "no problems would come to this."⁹ They thought it would be easily approved, and work on the dam would begin shortly. To their dismay, this was far from the truth.

In 1901, when Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock received the application for permission to build a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, he immediately denied it, proclaiming it was in the best interest of the nation not to imperil the beauty of the national park by putting a reservoir in the valley.¹⁰ Later, in 1903, Phelan tried again to secure rights for Hetch Hetchy but to no avail. In 1905 Phelan attempted to buy the water rights a third-time, but Secretary Hitchcock again denied the acquisition, giving the same reasons. All hope seemed lost for San Francisco in acquiring a new water source and being able to avoid commercially contracted water. Then it got worse for the city.

In 1902, Phelan finished his third term as mayor and stepped down from the position. The man who succeeded him, Eugene Schmitz, had other plans for the proposed Hetch Hetchy reservoir, or rather his boss did. Schmitz, in fact, was irrelevant to this issue. Abe Ruef was the reason Schmitz came to power as mayor. Abraham Ruef was one of San Francisco's most notorious political bosses.¹¹ He used Schmitz as a puppet to get what he wanted and in January of 1906, Ruef moved to circumnavigate the "messy" issue of Hetch Hetchy. Instead, he proposed a contract with the Bay Cities Water Company. The company promised Ruef one million dollars for his efforts. Unfortunately for Ruef, the bribe was discovered during a series of trials on corruption in the city known as the "graft trials."¹² This drive to eliminate corruption, in fact, helped clear the way for the building of the Hetch Hetchy reservoir, which otherwise might have been delayed or halted by political shenanigans.

The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and the fires that followed were also key factors in going forward with the Hetch Hetchy project. It was not so much the difference the water would have made, but it was the hysteria created by the disaster.¹³ Senator Key Pittman (D-NV) brought the earthquake to national attention. He blamed the extensive fires plaguing the city on the lack of water. "I know it was largely due to the greed of that water monopoly in its efforts to spend as little as possible and to grasp just as much as possible, and I never want to see such a condition again exist in any city," he declared.¹⁴ With the water problem being blown out of proportion, a group of city engineers, who had been ordered to investigate the issue, realized that now was the time to bring back the idea of using Hetch Hetchy as a source of water and power. One engineer who favored this idea, was Marsden Manson. He continued to play a key role in the Hetch Hetchy controversy until the bill was passed in 1913.

⁶ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 187.

⁷ Hundley Jr., "*The Great Thirst*," 170.

⁸ Hundley Jr., "*The Great Thirst*," 171.

⁹ Hundley Jr., "*The Great Thirst*," 171.

¹⁰ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 187.

¹¹ Robert W. Righter, *The Battle over Hetch Hetchy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55.

¹² Righter, "*Hetch Hetchy*," 58.

¹³ Righter, "*Hetch Hetchy*," 58.

¹⁴ Righter, "*Hetch Hetchy*," 60.

Due to some other coincidences, the Hetch Hetchy Valley was starting to become a more viable option as a source of water and power for the city. The exit of the Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock, an advocate against the dam in 1906, played a key role in the potential use of Hetch Hetchy. Manson now looked to a pivotal friend for help in the government to achieve approval, the chief forester of the US Forestry Service, Gifford Pinchot. Coincidentally, the new secretary of the Interior was a friend of Pinchot, James R. Garfield.¹⁵ In the time leading up to the application submitted in 1908, officials in Washington were busy persuading politicians to back the city of San Francisco's plan. To the surprise of preservationists, Gifford Pinchot, a long-time supporter of their cause, sided with San Francisco on the Hetch Hetchy issue.¹⁶ He believed that the dam, "represented the greatest good for the greatest number of people."¹⁷ In the 1913 hearings regarding the issue of the valley, Pinchot made his stance clear. "Now, the fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is that of use, to take every part of the land and its resources and put it to that use in which it will best serve the most people," he stated.¹⁸ To him, that meant serving the people and damming the Hetch Hetchy Valley. To keep the project alive, Pinchot did his best to convince other government officials to accept his logic. He met with US Representative James C. Needham (R-CA), to assure him that significant harm would not come to Yosemite. With the new secretary of the interior, James R. Garfield, already on his side, the only person who needed convincing was the president himself, Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁹

Another man who was once good friends with Pinchot, and considered President Roosevelt a dear friend, was very concerned with the decision to dam Hetch Hetchy. A Scottish-born businessman who moved to the United States in the 1870's, John Muir immediately fell in love with the National Parks, particularly with Yosemite. When Roosevelt visited the park and others around the area, he chose Muir as his guide because of the native Scot's communion with nature and love of the parks. In later years, Muir would sum up his stance on Hetch Hetchy and described those who advocated its destruction critically in an essay written a few years before his death:

These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism, seem to have a perfect contempt for Nature, and, instead of lifting their eyes to the God of the mountains, lift them to the Almighty Dollar. Dam Hetch Hetchy! As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man.²⁰

With the Hetch Hetchy idea revived once more, Muir decided to personally write Roosevelt to counter Pinchot and try to convince the president to reject this idea.²¹ Roosevelt replied, to Muir's dismay, that he had decided to side with Pinchot and allow the application to be accepted. He explained, "If the preserve was used 'so as to interfere with the permanent material development' of the region, the result would be bad." He "did not want to disagree with the people of San Francisco if they wanted this project to happen."²² Although Pinchot and Muir disagreed in the past, this controversy was the final stroke that set them apart indefinitely. Because of his commitment to the preservation of the parks, Muir got as many people as he could to write to Garfield to urge the

¹⁵ Righter, "Hetch Hetchy," 60.

¹⁶ Elmo R. Richardson, "The Struggle for the Valley: California's Hetch Hetchy Controversy, 1905-1913," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (September 1959): 250.

¹⁷ Righter, "Hetch Hetchy," 69.

¹⁸ Roderick Nash, *The Call of the Wild (1900-1916)* (New York, NY: George Braziller, 1970), 86.

¹⁹ Nash, "Wild," 250.

²⁰ John Muir, *My First Summer in the Sierra and Selected Essays* (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2011), 314.

²¹ Richardson, "Struggle for the Valley," 250.

²² Richardson, "Struggle for the Valley," 250.

secretary to change his position. Although Roosevelt did not want to interfere with the people's decision, he attempted to change the mind of Secretary Garfield in a letter enclosed with John Muir's letter to the secretary. Roosevelt suggested that they wait to make a decision on Hetch Hetchy. "It does seem to me unnecessary to decide about the Hetch Hetchy Valley at all at the present...there seems to be no reason why we should take action on the Hetch Hetchy business now," he counseled.²³ Unfortunately for Muir and the preservationists, Garfield held steady to his view, and in May 1908 he allowed San Francisco to use the Hetch Hetchy Valley and Lake Eleanor as a part of the water supply for that area. The only consolation that Garfield may have given to Muir was that he simply asked that Lake Eleanor be used to its full potential first.²⁴

Fortunately for preservationists like John Muir and others, the battle did not end there. They would work tirelessly to try to prevent this "terrible atrocity" from occurring to such a sacred place. Muir looked to a man who might be able to assist them in this cause. He was "the executive director of the American Civic Association and a good friend of the National Parks," J. Horace McFarland.²⁵ He would be of considerable help to Muir in attempting to get this proposition reversed. Others, such as Robert Underwood and members of the Sierra Club, helped as well. Unfortunately for Muir, the Sierra Club became deeply divided on this issue of Hetch Hetchy. Prominent members of the society, including "one of the founding members of the Sierra Club,"²⁶ Warren Olney, and the main opponent of Muir's position, Marsden Manson, as well as others sided with San Francisco on this issue. By 1908, the need was desperate as ever. Muir was pulling out all the stops by contacting various clubs and organizations like "the Mazamas (Portland), the Appalachian Mountain Club, the Saturday Walking Club (Chicago), and the American Civic Association"²⁷ to help support his battle to stop the damming at Hetch Hetchy. With neither Muir or Manson heeding any ground on this project, they continued to use newspapers and journals to attack one another.²⁸

With John Muir and his followers losing hope of being able to deter the government from allowing San Francisco to build a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, 1909 brought some change in their favor. William Howard Taft was elected president, and he appointed a new secretary of the Interior. The new secretary, Richard A. Ballinger, opposed the dam, partly because of a brief feud with chief forester, Gifford Pinchot. Both former Mayor Phelan and John Muir met with Secretary Ballinger to attempt to convince him one way or the other. It appeared that Muir had won over Ballinger, to a certain degree, to their cause. Furthering the dilemma, Taft had fired Gifford Pinchot as chief forester, resulting in the city losing an ally in Washington. To make matters worse for San Francisco officials, they could not actually build any permanent structures unless they owned the land.²⁹ The city of San Francisco was set even further back when, after being pushed by park supporters, Ballinger "issued an order requiring the city to show cause why the Garfield permit should not be revoked."³⁰ This was demanded because of a report issued by the Geologic Survey, on Ballinger's order. The survey was done by two engineers, Louis C. Hill and E. G. Hopson. They had judged that Hetch Hetchy would not necessarily be beneficial as a water source. This surprised Marsden Manson, so he dug a little deeper, in preparation for a congressional hearing with the Secretary in mid-1910. When he found that the survey was poorly researched and borderline

²³ Linnie March Wolfe, *Son of the Wilderness: The Life of John Muir* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 313.

²⁴ Advisory Board of Army Engineers, *Report on Investigations Relative to Sources of Water Supply to San Francisco and Bay Communities* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913), 7.

²⁵ Righter, "Hetch Hetchy," 62.

²⁶ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 191.

²⁷ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 191.

²⁸ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 192-193.

²⁹ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 193.

³⁰ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 195.

falsified, he blackmailed Ballinger into changing his mind.³¹ When the hearing finished, to the preservationist's dismay, Ballinger sided with the city, and abruptly commissioned a new survey by the Advisory Board of Army Engineers.³²

Since the Advisory Board of Army Engineers had to complete a survey of Hetch Hetchy, for the time being, things had to be tabled until further headway could be made. In the meantime, by 1911, Secretary Ballinger had resigned due to the strain of the job and the controversies he had engendered as head of the Interior Department. This left Taft in a frantic position to make the right political move, and he appointed Walter L. Fisher, who coincidentally was friends with both Gifford Pinchot and James Garfield.³³ To continue the blows being dealt to Muir, the Sierra Club, and preservationists, there was little interest from others to help, even those who had aided in the past, such as the Southern Pacific Railroad, as well as most electric companies in the area. Meanwhile the city of San Francisco moved to prepare a report for the Advisory Board of Army Engineers. The man who would eventually oversee this would be John R. Freeman.³⁴

After compiling numerous reports and surveys done by the city, Freeman's report was published in mid-1912. The thoroughness of the report ensured John Muir and his band of preservationists would not be able to convince congress to change their minds. The report fleshed out the plans for making the dam much bigger than originally intended, making a pipeline straight to San Francisco, as well as hundreds of pages of other adjustments. After the board looked at the report, it mostly aligned with Freeman's position, and victory was almost in view for the city of San Francisco after twelve long frustrating years with a waning water supply. However, before leaving office in 1913 after Taft's term came to an end, Secretary of the Interior Walter L. Fisher announced that his department "would not approve the project without specific congressional authorization."³⁵ So the city waited once more, but the end was in sight.

As the final president of three to tackle the issue of the Hetch Hetchy, Woodrow Wilson settled this affair—to an extent—at the end of 1913. One of the key individuals to conclude this affair was incoming Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, the former city attorney for San Francisco.³⁶ On top of that, during the middle of the year, John E. Raker, a representative from California, introduced a bill that would allow Hetch Hetchy to finally be transformed into a reservoir for the city of San Francisco.³⁷

One of the last attempts the preservationists had to stop this bill was on the floor of the capitol during a congressional hearing before the bill would be voted on. At the hearing, prominent advocates, including Gifford Pinchot and former mayor James D. Phelan, presented their argument while the main opponent to this bill, a Boston lawyer representing the Society for the Protection of National Parks, Edmund A. Whitman, attempted to rebut their claims. Most of their presentations were the same arguments made over the past years. Some claimed the reservoir would contribute to the beauty of the park, while others thought it would significantly lower the number of visitors to the park, or even that it is not necessary to use Hetch Hetchy at all. Nearing the conclusion of the hearing, the chairman, insisting that many of the anti-development arguments had been settled, cut off Whitman. None of the eleven representatives from California present, the chairman proclaimed, objected to the bill. With all John Muir did to attempt to divert this supposed disaster in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, no more could be done after the hearing.³⁸

³¹ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 196-197.

³² Advisory Board, "*Water Supply*," 9.

³³ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 201.

³⁴ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 203.

³⁵ Clements, "Politics and the Park," 206.

³⁶ Richardson, "Struggle for the Valley," 254.

³⁷ Hetch Hetchy Act of 1913, Public Law 41, 63rd Cong., 1st sess. (December 19, 1913).

³⁸ Nash, "*Wild*," 87-96.

In December of 1913, President Wilson ratified the Raker Act allowing San Francisco to build a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and creating what is known today as Hetch Hetchy Reservoir in Yosemite National Park. Although this was a victory for San Francisco and conservationists alike, the act placed extreme restrictions on dam construction, since it was being built inside Yosemite National Park. Special limitations and constraints imposed by the NPS, along with other restraints, would prove challenging in the construction process.³⁹ Thus, the dam would not be finished until 1925, and conflicts over the restrictions imposed by the Raker Act continued into the 1940's.⁴⁰ In fact, debate about the dam continues to this day with people wanting to drain the valley and restore it to its former glory.

Locally, the issue of Hetch Hetchy involved more than just San Francisco. The water supply controversy spilled over into the long-standing feud between the two prospering cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco. For example, in a 1910 editorial, the *San Bernardino Sun* took aim at "misinformation" spread by the *Los Angeles Times*:

...when the Los Angeles "Times" heads a bias Washington dispatch with the line "Can't Have Yosemite," a wayfaring man can discover that somebody is trying to fool the public and make them think that San Francisco is trying to gobble the Yosemite Valley for a water supply. Nothing of the sort Absolutely untrue, and not only untrue, but maliciously so, calculated to deceive.⁴¹

Both local and national newspapers and pamphlets suggest that at least some of the nation was divided on whether the valley should be dammed or not. This can be seen in a *Los Angeles Herald* article villainizing San Francisco and the dam entitled, "Shall This Beautiful Valley Be Destroyed?"⁴² However, in the city itself, residents did want the dam: they voted six to one in favor of the dam, by municipal bond election.⁴³ When the bill passed the senate 183 to 43, *The San Francisco Call* published an article titled "How San Francisco Men View House Vote on Hetch Hetchy." According to the article, various prominent businessmen were "delighted, thought it was good, and were overall happy with the outcome."⁴⁴

Additionally, on November 11, 1908, the *Call* ran a full-page frontpage article promoting the damming of Hetch Hetchy. It included a political cartoon vilifying Spring Valley Water Company for its outrageous water prices.⁴⁵ Overall, San Francisco wanted the bill passed, if newspaper coverage was any indication.

Throughout this controversy of approximately thirteen years, there were essentially only two powers at work. It simply came down to conservationism versus preservationists. Both sides sought to position themselves as representing the public or national interest. It was the preservationists who used this idea of national interest to keep the valley as it was because of its beauty. The conservationists, by contrast, saw no reason not to take advantage of this "public utility" and use it for the interests of the people, especially in the city of San Francisco.⁴⁶ One of the key reasons that preservationists lost their fight was because of the idea of the pragmatic over aesthetic. Supporters of the dam argued that it is more practical to use the water for economic growth in hydroelectric

³⁹ Hetch Hetchy Act of 1913, Public Law 41, 63rd Cong., 1st sess. (December 19, 1913), 4,5,6 et seq.

⁴⁰ John Ise, *Our National Park Policy: A Critical History* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1961), 95-96.

⁴¹ "Can't Have Yosemite," *San Bernardino Sun*, March 2, 1910.

⁴² H.R. Darling, "Shall This Beautiful Valley Be Destroyed?" *Los Angeles Herald Sunday Magazine*, October 17, 1909.

⁴³ Christine Oravec, "Conservationism vs. Preservationism: The Public Interest in The Hetch Hetchy Valley Controversy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70, no. 4 (1984): 448.

⁴⁴ "House Passes Measure Giving San Francisco Yosemite Water Right," *San Francisco Call*, September 3, 1913.

⁴⁵ "The Words 'Collection Under Injunction' Tell the Story," *San Francisco Call*, November 11, 1908.

⁴⁶ Oravec, "Conservationism vs. Preservationism," 444.

power and save the residents of San Francisco money with lower water bills. Opposing this outlook were some “hardy mountain climbers” who want to enjoy the climb and views of the Hetch Hetchy Valley.⁴⁷

Overall, too many miscalculations were made by preservationists in their battle to prevent the dam from being built. The controversy proved extremely political. John Muir and his fellow preservationists were not prepared for what they faced, and in the end, Hetch Hetchy suffered for it. This would technically be a loss for Muir, and he would die the next year. Thus, he would be unable to see the fruits of his labor emerge later. After the “tragedy” of Hetch Hetchy, people began realizing what had taken place and began to understand what Muir was trying to do. A few short years later in 1916, a branch of the Interior Department was created specifically to promote the preservation of the National Park Service, and more advocates of the parks began to arise. Suddenly, Muir’s message was no longer lost. Sadly, the San Francisco water controversy became overblown, vilifying the city. While some claims of its unfairness to the parks may be true, all the city wanted was a water supply of its own and to take advantage of the utilities of the Tuolumne River and the Hetch Hetchy Valley.

⁴⁷ Oravec, “Conservationism vs. Preservationism,” 447.

River Pirates of Southern Illinois: 1795-1830

Shane Melcom

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This story begins with Samuel Mason, a veteran of the Revolutionary War, who in hopes of plundering innocent travelers along the Ohio River, became an outlaw. Samuel Mason met his fate in 1803, after surviving a gunshot to the head, only to be later decapitated by his followers. His head, wrapped in clay for preservation, was then borne in triumph for a reward to Washington,

Mason's story is part of a larger tale of how Southern Illinois and the Ohio River were controlled, used, and plundered by the outlaws of Cave-In-Rock. It also shows us how laws factored into the situation, and how settlers started to migrate away from local lands, and into new, possibly dangerous territories.

Cave-In-Rock is located in Hardin County, IL, along one of the southern bends in the Ohio River, and it is quite literally, just a cave that juts into the rock face along the river. It sits in a high bluff, with beautiful hills surrounding it. Its history compared to its beauty is almost a paradox; its infamy came into play early when the first settlers were coming down the Ohio River in the late 1700's. The earliest known record of the cave is found in *The History of New France* by Charlevoix, published in 1744. An explorer from France by the name of M. de Lery came down the Ohio in 1729 and charted the area. He mapped the cave and the area around it, naming the cave "Caverne dans le Roc."¹ Since 1800, however, Cave-In-Rock has been the popular name of the site. Most of recorded history tells us that Cave-In-Rock has almost forever been known as a hideout for gangs, outlaws, pirates, and wrongdoers in general. Its location was perfect for pirating crews along the Ohio to take advantage of ferries and lonesome travelers, making their way through the Northwest Territory. There were almost no protections for settlers at this time, since Illinois was not even a state yet. People traveling this direction were completely at the mercy of their own survival skills and the wilds. Under such circumstances, outlaws could, quite easily, take advantage of their victims via theft, deceitfulness, and murder.



Cave-In-Rock

“Base of Operations”

In as early as 1797, Samuel Mason converted the cave at Cave-In-Rock into an inn. He coined it “Cave-Inn-Rock,” which is where the name stems from today. The inn was secretly a decoy, of course, luring weary travelers in with its beautiful location along the rocky shelves of the river's edge. From the cave, outlaws could see boats coming far upriver, long before the travelers were aware of the cave. Some of these first vehicles traveling the river were simple canoes, clumsily paddled downstream. As more settlements grew along the river however, larger, more load-bearing

¹ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 18.

crafts arrived, including flatboats, whose importance covered a quarter of a century from 1795-1820, known as the “Golden Age of Flatboating.”² This was the era in which river piracy would also reach its height. Small, silent boats such as canoes, skiffs, pirogues, and bateau were used at night by Samuel and his men for quick grab-and-go style missions from the flatboats. Starting in the late 1780’s and going through the 1810’s, pirating grew as a problem until the age of steamboats arrived. Once flatboats and smaller boats made way for the steamboats, and once the population of the area increased, standard river piracy started to give way to more “diplomatic” river pirates, or professional gamblers. This point will be expanded upon later. However, the people in our story are of the standard river pirating era, using simple methods and even some counterfeiting to take advantage of unknowing travelers. Most flatboaters seemed fairly brave individuals, entering unknown areas, sometimes nearly alone. Most understood the challenges they faced. Hence there developed a transition from an economy based on trust, to one based on the credentials of others. First, we will look at the outlaws and people, and then we will look at laws at the time, to see why it was difficult to quell the violence in the area.

“The Outlaws and People”

There is not an overwhelming amount of primary sources regarding the outlaws, in particular the careers of Samuel Mason and the Harpe Brothers, who were all part of a riverboat gang. This lack of sources, however, is due to the fact that there was very little in the way of newspapers or other public documentation; quite a few people at this time were illiterate. Most of the accounts were word of mouth and stories told over time. These challenges require that historians make inferences about what happened from the few sources available. Among the limited newspaper evidence of Samuel Mason is a small column that mentions the escape of Mason and others from an officer that was conducting them to New Orleans. The newspaper report claims they killed the officer, a Captain McCoy, and escaped north along the Natchez Trace.³ However, another source claims McCoy died in 1840 and was not hurt by Mason in any way.⁴ Whatever the case, of all the outlaws and highway robbers in the region, the Harpes appear by far the cruelest, and Mason the shrewdest. Mason was born in Virginia in 1750 and was a veteran of the Revolutionary War, more specifically an officer in the Continental Army. After his service, he moved into outlawry, robbing travelers along the rivers and roads solely for money. The more brutal Harpes were known to kill their victims out of simple cruelty. Mason was born into a great military family, and his brothers served under George Rodgers Clark on his expedition to Vincennes. Mason was also connected by blood to the distinguished Mason family of Virginia, which has led some to guess at his relation to George Mason, one of the original signers of the Declaration of Independence. It is not clear from the history, however, exactly how Mason went from being a respectable veteran, to a highwayman, in such a time of peace in the early United States.⁵

The Harpes have a much different background story. The two Harpe brothers’ crimes at the end of the eighteenth century in Kentucky, Tennessee, and southern Illinois, have hardly been equaled in historical records. This includes crimes in times of peace and war. The reasons for which they became so malicious and apathetic so quickly are unknown, as their pasts are also not well documented.

² Otto A. Rothert, *The Outlaws of Cave-in-Rock; Historical Accounts of the Famous Highwaymen and River Pirates who operated in Pioneer Days upon the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and over the Old Natchez Trace* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1924), 38.

³ “Natchez,” *Kentucky Gazette* (Lexington, KY), May 3, 1803.

⁴ Louis Houck, *A History of Missouri from the Earliest Explorations and Settlements until the Admission of the State into the Union*, vol. 2 (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1908), 140.

⁵ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 157-161.

The Harpes's string of terror started in 1798 near Knoxville, and it rapidly spread west to the borders of the Mississippi and north to the Ohio River and southern Illinois. The most well-known of their crimes has been written about by other historians, such as Clare Toohey's *Revolutionary Killers: Harpe Brothers, Serial or Spree?*⁶ One example Toohey gives in this article is that of the brothers simply killing a homesteading neighbor for "looking at their wives too hard." To this day there are stories told about "The Harpes" and "Harpe's Head" in southwestern Kentucky, southern Illinois, and eastern Tennessee. The Harpes themselves were believed to be brothers and natives of North Carolina. Micajah, who was also referred to as Big Harpe, was born somewhere around 1768, while Wiley, or Little Harpe, was born around 1770. Wiley Harpe also went by the alias of "John Sutton/Setton." Their father was said to have sided with the British in the war, thus fighting the colonists. After the war, however, British loyalists were looked down upon, and many were warned to move west.⁷ One might speculate then, that from the moment they were born, basically the Harpe brothers were hated by neighbors and members of the community because of their father's loyalist views. This would have definitely added fuel to the fire, so to speak, for them to act out later in life. In around the year 1795, the Harpes, accompanied by Betsey Roberts and Susan Roberts, left North Carolina and headed for Tennessee. Susan made legal claims that she was Big Harpe's wife, and that Betsey simply posed as his wife. In fact, though, Big Harpe claimed them both as his wives. The four of them roamed around Tennessee for the better part of a couple years, mainly spending time with stray members of the Creek and Cherokee Native Americans. They, of course, gave demonstrations of their brutality to the natives. Probably the only account of any mercy shown by the brothers is when they robbed a man by the name of William Lambuth. They took his possessions, and after looking through his bible for any currency, they discovered the name "William Lambuth" and "George Washington." They both agreed Washington was a good man, and the articles of William's they found convinced them he was a preacher. After the discovery, they allegedly returned all of his belongings, and rode away shouting "We are the Harpes."⁸ This rare act of mercy could be due to the fact that the men believed that every man's life, good or bad, was predestined.⁹ They thought that the "All Wise" had "preordained" all men to be good, or to be hateful and have a career of crime. They seem to have thought they were chosen to be bad, except on this one instance for some reason.

The last of the outlaws is a man named Peter Alston. Alston was born the son of a notorious counterfeiter; his father's brother also being known for counterfeiting. As far as sources tell us, the Alston family probably has its roots in the British Royal colony of the Province of South Carolina. As to where and when Peter was born, however, there is little evidence. A good guess would be North or South Carolina, Virginia, or Tennessee. Throughout his life, Alston went by many aliases. His most common alias was "James May," but he also went by "Samuel May," and "Isaac May" on occasion.¹⁰ In the summer of 1799, Alston reunited with his father in the Cave-In-Rock area to continue casting counterfeit silver coins.¹¹ At some point, Alston and his father met up with the Harpes and Mason and began their mutual crimes at the cave.

Most people coming into the area around this time were probably also affected by the outlaws, either directly or indirectly. Settlers coming into Illinois at the time were already pretty brave and expected to face danger. The trek to Illinois was often a one-way trip. There were no

⁶ Clare Toohey, "Revolutionary Killers: Harpe Brothers, Serial or Spree?," *criminalelement.com* (blog), November 25, 2011.

⁷ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 60.

⁸ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 158-161.

⁹ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 60.

¹⁰ Alex C. Finley, *The History of Russellville and Logan County, Ky.* (Reprint: Russellville, Ky.: A. B. Willhite, 1876, Reprint c. 2000), 42.

¹¹ Rothert, *Outlaws*, 272.

steamboats, trains, telegraphs to communicate with family, and no safety insurance. Leaving home and heading to Illinois often resulted in permanent separation from family, and this deterred quite a few people. Most of the first settlers were soldiers that had served in Illinois and came back later on their own, or flatboaters that loved the scenery. A lot of settlers stuck to the woodlands, for many people were wary of the prairies. They would not cross the grasslands for fear of prairie fires.¹² According to one study, “[a]lthough the likes of Micajah and Wiley Harpe, murderous brothers who infested Cave-In-Rock on the Ohio River, were eradicated by 1799, occasional atrocities still horrified residents. Certain problems retarding settlements budged only with population growth and the weight of numbers.”¹³ As the population of Illinois started to grow, the outlaws’ influence became less problematic.

Laws

As previously mentioned, Illinois was only a territory at the point in time that most of the river pirating was occurring. Illinois was added, with what would become other states, into the United States by the Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787. The Northwest Ordinance was a decree, written by Thomas Jefferson and others, that added the future states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, and part of Minnesota, into the Union. The fact that Illinois was only a territory, along with the other states to-be in the Ordinance, meant that the government had almost no jurisdiction to establish itself. This frontier was highly contested, basically wild. It took a while to get a foothold on the area in a legal sense, since it was so vast, and many people were trying to settle there at once. Some excerpts that I have found from the first written laws of Illinois do more to prove this point. This is an excerpt from the introduction of the laws:



The Northwest Territory

The very small number of statutes passed to modify the substantive law, in proportion to those relating to the courts, their auxiliary officers, practice and procedure—approximately one to five—shows very well that there was general satisfaction with the law but great dissatisfaction with the machinery for administering it. Justification for dissatisfaction with both the law and its administration was almost certainly greatest in the early years of the Northwest Territory and lessened as time passed. On the other hand, tinkering with the judicial system, evidencing dissatisfaction with it, steadily increased. This was certainly not because the service it rendered deteriorated; far from it. It was because appreciation of the courts was growing, because more was expected of them, and because certain changes in them which territorial opinion looked upon as betterments could not be thoroughly affected without altering fundamentally the whole judicial system set up by the Ordinance. Many things marked a tendency in that direction over a score of years. The change came to a climax in the Illinois statutes which will be particularly considered.¹⁴

¹² James E. Davis, *Frontier Illinois* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 124.

¹³ Davis, *Frontier Illinois*, 113-114.

¹⁴ “Laws of the Illinois Territory 1809-1818”

http://livinghistoryofillinois.com/pdf_files/Laws%20of%20the%20Illinois%20Territory%201809-1818.pdf, accessed April 5th, 2017.

From this quote, it is evident that officials were trying to assert their power. However, it is also very evident from the quote that the jurisdiction was greatly short-handed. They were working a skeleton crew and trying to keep up with the population moving into the Northwest. People were starting to respect the courts more, therefore expecting more from them. Another excerpt also shows us just how few and far between the court systems were at this time.

The Ordinance provided for the whole of the Old Northwest a single General Court of three judges. True, there was no population in great portions of this region and so no need for law; but there was need for courts in various scattered settlements over an area about nine hundred by three hundred miles. In some way the three judges were expected to supply the needs of this area for regularly administered justice.¹⁵

This statement mentions how there was “no need for law” because the location was not highly settled yet. However, we can see that there was definitely a need for more jurisprudence along the rivers. In Samuel Mason’s case, the way in which he got away with most of his crimes was simply *because* there were no laws yet, and people did not know what to expect when they were traveling down river. Counterfeiting was common because there was not a set currency for the entire U.S. government yet, thus travelers were easily swindled into accepting false currency. People traveling up and down the Ohio River were not necessarily “settled” since they were taking goods back and forth. This may have made it seem as though there was not as much crime among the “settlers” of the Northwest. Always being on the move and not keeping track of traveling merchants would have made it seem like less crime was occurring, since a lot of it most likely went on behind closed doors. One of the laws passed by the *First General Assembly of the State of Illinois* at its second session, which was held in Kaskaskia, states something interesting. An excerpt reads:

any person charged with or convicted of treason, murder, or other capital crime shall brake prison escape or flee from justice and abscond or secrete himself, it shall be lawful for the governor for the time being to offer any reward not exceeding two hundred dollars for apprehending and delivering any such person into the custody of such jailer as he may direct.¹⁶

This is significant because here is a good chance that this law directly stems from Samuel Mason’s and others’ escape from McCoy’s custody on the way to New Orleans, as mentioned above. I think it is in direct correlation with past events that transpired, and that it shows the state of Illinois realizing that this was a law that needed to be enacted. I believe this to be the case with many of Illinois’ first laws regarding crime. In any case, it was hard for anyone to know, law or not, what all was going on in the Northwest at this time.

Another interesting point worth making is that illegal gambling kept things in line as the river piracy era was ending. As I mentioned before, once steamboats became more common after flatboats, the river piracy started to decline. I think, personally, this led to a rise in gambling in the region. For example, just north-east of Cave-In-Rock and the Ohio River is the town of French Lick, Indiana. French Lick is home to two very large casinos that were built in the 1840’s and 1850’s, right around the time steamboats were becoming common, and they are still there today. Since

¹⁵ “Laws,” http://livinghistoryofillinois.com/pdf_files/Laws%20of%20the%20Illinois%20Territory%201809-1818.pdf, accessed April 5th, 2017.

¹⁶ “Laws of the State of Illinois Enacted by the General Assembly,” https://books.google.com/books?id=22E3AQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=murder&f=false, accessed April 26th, 2017.

policing was weak in the area, the structure of the mob coming down from Chicago to gamble helped govern the area, even if it was illegally.¹⁷

“How it Reflects on a National Level”

All this information boils down to a few simple things. The crimes committed by the outlaws and other river pirates impacted growing Illinois more than the court systems, and the national government as a whole, saw coming. The national government, even Thomas Jefferson himself, failed to understand how much of a load they were taking on when they added the territories through the Northwest Ordinance. The Illinois River Pirates are only a small piece of a larger story. There were doubtless hundreds more crimes and scandals throughout the Northwest Territory. The reason I chose to elaborate on this, however, is because I believe that some of the laws of early Illinois were directly influenced by the happenings along the Ohio River, and the crimes committed there. No doubt similar developments occurred across the country. The people of the early United States did not know what to expect when they were ever-pushing west through Manifest Destiny. People wanted land and freedom, and they did what they had to do to get it, honest or criminal.



West Baden Springs Hotel, French Lick, IN

¹⁷ Photograph of West Baden Springs Hotel. Kathy Jonas, *A Fairytale Getaway Not so Far, Far Away at French Lick Resort*, <http://www.lifeandspaces.com/articles/view/A-Fairy-Tale-Getaway-Not-So-Far-Far-Away-at-French-Lick-Resort>, accessed May 3rd, 2017.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the New Deal: Twentieth Century Historians and their Unsuccessful Attempts to Escape from Present Circumstances and Historiographical Trends

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Preface

Students of history in the twenty-first century find themselves surrounded by a multitude of approaches to the discipline with no shortage of models to follow. No longer must historians strictly adhere to rigid narratives detailing only “the facts” as Leopold Von Ranke advocated. A budding historian must consider where his/her approach will lie between the extremes of Von Ranke and, say, Howard Zinn, who preferred to engage in a study of the past that informed present circumstances. As times have changed, so too have approaches to the research and writing of history. Will an individual engage in a Marxist or postmodern analytical approach? Should social history be included or ignored? What duration of time and place will be studied? With so many questions, it is no wonder that historians are metacognitive about what they do. Perhaps in their debates they seek to convince themselves of the proper approach as much as to convince the reader. The reflections and writings of historians who study the New Deal often confirm that the present impacted their study of the past. Whether the country was emerging from McCarthyism, trying to repair the shattered idealism of failed policies relating to the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam, worrying about the uncertain economic times of the 1980s, or watching impeachment proceedings against an embattled president at the end of the century, twentieth-century historians find themselves in the midst of these debates, knowingly or unknowingly; they pointed fingers at the past and searched for common themes in bygone times. Often, though not always, their work reflected the prevailing historiographical trends of that era; historians who engaged in a study of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal have never managed to remove themselves from their present circumstances as they engaged in a study of the past.

A Developing Story: First Writings of the New Deal

It is surprising how impatient some are to write history; often, the people who choose to write while events are still unfolding are not historians. These writers do contribute to the process of historical discourse and are thus important to briefly consider, as their works are often first-hand, primary source accounts. Before President Roosevelt's second term was over, there were already several books that had been published about the New Deal. Those who crafted these works were often deeply connected to the president himself or the circumstances from which they wrote. In 1939, Raymond Moley, once chief strategist of Roosevelt's “brain trust,” wrote an account of the New Deal entitled *After Seven Years*. Moley's foreword, filled with disclaimers about how the book

was not going to be a history of the previous seven years, nor a biography of Roosevelt, alluded to his desire to foster debate on contemporary issues he thought were facing the United States.¹ His work accomplished that and much more, for historians still refer to Moley's writing. Moley left Roosevelt's side and eventually left the Democratic Party as a result of New Deal policies that he felt endangered business interests.² In some senses, Moley, even though deeply connected to the president and certainly unable to see him objectively, began what was to continue in decades of historiography to follow: an ongoing conversation about the successes and failures of the New Deal with the partisan ideologies of the people who wrote it often steering the conclusion. Non-historians like Moley who attempt to enter the historical arena, often help to frame debates that professional historians will engage in during the following decades. Whereas Moley felt that the New Deal was too progressive for his politics, members of the so-called New Left, for instance, would take issue with the notion that the New Deal was a failure for not taking progressive reform far enough.

When Curtis Nettles, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, looked at the developing New Deal in 1934, his insights reflected a recent historiographical trend. Initially, Nettles lamented that historians were powerless to shape future events. He cited Woodrow Wilson's past experience as an historian, as well as the historical advisors Wilson took to Versailles, as a failed venture in a scholar's ability to predict and shape the future. The sole purpose of Nettles' piece was to inspire hope that the Roosevelt administration would be more successful drawing on the expertise of a more recent historiographical trend than what Wilson had relied on. The more recent trend was Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis. Nettles argued that seven architects of the New Deal were Westerners and that Roosevelt's cabinet was no longer simply relying on the old New England ideology that Turner rejected, but that they were also gearing their stimulus towards the West, which was in dire need of it.³ Nettles faced the future with optimism and hopeful predictions, suggesting that Roosevelt was planning a revived emphasis on the frontier. There was some truth to this. The New Deal did focus its attention on the West through the Agricultural Adjustment Act and other measures, but there is little evidence to suggest that this happened as a result of the influence of Turner.⁴ Nettles and others who wrote in the midst of fluid circumstances often seemed either overly optimistic or pessimistic. These early writings are the first in what would be a long series of evaluations by specially-trained historians who would pore over numerous primary source documents as well as these discursive pieces. Regrettably, most of the accounts written in the midst of the New Deal were too filled with incomplete prophesy, personal vendetta, or some other blinder of presentism to be valuable as comprehensive historiographical pieces. Those needed to be written by the next generation of historians.

Schlesinger Jr. and Hofstadter set Historiographical Trends in New Deal Scholarship

Two historians would rise above the rest to define the New Deal in the 1950s. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s *The Age of Roosevelt* and Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* not only came to define New Deal historiographical debates in the decade following their publication, but both are still widely consulted by historians today. Alan Brinkley, who wrote *Liberalism and Its Discontents* at the end of the twentieth century, argued that Schlesinger's work inspired scholars with its "literary

¹ Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1939), xi.

² *Ibid.*, 310-312.

³ Curtis Nettles, "Frederick Jackson Turner and the New Deal," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 17, no. 3 (1934): 257-65.

⁴ In Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959) there is one mention of the influence of Frederick Jackson Turner and the disappearance of the frontier. It was referenced in the context of fears that it was coming true: that the frontier was disappearing. Nothing was mentioned about frontier ideology being used by the "brain trust."

grace” and “interpretive stance,”⁵ while Hofstadter was significant for his early use of social history methodology, as well as his refusal to place the New Deal within the progressive era of reform in the United States. To him, it was an emergency response separate from earlier progressivism. Schlesinger and Hofstadter, both liberals writing during an era of American history influenced by Cold War tensions and McCarthyism, were careful about how they characterized the policies of the New Deal, which some in the United States felt were socialist in nature. Each historian, however, took a different approach that led to continuous debate by later scholars.

The near-universally lauded trifecta of *The Crisis of the Old Order*, *The Coming of the New Deal*, and *The Politics of Upheaval*, written by Schlesinger at the end of the 1950s, comes closer to a pure study of the New Deal than any other source. More than one thousand pages depict the New Deal in a scholarly framework. Yet Schlesinger’s narrative style is accessible to any reader. His work blends the best practices of Herodotus, including entertaining stories that can captivate the reader, and Von Ranke’s scrupulous adherence to citations and evidence (*The Coming of the New Deal* includes fifty pages of endnotes) to create a most informative and entertaining account of the Great Depression and New Deal. Anecdotes of conversations Roosevelt had with his cabinet during the banking crisis⁶ were written in a way that made them nearly as exciting as a group of radical farmers in Le Mars, Iowa, who dragged a judge through the streets until he agreed to stop foreclosures in the county.⁷ Schlesinger was certainly one who believed that the writing of history could be both art and science.

Schlesinger was old enough to remember the Great Depression, but differed from most who had written about the New Deal prior to his work; as a teenager, he was neither old enough to have voted for Roosevelt nor making adult household decisions based on poverty or New Deal policies. This distance allowed him to engage in a more authentic analysis of the 1930s without having a deeply personal adult connection to the era. Although there are scholars who take issue with Schlesinger’s later work, *The Age of Roosevelt* is frequently consulted as a valued reference by modern historians. Even James Nuechterlein, in a 1977 piece that took great issue with Schlesinger’s political views and his influence on liberal scholarship, took great pains in a footnote to compliment Schlesinger’s writings in *The Age of Roosevelt* series, calling it “one of the genuine moments of twentieth century American historiography.”⁸

Schlesinger’s thesis centered on the idea that there was a cyclical pattern within political history where conservative forces grow during periods of liberal shortcomings and liberal forces gain momentum in times of conservative political stumbling. In the early pages of *The Coming of the New Deal*, Schlesinger recounts the “impotence” of the conservative leadership of the Hoover administration in dealing with the problems of America’s broken economic system and the sweeping changes the American people supported in a wave of liberalism during the first one hundred days of the New Deal.⁹ This is starkly contrasted in *The Politics of Upheaval*, which, from the onset, shows how some Americans were losing faith in Roosevelt’s New Deal in the face of its legal setbacks and economic stagnation in the mid-1930s.¹⁰ Schlesinger’s balanced treatment of the transition from conservative to liberal policies and ever-shifting responses of the American people to New Deal policy stands as an example of a historian rising above partisan circumstances to deliver writing unencumbered by the political climate that surrounded him.

⁵ Alan Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 111-112.

⁶ Schlesinger, *The Coming of the New Deal*, 14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁸ James A. Nuechterlein, “Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar American Liberalism,” *The Review of Politics* 39, no. 1 (1977): 16.

⁹ Schlesinger, *The Coming of the New Deal*, 1-23.

¹⁰ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Politics of Upheaval* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 1-14.

While many celebrated Schlesinger's scholarship on the New Deal, there is definitely room for criticism, as it neglected the role of women in shaping and promoting the policies that fostered the reconstruction of the nation's economy. Frances Perkins and Eleanor Roosevelt are given scant attention by Schlesinger. Even less attention is paid to the role of African Americans in forming or being impacted by New Deal legislation. These flaws, while not excusable, are to be expected given that the books' publication in the 1950s is prior to large-scale gender or postmodern historiography. Developments in these fields, however, would greatly shape upcoming histories of the New Deal.

There were early traces of the study of social history in Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* Hofstadter utilized the writings and work of literary, economic and sociological scholars to weave together the mindset of individuals who comprised the Populist and Progressive movements in the United States. He invoked literary critic Lionel Trilling to theorize about how liberal politicians could be popular with conservatives,¹¹ and he often referenced the work of John Maynard Keynes and other economists to describe how their approaches to the New Deal contrasted with Roosevelt's.¹² Social history was in its infancy, but Alan Brinkley, when writing about the historiography of this period, insists that Hofstadter's early advocacy of other social sciences outside of the traditional realm of history makes Hofstadter's work invaluable.¹³

Although Hofstadter's analysis of the New Deal makes up only sixty pages of *The Age of Reform*, he raised many eyebrows by characterizing Roosevelt's policies as the "chaos of experimentation" and something distinct and separate from the Progressive Era, rather than a continuation of it. The old progressive ideologies were bypassed.¹⁴ Breaking away from Schlesinger's argument that liberal and conservative politics were cyclical, opposing one another until eventually one force replaced the other as a governing power in America, Hofstadter found an alternative explanation to the politics of the New Deal. He insisted that the New Deal's clumsy, unphilosophical, and incomplete approach to fixing an economic catastrophe marked the end of real progressive politics in the United States. Future historians would either build on one of these camps or tear them both down. Schlesinger and Hofstadter, both writing in the midst of the Cold War, both being careful not to overpraise liberalism or villainize conservatism, and neither having direct connections to Roosevelt or his policies, set the tone for the New Deal history that would fill volumes for the next fifty years.

The New Left and the Turmoil of the 1960s

The sixties brought unprecedented changes for the United States. African Americans engaged in massive protests, militant action, and legal challenges in an attempt to end the discrimination that had plagued them since the earliest days of our republic. Cold War tensions erupted into the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. Assassinations of political and civilian leaders provoked questions about the direction of progress. The true constant factor in the 1960s was change, and few knew what would happen next. Historical study, which previously seemed an anchor of consistency during the turmoil of global conflict in the twentieth century, was about to experience a radical shake-up.

Out of the confusion of the 1960s came a flurry of writings by highly-educated social commentators; some had specialized education in history, but many were trained in other social sciences. Young people in America fervently protested the injustices within the country; at times, they joined organizations like Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Non-Violent

¹¹ Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, 307-316.

¹³ Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 132.

¹⁴ Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, 307.

Coordinating Committee. They were disappointed with liberal leaders of the decade and their inability to solve growing problems in the United States. Some of these young protesters, often referred to as the “New Left,” looked to history for guidance; they found most scholarship severely deficient. Scholars who began engaging in social history methodology and including minority voices in their studies suspected that the failures in 1960s America had roots in the policies and practices of the New Deal. Richard J. Evans summarized the historiographical trends of this period well:

Social history broke out of its ideological and institutional straightjacket. History “from the bottom up” became the key practice of left-wing historians, as they turned to rediscover examples of radical protest and rebellion in American history that had been forgotten because they had had no formal organizations or written programs. Marxism was an influence on many of these historians... but it was a Marxism shorn of dogma and cut loose from its former moorings in the Communist tradition.¹⁵

Evans’ characterization of 1960s historiography shows the influence of the social sciences, the influence of unfolding events in American life, and even the influence of Marxist theory (though not rigidly defined within the methodology of dialectical materialism, but more so as a realization of the role of class in history) shaped historiography of the 1960s.

Prior to the turbulence of the late 1960s, which fueled rabid New Left criticism of New Deal historiography, William Leuchtenburg’s *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* was released to the public in 1963. While Leuchtenburg’s work neither directly subscribed to the Marxist or New Left analytical framework, he was critical of the New Deal as an incomplete revolution that ultimately fell short of helping those most in need of support from the government.¹⁶ It seems fitting that Leuchtenburg began to chip away at the positive legacy of the New Deal as a result of its shortcomings in providing for those most in need in American society. Over the next five years following his publication, the inadequacies of liberal reform would be explored in numerous ways, and with that would come ever-increasing criticism on the incomplete New Deal.

Barton J. Bernstein, one of several historians often associated with New Left scholarship of the 1960s,¹⁷ lambasted the New Deal’s inability to put an end to the Great Depression. Furthermore, Bernstein contended that the New Deal, “failed to redistribute income, it failed to extend equality and generally countenanced racial discrimination and segregation.”¹⁸ He went on to say that the New Deal left workers in industrial factories helpless, lifting up only union members and their leadership.¹⁹ Bernstein’s latter point clearly illustrates the impact of Marx’s dialectical materialism on Bernstein’s classification of the New Deal as a failure not producing lasting change for the proletariat of America. Unquestionably, the civil rights struggle as well as civil unrest between African Americans and white people within the United States during the 1960s had an impact on Bernstein’s historical interpretation.

¹⁵ Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 145.

¹⁶ William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

¹⁷ Bernstein is labeled as part of the New Left in B. H. Nelson’s “Review of Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History,” *The Journal of Negro History* 54, no. 2 (January 1969): 69 and is frequently cited as a New Left historian in Jerold S. Auerbach’s “New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left Historiography,” *The Journal of Southern History* 35, no. 1 (February 1969).

¹⁸ Barton J. Bernstein, “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,” in *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History*, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (New York: Random House, 1968), 264.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 280-281.

New Left historians like Bernstein were clearly influenced by other works of the period. Howard Zinn's *New Deal Thought*, and several other writings,²⁰ were often held up as inspirations to the New Left. Zinn, familiar with Karl Marx's analytical framework of class struggle, wrote with some admiration of Roosevelt himself, but the president's economic program failed to address the lowest classes in society. The New Deal, Zinn concluded, was an experiment that fell short of creating a society where the working class shared in prosperity and New Deal legislation ignored the plight of African Americans.²¹ Zinn pushed for what he called "New Deal Thought." He advocated reinvigorating the spirit of experimentation, conservatively exercised by Roosevelt, which involved trying to use the government to improve the economy, and applying it to the problems gripping America in the 1960s. Historically, Zinn saw Roosevelt's New Deal as inadequate. Observing the racial tension that led to violence in northern ghettos in his own time, Zinn traced the strife back to the Great Depression.²²

When British historian John Tosh reviewed the concept of "history from below" in his compilation, *Historians on History*, he spoke of a rejection of "history from above" and how young thinkers in America were losing patience "with the more abstract tendencies in Marxist scholarship."²³ Part of the reason why Howard Zinn inspired so many young historians on the left was his dedication to drawing from the social sciences and highlighting "history from below." In *New Deal Thought*, Zinn included excerpts from novelist John Steinbeck²⁴ to underscore the plight of farmers, and a member of FDR's "black cabinet," Robert C. Weaver, to illustrate the difficulties of African Americans during the Great Depression.²⁵ By including these works, he made use of the social history movement, drew on Marx's dialectical materialism framework, and influenced (indirectly) those on the New Left and any others who would listen about how real reform could be accomplished by invoking "New Deal Thought."

New Left historians, like Bernstein, provide a glimpse of the real feeling reverberating in different parts of the nation in the 1960s; they also compelled historians to rethink their interpretations, ultimately giving new life to their studies. While few on the New Left produced lasting works that would prove invaluable to scholarship of the New Deal, historians who make a splash, even if they fail to withstand the test of time, live on in the minds of others. Many contemporary historians are still attempting to respond to criticisms of the New Deal those on the New Left levied more than fifty years ago. Whether it was questions raised by the New Left, or just by the social situation of the 1960s in general, the historiography of the New Deal became more inclusive of voices "from below," such as women, African Americans, and other downtrodden members of society. They would begin to factor prominently in New Deal historiography in the next several decades.

James Patterson, Social History in the States, and Other Trends of the 1970s

In the midst of the social and historiographical upheaval of the late 1960s, James T. Patterson produced an essay for the *American Historical Review* challenging historians to investigate a different set of debates. This piece, "The New Deal and the States," eventually became a book with the same title. Patterson proclaimed (incorrectly, in my opinion) that there was a general consensus

²⁰ One of many accounts of Zinn's influence on the New Left mindset can be found in Staughton Lynd's "The New Left," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 382, (March 1969).

²¹ Howard Zinn, *New Deal Thought*. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).

²² *Ibid.*, xvi.

²³ John Tosh, ed., *Historians on History: Readings*, 2nd ed (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009).

²⁴ Zinn, *New Deal Thought*, 243-251.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 324-331.

among historians of the New Deal regarding its objectives and the extent to which those were met.²⁶ Perhaps Patterson, like many historians, was dismissive of the New Left's interpretation of the New Deal. He surmised that the ever-evolving point of disagreement was how the New Deal impacted the states. The answers to this historical query varied depending on the individual state: thus, Patterson argued that the New Deal ushered in a new age of federalism, but ultimately had a limited impact on the states. The New Deal, he concluded, "far from being a dictatorial blueprint, was more like an overused piece of carbon paper whose imprint on the states was often faint and indistinct."²⁷ While this was Patterson's hypothesis, he called upon historians to take on a deeper and more thorough investigation within the history of various states to see if his thesis had merit. Patterson fostered a huge wave of scholarship relating to the New Deal's impact on state governments that continues to motivate national, state, and local historians to search for their locality's response to the New Deal. Historians reading Patterson's work had seen social science methodologies increasingly used to underscore the problems inherent within the New Deal. Now, they would utilize those methodologies in order to investigate the effectiveness of the New Deal through the lens of a state. Many historians who took to working on the New Deal and state governments found ways to incorporate minority voices that were just starting to be brought to the forefront of historiography in the era of the New Left.

In the mid-1970s, John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody published a two-volume collection of essays; they were turning away from conservative critics of the New Deal, as well as liberal champions and more radical detractors, to establish a complex collection of thought taking New Deal historiography into what they felt was a more productive direction for the last quarter of the twentieth century.²⁸ To underscore Patterson's influence, the entire second volume of Braeman, Bremner, and Brody's anthology dealt with historians who had investigated the New Deal in particular states. Thirteen essays representing different states and regions appeared within the historians' collection.

While there might have been a new point of focus after Patterson, historians continued to reveal a very mixed New Deal legacy. The methodological approach of social historians, however, continued to evolve in productive ways. Michael Malone found himself in uncharted waters as he researched the history of Montana in the 1930s. He noted that almost no twentieth-century scholarship existed relating to that state. Relying heavily on newspapers and the personal papers of Montana politicians, Malone articulated real (albeit short-lived) liberal progress in a state very few individuals know much about, with those who do often associating it with dominant conservative political forces.²⁹ Drawing attention to a completely different region and group of people, Bruce Stave looked at the New Deal's life in Pittsburgh. Stave, though not associated with the New Left, reached a similar conclusion, which was that the New Deal was unable to do much for Pittsburgh's African American citizens. Stave, like Malone, relied on newspaper accounts, but he also included tables and charts from Pennsylvania's legislative manuals and atlases to show that a New Deal political coalition was established in Pittsburgh.³⁰ Patterson, along with Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, were hopeful that focusing scholarship on the states might yield renewed conclusions about the national New Deal. While that did not happen, models for how to engage in high-level social history were being expanded as a result of small-scale studies of the states.

²⁶ James T. Patterson, "The New Deal and the States," *The American Historical Review* 73, no. 1 (1967): 70.

²⁷ James T. Patterson, *The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), 126.

²⁸ John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody eds., *The New Deal*, Modern America, vol. 1 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1975).

²⁹ Michael P. Malone, "The Montana New Dealers," in *The New Deal*, vol. 2, ed., John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, 240-268.

³⁰ Bruce M. Stave, "Pittsburgh and the New Deal," in *The New Deal*, vol. 2, ed., Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, 376-406.

If nothing else, the 1970s were calmer than the previous decade in the United States. Racial and gender discrimination were still taking place, but the sixties had given Americans the chance to examine themselves. It is heartening to see histories of African Americans and women starting to reach the pages of large-scale research of the New Deal. What is disheartening was that in the 1970s and early 1980s, there was still a feel of patronizing tokenism within these histories. Susan Ware elaborated on this notion. In her essay, "Women and the New Deal," Ware stated that "the impact of the New Deal on women in general, beyond those exceptional women who served in the New Deal administration, remains mixed."³¹ Ware, bolstered by a recent feminist movement, vehemently insisted that historians need to study women who were not just in Roosevelt's cabinet, but also women who organized and battled in various ways throughout the United States.³² Her calls would be heeded by other historians and helped by a postmodernist wave of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s.

New Hard Times: The 1980s Inspires a Look at New Avenues of Study

Just as cultural disturbances inspired the New Left to look for answers from history, and trends in social history opened new doors for historical inquiry, the economic challenges of the 1970s and 1980s created opportunities for historians to investigate matters that might inform a country suffering through its worst economic downturn since New Deal policies were in effect. Albert Romasco's *The Politics of Recovery: Roosevelt's New Deal* analyzed the temperament of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his ability to sell aspects of the New Deal to the American people. Romasco relied heavily on primary source materials; the secondary sources he used were some of the more classical studies on the New Deal (Schlesinger is a mainstay in Romasco's notes). His work reads quite a bit like Schlesinger's. Perhaps Romasco wanted a return to basic historical study. Likely influenced by a stagnating economy as he conducted his research in 1981 and 1982, Romasco realized that his world had still been shaped by Roosevelt's New Deal. On the final page of his work, he asks, "How then does political leadership reconcile the tension in values that exists between maintaining national unity and preserving traditional personal liberties?" The answer, Romasco concludes, centers on the proper balance from an able leader, and he concluded that no one but Franklin Roosevelt could have accomplished more in the face of the Great Depression.³³ It is unclear whether Romasco was frustrated with then-President Ronald Reagan or not, but without a doubt the parallels between the 1930s and 1980s must have been on the mind of Romasco and his readers.

Taking a different approach, Mark Leff studied the tax policies of the New Deal in *The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933-1939*. Leff admitted that the idea for his book began in a graduate seminar fifteen years before he published it,³⁴ but undoubtedly Reagan's tax policies were not far from Leff's mind as he finished the book in 1984. Characterizing taxation as a "lightning rod of the New Deal," Leff argued that Roosevelt's taxes were not progressive, but were merely symbolic; the president, Leff concluded, had squandered his chance at real progressive reform.³⁵ Leff, like historians of the sixties and seventies, continued to utilize the social sciences to create new historiography of the New Deal. Very few books focused on tax reform during the New Deal the way that Leff did. He extensively relied on business reports, newspaper accounts, diary

³¹ Susan Ware, "Women and the New Deal," in Harvard Sitkoff and University of New Hampshire History Department, eds., *Fifty Years Later: The New Deal Evaluated*, 1st ed., (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 129.

³² *Ibid.*, 131.

³³ Albert U. Romasco, *The Politics of Recovery: Roosevelt's New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 247.

³⁴ Mark Hugh Leff, *The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 293.

entries within the “brain trust,” and political cartoons to address both the reality and symbolism behind FDR’s incomplete reform. Leff’s descriptions of how Roosevelt was able to fool the public and partner with businesses highlights the difficulties ordinary people have in understanding tax policy,³⁶ an idea that remains timely.

Postmodernist epistemological thought began to establish itself among historians in the 1980s. Leff has elements of postmodernist thinking within his analysis. His argument was that Franklin Roosevelt was far more effective at symbolically changing the status of the downtrodden than he was at actually changing their circumstances. Leff incorporated FDR’s symbols like “the forgotten man,” as well as numerous political cartoons within the pages of his book³⁷ to show how people were being manipulated into thinking that Roosevelt’s progressive tax reform was sticking it to big business and standing up for the poor.³⁸ The reality, Leff argued, was quite different. Nevertheless, the “cultural turn” was impacting historians; they were moving away from time-consuming and expensive compilations of databases (the building blocks of social history) to engaging in a new study of the ways in which people make sense of the power structures in their world.

Studying the New Deal from the United Kingdom, Stuart Kidd wrote an account suggesting postmodernist thought should be applied to historical studies of the New Deal. Kidd began his piece by reviewing historiographical trends that he felt had been exhausted. Kidd insisted, however, that a vast reservoir of cultural resources had yet to be tapped into by historians. Kidd harnessed full-page images of Diego Rivera murals and Dorothea Lange photographs to study how these images represented symbols of how Americans saw themselves as empowered by the government and how art emphasized “community building, westward expansion, and the heroic qualities of both early settlers and modern farmers; the images] represented American history as a chronicle of purposeful and productive progress.”³⁹ Photographers employed by the government to produce documentary images captured the dignity of labor, often showing Americans at work. The symbols found within government-sponsored photographs or popular culture supportive of the president’s policies helped to make people believe that the New Deal had empowered them. The photographers often captured people engaged in noble work “[becoming] a universal symbol for the dignity of labour.”⁴⁰ Kidd’s use of these resources supported his conclusion that despite the political imperfections of the New Deal, the American people were largely supportive of the programs.⁴¹ To Kidd, historians could revise fruitfully their understanding of the New Deal by considering methodologies popularized as part of the “cultural turn.”

The End of a Century: Synthesizing Different Approaches to Historiography

Students entering graduate and doctoral programs in history during the 1990s had a plethora of choices regarding methodology and analytical framework. Many were thrilled to merge postmodern approaches advocated by Michel Foucault, who argued that power in society was decentralized into various inequalities within society, with gender studies championed by Joan Scott, who wanted more than just “women’s history.” Scott longed for a new history that was informed by paying attention to women, a long-ignored segment of the populace, creating new interpretations

³⁶ Ibid., 15.

³⁷ Ibid., 86, 154, and 161 show a few of many political cartoons utilized by Leff.

³⁸ Leff’s first chapter, “Taxing the Forgotten Man” assessed the rhetoric of Roosevelt and the opportunities for progressive tax reform.

³⁹ Stuart Kidd, “Redefining the New Deal: Some Thoughts on the Political and Cultural Perspectives of Revisionism,” *Journal of American Studies* 22, no. 3 (1988): 408.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 409.

⁴¹ Ibid., 415.

that would allow people to “understand the complex connections among various forms of human interaction.”⁴² Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman, writing as a doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina, found herself in the midst of this exciting synthesis of historiographical trends. Her article, “From Clubs to Parties: North Carolina Women in the Advancement of the New Deal,” encompassed many of the different styles of researching and writing history that had been utilized by historians throughout the twentieth century.

Wilkerson-Freeman clearly was following the lead of the social history tradition of New Deal history within the states, which James Patterson spearheaded in the mid-1970s, but instead of the tokenism in any accounts of women that appeared in these early state histories, Wilkerson-Freeman fully embraced Scott’s admonition that studying women would cast light on elements of political power that had been overlooked in traditional historical studies. “From Clubs to Parties” revealed that women in North Carolina cared considerably more about issues that would impact their lives than they did about party politics.⁴³ Furthermore, Wilkerson-Freeman centered her research on how Annie Land O’Berry and the collective efforts of other women in North Carolina overcame sexist attacks and skepticism to bring issues integral to women and families to the attention of state and national political leaders. It was clear that Wilkerson-Freeman relied heavily on social history methodology, as her footnotes demonstrate that she had to splice together a narrative from a wide variety of sources ranging from government documents and private papers. In doing this, Wilkerson-Freeman’s work made great strides towards addressing the deficits of the histories previously written. She also noted that there was quite a bit of work remaining. In one of her footnotes, she addressed the fact that scholarship on African American women in North Carolina did not exist in any specific way.⁴⁴

When Alan Brinkley set out to write *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, he acknowledged that the term “liberal” had become somewhat of an enigma, symbolizing an honorable political tradition on one hand and a controversial representation of the welfare state on the other.⁴⁵ Like many people working in the spirit of postmodernism, Brinkley was attempting to redefine an identity: that of what it meant to be a liberal. Writing in the midst of a major clash between conservative and liberal forces during the Clinton administration, Brinkley set out to analyze the power structures within the New Deal to see if he might clarify for readers the history of twentieth-century liberalism. He admitted at the end of his introduction that he was inspired to write the book during the “Reagan Revolution.” Brinkley explained that his book “tells the story of one effort to transform liberalism in response to the demands of a new and challenging time. Another such effort is still in progress.”⁴⁶ The remainder of the book investigates different clashes between liberal and conservative forces during the New Deal. The influence of postmodernism can be seen in Brinkley’s work as he tries to reposition liberal identity.

Interestingly, while historians like Wilkerson-Freeman were trying to establish a historiography of people whose identity had been ignored, Brinkley in *End of Reform* and his later compilation, *Liberalism and Its Discontents* aimed to reexamine the identity of a frequently-studied population. The series of essays Brinkley wrote in his attempt to rebrand liberalism was steeped in New Deal historiography. Brinkley tracked how historians treated the New Deal directly in the first four chapters of *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, but he also frequently brought up New Deal

⁴² Joan Scott, from “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” in Tosh, *Historians on History*, 145-148.

⁴³ Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman, “From Clubs to Parties: North Carolina Women in the Advancement of the New Deal,” *The North Carolina Historical Review* 68, no. 3 (1991): 321.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 322.

⁴⁵ Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 10-11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

scholarship in later chapters about subsequent liberal movements, such as his discussion of the New Left. Their critique of New Deal liberal reform as woefully inadequate sparked debate about liberal policy from people on both sides of the political spectrum. In other words, it was not just political developments of the New Deal that had framed the way people reacted to liberalism, but the ways historians wrote about liberal government reform would also impact the public's understanding of the term liberal.⁴⁷

FDR and the New Deal in Stone, Marble, and Bronze: The Public History Conundrum

The final chapter of Brinkley's *Liberalism and Its Discontents* inspected the complexities within the field of public history. Although he does not speak directly about the New Deal in this section, how history is displayed to the public occupies the mind of both the historian and the layman. A frustrated Otis Graham, Jr. spoke in *The Public Historian* of his anger at the controversies that arose in memorializing Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal on the national mall in Washington, D.C. Many of these controversies had nothing to do with the New Deal (some people objected to the original design of Eleanor Roosevelt's statue with her wearing her trademark fox-fur boa, while advocates for disabled Americans resisted the fact that initially, no statue would show FDR in his wheelchair). Graham felt that these discussions over-sanitized history and gave into pressures to be politically correct instead of historically accurate. He noted that he enjoyed the monument's depiction of the American people reacting to the New Deal, like the sculpture of a person listening to the radio, hoping for better days. When Graham visited the monument, however, he felt as if the people visiting were missing that the point was to depict hardship and hopelessness that was partially rectified by Roosevelt's policies. "Visitors touch the bas-reliefs, photograph their children in front of Eleanor, and play in the waterfalls, laughing and wearing their \$70 Nike tennis shoes. Historian William Leuchtenburg... told a reporter he is not sure he wants to revisit the site with the people in it... What is being felt or understood here?"⁴⁸ Graham might have to live with his annoyance, but controversies that surround the memorialization of the New Deal must be sensitively handled. For far too long, historians left out voices of ordinary people; in the spirit of fairness, these people should have some means of voicing their displeasure at the telling of history.

In historian Allida Black's critique of the FDR Memorial, we find that the postmodernist question of how power, gender, and identity influence experience is squarely part of the debate over the public history of the New Deal. Black takes issue with the placement of Eleanor Roosevelt's statue, for it seems as if she was relegated to the shadows of her husband, the same place historians put her and other women of the New Deal for decades. Despite the gains of the feminist movement and the leadership of gender historians, Eleanor Roosevelt is still just "Franklin's wife." Black eloquently described the issues she had with the monument:

The memorial not only ignores [Eleanor Roosevelt's] central role in the Roosevelt presidency, it runs away from it. Whereas the statues of FDR and Fala are grand, larger-than-life, easily accessible sculptures, the ER statue is barely her full height. Safely ensconced on the highest pedestal of the memorial in a small niche in the last room of the memorial, the statue depicts a resigned, world-weary woman, hands demurely clasped in front, leaving the United Nations.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*.

⁴⁸ Otis L. Graham, "Editor's Corner: On the Mall, a Monument to the Nineties," *The Public Historian* 19, no. 3 (1997): 7-10.

⁴⁹ Allida Black, "Struggling with Icons: Memorializing Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt," *The Public Historian* 21, no. 1 (1999):

Unfortunately, Black had identified just how slow we are to embrace progress. She concluded her piece by explaining how Americans are still uncomfortable with the roles of women in power.⁵⁰ The postmodernist methodology, which I initially struggled to comprehend, came into sharper focus after being exposed to works like Black's. The FDR Memorial is full of symbols, many of which are well done; it is similar to histories like Schlesinger's *Age of Roosevelt*, which are also well done in some senses, but incomplete in their treatment of gender. It will take time to change the historiographical perception of women as subordinate to men, even when they were equal or greater partners, as was the case for Eleanor. Unfortunately, Eleanor is forever fixed in bronze on the national mall, underscoring yet again why accurate public history and historiographies in general matter more than can be emphasized in a paper.

Conclusions

As the United States moved towards a new millennium, historical research into the New Deal was no longer dominated by historians who had lived through the 1930s. Once that change took place, new questions about how the New Deal should be studied or categorized came into focus. Historians always had to contend with their present circumstances shaping the way they saw the past, but American and world events, as well as courageous historians who blazed new trails in historiography, allowed more complete accounts of the New Deal to be written. There is still quite a ways to go in order for American historians to be able to say proudly that they have investigated all voices and perspectives of this time of sweeping political change. No doubt, historians in the twenty-first century will use the methodologies and analytical frameworks that were established in the twentieth century, but new and exciting historiographical trends will inevitably rise up in the future. As historians continue to change with the times, they will also continue to articulate their influences, both directly, through forewords, introductions, and prefaces, as well as indirectly, leaving their method of inquiry behind in their narratives and footnotes. How the next century will write about the New Deal is unknown, but it will, in some ways, reflect the ways in which society evolves over the next one hundred years.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 72.

The Confederate Diplomatic Mission to Mexico: A Testing Ground for European Recognition

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The American Civil War has been taught in history classrooms around the nation ever since the guns fell silent in 1865. Children learn of the glorious leaders, grand armies marching across the continent, huge bloody battles, the shifting and expanding Union war aims to end slavery as the conflict progressed, and they learn about Jefferson Davis and his failed attempt at forming a nation. Yet the Civil War is far more complex than that. The war touched almost every American citizen in one way or another between 1861 and 1865. The war would claim over 600,000 Americans over the course of its duration. It tore the nation apart and divided the North and the South so deeply that we still see evidence of the war today. The guns may have fallen silent, but the anger and divisiveness rage on.

The Civil War was ultimately won on the battlefields, but there were many other battles that erupted during the war: the fight to break the Union blockade, battles in Congress, on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line, and the failed battle for international Confederate recognition. This last issue was the fight the South needed to win in order to prevail in the larger conflict and gain its independence. The Confederacy needed a quick war to defeat the Union, and European recognition was the way to guarantee that victory. European recognition, Confederates hoped, would help them break the superior Union blockade that was starving and strangling the Confederacy, put pressure on the Union from multiple fronts, and allow the Davis administration some leverage over the Union at the negotiating table. Davis and the Confederate Cabinet members thought recognition would be easy. The South had extensive economic ties with England and France, and cordial relations with Mexico. It aimed to invoke the same strategy used by American colonists in 1776 that allowed France to recognize the Americans and intervene on their side. Davis and his diplomats understood the importance of their foreign relations missions to the Great Powers of Europe. Their survival depended on it. Despite the grave importance of their mission, however, the Davis Cabinet and the diplomats sent to Mexico were over confident and did not care to understand the Mexicans. This spelled the end for the mission before it ever began. Union diplomats were determined to keep Mexico out of the hands of the Confederacy, and they had the patience, time, and money to do so.

Despite the American Civil War being one of the most written about topics, little is written about the Confederate mission to Mexico. Studies of the mission are in need of updating. The sources we do have blame politics and economics for the Confederate failure, not the diplomats themselves. One such book is *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy*, by Lynn Case and Warren Spencer. Their analysis focuses on the French side of diplomacy with only parts of the book touching on the Mexico mission. While a great analysis of Civil War diplomacy, the book fails to point out the unwillingness of the Confederate delegation to compromise during its mission as well as the feeling of superiority the Confederate diplomats had while in negotiations with the Mexican government.

Jefferson Davis, a United States Senator from Mississippi, was elected President of the Confederate States of America on February 9, 1861, in Montgomery, Alabama. It is here that Davis would select his Cabinet; of particular importance, he appointed Robert Toombs as his Secretary of

State.¹ Toombs, born in 1810 and the son of a Revolutionary War veteran, found himself in Congress in 1844 representing the citizens of Georgia.² He was a member of the Whig party and a legend in Washington. Charming, charismatic, appealing to the average citizen, Toombs had a reputation for being an expert in giving speeches and winning debates. This legacy and reputation would follow him to Washington. A staunch Whig, Toombs favored a moderate protective tariff. He even enjoyed singling out his fellow Southerners, Whig or Democrat, who put their own interests ahead of the Union or their state. Although Toombs was a defender of slavery, he broke with his fellow southerners to oppose President Polk and his Mexican War. He knew and predicted that once the United States had won the Mexican War, it would lead to “the acquisition of Mexican territory and that would precipitate a disastrous argument on slavery.”³ He defended slavery and the rights of the South, but he saw the need to protect the Union more. After the Mexican American War, Toombs would accept the territorial gains of the United States and the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny and become an unyielding champion of the rights of the South in the newly acquired territory.⁴

Toombs’s emergence as a champion of the South’s right in this new territory did not automatically align him with Davis and the radical states’ rights advocates. Davis and Toombs disagreed on many issues that led up to the Civil War. Toombs supported the Compromise of 1850, California entering the Union as a free state, popular sovereignty in the New Mexico Territory, and the banning of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.⁵ Jefferson Davis would oppose all these measures that Toombs worked so hard to defend. Toombs would also oppose John Calhoun’s creation of a sectional Southern party in 1849 because, in Toombs’ view, any party that was not continental in sweep was not a true party of the American republic.⁶ In the years leading up to the Civil War, Toombs would refer any man who was undermining the existing national system in America as “bad men and traitors.”⁷ This strong, genuine sense of unionism would dominate Toombs’ political thinking and career during the 1840s through the 1850s. However, as the nation became more divided on slavery, Toombs and other southern defenders of unionism began to change their minds.

The nation was a very different place in 1860 than ten years earlier following the victory over the Mexican forces. The rise of the Republican Party and its growing calls for the destruction of slavery, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, the Dred Scott ruling, and the final blow of Lincoln’s election in 1860 all contributed to the drastic change that occurred in the United States in the ten years before the war. All of these factors also changed Robert Toombs’ views on unionism and southern rights as well. Toombs would leave the Senate in January 1861 after delivering a heated speech in which he branded Abraham Lincoln “an enemy of the human race” who “deserves execration of all mankind.”⁸ Toombs would become one of the most outspoken members of secession by the winter of 1860 into 1861.

He reversed his defense of the Constitution and argued that the South would be better off without it. His final statement in the United States Senate called for war against the Union and declared that his home state of Georgia is “on a war path,” and that Georgia and the South are

¹ Burton J. Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause: Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet* (New York: The Literary Guild of America, 1939) 71.

² *Ibid*, 71.

³ *Ibid*, 74.

⁴ *Ibid*, 74.

⁵ *Ibid*, 74-75.


⁶ *Ibid*, 75.

⁷ *Ibid*, 75.

⁸ *Ibid*, 79.

“ready to fight now as we ever shall be!”⁹ He then stormed out of the Chamber, went to the Treasury and demanded his salary and mileage compensation and took it all back to Georgia. Soon after his explosive resignation, later that month in fact, Georgia left the Union on January 19, 1861 with Toombs leading the call for secession. This outspoken loyalty to the secession movement and to his home state along with his reputation and statesman-like quality led Davis to appoint Toombs his Secretary of State.

Toombs would not be the only Confederate secretary of State during the Civil War. He resigned on July 24, 1861, in a letter to Jefferson Davis. Toombs left the Davis Cabinet because “duty calls me to the battlefield.” He and Davis, Toombs insisted, “never had a single difference of opinion in any degree affecting the public interest.”¹⁰ Despite his early departure from the Davis Administration, Toombs set the course for Confederate foreign policy and took the early steps to gain European recognition. He got to work right away after his appointment. It would be his job to forge friendly relationships with the European Powers, primarily France and England, in the hopes of guaranteeing European recognition of the Confederate States of America. The war might even come to an early end if England and France were to recognize the Confederacy. The United States would have to fight a war on multiple fronts and prepare for potential invasion from Europe. The superior English and French navies could destroy the Federal blockade of Southern ports which would allow the Europeans to resupply the South with manufactured goods that they needed to win the war on the battlefield. Then the South could again resume shipping cotton to European markets. The European Great Powers were key to the success of the Confederacy.



Robert Toombs

However, Davis and Toombs sent the first Confederate foreign diplomatic mission, not to Europe, but to Mexico. Toombs appointed John Pickett from Kentucky to head the Confederate diplomatic delegation to Mexico.¹¹ On May 17, 1861, Pickett received a letter that contained his formal post as the Confederate commissioner to Mexico and his diplomatic instructions from Toombs. Pickett was to “assure them [Mexico] of the readiness of this Government to conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with that Republic on terms equally advantageous to both countries.”¹² The unstable and poor nation of Mexico hardly appeared a likely candidate for a Confederate diplomatic mission for recognition. But Mexico’s instability, Toombs and Davis believed, might play into the hands of the Confederates because “no country enjoyed less respect or influence in the foreign offices of the world, and none would seem less likely to be flattered by a proud young people, like the Confederacy, seeking international standing.”¹³ Pickett would be responsible for

⁹ Ibid, 79-80.

¹⁰ Toombs to Davis, July 24, 1861, in *Papers of Jefferson Davis 1861*, vol. VII, eds., Lynda Lasswell Crist and Mary Seaton Dix, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 266.

¹¹ Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 107.

¹² Toombs to Pickett, May 17, 1861, in *The Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy: Including Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1865*, vol. II ed., James D. Richardson (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1966), 21.

¹³ Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 109.

opening the door with Mexico then, in turn, opening a door with the European Powers. The planned diplomatic attack was not a frontal assault on Paris or London, but a backdoor approach through Mexico City.¹⁴

The European powers retained a vested interest in Mexico ever since the Spanish left in 1821. Mexico was the jewel of Central America and its resources highly desired by the English and the French in particular. The Mexican government, however, was constantly in turmoil, and it was in massive debt to the European powers, which wanted their cash back from Mexico and decided that they knew how to run the country better than the Mexicans did. After all, since the departure of the Spanish in 1821, the Mexican government went through seventy-five presidents.¹⁵ Nor did the Mexican government show signs of stabilizing either. The most formidable opponent to the European plans for Mexico was the United States. Americans had already shown their desire for land in the New World. Their massive land grab in 1848 reaffirmed the European belief that America was a growing economic threat. The Monroe Doctrine was another obstacle to European ambitions in Mexico. Many European leaders and governments had dismissed the Doctrine when it was first announced in 1823. However, as the United States continued to expand west to the Pacific Ocean and grow its economy, Europeans took the Doctrine more seriously. It was not stopping any European power, but it was certainly something to consider. Now, with Americans engulfed in a Civil War, the European plans for Mexico were back on. Americans would be too occupied with their blockade of the East Coast to worry about European fleets entering and leaving the Gulf of Mexico. Of the European powers, the French, under Napoleon III, had the greatest hopes and plans for Mexico. France had seen the turbulent Mexican governments fail time and time again. To restore glory to France and rebuild her Empire, Napoleon III and his noble Spanish wife Eugène, had drafted up plans for an invasion of Mexico that would place Archduke Maximilian of Hapsburg, second in line for the Austro-Hungarian throne, on the throne in Mexico to establish a stable, European government there to hopefully bring glory to France.¹⁶ With a weakened, distracted U.S. government, the French saw opportunity to pursue their plan. From the European perspective, secession turned the Monroe Doctrine back into a laughable document. A divided America could not stand up to massive European fleets or armies looking to encroach into Central and South America.

The Confederacy saw the opportunity to capitalize on diplomacy during this time as well. The necessities of war and conflict brought the Confederates and French very close. In 1861 any enemy of the U.S. federal government, wherever they were found, were destined to become friends with the Confederacy.¹⁷ That was one of the founding principles of the Confederate foreign policy at the start of the war. Better yet, Davis and Toombs had something concrete to offer Napoleon III, and the French had much to offer the Confederacy in return. If the Confederate States of America could get the French to recognize their independence, England was sure to follow because France and Great Britain were acting as a single unit in the American crisis. They both sent a joint delegation to Washington after both nations declared the Confederacy a belligerent in the war, one step shy of recognition. They would also act as a single nation in the possible recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation.¹⁸ This infuriated William Seward, the American secretary of state. Lord Lyons and M. Mercier, English and French ministers to the United States requested an audience with Seward and demanded they be met with together. This was unacceptable to Seward

¹⁴ Ibid, 109.

¹⁵ Ibid, 108.

¹⁶ Ibid, 112.

¹⁷ Ibid, 114.

¹⁸ Ibid, 115.

and Lincoln. Meeting with them together would only encourage their commitment to join forces, if the South were to be recognized.

To Jefferson Davis and Robert Toombs, the news that England and France would be working very closely with one another during the American crisis was welcome. If Toombs could get the French to recognize the Confederacy as independent, that might bring in the much more valuable prize, England. To achieve this goal, Toombs would have to promote the Napoleonic scheme in Mexico because the “quickest way to a possible diplomatic triumph in Europe lay through Mexico.”¹⁹ Even though this was a quick solution to the recognition issue that plagued the Confederacy, endorsing a European scheme to place a monarch on the throne of a nation in the western hemisphere, would counter the entire American way and the American system and tradition. And, on top of all that, the European monarch would be placed right on the border with the Confederate States of America—another concerning issue. Despite George Washington’s famous insistence that America avoid “entangling alliances” with Europe and its ideas, and President Monroe’s outspoken opposition to any extension of European influence in the New World, Toombs and Davis were willing to defy the ideals of fellow southerners Washington and Monroe and make those concessions.²⁰

The odds looked good in early 1861 regarding a Confederate diplomatic victory in Mexico. Davis, at the request of John Forsyth, the American minister to Mexico in the years leading up to the Civil War, appointed John Pickett as a special agent to represent the Confederate government in Mexico. According to the letter that accompanied that request, Forsyth boasted that Pickett was “admirably qualified for such a mission.” Forsyth also noted that Pickett’s “knowledge of Mexican character, its language and its public men, his well-known Southern loyalty and personal chivalry recommended him as eminently suitable to fill a position so delicate and important as this.”²¹ A graduate of West Point, Pickett had resigned his Army post for an exciting life as a diplomat. He would need to obtain the support of the Mexicans in order to secure an alliance with the French.

Pickett was heading to a Mexico torn apart by yet another Civil War. Benito Juárez, the leader of the liberal, anticlerical popular majority, was fighting the opposition party, the Conservatives, composed of property owners and good churchmen, devoted to the restoration of the hierarchy and its ravished lands.²² The United States government formally recognized the Juárez regime as the legitimate government in Mexico after Juárez defeated the Conservatives, led by Zuloaga. This was bad news for Pickett and Toombs. If Zuloaga were to have won the civil war, the prospects of Mexican recognition of the Confederacy and the restoration of a European monarch on the throne of Mexico would have improved dramatically. Davis and Toombs decided to send Pickett despite the challenges. They still needed that relationship with the Mexican government to ensure victory over the Union. Forsyth noted in a March 20, 1861, letter to Davis that “recognition by Mexico would follow that of European powers as a matter of course.”²³ Pickett would not be working alone in his mission to Mexico;



John Forsyth

¹⁹ Ibid, 115.

²⁰ Ibid, 116.


²¹ Forsyth to Davis March 20, 1861, in *The Papers of Jefferson Davis 1861*, 75-76.

²² Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 116.

²³ Forsyth to Davis, March 20, 1861, in *The Papers of Jefferson Davis 1861*, 75.

John Forsyth of Alabama and John Slidell of Louisiana would be joining him. Pickett was no stranger to Mexico either. He served as U.S. consul at Vera Cruz between 1856 and 1859, after he left the army and bounced around the Caribbean for a time.²⁴ These three men were among the most qualified men in North America to take on Mexico. And luckily for the Confederacy, all three of these men would join the secession movement and resign from their posts in the United States government to join Jefferson Davis.

The Confederates aimed to open and friendly relations with the people of Mexico as soon as possible. They wanted to be in Mexico City and have a relationship with the Mexican government before the Americans could gain any sort of diplomatic advantage over the Confederates.²⁵ Toombs was looking for Pickett to feel out Mexican merchants and traders on the subject of privateering. Pickett, however, never had the opportunity because the American diplomat sent from Washington D.C. arrived soon after Pickett. The Union sent Thomas Corwin to Mexico to thwart any attempt by the Confederacy to establish a relationship with Mexico.²⁶ In his instructions from Seward, Corwin was to “not allude to the origin or causes of our domestic difficulties in your intercourse with the government of Mexico.”²⁷ Seward and Lincoln thought it best that the difficulties at home were downplayed in order to help Union diplomats on the ground. Corwin was the one man the Confederacy did not want Lincoln and Seward to appoint to Mexico. Pickett hated Corwin with a burning passion. Corwin was originally from Kentucky, like Pickett, however, Corwin moved to the North and served as the Governor of Ohio in 1840 and secretary of the treasury under President Millard Fillmore. Corwin quickly became an outspoken critic of slavery; his name was detested all throughout the South.²⁸ Corwin took his antislavery rhetoric a step further when he was elected to the Senate in 1845. There, he attacked President Polk’s actions and motives during the Mexican-American War. Corwin’s outspoken nature won him favor in the North, but he was labeled a traitor in the South.²⁹ Pickett had Central American experience, but his affiliation with the Confederacy would prove a handicap. The South dreamed of having a Central American and Caribbean empire once they gained their independence. Mexico took note of this and remembered this when Pickett arrived.³⁰



Thomas Corwin

Corwin was charming, a born diplomat. His challenge to the Mexican American War in the late 1840s helped his case dramatically. The Mexicans took to Corwin almost instantly. Pickett had to convince the Mexican government that Davis was not the threat; Lincoln and the Union were the ones to fear. Pickett and the Confederacy could offer greater protection to Mexico than the Union could. The Mexican-Confederate border was the only part of the Confederate coast not covered by

²⁴ Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 118.

²⁵ James Morton Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1964), 71.

²⁶ Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 120.

²⁷ Seward to Corwin, April 6, 1861, United States Department of State. *Message of the President of the United States to the two houses of Congress, at the commencement of the second session of the thirty-seventh congress: Instructions and Dispatches: Mexico*, Vol. I. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1861), 66.

²⁸ Hendrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 120.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 121.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 122.

the federal blockade. It could be here that supplies could be smuggled into the Confederacy and cotton and other exports could be shipped to Europe from Mexico.³¹ The Confederates also had leverage over the Mexicans. Across that same frontier that goods could be shipped and traded, troops could be moved as well. The Confederacy could easily invade Mexico, should Davis feel the need.³² Pickett wanted to be friendly but forceful with the Mexicans. As an opening gesture, he drafted a letter comparing Mexico and the Confederacy in order to persuade Mexico that Davis and the South were not the hostile, dangerous ones. Pickett noted how both nations were rooted in agriculture, used similar forms of labor systems, and mutually feared northern aggression. He also noted that the political upheaval in Mexico resembled that of the Confederacy. Uprisings in both nations were founded in political freedom from an oppressive government.³³ Pickett's letter was picked up by the Mexicans five days later. He was granted a personal, not official, audience with Zamacona, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, at his home.³⁴ In his seven months in the country, that would be his only interview with a Mexican official. President Juárez never met with the Confederate delegation, and his ministers gave the Confederates a wide berth as well. Pickett managed to set up a meeting with a Mexican official, but had not obtained anything even mildly resembling an alliance or trade agreement with Mexico. The main reason Juárez resisted meeting with the Confederates was that he was busy meeting with Corwin on a regular basis. The Confederates could give the Mexicans promises and hopes, but the Union could give the Mexicans what they really needed, money.

Juárez and his government were not huge supporters of either the Union or the Confederacy. To Mexican officials, both sides of the Potomac were “gringos and therefore obnoxious to patriotic Mexicans,” claimed historian Burton Henrick.³⁵ The Union understood that for good, effective diplomacy to work, Corwin could not play into that stereotype. In a letter to Seward on June 29, 1861, Corwin remarked that Mexico regards “the United States as its true and only reliable friend in any struggle which may involve the national existence.” Corwin goes on to say how remarkable that is with the “deep prejudices engendered in the general Mexican mind by the loss of Texas, which they attribute to our citizens, and the compulsory cession of territory which was a consequence of our war with them.”³⁶ Corwin was shocked when the Mexican government even talked to him because of the strained past relationship between the United States and Mexico. This realization would go a long way in the negotiations. Juárez also worked with Corwin because the Union had money that could potentially save him from European debt collectors. Mexico had defaulted on its debts to England and France and had no hope of repaying them. Juárez, in fact, had little control over Mexico. Opposition was still a threat and his people were divided on his rule. Tax money and trade revenue were not enough to balance the budget, let alone pay the Europeans back. This offered the justification European powers were waiting for. They drew up a Convention with Spain for the seizure of Mexican ports.³⁷

Corwin and Seward knew this would play into the hands of the Confederacy if this were to happen. Why not cut the Europeans off at the pass? Seward sent Corwin a note telling him to work out a loan to Mexico from the United States for the liquidation of the European debts. This money would pay back the Europeans, reestablish domestic order, and make the Mexican government indebted to the Union. Juárez and Corwin came to an agreement for the United States to assume

³¹ Ibid, 123.

³² Ibid, 123.

³³ Ibid, 124.

³⁴ Ibid, 125.

³⁵ Ibid, 125.

³⁶ Corwin to Seward, May 29, 1861, *Message of the President Instructions and Dispatches: Mexico*, 70.

³⁷ Henrick, *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 126.

\$62,000,000 of the Mexican debt. To ensure security of repayment, Corwin added that the Mexican government use public land and mineral assets as security. The treaty also included the Americans right to seize those assets and the Mexican states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Lower California, and Chihuahua in the event that the Mexican government could not repay the loan within six years.³⁸ There was no possible way that Mexico would be able to repay the loans in six years, but Juárez agreed. The treaty would never go into effect however. It was blocked by Congress because the Federal Treasury was already overburdened, and England and France would not agree to the terms.³⁹ Still, even though this treaty was never signed nor implemented, it was still extremely valuable to the Union. The negotiations took over a year, and in that time, Juárez was becoming more aligned to the Union with each passing day. Each day he met with Corwin, he did not meet with Pickett. Also, the treaty blocked any hope of a Confederate or European domination of Mexico or Central America. Corwin held the prospect of ready money in front of Juárez the entire time he was in Mexico. The Americans remained in control of the situation and the proceedings the entire time.⁴⁰

To add insult to injury for Pickett, none of his correspondence had been reaching Toombs back in the Confederacy. For over half of a year, Pickett's superiors had no idea what was going on in one of the most important nations in the world for Confederate success. As part of the deal struck between Corwin and Juárez, the Mexican authorities stopped mail between the Confederate delegation in Mexico and the Confederate government.⁴¹ In essence, Pickett accomplished nothing in his seven months in Mexico. He managed to gain one audience with a Mexican official, he was diplomatically outmaneuvered by Corwin, and none of his reports were reaching Toombs or Davis. Pickett would leave Mexico in disgrace because after word got to the delegation of the Battle of Bull Run, Southerners in Mexico rejoiced; meanwhile, the Union citizens in Mexico had little to celebrate. Pickett took offense at some of the things being said by some Yankees and got into an altercation with "an unlucky pill-vendor named Bennett."⁴² Pickett slapped him with the back of his hand. This Southern gesture soon turned into a brawl. As a member of a diplomatic delegation, Pickett assumed he would be treated with respect and be ordered to leave the country. However, the Mexican government ordered an armed detail to arrest Pickett at his home and treated him as an ordinary street brawler.⁴³ He would be thrown in jail and after twenty-four hours ordered to apologize to Bennett and pay a fine. Pickett refused and spent the next thirty days in the city jail. He eventually bought his freedom and returned north as fast as he could. This humiliation amounted to the perfect end to the Confederate attempts at recognition through Mexico. Pickett's mission was a failure, and the Confederate hopes for recognition also ended in failure.

The Confederacy assumed obtaining Mexican recognition would be an easy task. It had committed, skilled men ready to get the job done. Toombs was a skilled politician and devoted to the Southern cause. His overconfidence in his mission, however, derailed the hopes of Confederate recognition from the European powers. The Confederate States of America needed to exploit the weak Mexican government in order to insure friendly relations with France and England. Davis was even willing to back a plot to establish another monarchy on the North American continent in the hopes of gaining French support. This would lead to the ultimate prize, English recognition of an independent Confederate States of America. The two powers, England and France, were both working in tandem on the issue of the Confederacy. They both viewed the Confederates as belligerents, but Davis and Toombs wanted more. Intervention would almost guarantee a southern

³⁸ Ibid, 127.

³⁹ Ibid, 128.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 129.

⁴¹ Ibid, 129.

⁴² Ibid, 135.

⁴³ Ibid, 136.

victory. The soft underbelly through Mexico, however, turned out to be tougher than first thought. Corwin and the Union out maneuvered the Confederates for Mexican support and allegiance. Once Pickett and his delegation left in disgrace after being imprisoned, there was little hope that the Europeans would intervene in the American Civil War, dooming the Confederate States of America.

Truman and Korea: A Cold War Confrontation

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On June 25th, 1950, seventy-five thousand North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. Over the course of the next few days, the communist invaders decimated their southern cousins. As they seized the capital city of Seoul and continued the march southward, it became clear that only outside intervention could save South Korea's sovereignty. This salvation would come in the form of the free world's champion, the United States. Under the leadership of seasoned president Harry S. Truman, America had declared in the years following World War II that it would defend and support the "free peoples" of the world from the threat posed by communism.

To Truman, the North Korean invasion was a thinly veiled attempt by his Cold War rival, the Soviet Union, to drag the Americans into a conflict that would distract them from their ultimate goal of strengthening the western world against communism. It was also viewed as a challenge to the policy of containment laid out by the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which had recently failed to prevent Mao Zedong from taking power in China. Truman himself took much of the blame for "losing China," and his reluctance to fully support the Chinese Nationalists in their civil war was a mistake he did not intend to repeat in Korea. His decision to send American troops into the conflict, instead of just the economic support promised by the Truman Doctrine, also set an important precedent for the powers of the presidency during the Cold War and beyond. The Korean War was the first of many proxy conflicts fought between the United States and Soviet Union throughout the second half of the twentieth century in which each superpower sought to expand its own authority and influence at almost any cost.

The roots of the confrontation can be found in the years leading up to World War II. In 1910, Korea fell into Japan's Pacific Empire and was largely repressed and divided for the next thirty-five years.¹ Tens of thousands of Korean citizens were forced into labor across East Asia, especially after Japan went to war with the United States in 1941. As early as 1943 at the Tehran Conference, President Franklin Roosevelt made plans for a Korean "trusteeship" after the war that would fall under the control of the Allies until they felt it was ready for independence.² However, Roosevelt was dead by the Potsdam Conference of 1945, and his successor Truman devised an alternative plan. He worried that the Soviets would press their geographic advantages to seize Korea as soon as they entered the Pacific War, or at least impose a communist regime over the peninsula. His best hope was that American use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would persuade the Russians to yield the issue. This was not the case, as the Red Army pushed deeply into the country even after the bombs were dropped. In response, Truman offered to forgo the original

¹ Arnold Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 348.

² *Ibid*, 349-350.

agreement on a general trusteeship of Korea in exchange for a political division of the country at the 38th parallel.³

Soviet Premier Stalin agreed, and Korea became a nation occupied by Russians in the north and Americans in the south. Tensions began to rise almost immediately, both between the opposing powers and within the ranks of the divided Korean people. These divisions were personified in the characters of the split nation's two major leaders. Kim Jong-Il was a native of the northern city of Pyongyang, as well as a staunch communist who had waged a guerilla war against the Japanese in China. He cooperated with the Soviets in the liberation of his country, and subsequently received their support to lead the North Korean Communist Party.⁴ At the other end of the spectrum was Syngman Rhee, an American-educated nationalist and devout anticommunist.⁵ Despite their differences, both men shared a common desire for Korean independence from outside control.

By 1949, both the United States and Russia had largely pulled out of Korea. Truman recognized the southern Republic of Korea on the first day of that year, and within a few months passed the reins of power to Rhee.⁶ The South Korean leader quickly turned his country into a police state, jailing political opponents and violently quelling rebellion. In the spring and summer alone, Rhee's administration claimed to have hunted down and killed 19,000 "guerillas" and jailed 36,000 political prisoners.⁷ The situation in North Korea was similar, but the Americans and Soviets were too preoccupied elsewhere to intervene. China's fall to communism ensured that the United States would continue economic support for Korea, but the Truman administration also wanted to keep its distance from the increasingly volatile Rhee.

Concurrent with the changes being made in Korea was the intensifying political and ideological rift between capitalism and communism in the west. The United States and Soviet Union clashed several times as they quickly shifted from wartime allies to opposing superpowers, as the defeat of Nazism turned the focus of America's attention to the threat posed by communism. Increased fears that communist revolutions would sweep a broken Europe in the years following World War II brought the descent of Churchill's "Iron Curtain." Stalin, angered by the perceived betrayal of his former Big Three allies, began to look to expand his operations in other regions. A confrontation in the Middle East in mid-1946, in which Soviet troops attempted to secure oil concessions from Iran as a price to lift their occupation, was one of the earliest examples of Stalin attempting to expand his influence.⁸

If the Iran incident stoked Truman's fears of Stalin looking to expand his sphere beyond Eastern Europe, then Soviet meddling in Greece and Turkey a year later confirmed it. Greece, a country racked by constant civil war, was seen as a "ripe plum" for the Soviets to pick.⁹ Turkey was a somewhat more stable nation, but its proximity to both the Soviet Union and the Middle East could easily make it the domino that would spread communism across the region. It was these events, coupled with a resurgent fear of communism among the American populace, that pushed President Truman to make his historic address to Congress on March 12th, 1947, declaring that the United States would support any nation fighting against the oppression of communism. He pledged \$400 million in economic and military assistance to help Greece and Turkey defend themselves from communist revolution.¹⁰ Congress largely supported the Truman Doctrine, and its namesake

³ D. Clayton James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1954* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 14.

⁴ Mark Byrnes, *The Truman Years, 1945-1953* (Harlow, England: Pearson, 2000), 85.

⁵ *Ibid*, 84.

⁶ Offner, 355.

⁷ Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 567.

⁸ Byrnes, 17-18.

⁹ Offner, 197.

¹⁰ Kolko and Kolko, 342.

president signed it into law two months later. While the new policy was put in place mainly to secure democracies in Greece and Turkey, it also formed the basis of America's response to the emerging crisis in Korea.

By late 1949, Syngman Rhee was becoming an increasingly more frustrating character for U.S. policymakers. His police force of 35,000 was especially brutal towards potential communists and leftists, and he was frequently chastised by Truman's fourth Secretary of State Dean Acheson for attempting to provoke border conflict.¹¹ Beyond that, he constantly lobbied the United States for a larger and better equipped army with which he could take preemptive action to prevent a North Korean invasion, despite having nearly 150,000 soldiers in early 1950.¹² Truman and Acheson had difficulty finding support for the radical leader in Congress, and their Marshall Plan-style Korean Aid bill was defeated in the House in January 1950. American forces had been largely removed the previous summer, besides a few hundred men who made up the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) that worked to train the South Korean army.¹³

With the exception of KMAG, Truman and the Americans left South Korea relatively undefended to northern aggression. Rhee's volatile nature convinced many, including General Douglas MacArthur, that the Republic of Korea could not be trusted with weapons that would allow them to perpetrate an offensive war. Conversely, the Soviet Union left the North Koreans with a plethora of heavy artillery, tanks, and planes, as well as China returning nearly 12,000 veterans to the country who had been helping to fight the Nationalist forces.¹⁴ To many, including Kim Jong-Il, this suggested that Truman believed South Korea was no longer worth defending. After all, Secretary of State Dean Acheson himself had left it out of his "Pacific defense perimeter" when he spoke before reporters in early 1950. Elsewhere he voiced his own opinion that it was a militarily indefensible nation. But in all reality, the United States left South Korea so lightly defended because its leaders underestimated the threat posed by the North. Syngman Rhee was believed to be the primary aggressor on the peninsula who regularly announced his intent to unite Korea by force. While Kim Jong-Il had made similar threats, he had also urged for a peaceful reunification.¹⁵ This idea may have lulled Truman, Acheson, and MacArthur into a false sense of security that would be shattered on June 25th.

Truman's initial thought upon hearing of the North Korean invasion was that it was the first step in a Soviet plot to distract America from an attack in Europe or elsewhere.¹⁶ In truth, it was the culmination of months of careful planning by the northern regime to save their weak nation. Stalin, always the first to be blamed by Truman, also had some influence over Kim's decision to cross the 38th parallel. He correctly predicted that his American counterpart might overreact to an attack on South Korea in order to compensate for failure in China. Stalin, in fact, directed Kim to consult Mao for support if he insisted on a military reunification.¹⁷ In a March 1949 meeting, Stalin offered loans to help modernize the North Korean military, as well as Soviet flight instructors to help Kim build up his air force.¹⁸ He would later express his belief that neither the U.S nor Japan were sufficiently recovered from World War II to fight a "big war" in Korea, and a rapid surprise advance would be

¹¹ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W Norton, 1969), 451.

¹² Kolko and Kolko, 573.

¹³ Offner, 356.

¹⁴ Kolko and Kolko, 573.

¹⁵ Offner, 358.

¹⁶ James, 11.

¹⁷ Offner, 367-370.

¹⁸ "Meeting Between Stalin and Kim Il Sung," 5 March 1949, Wilson Center, Digital Archives, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112127>, accessed 23 April 2018.

enough to convince them not to intervene.¹⁹ Mao Zedong had also agreed to support Kim and the North Koreans, both because of their shared struggle in World War II and as vengeance against the United States for continuing to support the Republic of China, the Taiwanese government-in-exile.²⁰

President Truman, upon returning to Washington from a vacation to his home in Independence, Missouri that had been cut short, immediately began to prepare a military response to the North Korean attack. He cited the Truman Doctrine of three years earlier, calling Korea the “Greece of the Far East” and claimed that its fall to communism would lead to the loss of all Asia.²¹ After consultation with his administration officials, he was forced to settle for U.N Security Council measures rather than immediate American intervention that might provoke Chinese or Soviet retaliation.

To Truman, the United States had a moral commitment to defend its allies against communism even if they were strategically unimportant.²² For this reason, he began to prepare an American response to the conflict even if the United Nations was unwilling to act or if the Soviets used their veto to prevent immediate action. The Soviets, however, were not present at the meeting to use their veto as they were boycotting the United Nations in protest of their refusal to accept Mao’s People’s Republic of China.²³ The Security Council unanimously voted to intervene, and United States’ air and sea power began to deflate the North Korean advance. In a statement given two days after the initial invasion, Truman claimed that the forces of communism had “defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security” and that the United States was performing its “lawful and necessary” duties to the Korean people.²⁴ Truman and MacArthur were initially cautious about putting American troops on the ground due to a lack of congressional approval, but it eventually became clear that the South Korean army alone was not enough to turn back the invasion. The south’s army was, in Truman’s words, “armed to prevent border raids and preserve internal security” and was thus incapable of fighting the superior North Korean forces.²⁵ In the coming months, 65,000 American troops were deployed by the president to defend the Republic of Korea.²⁶

Even with the support of U.S military might, the South Korean forces were pushed almost to the sea. By September, the war in Korea was beginning to look like a lost cause. In a last-ditch effort to force the North Koreans to pull back, General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the UN command, mounted an amphibious assault on the coastal city of Inchon.²⁷ The northern army, cut off from supplies and surrounded on all sides, was forced to retreat back above the 38th parallel. Energized by the victory, MacArthur continued the pursuit into North Korean territory with Truman’s support. What had begun as a defensive war to protect American interests had turned into a chance for the United States and its president to score a powerful Cold War victory. Their hopes were dashed, however, when a Chinese force of nearly 250,000 crossed the Yalu River to support the North Koreans. MacArthur wanted to take the war to China and remove Mao from power, but Truman refused to enter into a prolonged conflict. The angered general publicly voiced

¹⁹ “Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong,” 5 October 1950, Wilson Center, Digital Archives, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117313>, accessed 23 April 2018.

²⁰ Kolko and Kolko, 350.

²¹ Offner, 371.

²² James, 12-13.

²³ Byrnes, 86.

²⁴ “Statement by President Truman on Korea,” 27 June 1950, Wilson Center Digital Archives, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116192>, accessed 23 April 2018.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Kolko and Kolko, 591.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 595.

his disagreement to Congressional leaders and the media, forcing Truman to remove him for “rank insubordination.”²⁸

As with most Cold War conflicts abroad, Korea became vastly unpopular among the American people. The removal of General MacArthur, coupled with the massive Chinese intervention and continued loss of American lives, forced Truman to begin searching for peace. He would never find it, and it was not until July 1953 that his successor Dwight Eisenhower was able to negotiate the armistice that still survives today.

The war was a blemish on the record of an otherwise largely successful president. Truman’s legacy is dogged by questions of what went wrong in Korea while ignoring the positive outcomes of the war. Without a doubt, a unified communist Korean peninsula would have been a threat to the reconstruction of Japan. Had the United States refused the call to defend its ally, it would have sent a strong message both to Stalin and America’s NATO partners that Americans were unwilling or unable to uphold their commitment to fight the global spread of communism. While President Truman unquestionably made several poor strategic decisions in the Korean conflict, the Cold War may have played out much differently had he made no decision at all.

While it is hard to argue that intervention in Korea was anything but necessary, it is also difficult to defend Truman’s decision to send American soldiers into a war unsanctioned by Congress. Today, the power of the president to send troops into battle is commonly accepted and has been seen in notable conflicts such as Vietnam and Iraq. However, Truman was the first to set this precedent. Up until this point, confrontation on the scale of Korea had required a congressional declaration of war, which might have been difficult to obtain considering South Korea’s strategic unimportance and radical leader. When asked by President Truman about the legality of sending troops without declaring war, Senator Thomas Connally (D-TX) replied, “If a burglar breaks into your house, you can shoot at him without going down to the police station to ask for permission.”²⁹ While the conflict was supported by a vast majority of Congress, enough prominent Republicans opposed it that it appeared to some in the public that Truman had bypassed the legislative branch.

Like most Cold War conflicts, the Korean War was centered around a selfish desire for power and influence.³⁰ While some parties in both the north and south had a real nationalistic urge to reunite the peninsula, it seems that Syngman Rhee and Kim Jong-Il sought more to increase their own personal power. Despite this, they were in all reality pawns of the United States and Soviet Union. The Korean peninsula in 1950, while holding some strategic and economic importance, was much more significant for Truman and Stalin as a proving ground for their opposing ideologies. Truman’s and MacArthur’s plan to conquer North Korea, when they barely had a hold on South Korea even before the war, shows that their true intentions were to score a political victory that would send a message to the Soviets. Stalin was just as guilty, having secretly implored the Chinese to intervene in hopes that it would spark a greater conflict with the United States. All in all, Korea was less of a civil war and more of a pursuit of power between the world’s two great competing hegemonies.

Despite being commonly dubbed “the forgotten war,” the implications of Korea reverberated throughout the Cold War era. It marked a shifting focus from the abstract political battleground of Europe to actual proxy military confrontation between the U.S and U.S.S.R around the globe. Anybody who challenged the commitment of the United States and President Harry

²⁸ John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 205-207.

²⁹ Robert Turner, “Truman, Korea, and the Constitution: Debunking the ‘Imperial President’ Myth,” *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 19, no. 2 (Winter 1996).

³⁰ Melvyn Leffler, “National Security, Core Values, and Power,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, 4th ed., vol. 2, eds. Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co., 1995), 14-15.

Truman to uphold their promise to protect the free world from the vices of communism was silenced in 1950. If the world had any doubts about the potential of the Cold War to heat up into a global conflict, they were shattered by the violence and bloodshed of Korea.³¹

³¹ In terms of historiography, like many aspects of Truman's legacy, his handling of the Korean War has generally received mixed assessment from historians. Some of the earliest scholars, Spanier being one of the few cited in this paper, ascribed to the view that Korea was a necessary war fought to defend democracy from the vices of communism. The later post-revisionist view, best characterized in the cited works by Byrnes and Offner, puts the blame for the conflict on the shoulders of Truman and Stalin, who both had personal and varied reasons for wanting to draw the other into a Korean conflict.

Markte und Mauern: Erhard's Economics and the Cold War

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Between the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the economy of West Germany underwent a massive transformation, overseen by then Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, as it tried to reintegrate into the world market—a system by this time thoroughly controlled by the Americans. The economic minister of the Adenauer administration was a fellow CDU (Christian Democratic Union) affiliate named Ludwig Erhard. The public credited Erhard (along with Adenauer) with what is termed the *Wirtschaftswunder* or the economic miracle. The West German economy recovered at a rate that, in comparison to other European countries, seemed miraculous.

Erhard is often described as the father of West German economics. He grew up in a lower-middle class family in Bavaria. Newspapers described a rotund, cigar chomping, rosy faced man with an unflappable charisma.¹ Erhard's new economic program combined with the relative prosperity of the West German state proved both the blessing and diplomatic tool that the United States government felt necessary to help foster strength and prosperity in the West. The wealth of this new German state, however, had unintended consequences. Through economic reform, the position of the Germans started to shift from a burden to the United States to an affirmation of its values, which increased West Germany's significance throughout the Cold War. As a result, tensions between the United States and Soviet Union grew and culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall (1961), a visual manifestation of the Iron Curtain drawn across Europe. This signaled the end of the Adenauer era and kickstarted a short era under Erhard as chancellor.

This paper begins by examining the background of the Cold War in terms of economics, focusing on Germany's significance in the emerging economic system. It starts with the beginning of the occupation where people lived on rations and traded in cigarettes and cognac. Then it moves to Erhard's early years as the economic minister, when his actions both clashed with and impressed the US occupying forces, as he shut down price controls and presided over the creation of the *Deutschmark*. After this point, the study shifts to explain the role of Erhard's economics in the realm of diplomacy between the United States and West Germany in the leadup to the second Berlin Crisis. Finally, the work will touch on the broader implications of the economic state of West Germany up until the end of the Berlin Crisis under Kennedy in 1961. Erhard came up with his own, albeit somewhat unorthodox solution to the 1961 Berlin crisis, but was ultimately shot down. After which point, West Germany transferred from the Adenauer age to Erhard's own short-lived chancellorship. The impact of West German economics on diplomacy lasts even to the present day in our globalized world. We begin, however, in a very different world where the roots of the German economic revival lie in the end of the occupation and beginning of the Cold War.

After World War II, the remnants of Weimar Germany's Catholic Central Party reformed their party as the new Christian Democratic Union. Its purpose was to be a more inclusive Christian

¹ Von Alexander Marinov, "Ludwig Erhard: Der Zigarrenmann Und Das Wirtschaftswunder," *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, May 11, 2009, <http://www.wz.de/home/politik/ludwig-erhard-der-zigarrenmann-und-das-wirtschaftswunder-1.126492>.

party in 1945 to move beyond the religious divisiveness of the past. The CDU was not always United States' ardent anti-communist ally in central Europe. Early on, Adenauer was baffled by the initial distrust the CDU faced from the allies, particularly from the British forces, who seemed to trust Social Democrats or even the German Communist Party, rather than this new center right Christian party. Adenauer attributed this to British suspicions that the CDU was founded by former Nazis.² Nevertheless, by 1946, Adenauer's CDU was represented within the provincial government with seven fixed seats, putting it on par with the communists and the Social Democrats in the North Rhine Province.³ By the late 1940s, the CDU would assert itself as a dominant force within the new Germany. To Adenauer, only a party with great moral conviction and strong roots within the 'Western-Christian' tradition could halt the threat of communism to Germany.⁴ Adenauer described the function of his authority as mainly economic, seeing as this council controlled the industrialized Ruhr valley. Erhard was quick to point out, the Ruhr Authority was independent of the British High commission, since it was established as an independent body in the late 1940s, due to the struggle between the occupying powers to control what was then the industrial heartland of Germany, even though the Ruhr itself was under British control. The French and the Russians demanded international control of the Ruhr.⁵ Secretary of State James Byrnes struck a compromise through the Ruhr Agreement, which formed an independent international body with France, Germany, the US, and UK to oversee Germany's coal.⁶ Despite its independence, the organization depended on US loans.⁷

At the start of 1947, it seemed unlikely that West Germany would become the bastion of American style liberal economics in the face of Soviet Communism. While the Christian Socialists in Erhard and Adenauer's party rejected Stalinism, their faction within the CDU was heavily critical of capitalism. Yet Adenauer himself was no fan of socialism. In the party's protocols, Adenauer was once quoted saying: "With the word socialism we win five people, and twenty others run away."⁸ Nevertheless, Adenauer eventually compromised with the more socialistic elements of his party in the Christian Socialist Union, and thus in February 1947, the CDU created the Ahlen Program. The program was heavily critical of capitalism. At a meeting in the British zone of occupation, the CDU put forth the following proclamation:

The content and goal of this new social and economic order can no longer be the capitalistic pursuit of power and profit; it must lie in the welfare of our people. A socialist economic order must provide the German people with an economic and social framework that accords with the rights and dignity of the individual, serves the intellectual and material development of our nation, and secures peace both at home and abroad.⁹

Erhard was good friends with a figure responsible for reviving a style of economics long considered the antithesis to socialism—Friedrich Hayek, a man who would go on to found what is commonly known as the Austrian school of economics, a revival of the free market, classical liberal

² Konrad Adenauer, *Adenauer Memoirs 1945-1953* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1966), 153.

³ Adenauer, *Adenauer Memoirs*, 154.

⁴ Adenauer, *Adenauer Memoirs*, 45.

⁵ Yoder, Amos, "The Ruhr Authority and the German Problem," *The Review of Politics* 17, no. 3 (1955): 352-353.

⁶ Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands also were in this international body, but their votes amounted to 1/3 of those of the major powers.

⁷ Adenauer, *Adenauer Memoirs*, 186.

⁸ Georg Stötzel and Martin Wengeler, *Kontroverse Begriffe: Geschichte des öffentlichen Sprachgebrauchs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 38.

⁹ "The Ahlen Program (February 1-3, 1947), from a Pamphlet by the National Office of the CDU (Bonn, n.d.); Reprinted in Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, *Die Parteien Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [The Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany]*, Hamburg, 1973, p. 157.

economics. Erhard was Bavarian himself; Hayek from Austria, which gave him a similar cultural background to Hayek's. He belonged to an economic group that called themselves the *Ordoliberal*s in the University of Freiberg. This group did not buy wholly into the laissez faire ideas of some classic liberals.¹⁰ Erhard portrayed himself as more of a moderate in his economic thought, and he espoused a golden middle path for the future of the German economy.

Despite the perceived economic power of the West's brand of capitalism, Erhard put forth a program for a new type of "hybrid" economy, dubbed the "social market economy," which continues to drive German economic policy even today.¹¹ Erhard loosely defined this new economy in his preface of his book, *Prosperity Through Competition*, as: "overcoming the age-old antithesis of an unbridled liberalism and a soulless State control, to finding a sound middle way between out-and-out freedom and totalitarianism."¹² Erhard made frequent use of the press, such as the American backed *Neue Zeitung*, to promote his economic ideas in concert with other organizations of neoliberal economists. Through the *Neue Zeitung*, he called on the Allies to adopt currency reform as soon as possible.¹³ At this point, the Germans still heavily relied on an underground market of bartering with cigarettes and cognac. People hoarded goods as they would have under a communist system, so there was no real economic growth from about 1945 to early 1947.¹⁴

Erhard envisioned a bigger role for Germans to determine their fate through deregulation. While some of the occupation authorities, particularly the British, viewed this as a threat, others sought to use Erhard as a counterweight against the forces of socialism. For this reason, Americans involved in the restructuring of Germany saw an opportunity to showcase the power of capitalism in contrast to communism. Erhard offered his services to the occupying forces as early as 1945, which earned him a post as the economic Minister of Bavaria, the largest province in Germany and right in the heart of the American zone of occupation. His house still lay in ruins after an Allied bombing, so Erhard was staying with friends in Fürth-Dambach. His main task was to restore the municipal economic office and promote the reindustrialization of the region.¹⁵ Erhard was put on an economic council formed by General Lucius Clay, US military governor of Germany. There he spoke out against the dismantling of BMW and argued for more German responsibility in the economy. Many of the occupying forces were wary of these ideas.¹⁶ But Clay was more open. In particular, the general had wished to push for West German economic superiority in relation to the East since the very beginnings of the occupation. Rations became a means of economic competition in Clay's eyes. The general rejected the authority's proposal to reduce rationing in the US zone. He wrote: "there is no choice between becoming a Communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. It is my sincere belief that our proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle Europe, but will pave the road to a Communist Germany."¹⁷ Over time his attitude only intensified. In 1947 Clay wrote in a letter, "I still believe we must proceed vigorously with revival of German economy.... if we are to save Germany from chaos and communism."¹⁸

¹⁰ Daniel Yergin, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 34.

¹¹ "Combining Market Economy and Social Inclusion," Government, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, <http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/the-social-market-economy.html>, accessed December 7, 2018.

¹² Ludwig Erhard, *Prosperity through Competition* (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1958), x.

¹³ Alfred C. Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard: A Biography* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 57.

¹⁴ For more on this see: Loren Gatch, "From Black Market to Barter Mart in Postwar Germany," *Paper Money* no. 275 (October 2011): 364-372.

¹⁵ Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, 50.

¹⁶ Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, 52.

¹⁷ Lucius Clay to Oliver Echols and Petersen, "103. Food Situation in the U.S Zone," March 27, 1946, in Lucius D. Clay, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, ed. Jean Edward Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 184.

¹⁸ Lucius Clay to Royall, "240. French Obstructionism," July 28, 1947, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 390-391.

With Clay's support, Erhard was appointed the joint British-American zone's economic director in 1948. He played an integral part in the German recovery, as it was Erhard who delegated the flow of supplies from the US military into Germany. During this time, he was still working part time as a professor of economics.¹⁹ One of his first acts would be to pass the *Leitsätze Gesetz* or "guiding principles law" through the economic council, behind the backs of the allied powers in June of 1948. This law would in affect ban all rationing. It would also lift all the price controls. Erhard believed that the British would veto this bill if given the chance, so he circumvented authorities. When the French, British, and Americans found out about Erhard's plan, they initially grew nervous.²⁰ According to the oft repeated story from Erhard's friend, Hayek, Lucius Clay called Erhard to his office. "Professor Erhard, my advisers tell me you are making a big mistake," Clay told him. "Don't worry, they told me the same thing," replied the economist.²¹ Erhard maintained that he acted within his authority.²² Clay agreed. In fact, he sympathized with what Erhard was doing. The Allies decided to approve Erhard's plan, which truly went into effect June 30, 1948.

This, combined with Erhard's currency reforms just three days earlier, made his new free market policies a success in the eyes of many. In just a few weeks after Erhard announced currency reform, the vendors of West Germany could acquire products in quantities not seen since 1938. The bizonal economy was revived, productivity rose, and German workers no longer had to rely on the black market for basic goods.²³ From this point on, Erhard was known as the father of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. The Americans, French, and British would not dare remove him from his post due to his growing popularity. Occupying authorities like Clay knew they could work with Erhard, but to some extent they were still wary. The CIA noted his rapid rise from an economics professor to an international political figure. Erhard campaigned almost as much as Chancellor Adenauer. He even wrote for American and English newspapers. Despite this, authorities noted he was noticeably quiet on international affairs outside of his support of NATO and integration within Europe.²⁴ In the Spring of 1949, Erhard attended meetings with the Soviets where the German leaders discussed the policy of political unity, but the real subject of concern was the maintenance of East and West Germany's economic united front in the face of the first Berlin Crisis.²⁵ Many revisionist historians attributed the partition of Germany to growing differences between the two zones.²⁶ Erhard's economic reforms did in fact drastically increase disparities between the two zones. Despite his later popularity, in some ways, the Bavarian professor turned economic minister made West Germany a victim of its own success. The consul general, however, noted the opportunistic nature of the West German politicians, which only seemed to be fueled by the fact that Russia could be on Germany's doorstep any minute.²⁷

After the resolution of the Berlin Blockade and the elections of 1949, Erhard advocated close cooperation with both America and Britain. Those who advocated such ties were known as

¹⁹ Mark Spicka, *Selling the Economic Miracle: Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 38.

²⁰ Christian Glossner, *The Making of the German Post War Economy* (London: I.B Lauris, 2010), 57-58.

²¹ F. A. Hayek, *The Fortunes of Liberalism: Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 194-195.

²² Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, 70.

²³ Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, 72.

²⁴ CIA, "West Germany's Ludwig Erhard" (May 29, 1959), *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary*. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ERHART%2C%20LUDWIG%20VOL.%202_0059.pdf, accessed April 15, 2018.

²⁵ "The Consul State General at Bremen (Altaffer) to the Secretary of State," March 15, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, vol. III, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 1949 (Washington, D.C, 1974), 224. [Hereafter *FRUS* and vol. number]

²⁶ For an example of revisionist scholarship see: Carolyn Eisenberg, "Rethinking the Division of Germany," in *Rethinking the Cold War*, ed. Allen Hunter (Temple University Press, 1998), 47-61.

²⁷ "The Consul State General at Bremen (Altaffer) to the Secretary of State," March 15, 1949, in *FRUS*, 224-225.

Atlanticists. However, this would also put Erhard at odds with people like Adenauer, who advocated closer ties with France (also called Gaulists). The culmination of ties between Germany and France became an important foundation of the integration of Europe. Erhard was involved in the creation of France and Germany's shared market, despite his protestations to the office of German affairs. Erhard told the office's director that he was there to focus purely on economic issues, rather than the larger political issue of Franco-German relations.²⁸ Meanwhile, Erhard made frequent trips to Washington to talk economics with the Americans. In 1953, the United States enacted a cultural exchange program with Germany which promoted a "free cultural exchange" between the nations. Erhard was both a participant and a proponent of the program. The idea was that it would increase German understanding of the United States.²⁹

Erhard did not just have to contend with improving his understanding of the United States. In the new world of the Cold War, the United States labored to facilitate the Schuman Plan to promote unity between old rivals turned Cold War allies. Once again, economics became the basis of solving the longstanding political problem between Germany and France: in this case, the Saar region, which had been heavily industrialized and a source of contention between the two nations for decades. Erhard drafted an economic settlement which said that the Saar region would be liberalized and made an area for French goods to enter duty-free.³⁰ During the early 1950s, the United States also mediated between Erhard and the British government. One issue was West Germany's inability to provide sufficient scrap metal to Britain. Parliament expressed hope that it could reach a satisfactory agreement with Erhard, who rejected the British proposals without making a counterproposal. The British hoped US officials could press the West Germans to meet the obligations, or there would be very serious consequences.³¹ In the end, Erhard became a proponent of an integrated Europe, countering Secretary Dulles' more pessimistic view on the matter. Erhard believed not only that Germany could be unified, but so could Europe through free trade and travel. In addition, he believed wealthier nations could fund aid to weaker ones such as Italy.³²

In 1957, Erhard was appointed to vice-chancellor, and by 1959, Erhard seemed like a likely candidate for the next German chancellor, so US officials were already predicting how he would act in that position. Adenauer grew to resent Erhard's popularity over the two-year period they worked together in the chancellery. Adenauer went on record saying that Erhard did not have what it took to be chancellor, even if he was talented.³³ Their relationship quickly became embittered over time as the result of differing approaches to foreign policy. Erhard frequently overreached in his capacity as minister, but his position as the father of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, as well as his unusual charisma, made him a powerful candidate for the office. His platform was not backed by nationalism, but rather his vision of "Prosperity for All."³⁴ This applied not only to his domestic policy, but his foreign policy as well.

²⁸ "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)," November 23, 1953, in *FRUS* vol. VII, Germany and Austria, 1952-1954, No. 233.

²⁹ Henry J. Kellermann, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Germany 1945-1954* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1978), 159.

³⁰ "Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State," March 29, 1953, in *FRUS* vol VII, Germany and Austria, 1952-1954, No. 172.

³¹ "The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State," June 30, 1951, in *FRUS* 1951, vol IV, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, No. 64.

³² "The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State," June 07, 1955, in *FRUS* 1955-1957, West European Security and Integration vol. IV, doc 97.

³³ "Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State," June 22, 1959, in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, The Berlin Crisis, vol. III, doc 413.

³⁴ Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 191-192.

Erhard's use of economic soft power continued after Adenauer resigned in 1963, and the economist took the position of chancellor. Upon his appointment, Erhard concocted a scheme that may have very well been the ultimate culmination of his belief in soft power. When he faced the second Berlin Crisis as the Soviets blocked off East Berlin, it occurred to him that perhaps he could simply *buy* East Germany. Erhard would offer grants in return for Khrushchev giving the Germans something back in return: a gradual phasing out of the wall, culminating in reunification. While the Americans concluded the idea was unrealistic, they did not wish to discourage Erhard from using his "economic tools."³⁵ The acting Secretary of State George Ball sent a message to President Kennedy that Erhard became preoccupied with this idea.³⁶ Erhard had spoken of how he wished for German unity after all. Kennedy would be assassinated before Erhard could truly discuss this with him. The plan did not come to fruition, and Erhard abandoned the idea of a reunited Germany. Lyndon Baines Johnson, however, would come to be a very close friend of Erhard, and throughout this period, the US president and Erhard would maintain close relations between their respective countries.³⁷

The Adenauer era and the Erhard era are said to be one in the same by the more sympathetic biographers of Ludwig Erhard.³⁸ Erhard's economic policies greatly influenced relations between East and West. It also influenced the formation of the modern economies of Europe, the study of economics, and even brought consumer culture into Germany. Erhard proudly called West Germany "a free nation of consumers," as he perused through the modern household appliances and gadgets in Berlin's 1950 German industrial exhibition.³⁹ West Germany would truly become Westernized—even Americanized to some of the detractors of this culture. In many ways, Erhard's career was the culmination of economics as soft power. Erhard came to be one of the larger-than-life political figures in postwar Germany, and, while infighting dealt a heavy blow to his political party, the CDU under Erhard and Adenauer became the major political force in postwar Germany. Although Erhard may not have considered trade political, trade became the biggest tool in West German foreign policy. The CDU's new economic order thus shaped West Germany's place in the Cold War and relationship with the rest of the First World.⁴⁰

³⁵ "Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State," October 3, 1963, in *FRUS* 1962-1963, Berlin Crisis, vol XV, doc 217.

³⁶ "Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy," October 26, 1963, in *FRUS* 1962-1963, Berlin Crisis, vol XV, doc 233.

³⁷ Margarita Mathiopoulos, "The American President Seen Through German Eyes: Continuity and Change from the Adenauer to the Kohl Era," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (1985): 682-683.

³⁸ Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 191

³⁹ Erica Carter, *How German is She?: Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 26.

⁴⁰ Special thanks to Dr. Edmund Wehrle and George Anaman for their input on this paper

The Exceptionalism of the 1979 Iranian Revolution: Religion and Diplomacy

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The 1979 Iranian Revolution appears an aberration from previous revolutions and revolts in Iranian history due to the circumstances leading to the revolution and its aftermath. By the 1970s, the Iranian people had tired of living under an oppressive regime, which offered little to the citizens, while taking the fruits of the nation's wealth for lavish displays of luxury to impress the outside world, as the Iranian population suffered. In an effort to empower the people and to reinstall Islam in the country, Iranians turned to revolution and to a new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. The 1979 Iranian Revolution should be considered an outlier from previous Iranian revolutions as the secular ideals of Iran changed suddenly with the installation of an Islamic ruler, Khomeini, who reversed domestic socioeconomic policies, changed diplomatic relations between countries, and altered the role of the government during the hostage crisis.

Following its reinstatement in 1953, the Pahlavi regime subjected its citizens to drastic secularization in its attempt to westernize the country. These policies included land reforms which took land away from wealthy owners and gave small chunks of land to peasants.¹ Because these pieces of land were not sufficient to sustain an existence, peasants were forced to sell their land back to the original owners and move into urban areas.² With this relocation, uprooted peasants became exposed to new ways of life and people with whom they had never interacted before. They were often left a poor, neglected population.³ Another faction in Iran who began to feel marginalized after the reinstatement of the Pahlavi regime and the secular government were religious groups. Due to increased secularization in Iran, many of the religious orders began to feel as though the Pahlavi dynasty was attempting to push away Islam in all aspects of Iranian life. This is how Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the series of reforms, known as the "White Revolution," instituted by the Pahlavi monarch in the 1960s.⁴ Khomeini saw the White Revolution as "an anti-Islamic sacrilege aimed at destroying the role of the clergy in Iran."⁵ The regime also banned head scarves for women in a drive to promote secularization throughout all aspects of Iranian society.⁶

The uniqueness of the 1979 Iranian Revolution centers around the role of the *ulama*, or religious class. Iran is an Islamic country largely dominated by Twelver Shi'is, though there is a small population of Sunni Muslims as well. Religion always has had a role in Iranian politics, however great or small depending on the time period. Early in its establishment, the *ulama* decided its involvement in politics would be minimal in order to keep ideology apart from the political systems. Unless the government became so corrupt that the *ulama* felt the need to interfere in order to save the country and its people, it stayed away from politics. But even after becoming involved in politics, rarely did the *ulama* maintain its involvement after achieving its goals in stopping corruption.

¹ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 150.

² *Ibid.*, 153.

³ Michael H. Hunt, *Crisis in US Foreign Policy: An International Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 371.

⁴ David Farber, *Taken Hostage* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 64.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era," in *Iran under the Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 115.

Historian Nikki K. Keddie explains, “some revolutions have had religious ideologies, but clerical rule after a revolution was new.”⁷

The Tobacco Protest (1891-1892) is an Iranian example of how the *ulama*'s involvement ceased after attaining its goals. The Shah at the time of this revolt, Nasir al-Din Shah, issued full rights to a foreign entity over the tobacco industry in Iran, which led to great upheaval throughout Iran as the company raised prices and made it difficult to buy and sell tobacco. Ayatollah Shirazi issued a fatwa against buying and selling tobacco for all Iranian citizens. The fatwa proclaimed that if people smoked cigarettes, they did so in defiance of the Hidden Imam. The Hidden Imam is Twelver Shi'i's belief that the son of the Eleventh Imam went into “occultation,” and this Hidden Imam is the true leader of the Shi'i Muslims who will return at some point in the future.⁸ To do something against the will of the Hidden Imam—in this circumstance smoking cigarettes—is incredibly disrespectful. Following several days of no smoking, the Shah retracted the concession over tobacco. After the *ulama* helped eradicate the meddling of outside forces in tobacco dealings, it stepped back from the political mainstage to allow the people to continue fighting the small injustices.

Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) also showcased the *ulama*'s active role in the government during the revolution and its withdrawal once goals had been met. During the Qajar Dynasty's rule, there was great unrest, stemming from the rising sugar prices.⁹ The Iranian government forced price controls on the *bazaaris*, or merchant class, in order to limit the power of the *bazaaris*.¹⁰ Along with their *ulama* allies, the *bazaaris* also had support from the intellectuals and the British government.¹¹ Starting in 1905, the *ulama* instigated multiple riots and strikes in order to protest the Qajars.¹² Anti-Qajar forces were able to escape the Qajar forces by camping out in the British Embassy, where the protestors demanded the establishment of a “house of justice.”¹³ After the creation of a parliament, the *ulama* held many seats in the new form of government and had great influence on the new constitution that was being written.¹⁴ Ayatollah Mohammad Husseim Na'ini stated, “constitutional government was the best form of rule in the absence of the Hidden (Twelfth) Imam,” which was greatly contested by other members of the *ulama* who said “constitutional government was a Western-inspired heresy.”¹⁵ Clearly the *ulama* still had a lot of power within the Iranian government at this time, though this power was protested by the members of the secular side of the Iranian government, and the *ulama* would eventually leave the Iranian government after the signing of the new constitution.¹⁶

The *ulama*'s expanded involvement in politics after the 1979 Revolution was likely due to the high status of Khomeini, who held the highest position in the *ulama* as an ayatollah. Khomeini stated that “neither he nor the *ulama* would hold direct power in a new government.”¹⁷ Though this was likely a sincere statement, Khomeini was the de facto leader of the revolution, even if he never formally took control of the people. Historian David Farber argues in his book, *Taken Hostage*, that Khomeini believed that “only in Islam could the Iranian people find their destiny and the Iranian

⁷ Keddie, 240.

⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁹ M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 30.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Fatih Varol, “The Politics of Ulama: Understanding the Role of the Ulama in Iran,” *Milel ve Nihal*, 13, no. 2 (2016): 133.

¹² Ghods, 31.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Varol, 135.

¹⁵ Ghods, 37.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, 240.

state its political legitimacy.”¹⁸ Harnessing this sentiment with pointed rhetoric, Khomeini was able to rally the disgruntled people behind his religious takeover of the secularized government.

The seriousness of the corruption in the Iranian government determines how involved the *ulama* would be in a revolution. The 1979 Revolution saw great religious involvement from the start, especially compared to previous revolutions in Iran. After the Tobacco Protest, when the *ulama* decided its involvement would end after the fatwa was taken back and the people once again had access to tobacco. Of course, there were personal reasons for issuing the fatwa, as a fair amount of the money the *ulama* used for its organizations came from the assistance of the merchant class. These merchants gave money to the *ulama*, but were unable to do so after they could no longer sell tobacco. Though its initial involvement in the 1979 Revolution was to return Iran to a religious power, the *ulama* did not end its involvement there. Religious figures, in fact, enjoyed a large jump in social status and financial security due to the higher power of the Ayatollah as the leader.

Discontent with the regime had boiled throughout Iran for many years. Increasingly, the people wanted a leader to help eradicate the Pahlavi dynasty. As many of their problems rested with the growing secularization of Iran, many looked to the religious clerics to lead them to revolution. The outstanding member in the eyes of the Iranian people was Khomeini. An ayatollah is one of the highest-ranking clerics in the Islamic faith, which offers a logical reason why the people would choose Khomeini as their leader. He was also a longtime critic of the Shah’s leadership and was exiled from Iran for multiple years, until he returned around the time of revolution. Khomeini was not a silent protester against the Pahlavi government. In fact, Khomeini often spoke to students and against the Pahlavi Shah to persuade the Iranians to fight their current government. In the early months of 1970, Khomeini gave a series of lectures to Iraqi students of religion about implementing Islamic political principles in Iran. He used his charismatic leadership to present his beliefs on the role of Islam in Iran in the following section of his lecture.

So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up! Address the people bravely; tell the truth about situation to the masses in simple language; arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the street and the bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert students into dedicated *mujahids* [those engaged in jihad or holy struggle]. The entire population will become *mujahids*. All segments of society are ready to struggle for the sake of freedom, independence, and the happiness of the nation, and their struggle needs religion. Give the people Islam, then, for Islam is the school of *jihad*, the religion of struggle; let them amend their characters and beliefs in accordance with Islam and transform themselves into a powerful force, so that they may overthrow the tyrannical regime imperialism has imposed on us and set up an Islamic government.¹⁹

By appealing to students, Khomeini set up the educated youth to oppose western powers and the Pahlavi government with religion.

The Pahlavi regime viewed Khomeini as a threat, which led to a pro-Shah Iranian newspaper releasing an attack on Khomeini in January of 1978. This sparked protests throughout Iran, especially in Qom, where protests resulted in the deaths of at least 70 people in the span of two days.²⁰ This bloodshed is widely considered to be the catalyst for the Iranian Revolution as it showed the people how far the Pahlavi were willing to go in order to continue their rule. As Khomeini’s popularity grew, it became very clear to the Shah and his administration that they would not hold

¹⁸ Farber, 63.

¹⁹ Ayatollah Khomeini, “Lectures delivered to students of religion in Najaf, Iraq,” January-February 1970, in *Crisis in US Foreign Policy*, 395.

²⁰ Keddie, 225.

power in Iran much longer. The Shah fled from Iran, and after a few days of political stand off, power officially transferred to Khomeini in February 1979.²¹

One standout feature leading up to the 1979 Revolution was the public hatred for western powers, especially the United States.²² A few incidents altered the revolutionary mood, turning the Iranian people further against the United States. The first mistake made by the Carter administration was allowing Mohammad Reza Shah into America for medical treatment in the fall of 1979.²³ To some, this represented America's loyalty to its allies, but others perceived this action as Americans refusing to acknowledge the new Iranian government by aiding the previous regime, which was put in place by the CIA. The Carter administration debated heavily admitting the Shah for medical treatment, knowing the Iranian people would likely not view this decision in a positive light, and could potentially harm Americans. Just days before the Hostage Crisis began, a second diplomatic faux pas the United States made was at a meeting between President Carter's national security adviser, the Pahlavi Shah's Iranian prime minister, and the Iranian foreign minister.²⁴ By meeting with those who were against the new Iranian government, Americans appeared to be against the revolution. The meeting generated apprehension among Iranian citizens about whether the United States planned on repeating a coup, much like the coup that occurred in 1953.²⁵

Already, in February 1979, Iranian students seized the American Embassy in Tehran for several days. The Carter Administration reiterated to the Iranian government that it needed to stick to its obligations and coerce the students to let go of the embassy.²⁶ During this takeover in February, Khomeini told the students to stand down from taking over a foreign building.²⁷

That same year, a similar occurrence took place on November 4, but it resulted in a different outcome. The Carter Administration believed Khomeini would order the students to stand down like the February attack, but Khomeini did the opposite.²⁸ Both the cleric and his son condoned the students for overtaking the embassy.²⁹ This was a brazen, unprecedented move by a government, as embassies are viewed as being a part of another country. To attack an embassy amounts to attacking a country as a whole. Though the students were eventually convinced to release some hostages, mostly women and black men, they still kept 52 hostages for 444 days. According to Michael M. Gunter, the seizure of the embassy and the taking of hostages violated two principles of the international law of diplomacy created by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.³⁰ These principles are "the immunity of diplomatic personnel from local arrest, detention, or trial, and the inviolability of embassy premises."³¹

The February takeover of the U.S. Embassy was a difficult time, but for the most part, the two countries came out of the takeover unscathed. This was not true for the November 1979 takeover of the American Embassy. After the students raided the embassy, they discovered Americans within the building shredding and burning government documents. Eventually they

²¹ Ibid, 238.

²² Ghods, 195.

²³ Christopher Hemmer, *Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979-1987* (State University of New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 51.

²⁴ Hemmer, 52.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, 40.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, 53.

²⁹ Harold H. Saunders, "Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979-May 1980," in *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of Crisis*, ed. Paul H. Kreisberg (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 72.

³⁰ Michael M. Gunter, "The Iranian Hostages Case: Its Implications for the Future of the International Law of Diplomacy," in *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years*, ed. Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), 191.

³¹ Ibid, 191.

stopped the shredders and locked the hostages away. But they noticed some documents that had not yet been shredded, which held valuable information about U.S. involvement in the 1953 Coup, a CIA-supported coup to instate the Pahlavi Shah back in power instead of the elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. England and the United States enacted the coup in order to quell concerns about oil in Iran and the defensive position against the Soviet Union.³² Already aware of this incident, the Iranian people were distrustful and angry toward the United States.³³ But as the extent of U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup was discovered in these documents, anger grew to a fevered pitch. Naturally, the students figured out the most valuable documents were shredded first, leaving the less important documents for last. Students then went through each shredder and pieced back together every document that had been shredded, which took years to complete. As they found out about the involvement of foreign powers in their government, tensions grew to an all-time high between Iran and the United States. This was the catalyst for change in diplomacy between nations, especially Iran and the United States.

Prior to the 444-day incident, relations between Iran and America were relatively normal, though perhaps a little tense. The United States supported any country's government that was anti-communist, especially during the postwar period and the beginning of the Cold War. At its creation, the Pahlavi regime was anti-communist and supported by the United States, as the Pahlavis called for sweeping reforms that went along with the policies of the Americans, i.e. abolishing religion in the government and daily society. Tensions grew again after Mosaddeq was elected prime minister in 1951, then thrown out of office by a CIA sponsored coup. Following the coup, the United States supported the subsequent regime that ruled over the country. Though the regime was authoritarian, it was anti-communist. These diplomatic relations stalled completely after the Hostage Crisis began.

At the beginning of the Hostage Crisis, the Carter administration sent representatives to Tehran hoping to meet with Khomeini or his close cabinet. Yet anyone Carter sent to speak with Khomeini was seen as an enemy.³⁴ Carter would eventually choose former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Foreign Service Officer William Miller to speak with Khomeini to ask for the safe return of the American hostages.³⁵ But Khomeini ordered that no one in Tehran was to speak with the ambassadors from the United States.³⁶ Foreign Service Officer Miller recalled of communication between Iran and the United States,

We said we were sent by President Carter to discuss all these matters. The response was that they would consult with the Ayatollah and would have an answer in a day or two. The next stage was very frustrating because the Revolutionary Council, we were informed, had been ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini to have no contact with us.

Although the Ayatollah and his cabinet would not speak with the representatives directly, messages from the United States would be relayed through secretaries to the Iranian cabinet.³⁷ Without meetings and only indirect communication, the contact between the two nations was strained.

The United States then moved to the position of not negotiating with the captors until the release of all the hostages.³⁸ The Iranians responded with three demands: a return of the Shah's assets, an end to the American interference in Iran's affairs, and an apology from America for

³² Hunt, 368.

³³ Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 275.

³⁴ Saunders, 74-75.

³⁵ Ibid, 75.

³⁶ Ibid, 76.

³⁷ Ibid, 77.

³⁸ Ibid, 80-81.

previously committed crimes against Iran.³⁹ There was little movement on the demands made by the Iranians.⁴⁰ Eventually, the captors released thirteen women and black hostages back to the United States.⁴¹ The Carter Administration continued to concern itself with the rights and treatment of the hostages during this time, often attempting to go through back channels in order to find out about the welfare of the hostages.⁴² After the refusal to release all hostages, the United States adopted an embargo against Iranian oil, which extended to other American allies as well.⁴³

Diplomacy had never been as tense between the two countries as it was at this point in the Hostage Crisis. The Iranian revolutionaries and Khomeini were unwilling to meet and come to an agreement with the American representatives since the discovery of more documents in the embassy revealing the extent of American involvement in Iranian politics. Fanning anger after these findings, Khomeini dubbed America the “Great Satan.” The intensely political cleric clearly saw American involvement in Iran as an attack on Islam itself.⁴⁴ Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders sent a briefing memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about the contact situation with Khomeini in September of 1979. An excerpt of this memo stated,

We have had no direct contact with the man who remains the strongest political leader in Iran. His hostility towards us is unlikely to abate significantly, although there have been fewer venomous statements against us recently. Clearly, a first meeting could be a bruising affair.⁴⁵

Communication between Iran and the United States was not only difficult, but also a political minefield, as the United States also strove to maintain ties to different groups. Saunders’ memorandum continues about this political minefield.

A meeting with Khomeini will signal our definite acceptance of the revolution and could case somewhat his suspicions of us...On the other hand, we would risk appearing to cave in to a man who hates us and who is strongly deprecated here and by Westernized Iranians. Thus, we would want to be careful not to appear to embrace Khomeini and the clerics at the expense of our secular friends...

The symbolism of a call on Khomeini would not attach to visits to the other religious leaders, but they will not see us until we have seen him. We badly need contacts with...moderate clerics. We want to reassure them of our acceptance of the revolution as their influence may rise in the months ahead.⁴⁶

Rarely in Iran or elsewhere has diplomacy between two nations come to a virtual stand still, as was seen during the 1979 Revolution. Diplomatic principles had been upheld by governments throughout history. Rulers of Ancient Greece recognized their political mistakes after killing representatives from the Persian kingdom, which was resolved after two men from the Grecian

³⁹ Saunders, 75.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 84.

⁴¹ Ibid, 85.

⁴² Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 181.

⁴³ Saunders, 93.

⁴⁴ Farber, 65.

⁴⁵ Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, briefing memorandum of 5 September 1979, *Crisis in US Foreign Policy*, 408.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

kingdom offered their lives in return.⁴⁷ Hugo Grotius, considered to be the father of international law, once stated, “two points with regard to ambassadors which are everywhere recognized as prescribed by the law of nations, first that they be admitted, and then that they be not violated.”⁴⁸ Clearly the treatment of representatives from other countries has been well established throughout time, and is generally understood throughout all nations. This knowledge was lost on the Iranian revolutionaries and Khomeini himself as they refused to release over 50 hostages until America caved to pressure and granted them their demands. A few days after the Hostage Crisis began, Ayatollah Khomeini spoke out about the Hostage Crisis and the discontent with the Pahlavi regime in an unapologetic voice.

The young people of our nation, after long years of oppression and misery, have decided to hold in that nest of spies a few individuals who were spying on our nation and conspiring against it, or rather, against the whole region... We fear neither military action nor economic boycott, for we are the followers of Imams who welcomed martyrdom... we are warriors and strugglers; our young men have fought barehanded against tanks, cannons, and machine guns, so Mr. Carter should not try to intimidate us... As for economic pressure, we are a people accustomed to hunger. We have suffered for about thirty-five or fifty years.⁴⁹

Khomeini's outward defiance in the face of international law and proper hostage conduct was not a normal occurrence, a fact upon which President Carter commented during a press conference on the Hostage Crisis a few days after Khomeini's address. Carter focuses on how Iran had broken not only international law, but also the laws of most religions.

The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world. For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism, for a government actually to support and, in effect, participate in the taking and the holding of hostages is unprecedented in human history. This violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones kidnaping. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones blackmail. There is certainly no religious faith on Earth which condones the sustained abuse of innocent people.⁵⁰

As President Carter mentioned in his speech, there has been nothing like the Hostage Crisis in human history, since it is so unheard of that a government would participate in the kidnaping and blackmail of another country's embassy.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution continues to baffle historians because of its deviation from normal Iranian revolutionary standards. Rarely in history were revolutions largely inspired by religion, and even more unique was the emergence of a religious-based government (a theocracy) following the revolution. This variation from past Iranian revolutions is clear in the role played by the *ulama* in politics. The *ulama* had great power that was deeply rooted in Iranian history; to fail to see their large role in the 1979 Revolution would be impossible. Another way the 1979 Revolution changed the idea of revolutions was the issue of diplomatic relations. It is unusual that a government

⁴⁷ Gunter, 196.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ayatollah Khomeini, address delivered to Monsignor Bugnini, special papal emissary to Iran, 12 November 1979, in *Crisis in US Foreign Policy*, 408-409.

⁵⁰ President Jimmy Carter, "Press Conference Comments," 28 November 1979, in *Crisis in US Foreign Policy*, 409-410.

would support the taking of hostages, and even praise their citizens for taking a foreign embassy. Though many revolutions or governmental disruptions have occurred during Iranian history, the 1979 Revolution was a stand-alone event due to the unprecedented involvement of the religious class and the lack of concern for proper diplomatic proceedings.

The Sounds of World War I: American and British Music on the Battle Front, the Home Fronts, and in the Aftermath of War

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“If peace...only had the music and pageantry of wars,” writer Sophie Kerr once declared, “there'd be no wars.”¹ Indeed, war has inspired great music throughout history. Perhaps peacetime deserves a bit more credit than Kerr affords, but her point is well-taken: in times of war, we have seen the creation of classic symphonies and beloved popular songs. But why? Why in times of great destruction come also these great creations? Music, of course, is powerful. It is emotive and can encourage any number of responses from listeners, depending on the artist's or user's intent. That is why music is so interwoven with war—it can be used in many ways to elicit many reactions. On the home front, it can either promote or protest a nation's involvement in war, and when the battle is done, it helps survivors grieve the fallen and memorialize their experiences.

Music played a particularly significant role for British and American soldiers and citizens in World War I. With the music industry rapidly growing in the early twentieth century, the mass production of sheet music and, to a lesser extent, sound recordings ensured that music became a prevalent part of military and civilian life. On the battle front, music helped shape soldiers' perceptions of their wartime mission by stirring visions of military success and by promoting the idea that troops were spreading democracy, especially over a tyrannical Germany. Music also inspired a negative, dehumanized view of the German enemy by depicting them as barbarians and animals who either needed to be reformed or killed. On the British and American home fronts, music was critical in shaping public opinion of the war. Songs aimed to garner support for the war effort by glorifying service, sacrifice, and patriotism. Songs against the war, on the other hand, focused on peace, the futility of war, and even poked fun at certain government policies. At the end of the war, music became a powerful tool, especially for classical composers, to mourn the dead and give outward expression to the grief caused by such a bloody, devastating war. Studying the music of World War I may not provide body counts or shed any light on military battle plans. By and large, it does little to reveal much about any one specific person, except perhaps the big personalities like songwriters George Cohan or Irving Berlin. But it does reveal the attitudes and values to which people, both in and out of the military, were exposed and how those attitudes and values evolved over the course of the war. Additionally, it reveals the cultural weight that Britain and America put on song as a means of coping with the experience of war in the 1910s.

Historiography and Methodology

The topic of music in World War I has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. Given the current dominance of cultural history (for instance, much has been written about the literature that came out of the war), it is all the more puzzling that music has largely been ignored,

¹ James Charlton, *The Military Quotation Book, Revised for the 21st Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2013), 160.

especially given its power in shaping public opinion of the war. There have been, however, a few notable historians who have tackled the issue. In the 1980s, J. E. Vacha looked at Americans' reactions to German classical music in "When Wagner was Verboten," arguing that tolerance was an immediate casualty of America's entrance into the war, evidenced by cruel treatment of German-American singers and composers, and the dismissal of classical German works for French and Italian ones.²

It was not until the 2010's, likely because of the war's centenary, that historians like Kate Kennedy, John Mullen, and Don Tyler began more fully to address the role of music in the war.

Kennedy, like Vacha, was most interested in the role of classical music. In her 2014 article, "A Music of Grief," Kennedy showed how classical music transformed over the course of the war from works of patriotic spirit to works that mourned loss and destruction. She focused on such English composers as Edward Elgar, Ivor Gurney, Patrick Hadley, and Arthur Bliss, whose symphony *Morning Heroes* grappled with trench warfare.

John Mullen departed from the fascination with classical music and instead looked to popular music and live performance in *The Show Must Go On! Popular Song in Britain during the First World War* (2015). He was less concerned with the creators of music and more interested in the "ordinary people"³ who flocked to music halls, minstrel shows, and pantomime musical comedy shows in an effort "to maintain some continuity with life before the war."⁴ He finds that live shows provided opportunities for working class British citizens to escape the pressures of wartime living, but also to engage in a dialogue about the war, as it was the subject of many popular songs.

Don Tyler also focuses on popular music, though he does briefly consider classical music and the emerging jazz scene that would come to dominate the post-war years of the 1920s. While he has a short section on British musical contributions to the war, Tyler primarily writes from an American perspective and, thus, focuses on American music. He presents hundreds of songs, analyzing some more deeply than others. The real strength of Tyler's book is his incorporation of background information, explaining the songs' origins and providing links (when available) to audio sources.

In my contribution, in addition to consulting works by the above historians, I look at music journals and news articles from 1914 to 1918 to examine what people were saying about music, its purpose, and its future as they were living through the upheaval of war. British and American sheet music from the war years, however, have taken up the bulk of my research. I have tried, when possible, to listen to audio recordings of popular songs and classical compositions, but much of my analysis is based on lyrics, which are much more easily accessible.

To situate this argument about the importance of music in World War I, this study begins with a brief discussion of the growing music industry during the war years, which saw an explosion of sheet music and audio recordings. From there, it moves to the role of music on the war front, looking at how soldiers used it to boost morale and encourage them to battle their enemies. The paper will then move to a discussion of the home front and music's ability to stir up feelings of patriotism, nationalism, and hatred of the enemy on one hand, and how it was used in protest and anti-war movements, on the other. This study concludes with a section on music's continued importance after the war, as it helped civilians and ex-combatants memorialize their experiences and honor the fallen.

² J.E. Vacha, "When Wagner Was Verboten: The Campaign Against German Music in World War I," *New York History*, 64, no. 2 (April 1983): 171-188.

³ John Mullen, *The Show Must Go On! Popular Song in Britain during the First World War* (Dorchester, UK: Henry Ling Limited, 2015), 3.

⁴ Mullen, *The Show Must Go On*, 4.

A Growing Music Industry

As earlier mentioned, music has long been a part of war. In America especially, wartime brought popularity to many songs, from “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” and “Dixie Land” during the Civil War, all the way up to the explosion of folk music protesting the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. But music first became truly ubiquitous during World War I, when the commercial music industry started mass producing songs. The circulation of sheet music for piano and vocals reached people all over the United States and Great Britain. In the United States alone, 35,000 songs were registered for copyright during World War I.⁵ One could easily purchase sheet music to add to their collection at home. Most homes at the time of the war, particularly middle and upper-class homes, had a piano (usually a grand piano in upper-class homes, whereas the upright model was a more affordable option for most people). As radio was still in its infancy, people would gather around the piano to listen to music or sing along.⁶

Access to acoustically recorded music was growing, as well. At least 200 songs were recorded and distributed commercially in the United States by the “big three” firms of Edison, Victor, and Columbia, as well as smaller companies, and in Great Britain by Decca and Gramophone.⁷ These recordings could be bought and taken home to be played on a mechanical playback device, such as a gramophone, Victrola, or phonograph (all playback devices that differed only slightly in design).⁸ With this incredible growth in availability and popularity, music became one of the most prominent features in British and American life.

Music on the Battle Front

Given music's popularity and its increasingly accessible nature, it is not surprising that music followed soldiers to war and played a major role in military life. In a 1916 edition of London's *The Musical Herald*, Captain T. R. Mayne of the 15th Hampshire Regiment wrote about the army's incorporation of music into its activities and, in fact, into its very makeup. “Each battalion,” he informs his readers, “is now equipped with one or more bands, and although more-or-less self-trained, they are nevertheless a credit to their comrades and to the great cause in which they are enlisted.”⁹ While at least one band was standard, the average was three, according to Mayne: a drum and fife, a bugle band, and a brass band. Despite the attention and organization devoted to instrumental music, however, less attention was given to vocal music. Still though, according to Mayne, dedicated individuals formed choirs with fellow soldiers and devotedly spent their leisure time practicing vocal music, which he accredits with “enlivening the spirits of the soldiers.”¹⁰

Indeed, morale-boosting is arguably music's most important contribution on the battle front. A lively inspiring tune could lift the spirits of weary, tired, and homesick troops. Amidst the chaos and destruction of war, singing had strong therapeutic value, releasing soldiers' energies into music, while reminding them why they were fighting and promoting visions of success. For instance, Harry Castling and Harry Carlton's “The Tanks that Broke the Ranks out in Picardy” drew on Allied victories to uplift and encourage British troops. The lyrics imagine British tanks doing the

⁵ John Roger Paas, *America Sings of War: American Sheet Music from World War I* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), ix.

⁶ John Druessedow, “Popular Songs of the Great War: Background and Audio Resources,” *Notes* 65, no. 2 (2008): 366.

⁷ Druessedow, “Popular Songs of the Great War,” 365.

⁸ Druessedow, “Popular Songs of the Great War,” 366-367.

⁹ T. R. Mayne, “War Music in the New Armies,” *The Musical Herald*, 814 (1916), 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

“Caterpillar Crawl” and terrorizing German troops. One verse even sees a tank's claw reach out for a ginger-haired colonel and “[take] him for a joyride ’round Picardy.”¹¹

American troops, too, emphasized victory against the Germans in their songs. Billy Gaston's “I'm All Dressed Up to Kill” celebrates American soldiers' efforts to defeat the “Huns”:

When we're in the thickest of the fray,
Mister Hun will take the count that day.
With the wallop we'll be sending
He'll see stars and stripes unending...

...I'm all dressed up to kill
A *boche* named Kaiser Bill.
Oh! The things I'm dressed in will be felt,
Especially my cartridge belt.
I'm all dressed up to kill.¹²

In fact, many American popular war songs tell how the American troops will be the ones to “make the Kaiser pay for what he's planned,”¹³ to “smash that Hindenburg line / And cross the River Rhine,”¹⁴ or to “Drop bombs on Germany / Just for the sake of democracy.”¹⁵ In “The Kaiser's Dinner,” American soldiers even threaten to “forcibly feed” Kaiser Wilhelm with “shrapnel salad and cannon seed.”¹⁶ The explicitly violent nature of many of the era's popular songs reflect the brutality of war, which may seem ironic, since their purpose was to boost morale. But the coupling of violence against the German army with the glorification of the homeland, whether Great Britain or the United States, was critical to keeping the troops motivated. These songs, which were often sung in a group, encouraged comradeship among fellow soldiers and helped in the unfortunate, but arguably necessary task of desensitizing the men at war. They encouraged an us versus them mentality, in which the Allied powers would destroy the German military and replace tyranny with liberty.

The war's successful outcome, the music suggested to the soldiers, was in their ability to defeat and conquer the brutish, animalistic Germans. Just as this encouraged soldiers' active participation—reminding them to put in their all when at battle—it also made it easier to fight against an enemy who was less than human. In his 1918 “The Beast of Berlin,” for instance, John Clayton Calhoun repeatedly refers to the German troops as swine, as beasts that need to be hunted, even claiming that, “Of all the animals I ever knew / Of all the beasts within the zoo,” the “Beast of Berlin” is the worst and most dangerous.¹⁷ In singing about these supposedly wild Germans whose own nature, and certainly whose government, could not be trusted, American and British troops felt their own superiority and the desire to showcase it. Music, then, had the power to excite the soldiers—to rile them up, give them a mission, and bring purpose to the horrific violence they witnessed and perpetuated—and it helped feed their desire to defeat Germany.

Music on the Home Front

¹¹ Harry Castling and Harry Carlton, “The Tanks that Broke the Ranks out in Picardy” (Melbourne: Dinsdale's, 1916), accessed October 15, 2017, nla.gov.au/nla.mus-an5445360.

¹² Billy Gaston, “I'm All Dressed Up to Kill,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 202.

¹³ Walt J. Jansen and Will P. Jansen, “We'll All Make Billy Pay the Bill He Owes,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 240.

¹⁴ E. Clinton Keithley, “On the Sidewalks of Berlin,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 236.

¹⁵ George C. Cohn and Walter Smith, “Keep Them Dropping,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 229.

¹⁶ C. Guy Wakefield and H. B. Murtagh, “The Kaiser's Dinner,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 234.

¹⁷ John Clayton Calhoun, “The Beast of Berlin (We're Going to Get Him),” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 225.

Music was every bit as, if not more, important on the home front than it was on the battle front. British and American civilians engaged with the war effort in many ways, not the least of which was through singing and listening to music. Popular songs were used in both protest and support of the war. For Britain, support came early, but anti-war sentiment came almost as quickly. In America, on the other hand, popular music mostly followed President Wilson's evolving stance on American involvement, from encouraging neutrality to active engagement on the side of the Allies. In either case, whether pro-war or anti-war, music had the potential in both nations to significantly influence public opinion.

When Great Britain joined the war in August 1914, government and military officials found it necessary not only to garner public approval of the war, but to begin recruiting the nation's men into the fight. Consequently, British songs from the early stages of the war glorify military service and the sacrifices made by those at home. Paul Rubens' "Your King and Country Want You," for instance, calls men to service with promises of love and devotion from their countrymen, by appealing to a sense of tradition and history. "Come and join the forces/as your fathers did before."¹⁸ Charles Collins and Fred Leigh's "Now You've Got Yer Khaki On," certainly bawdier than Rubens' tune, tempts men to join the army by associating military service with sexual appeal. Sung from the perspective of a once-allusive young woman, she is no longer able to resist the new army recruit. "Now, I do feel so proud of you, I do honor bright/I'm going to give you an extra cuddle tonight,"¹⁹ she assures him when he shows up in his khaki uniform.

The promise of girls and glory could not keep spirits up on the British home front, however, and they quickly faded as the war's body count grew. The First Battle of Ypres in the late autumn of 1914 left 7,960 soldiers dead and 29,562 wounded, and British civilians were already becoming disillusioned with the war.²⁰ The rapid decline of wartime fervor affected popular music. John Mullen notes that the Francies & Day publication of 1915's greatest hits featured not one single recruitment song, a drastic change from 1914. Songs started to take on a more critical perspective, if not always of the war itself, then certainly of wartime policies. As Parliament debated the conscription bill in 1916, "Conscription on the Brain" became a favorite song among music-hall audiences.

Asquith take back your bill
It really makes us ill
For we are all real volunteers today, sir
We are our good king's own
In flesh and blood and bone
And we're going to wipe out the blessed Kaiser²¹

Though this song is relatively tame and clearly demonstrates a still-present dedication to defeating Germany, another music hall favorite, Ernest Hastings "The Military Representative," is harsher. Using comedy to criticize conscription, the song tells of a 91-year-old, dead man who is refused exemption from being conscripted. A tribunal talking to the man's widow tells her:

¹⁸ Paul Rubens, "Your King and Country Want You," (London: Chappell Music, 1914), accessed October 23, 2017, <http://firstworldwar.com/audio/yourkingandcountrywantyou.htm>.

¹⁹ Charles Collins and Fred Leigh, "Now You've Got Yer Khaki On," (1915), accessed October 24, 2017, <https://monologues.co.uk/musichall/Songs-N/Now-Youve-Got-Khaki.htm>.

²⁰ Mullen, *The Show Must Go On!*, 159.

²¹ Mullen, *The Show Must Go On!*, 167.

What say, ma'am, he's in heaven now?
Well you just let him know
I'm sending a Sergeant to fetch him back
For of course he's got to go!²²

As Britons went from using music to praise the war effort and promote recruitment to using it to criticize the government and show their disillusionment, Americans went through an opposite trajectory. Popular American music from 1914-1918 reveals that attitudes toward the war moved largely from condescension to enthusiasm. When Europe went to war in 1914, Americans held firm on their decision not to get involved. Peace and self-control became common themes in popular songs, and lyricists often contrasted a civilized United States with a brutal, excitable Europe. W. R. Williams, for example, was inspired to write "We Stand for Peace While Others War" after President Wilson appealed to the nation "to remain neutral in thought and deed."²³ In his call for nonviolent arbitration, Williams admonishes Europe for setting progress back a thousand years before warning that:

There's nothing worth the toll of life,
Before or since the flood:
Is so-called "honor" worth the price,
When rivers flow with blood?²⁴

Questioning the civility, even the humanity, of the European aggressors is typical of these early songs. Famed composer Irving Berlin paints the belligerents as worse than the devil in 1914's "Stay Down Here Where You Belong." In that song, the devil's son complains that hell is too hot, and he wants to go up on earth to "have a little fun."²⁵ But the devil advises him to

Stay down here where you belong
The folks who live above don't know right from wrong
To please their kings, they've all gone out to war
And not a one of them knows what he's fighting for...

Kings up there, they don't care
For the mothers who must stay home,
Their sorrows to bear.
Stay at home, don't you roam.
Although it's warm down below; you'll find it's warmer up there.²⁶

Berlin clearly aimed for humor, but the message was clear: the war in Europe is hell on earth. It is a scene of chaos and confusion, where leaders lack compassion, and the people must suffer for reasons they do not even understand. America, like the devil's son, must stay out of the conflict.

Motherhood, as demonstrated in Berlin's song, is a recurring feature of anti-war and protest music. Indeed, what could be more powerful than the image of a heartbroken, war-weary mother? Songs like Will Dillon's "Don't Take My Darling Boy Away," and Louise Small's "Lay Down Your

²² Mullen, *The Show Must Go On!*, 168.

²³ Paas, *America Sings of War*, 4.

²⁴ W. R. Williams, "We Stand for Peace While Others War," in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 4.

²⁵ Irving Berlin, "Stay Down Here Where You Belong," in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 8.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Arms” very explicitly play on maternal emotions, featuring weeping mothers who have been forced to give their sons to the war. Another favorite, Alfred Bryan and Al Piantadosi’s “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier” (see Figure 1), was in the top 20 of American favorites during most of 1915, even reaching the number one spot in March and April of that year.²⁷ The mother featured in this song mourns a son she has lost in battle, but she thinks not only of her dead child, but also of other grieving mothers, even in the enemy nations. She asks, “Who dares to place a musket on his shoulder/To shoot some other mother’s darling boy?”²⁸ As a mourning mother, she is depicted as being able to see the common humanity, even among supposed enemies. Bryan, the song’s lyricist, uses this notion of maternal compassion to draw attention to the hollowness of any perceived success that victory might bring:

What victory can cheer a mother’s heart,
 When she looks at her blighted home?
 What victory can bring her back
 All she cared to call her own?
 Let each mother answer
 In the years to be,
 “Remember that my boy belongs to me!”²⁹

In addition to portraying the futility of war, the song’s lyrics offered a powerful message to mothers that their voice could help prevent future wars. Women, such lyrics affirmed, could use their status as mothers to speak out against the violence and destruction of war.

Tragically, they could not prevent America from entering the war. By 1917, lyricists had begun writing songs with noticeably different perceptions of the ongoing conflict in Europe. Rather than speaking generally of Europeans as uncivilized for resorting to combat instead of diplomatic negotiations, newer songs abandoned Wilson’s call for neutrality in thought and deed and more clearly demonstrated Americans’ Allied bias. For instance, Daisy Theresa Meyer’s “We Hail from the U.S.A.” imagines:

When the Hohenzollerns meet the fate
 Of Romanoff of Russia
 We’ll shout “Hurrah” and say “Amen”
 To the government of Prussia.³⁰

Moreover, America’s revolutionary spirit guided growing acceptance of the war, as seen in Herbert Moore and W. R. Williams’ “America To-Day,” which applauds past heroes like




Figure 1 – The sheet music for Bryan and Piantadosi’s hit song “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier” describes the song as “a mother’s plea for peace” and features the image of a mother cradling her grown son as visions of warfare loom overhead. Image taken from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2002600251>.

²⁷ Paas, *American Sings of War*, 18.

²⁸ Alfred Bryan and Al Piantadosi, “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier.” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 18.

²⁹ Alfred Bryan and Al Piantadosi, “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier.”

³⁰ Daisy Theresa Meyer, “We Hail from the U.S.A.,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 95.

Washington and assures the world that the “mem’ry of the Revolution”³¹ remains a strong force in American life. Mary Earl’s “We Hear You Calling” (shown in Figure 2) celebrates the Marquis de Lafayette and makes the following promise:

Lafayette, we hear you calling,
 Lafayette, ‘tis not in vain
 That the tears of France are falling.
 We will help her to smile again,

For a friend in need is a friend indeed.
 Do not think we shall ever forget.
 Lafayette, we hear you calling
 And we’re coming, Lafayette.³²

Evoking the French hero of the American Revolution, Earl’s song drummed up support for the war by creating images of a glorious past. But her song also reminded the country of its unpaid debt to France. Americans could justify their changed attitude toward the war by claiming that providing aid to France in the Great War was America’s first step in honoring French aid during the American Revolution.



Mary Earl’s “Lafayette (We Hear You Calling)” pays tribute to the Revolutionary hero and promises to repay America’s debt to France. Images taken from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2013562255>.

Americans and Britons both used popular music to demonstrate patriotism, but they did so with classical music as well. Germany has had a long history of accomplished classical composers,

³¹ Herbert Moore and W. R. Williams, “America To-Day,” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 92.

³² Mary Earl, “Lafayette (We Hear You Calling),” in *America Sings of War*, ed. Paas, 160.

which became problematic for the Allies in the war, since classical music remained a common genre to listen to and enjoy. Extreme anti-German sentiment often overrode appreciation of the music, though. In November 1917, the New York Metropolitan Opera Company, under instruction from its Board of Directors, canceled almost one-third of its upcoming season's repertoire.³³ All German-language productions were removed from the schedule, including Beethoven's *Fidelio* and nine works by Wagner. Italian and French operas replaced the German compositions for the Met to continue its fall season. Reaction to the Met's decision was at first mixed, notes J. E. Vacha. But ultimately, "emotion was in ascendant over reason,"³⁴ as American opera-goers cemented their hatred of the enemy and his culture.

Throughout the war, American and British musicians took to music reviews and journals to ponder what such vitriol toward German culture would mean for the future of music. Again, they had mixed feelings. Some, like Walter Spalding, felt that abandoning such a heavy reliance on German compositions could only benefit America, a nation whose music had suffered from the "dwarfing influence" of Europe.³⁵ At last American composers, he felt, would have the opportunity to cultivate their own style of music that would express the ideas and characteristics of the United States. Others, like English music critic Ernest Newman, worried about the anti-German attitude. He explained that, politics aside, Germany had given much of their genius to humanity. "How," he asked, "can we contemplate without alarm and regret a possible set-back to the culture that, be its faults what it may, has given us Wagner and Brahms, and Strauss, and Hugo Wolf?"³⁶ Unfortunately for Newman and those who hoped music could transcend the politics of war, music, as has been shown, remained instrumental in promoting patriotism, nationalism, and explicitly anti-German feelings.

The Aftermath of War: Music and Mourning

When an armistice was declared in November 1918, military operations ended and the war officially drew to a close. But the world was only beginning to face the high death tolls and the terrible devastation left in its wake. Those who saw battle or lost loved ones to the war sought solace in music. Song became a tool for making sense of and expressing the war's horrors and grieving the dead. In "A Music of Grief," historian Kate Kennedy points out that post-war classical music "emerged contemporaneously with the far more widely known war testimonies and novels of the 1920s and 1930s."³⁷ As she indicates, much of this classical music did not reach as wide an audience as the literature that came out of the war and, consequently, has been largely obscured in the historiography of World War I. Yet, compositions by musicians like Ralph Vaughn Williams, Arthur Bliss, and John Foulds are important records of the war experience.

British composer Ralph Vaughn Williams, who had served in the Royal Army Medical Corps, wrote his *Pastoral Symphony* in response to the sights and sounds he had experienced while in service. Of the composition, Vaughn Williams explained, "It's really wartime music—a great deal of it incubated when I used to go up night after night in the ambulance wagon at Ecoivres."³⁸ Indeed, it was not uncommon for composers to incorporate sounds into their music that attempted to reflect the sound of bombs, aircraft, and general chaos. As Tyler rightly notes, "Music about the war was

³³ Vacha, "When Wagner was Verboten," 175.

³⁴ Vacha, "When Wagner was Verboten," 175.

³⁵ Walter R. Spalding, "The War in Its Relation to American Music," *The Musical Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (1918): 3.

³⁶ Ernest Newman, "The War and the Future of Music," *The Musical Times, 1904-1995*, 55 (2014): 571.

³⁷ Kate Kennedy, "A Music of Grief: Classical Music and the First World War," *International Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2014): 380.

³⁸ Ralph Vaughan Williams quoted in Tyler, *Music of the First World War*, 225.

disturbing, unstructured, and sometimes frightening.”³⁹ No one can know for certain what battle is like unless they have gone through it. But in sharing their experiences through song, musicians could at least give civilians a sense of what it was like.

Other composers used their talent to mourn. John Foulds wrote his *World Requiem* for the Royal Albert Hall’s 1923 armistice celebrations.⁴⁰ In its effort to honor the dead, Foulds’ composition utilized 20 texts, religious and philosophical, from all around the world and required an astonishing 1,200 performers. Arthur Bliss’s *Morning Heroes* was much less cumbersome, but no less emotional. Bliss dedicated his symphony to his brother, who had died in the war. The work’s impactful final movement, Kennedy mentions, is meant to symbolize dawn.⁴¹ The notion, of course, is that after the blackness—the night—of the war years, morning had finally come, but at the expense of the hundreds of thousands of young men who gave their lives in service to their countries.

Conclusion

Given the scope of World War I, perhaps it should not be entirely surprising that music has been largely sidelined for more immediately obvious approaches to analyzing the war. And yet, it *is* surprising. As Kennedy noted, war-themed novels and poetry from the years of and immediately following the war have been extensively studied and their popularity well documented. Music—classical and especially popular—offers insights as rich into the cultural and social dynamics of nations at war as literature. Fortunately, this is becoming more evident as historians like Don Tyler, John Mullen, and Kate Kennedy have worked to shed light on the significance of wartime music.

This brief study contributes to the discussion by focusing on battlefield and home front music of Great Britain and the United States, as well as post-war classical compositions. On the battle front, British and American soldiers used popular music to keep their spirits up, cement their dedication to democratic ideals and the spreading of liberty, and to demonize and dehumanize their German enemies. Music was also used to shape perceptions of the enemy on the home fronts through lyrics that portrayed them as uncivilized aggressors. Additionally, on the home fronts, music encouraged enlistment into the army and sacrifice by family and loved ones for the greater good of the nation. However, music was also a tool with which to express criticism and grievances, particularly in the U.S. before 1916 and in Great Britain after 1914. Popular music from 1914-1918 reveals the different values and attitudes people were exposed to regarding the war and is, therefore, valuable source material. Classical music, too, must have its place in the historiography, as many compositions were written by men who had experienced the war firsthand and used their music to express what they had seen and the loss they had felt. Their music became tools of mourning for the war’s survivors and should not be ignored.

There is still much to be said about the place of music in World War I. The field is expanding in this area, but there is plenty of room to fill before we get a complete and fully comprehensive understanding of how music shaped the war and how the war shaped music. Hopefully the increased interest due to the centenary has not completely passed, and historians will continue to study this important topic.

³⁹ Tyler, *Music of the First World War*, 224.

⁴⁰ Kennedy, “A Music of Grief,” 383.

⁴¹ Kennedy, “A Music of Grief,” 383.

How Foolish Decisions by the United States Led to the Berlin Airlift and How Prudent Ones Turned the Situation to Their Advantage

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Introduction

“Today is the day when the people of Berlin raise their voices. [...] You people of the world! You people in America and England, France and Italy! Look at this city and realize that you mustn’t abandon this people, can’t abandon them!”¹ West Berlin Mayor Ernst Reuter was concerned. When he gave that speech on September 9, 1948, the roads from the western territories of Germany to Berlin had been blocked for almost three months by the Soviet Union. No truck could supply the inhabitants of the Western part of the old capitol of Germany with food and coal.² How could it come that far? The Soviet Union took a drastic step when it cut off access to the city, but in any conflict usually more than one party is responsible: this situation was no exception. After 1945 the Americans made some foolish decisions that led directly to the Berlin crisis, which otherwise maybe could have been prevented. Later they prudently were able to turn the situation around with the Berlin Airlift. The Berlin people survived and the western sectors did not fall into the hands of the Soviets, because of smart strategy. During 1948 and 1949 the United States managed to change a bad initial situation, which it partially caused, to their advantage and thereby win the first “battle” in the Cold War.

Rising Tensions

Shortly after World War II, tensions between the victorious nations grew. After its capitulation, Germany had been divided into four occupation zones, each held by one of the “Siegermächte.” The western territories were occupied by the British and the United States, while the Soviet Union was responsible for eastern Germany. Eventually, France would also get a zone in the West. Those agreements had been made in a series of conferences, most importantly the ones in Yalta, which had been held between Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin; then later at Potsdam, between Harry S. Truman, Stalin, Churchill, and Clement Atlee (who succeeded Churchill). Directly after the war, Berlin was controlled by the Russians, but the Allies agreed on splitting up the capitol among themselves, even though the city was over 100 miles deep in Soviet occupied territory. In July and August 1945, the western Allies started occupying their sectors. An agreement the Soviets pushed through was that each part of Berlin should be supplied by its respective allied occupant. The agreement caused problems for the Americans, British and French, as they had to transport food and other essential goods into their zones, a problem the Soviets did not have. They could provide their sector with the products from the surrounding agricultural Brandenburg, which they had effectively cut off from the other Allies.³ After the Yalta

¹ Christain Härtel, *Berlin: A Short History* (Berlin: Be.Bra Verlag, 2016), 56.

² Ibid.

³ Roger G. Miller, *To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift 1948-1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 1-3.

conference, the relationship between the Soviet and the western states deteriorated. The United States tried to contain the communist expansion and the USSR boycotted the Marshall Plan. In 1947 the eastern powers claimed that the Allies were violating the Potsdam agreement, while the Westerners built up a separate, more and more independent capitalist West-Germany (or bizonia, a combination of the British and U.S. zones, later joined by the French zone). The permanent splitting of Germany became apparent, which caused the Soviets to claim that Berlin could no longer be the capitol of the entire country.⁴

Start of the Blockade

The looming crisis manifested itself in 1948. Negotiations concerning a joint currency between the western Allies and the USSR had failed, and the Soviet representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council.⁵ The Westerners decided to create a new currency and announced it on June 18th, 1948.⁶ Two days later, the Deutsche Mark was introduced in West-Germany, but not in Berlin.⁷ Especially, economic advisor (and later chancellor) Ludwig Erhard advocated the abolition of the Reichsmark and the switch to the Deutsche Mark, which should help the struggling German economy and counter inflation. The introduction of a new currency without having made an agreement with the Soviets before, was one of the foolish decisions made by the Americans, as the reform played a huge role in the emergence of the Berlin Blockade. The consequences of that move could and should have been predicted. The old Reichsmark became worthless in the western zones, if not traded for new Deutsche Mark, which could have caused a flood of the depreciating currency into the eastern zone.⁸ As a counter, the Soviets then announced its own currency, the Ostmark, on June 22.⁹ To stop Reichsmark from flooding into their territories, the Soviets halted all traffic from West-Germany into the whole of Berlin.¹⁰ On that exact day, the blockade of the city by the Soviets began.¹¹ For experts in national economics, this effect could not have been completely surprising, therefore it was either a foolish decision or a high risk. To be fair though, even if the circumstances suggested it, financial reasons were secondary for the forced segregation of the city. It was rather a struggle for the upper hand in Berlin and consequently, Germany. Ernst Reuter, former mayor of West Berlin, summed up the situation by saying that the one who controls the currency gains power over the territory. Even though Berlin was not of strategic importance, the symbolism it conveyed was not to be underestimated.¹² The currency reform may not have been the most important reason for the blockade, but it certainly was the flash point.

After the Soviets had made their move by stopping every ground traffic from the west to the city, the United States had to decide how to handle the situation. Berlin was cut off from supplies—the situation was critical. The decision lay with U.S. President Harry Truman and his administration. In the end, they were thinking of the bigger picture, which encouraged prudence. They knew that

⁴ History.com Staff, “Berlin Blockade,” <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/berlin-blockade>, accessed December 2, 2017.

⁵ Härtel, *Berlin*, 55f.

⁶ Andrei Cherny, *The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America's Finest Hour* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2008), 235.

⁷ Miller, *To Save A City*, 18.

⁸ Bryan Taylor, “The Currency Reform that Created Two Germanies,” Global Financial Data, <http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gfdblog/?p=3142>, accessed December 2, 2017.

⁹ Miller, *To Save A City*, 18f.

¹⁰ Taylor, “The Currency Reform that Created Two Germanies.”

¹¹ Härtel, *Berlin*, 56.

¹² “Berlinblockade der Sowjetunion und der Luftbrücke der Westmächte,” Lernhelfer, (last modified 2010), <https://www.lernhelfer.de/schuelerlexikon/geschichte/artikel/berlinblockade-der-sowjetunion-und-luftbruecke-der-westmaechte>.

losing Berlin could mean losing Germany entirely.¹³ In an article, Russian historians Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov evaluated Joseph Stalin's decisions during the time of the blockade. A reunified Germany under Western control was one of his biggest fears, therefore he wanted to increase his control over the country. With the blockade, he went one step too far and overestimated his position, even though the economic situation in the Soviet territories was better than in the western parts after the war. With their party SED and the boycott of the Marshall Plan, the Soviets tried to gain control over Berlin. Stalin distanced himself from a diplomatic solution for a united future of Germany. In 1947, East German communists acceded to Stalin's desire to create a satellite East German regime, which eventually led to the Berlin Blockade.¹⁴

The Missing Agreement

One problem with the blockade was that it was not as illegitimate as it seems. Indeed, the postwar era proved chaotic, and dividing Germany into four parts created grave unforeseen problems. Parting Berlin was even more difficult as it was deep in the Soviet zone. There were a lot of issues that had to be dealt with, like the rebuilding of the city, which was in ruins, and the feeding of its population. There were neither gas nor electricity, and water supply was far from dependable. Bridges had been destroyed. There were not enough hospital beds. The population of Berlin struggled simply to survive in the aftermath of World War II.¹⁵ What had foolishly been forgotten was to issue a formal agreement that assured the western Allies overland access to their territories. It had simply been assumed that the western forces would be given access, and no one in power expected a conflict with the Soviet Union that would make an explicit agreement necessary. This was naivety on a big scale. The fact that a formal treaty was missing gave power to the Soviets, who could now claim that access to the city was not the right of the western parties, but more granted out of Soviet courtesy. It also meant the occupiers of East Germany could withdraw that favor, which they eventually did.¹⁶ What seemed like a matter of course, turned out to be essential.

What Now?

When the United States decided to counter the blockade, the option of a military intervention was on the table. The leadership made a prescient decision by not taking that step after analyzing the situation. The commander of the American military forces in Germany understood that the blockade did not only put the people in Berlin into a bad situation materially, but also forced the inhabitants into accepting Soviet authority over the city. A military solution was a possibility, but finally President Truman decided prudently, that the risk was too high.¹⁷ He and his administration had to keep in mind that any action might cause retaliation and could start a war. On April 2, 1948, the CIA published an investigation about the situation in which it concluded that the USSR would probably not take military action during 1948, but the investigation also included a warning that if the Kremlin saw any move by the United States as an indication or intention to attack the USSR or

¹³ History.com Staff, "Berlin Blockade."

¹⁴ Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, "Stalin's Inexorable Aggression," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, 4th ed., eds. Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 285 - 295.

¹⁵ Härtel, *Berlin*, 54.

¹⁶ Miller, *To Save A City*, 1 - 3.

¹⁷ Robert P. Gratwol and Donita M. Moorhus, *American Forces in Berlin: Cold War Outpost* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), 31.

its satellites, it would probably respond militarily.¹⁸ The same conclusion was drawn later in another investigation about the same topic.¹⁹ If Truman really had decided to fight for Berlin, the USSR would have defended it, according to the investigation, and therefore would have started a war. Another way had to be found.

The Airlift

Supporting Berlin over the roads or the ground in general was hardly possible without breaking the blockade violently. The Soviets did not even break a formal agreement, so, in a sense, military action would have made an attack more legitimate, due to the fact that no agreement had been made regulating the overland way to the city. Luckily, another treaty had been signed three years before. There were three air corridors from West-Germany to West-Berlin that had been warranted by the Soviets in 1945 and 1946. The fact that airways had been secured shows prudence on the one hand, but proves foolishness on the other, because it meant that routes of transportation had been an issue and had been discussed. Surprisingly, the importance of the roads had just been completely underestimated. The air corridors were Frankfurt-Berlin, Bückeburg-Berlin and Hamburg-Berlin, and they were 20 English miles wide. Additionally, the Berlin Control Zone had been established, which was a free flight zone in a radius of 20 miles around the Allied Control Authority Building in the capitol.²⁰ The existence of the corridors opened a legal path to Berlin, which did not require military engagement.

To understand the thought process of the American representatives, the memoirs of President Truman give great insight. After the Russians recognized that the Marshall Plan worked, he wrote, they decided to cap off their territories completely from the western ones. As a response, the western forces started building up and restoring their assigned territories on their own, without the involvement of the Soviets. At that point, it became obvious that the reunification of Germany was unlikely. During 1947, Truman received reports that the German economy was nearing collapse, and that the Americans had to put more effort into its restoration. A healthy Germany was essential for the European economy and so measures to encourage this development had been included in the Marshall Plan. Concerning the Russians, Truman claims their walkout of the Allied Control Council was nothing that came as a surprise. For Germany it meant that the “four-power control machinery had become unworkable.” What would cause a problem for Germany would cause a major crisis in Berlin. Truman of course has the American view on the issue: the president complained that the currency the Soviets introduced only increased inflation and that the Russians purposely tried to manipulate the German economy. For the president, the currency reform was pivotal for the beginning of the blockade. Yet, to Truman, the real intentions of the Soviets were to get the western forces out of Berlin. The blockade was actually a fight for power over Germany and Europe.²¹ A written agreement over access to the city, Truman reasoned, would have made only little difference, because the symbolic importance of Berlin was too high and the whole struggle was not about legal agreements:

¹⁸ “Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948,” April 2, 1948, in *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence, War in Berlin, 1946-1961*, ed. Donald P. Steury (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 142 - 146.

¹⁹ Ibid, 149 - 152.

²⁰ “Flight Rules by Allied Control Authority Air Directorate for Aircraft Flying in Air Corridors in Germany and Berlin Control Zone,” October 22, 1946, in *Notes on Berlin 1943-1963*, eds. Wolfgang Heidemeyer and Günther Hindrichs. (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1963), 39f.

²¹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 120 - 123.

The Kremlin had chosen perhaps the most sensitive objective in Europe - Berlin, the old capital of Germany, which was and is a symbol to the Germans. If we fail to maintain our position there, Communism would gain great strength among the Germans. [...] If we wished to remain there, we would have to make a show of strength. [...] Russia might deliberately choose to make Berlin the pretext for war[.]²²

The blockade created a huge threat for the future of Europe, he concluded. Even though Truman's memoirs in some ways sound like excuses for not trying to establish a better relationship with the Russians and justify why the United States accepted the portioning of Germany, his argument is comprehensible and also accords with the evaluation of Stalin's aggression by Zubok and Pleshakov.

The introduction of a new currency and the missing agreement on access to Berlin were still of foolish nature. But after the blockade had already started, American prudence took over. Truman's reaction on the crisis was as simple as it was brilliant and its impact was tremendous. Until a diplomatic solution had been found, an "airlift" would be installed. The installment was one of the most prudent moves the Americans made in all of the Cold War. All their available planes in Europe should use the air corridors to bring supplies to the isolated city. Advisors had convinced Truman that the people in Berlin were absolutely indignant regarding Soviet control, which gave the Americans the backing they needed for solving the crisis, even though the airlift supplied only up to 2,500 tons per day, when actually about 4,500 were needed. Still, the clever organization of the flights made it possible for the population of the city to survive until the blockade had been opened.²³ To be fair, although the United States started the airlift, they were not the only ones to participate in it. While the French built up infrastructure to make the landing and taking-off of so many planes possible, the British RAF also sent their planes with supplies to aid in the mission.²⁴

The German Perspective

"It tasted like barbwire, but we were happy to have it," recalls Ulrich Krischbaum, a habitant in Berlin, who was six years old when the airlift began. "Before the blockade we had nothing and when it began even less." Proof of the prudence of the decision for the U.S. airlift is how it was perceived in Germany, and how it led to a better relationship between the two peoples. The situation in Berlin was precarious, but the people survived and were thankful.²⁵ To this day, the events of that time are in the memory of the German people. Growing up in Bavaria, I remember learning about the "Rosinenbomber" in my history class in high school. When the blockade ended in May 1949, 2.3 million tons of supplies had been transported in over 277,000 flights. The effort of the pilots did not only help the population to survive, it also created a "new atmosphere of friendship between the defeated and the victors," as Christian Härtel describes it in his book, *Berlin, A Short History*.²⁶ What made the operation more than just the provision of essential goods, were the pilots' efforts to put smiles on the faces of German children. The first of them was Lieutenant Gail S. Halvorson, who became known as "Der Schokoladen-flieger" (German for "the chocolate pilot"). When he was on one of his trips to the city, he noticed children at the airport. He started speaking to them and promised to come back with candy. Soon parachutes started dropping from his airplane holding chocolate bars and other sweets. His supervisors heard about what Halvorson did, but

²² Ibid, 123f.

²³ Ibid, 123 - 126.

²⁴ Härtel, *Berlin*, 56f.

²⁵ Lydia Leipert, "Alle Wollten Schokolade - und Ich War Zu Klein," *Spiegel* Online, June 24, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/berliner-luftbruecke-a-949342.html>.

²⁶ Härtel, *Berlin*, 57.

instead of stopping him, they liked the effort and soon more planes started dropping candy over the joyfully waiting children. The “Rosinenbomber” were born. Kirschbaum, the six year old boy from Berlin, had also heard that a pilot named Halvorson was dropping nice things over the city. He was too small to fight for one of those little boxes against the other children, but later he was invited to a Christmas party on an American base. Until today he remembers that while he ate cookies and milk, he did not feel like a defeated enemy, but felt that the Americans wanted to help him. With their kindness and helpfulness the U.S. soldiers formed a strong bond with the West-Berlin population.²⁷ They thanked them by not accepting Soviet authority. When the Russians offered cheap food and oil in exchange for a pledge not to accept supplies from the Americans, only one out of a hundred accepted the bargain.²⁸

Blockade Ends - Airlift Wins

The Americans had helped the population of Berlin through their hardest period since the end of the war until today, but the love of the people was not everything they got from their help. For Joseph Stalin, the airlift was a huge propaganda defeat. He had no option to stop it, apart from shooting planes down and thereby starting World War III. In May 1949 Stalin gave up and lifted the blockade.²⁹ His plan to gain control over all of Germany or at least all of Berlin failed. He wanted to use the population of Berlin as hostages. They were his bargaining chips in negotiations with the Allies. If they did not want to let the West-Berlin people starve, they would have to meet his demands. Because of the airlift, the Allies could negotiate without pressure, as they knew the people were taken care of.³⁰ The most genius aspect of the airlift was probably that Stalin did not have any realistic options to stop it.

Evaluation

The historian Melvyn Leffler elaborated in an article on how the American leaders showed prudence during the Berlin Blockade, because they understood that it was important to keep western Europe out of the Soviet’s grasp. Leffler claims that it was wise that Truman decided not to abandon Berlin and he called the steps they took to help keep the people in Berlin alive as a wise calculated risk.³¹ I can only agree with that, although foolish decisions by the United States partially caused the blockade in the first place. The Americans showed fair and sophisticated behavior in victory, whereas the Soviet Union tried to exploit their power over the defeated nation.

Still, the outcome was not all positive. The blockade may have ended and the United States won the first “battle” of the Cold War, but the conflict between East and West had hardened. In the west, the Federal Republic of Germany had been founded, while the Soviet Union created a state on its own, the German Democratic Republic.³² The division remained until many years later on October 3, 1990, when the country was finally reunited. The Berlin people were thankful for the help in their time of need, but in the next years the German population grew more and more independent. In 1963 John F. Kennedy may have been “ein Berliner,” which caused over 300,000

²⁷ Leipert, “Alle Wollten Schokolade.”

²⁸ Gratwol and Moorhus, *American Forces in Berlin*, 48.

²⁹ John Preston, “How the ‘bonkers’ Berlin Airlift Beat Stalin: British and American Troops Defied the Odds and Came to the Rescue of the Desperate Berliners,” *DailyMail.com*, October 19, 2017, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/books/article-4998448/How-bonkers-Berlin-Airlift-beat-Stalin.html>.

³⁰ Miller, *To Save A City*, 104.

³¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, “With a Preponderance of Power: America’s Wise, Prudent, and Foolish Leaders,” In *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, 303.

³² Gratwol and Moorhus, *American Forces in Berlin*, 54.

people to cheer him, but that did not mean that the German people would go along with every step the U.S. would take.³³ As soon as the United States engaged in the conflict in Vietnam, protesting voices got louder and louder in the aspiring European nation. Especially students took a stand against the war and condemned the policy of the U.S. administration, by going into the streets, expressing their protest. Still, the cultural influence of the Americans on the Germans was huge and is to this day.³⁴ The Berlin Airlift was a pivotal, prudent move by the U.S. government and prevented Berlin from falling into the hands of the communists. By not using any form of military violence in the conflict, President Truman and his advisors chose the ideal way to deal with a situation that could also have led to war. After having made mistakes, they managed to turn a bad situation to their advantage, into the first win in the Cold War.

³³ Härtel, *Berlin*, 65.

³⁴ Thomas Adam and Will Kaufmann, eds., *Germany and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History* (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2005), 1099.

The Road to the Seneca Falls Convention

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America in the 1800's was a thriving place and time for women's activism. Antebellum women began to speak up about what they felt they deserved. Women intensely debated issues such as slavery, rights, education, and equality. Many women abolitionists believed they should be entitled to the same rights as men. As the abolitionist and the women's rights movements began to progress in the 1820-1830's, women realized they were under a form of discrimination based on sex, and they mobilized to challenge this system. The main goal of women activists was to have their voice heard, to be taken seriously. They increasingly demanded to be seen as equals. The women's suffrage movement was a fight to publicly educate people about the inequality of women. During the nineteenth century, women were unable to vote. They found this unfair since they were important citizens who made contributions. Activists fought vigorously for their rights for years, determined to become equal parts of society. Through inspirational women, hope and protests, women managed to make a statement in America for their rights.

The Challenge: Home, Work, and Education

Irritated and tired of being the "weaker" gender, women learned to start standing up for themselves. Society expected women to be delicate, full of poise, and devoted as wives/mothers. From a legal standpoint, women in antebellum America were the property of their fathers and then husbands. People used the word "protected" when explaining a husband's power over his wife, even though, most women would be described as submissive to their spouse. Women did not legally exist outside of their marriage. They faced significant discrimination due to their sex, and they were considered frail, not meant to work other than hold down the house. Often during this time in America, women were only seen as important for doing work around the home.¹ Women learned the hard way that when the United States Constitution said, "All men are created equal," the founding fathers meant males. In 1764, American revolutionary James Otis questioned a women's standing by asking, "Are not women born as free as men? Would it not be infamous to assert that the ladies are all slaves by nature?"² Change came only slowly. The biggest obstacles that women began to challenge were the right to vote, equal wages, and limitations on education.

Women's roles in antebellum America were radically changing. Their roles in society were changing, along with what they were expected to do for the family. Women started to take more control of the household. Some women were single, which meant they alone took care of the house, the business, and the money. In 1836, New York Judge Thomas Hertell proposed to allow women the right to claim property.³ Few supported the bill, but Ernestine Potoski Rose, a Jewish immigrant, launched a petition drive to gain support for the bill. After defeat of the originally proposed bill, Hertell tried again in 1840 after the support of signatures from Rose's petition. The goal would allow

¹ Sally G. McMillen, *Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women's Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press), 24.

² McMillen 13.

³ McMillen 29.

wives to control property; a controversial move because it questioned the meaning of their citizenship. To the government, those who were competent to own property should be given the right to vote. This caused a fuss because according to property rights, under the new law, women would be able to vote and be active members of society. Women believed that if they were capable of owning property and paying taxes to support the government, then they should be able to vote as well. Men began to worry, thinking that they might lose control if their wives were given too much power.

Controversy also swelled around gender and the workforce. Women were not allowed to hold the same jobs as men, yet they still did intense labor. As economic opportunities increased, women left their homes to join the labor pool, this was particularly the case in the Northeast.⁴ Most women worked in the emerging textile industry. Even as workers, women were still treated in a different manner than men. Many women were part of all-female factories that had strict rules governing conduct and work. They were to maintain disciplined behavior and act properly. Factories thought they were “protecting” women this way. Many factory girls loved the opportunity to earn money on their own. Girls felt a sense of pride by being able to help support their families.⁵ Women transitioned back and forth between the two worlds of being a housewife and being a working woman. Even though women worked long hours over machines, they were not paid as much as their male superiors. Many women joined groups to protest the injustice of not being paid enough.

Another widely focused matter was the growing interest in education for women. Since colonial times, education was very limited for women. It was believed that women would not have need for an education since they would be spending all of their time in the house and raising their kids.⁶ The few girls who did receive an education were taught to read and write from home. After the American Revolution, the public began to promote female education. They believed that in order to have their responsibilities and raise their children, women should have a basic education. It was said that if a woman had a higher education then they would be better companions for their husbands.⁷ During the antebellum period in America, schools were separated by sex. Girls were allowed to attend school, but their education was rarely as rigorous as that in male schools. Women were taught female etiquette. They protested that they should receive equal education compared to men. Many believed that it was biologically impossible for women to retain the same knowledge as men. Supposedly a women’s brain could not handle higher education, but that was obviously a misconception as many women were very intelligent. Going into the nineteenth century, women started to have the opportunity to get a higher education. Once women were exposed to being equal to men in education, they pursued equality in other areas.

Stanton’s Stand

An influential abolition woman who did not believe in the separation of spheres was Elizabeth Cady Stanton. She challenged the orthodox views of women as homebodies. She and other strong, brave women began the long journey to the most influential convention in the Women’s Rights Movement in Seneca Falls. Stanton was born November 12, 1815, to Margaret Livingston and Daniel Cady. She grew up in Johnstown, New York. Elizabeth was raised in an old-fashioned home. All young Elizabeth grew up knowing was church, school, and family. Her sister Margaret helped bring out the disobedience in Elizabeth. Elizabeth was always watching her every move. She believed that, “everything we do is sin, and... everything we dislike is commanded by

⁴ McMillen, 30.

⁵ McMillen, 31.

⁶ McMillen, 31.

⁷ McMillen, 32.

God or someone on earth.”⁸ Once she learned that she could have a little fun and not live in constant fear, she rebelled enthusiastically. “Elizabeth believed that the laws, norms, and values that structured men’s and women’s lives in her childhood were unchanging and unchallenged,” noted a biographer. Luckily, she grew up in a bustling town of transition. Johnstown was very industrious and progressive. Manufacturing was the heart of Johnstown. In 1808, the first glove and mitten factory was founded.⁹ With the end of the War of 1812, a new American era was born.

At this time, change was occurring in religion, law, transportation, and structures all throughout bigger states and cities. Although there were physical and idealistic changes to the country, women still faced the usual changes. In 1830, Elizabeth was just fifteen. The common law was still in effect and marriage women were *femme covert*s. The problem Stanton saw was that the non-married women still did not receive many key rights. Women who were not married paid their own taxes and owned their own land, but could not do other things, like vote or serve on a jury. Women were also still restricted from “men’s colleges.”

One day, Stanton’s brother, Eleazar, died suddenly. Elizabeth distinctly remembers her father saying to her, “Oh, my daughter, I wish you were a boy!”¹⁰ After this, she was determined to keep her father happy. The social outcome from this was that she saw how boy’s lives limited the opportunities for girls.

Even as a young girl, Elizabeth began noticing the oppressions of women and believing in the need for social change. Young Elizabeth was very conscious of injustice. With her father serving as a judge, she stayed well aware of matters of the law. Even as a girl, she found marriage restrictions insulting. She was interested in public gatherings and current events. Although she did not agree with marriage constraints and limitations on women, she did not despise men. She envied them. Elizabeth had men as role models. They were strong and independent. She tried to prove to her father (and to herself) that she was, “as good as a boy.”¹¹ She was the top of her class and the only girl in advanced mathematics and languages. One of the big controversies including men and women was the separation of education. Men and women often went to separate schools designated by sex. They were also taught differently, women focusing on what would be helpful around the house, and men learning important tools of the real world. Stanton sought to break that stereotype by learning all that she could. She especially loved debating with men about subjects. Elizabeth started breaking stereotypes as a young woman.

Although Stanton apposed gender norms and separation of sex’s opportunities, she led a fairly “normal” life for a woman in the nineteenth century. She grew up, became a teacher and married. She never planned to teach, but she loved being an instructor. She met her husband, Henry Stanton, through visits to her cousin Gerrit Smith. One thing Elizabeth deemed important was that her maiden name was also kept visible. Henry was also a fellow abolitionist. The two travelled together, attending conferences and engaging in debates. In fact, right after their wedding, the two left for London to attend an Anti-Slavery Conference.¹² They lived comfortably with their three children in Massachusetts. Henry practiced law in Boston which helped them maintain a slightly privileged lifestyle. Sadly, Henry’s health declined in 1847 which led the family to move to Seneca Falls.¹³ Elizabeth saw the change in environment when she moved. She noticed her social decline

⁸ Lori D. Ginzberg, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton: An American Life* (New York: Hill and Wang), 21.

⁹ Ginzberg, 25.

¹⁰ Ginzberg, 18.

¹¹ Ginzberg, 24.

¹² James Newman, *Becoming the Birthplace of Women’s Rights: The Transformation of Seneca Falls* (New York: Business Source Elite, 1992), 1.

¹³ Newman, 1.

and how she fell back into the restrictions of sexes. She knew a change needed to happen, and she wanted Seneca Falls to host a convention to bring that change.

Mott's Lot

Elizabeth Cady Stanton was the driving force of the women's rights movement in Seneca Falls. She spearheaded the Seneca Falls Convention. Although the head woman at the convention, she was not the sole important figure. Three other essential women were Lucretia Mott, Lucy Stone, and Susan B. Anthony. Mott, the eldest organizer of the Seneca Falls Convention, was a Quaker minister who believed in women's equality. She was very confident and determined to improve the lives of women in America. While growing up, Lucretia's mother was the head of the household, as she made all the decisions relating to their house and business.

From her background, Lucretia knew women were powerful and this inspired her path. She believed more and more women would eventually understand their inequality, and she wanted to lead them to justice. She said, "And although woman may not yet be so awakened to the consideration of the subjects as to be sensible of the blessing of entire freedom, she will, I doubt not, as she comes to reflect on the subject more and more, see herself in her true light."¹⁴ Lucy Stone did not attend the convention, but she was still a leading figure of women's rights. Like Lucretia, Lucy grew up watching her mother put in hard work on the family's farm. She saw how much her mother put in labor, yet she did not receive any benefits or rights. Lucy would grow up to earn a college degree and emerge one of the most "spellbinding lecturers of the mid-nineteenth century."¹⁵ Susan B. Anthony was a close friend of Stanton. The two influenced each other greatly. Susan grew up in a family where both parents believed that women were capable of more. Ever since she was a little girl, Susan knew her purpose. Her work began after she noticed she received lower wages than men. One of Lucy Stone's pieces influenced her, and she vowed to never become a piece of property.¹⁶ These four women worked for years to advance women's rights. They made huge impacts on American women in the nineteenth century.

Seneca Falls: Unlikely Place for a Revolution

Seneca Falls, New York was a remote place that had rolling farmland and beautiful sights. It was an unexpected city for such a huge convention. It is located near the Genesee Canal just a few miles from the present-day New York State Thruway.¹⁷ Seneca Falls sits in what we call today the Finger Lakes District of New York. In the nineteenth century, Seneca turned into a booming city once it used the power from waterfalls of the Seneca River. This industrial city was nicknamed "Pumptown" for its manufacturing of water pumps and fire engines.¹⁸ It was not home to colleges nor great writers, but it was full of activity. In the mid-nineteenth century, Seneca began to develop industrially. In 1828, the village was connected to the Erie River with the rising canal system that began with the completion of the Erie Canal. In 1841, the passenger rail service arrived in Seneca Falls. In 1843, a new chapel was built, and it encouraged controversial speakers and gatherings.¹⁹ Unless interested in American History, most people have never heard of Seneca Falls or the intense

¹⁴ Lucretia Mott, *Lucretia Mott: Her Complete Speeches and Sermons* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 227, 232.

¹⁵ McMillen, 40.

¹⁶ McMillen, 47.

¹⁷ McMillen, 35.

¹⁸ Newman, 1.

¹⁹ Newman, 1.

event that was held there. The convention that was held at Seneca Falls changed the ways America viewed and treated women in the mid-nineteenth century.

In 1848, Seneca Falls was going through rapid social and economic changes.²⁰ The small farming center was now becoming technologically advanced. Instead of the old, slow moving canal system, a new railroad system emerged. This made transportation throughout the city and the rest of the state easy and more accessible. New transportation opportunities brought in new kinds of people. Businessmen began settling in Seneca Falls, replacing farmers. They introduced a market economy and began producing and transporting goods. As a result, Seneca Falls began modernizing.²¹ Around the time of the Women's Rights Convention, Seneca Falls was transitioning from being a rural village to a prosperous industrial city. This made Seneca Falls the perfect place to host the convention.

Lucretia Mott, Mary Ann McClintock, Jane Hunt, Martha C. Wright, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were the chief movers and managers of the Seneca Falls Convention.²² They met together and wrote up a schedule with speeches and resolutions to be discussed. The Women's Rights Convention was planned for July 19th and 20th, 1848.²³ The convention was to be held in the new Wesleyan Methodist Chapel. When the 19th of July came, the weather was a hot ninety degrees and the atmosphere was full of pride. The convention was originally exclusive to females, but to their surprise, several men attended. As the crowds gathered to enter the chapel, they found the doors were locked! No one present had a key or knew a way to get in. All the doors were locked and the windows were too high. Thankfully, males present managed to lift someone up to a window so they could get inside and unlock the doors. Now the Women's Rights Convention could commence. Roughly 300 people attended the convention. At the Women's Rights Convention, it was resolved "that all men and *women* are created equal."²⁴

Revolutionary Document

During the convention, the attendees were presented with a declaration proposing rights that should be granted to women. It was titled the "Declaration of Sentiments." It proclaimed the equality of men and women as both deserving the same basic rights. Among those rights were, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."²⁵ The Declaration aimed to improve upon the original Declaration of Independence. Women spoke up about the oversights in the original document and insisted that they should no longer have to suffer from the government's mistakes. The Declaration stated as their "duty" to ask for a new set of regulations for women. Then, the writers raised numerous issues regarding the different ways women were unequally treated compared to men. The Declaration of Sentiment also included resolutions. Not only did these women address obstacles in the way of women, they also proposed specific ways to resolve said matters. There were over a hundred signatures on the declaration, females and males.

At the time of the Women's Rights Convention, no one ever figured it would become such an historic piece of America's puzzle. Although the Seneca Falls Convention was not highly known at the time, it later became a staple in women's rights history. Sadly, there were no immediate changes to the equality of women in America after the convention. In fact, there were only slight

²⁰ Sandra Weber, *Women's Right National Historical Park, Seneca Falls, New York* (Washington, DC: U.S Department of Interior: National Park Service, 1985), 3.

²¹ Weber, 4.

²² Kathryn Cullen-DuPont, *American Women Activists' Writings* (New York: First Cooper Square Press Edition, 2002), 82.

²³ Noelle Baker, *Stanton in Her Own Time: A biographical chronicle of her life, drawn from recollections, interviews, and memoirs by family, friends, and associates* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2016), 84.

²⁴ "Declaration of Sentiments," 29 July 1848, *OA H Magazine of History* 3, no. 3-4 (Summer-Fall, 1988): 54.

²⁵ "Declaration of Sentiments."

changes for years. The first big advancement was when Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The amendment granted citizenship to anyone born in the United States. It also dictated that no state could deprive a citizen of the right to life, liberty and property. Further it mandated that states could not deny a citizen equal protection of the laws. The biggest reward did not happen until 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment was passed. Over 70 years after the convention, women were finally allowed to vote. Sadly, many women, like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others present during the women's convention, were not alive to see all their hard work pay off. Eventually, women's rights would begin to catch up to those of men. "Beginning in 1848, it was possible for women who rebelled against the circumstances of their lives to know that they were not alone..."²⁶

²⁶ Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movements in the United States* (Harvard University Press, England, 1959), 72.

Good for the Seoul: The 1988 Olympics as a Vehicle of Democratization

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*The ceremonial torch of the XXIVth Olympiad, Seoul, South Korea, September 1, 1988.
(photograph courtesy of Ken Hackman, U.S. Air Force)*

In 1988, Seoul, South Korea, hosted the summer Olympic Games despite overwhelming odds stacked against the city. Among the challenges: the international community viewed Seoul as a Third World city beleaguered by immense slums and an inadequate infrastructure. Calls for human and political rights drove a series of demonstrations and democratization movements against the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, while tensions between the North and South Korean governments remained high in the absence of a peace treaty. Furthermore, in the history of the modern Olympic Games, only one other Asian country was successful in their bid to host the games: Tokyo, Japan, in 1964.

Regardless of the challenges, Seoul's campaign to host the 1988 Olympics proved successful, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded Seoul the 1988 summer games. Even more unlikely, the games proved a major catalyst for political reform and helped remake the Republic of Korea into a thriving modern nation.

This article intends not only to expose the obvious economic and political objectives of South Korea, but also to highlight the substantial impact the preparation and the games themselves had on the Korean public. To the South Koreans, the main purpose of hosting the Olympic Games was to reverse the international opinion of South Korea as a Third World country, to a nation with political and economic legitimacy. However, the games would have another impact entirely: becoming a catalyst for democracy.

Seoul's selection, in fact, came simply because the IOC had to award the games to someone. Three other cities had mounted bids to host the 1988 games: Melbourne, Australia; Athens, Greece; and Nagoya, Japan. However, by May of 1981, Melbourne had withdrawn from contention due to economic concerns; whereas Athens' withdrawal from consideration can be attributed to the myth that the city aspired to host the games permanently. "Melbourne had withdrawn in February, as had Athens, whose bid was apparently linked to the idea that Athens would provide a permanent home for the Games," concluded Christopher Hill, a leading historian of the modern games.¹

Within the IOC it was generally accepted that an Asian city would have top priority over other international cities as the host site of the 1988 games. "There seems also to have been a general feeling in Lausanne [IOC Headquarters] that it was time to award the games to an eastern city, as they had been held in the Americas or Europe ever since the Tokyo games of 1964," explained Hill.² This may have also influenced the Olympic committees of Melbourne and Athens to withdraw their bids. The only real competition remaining was from Nagoya, Japan. Nagoya was the clear front runner and obvious choice. The city had been campaigning for the games for nearly two years, was recognized internationally as a legitimate host, and was familiar with how to host the games as they were only twenty-four years removed from the Tokyo games of 1964. However, the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) worked diligently to influence the decisions of the voting members of the IOC. The KOC was clearly willing to win the games by any means necessary. The experienced, although bitter, organizer of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, Peter Ueberroth noted the KOC's desperation to host the games. "Seoul also gave away, quietly, two first-class roundtrip tickets to each IOC member. The tickets were easily redeemed for cash; many were," he recalled.³ To add to suspicions of corruption, Olympic delegates were met by the brilliant smiles of many of Korea's most beautiful women, including former Miss Koreas and airline hostesses when they arrived in Baden Baden, West Germany, for the selection conference.⁴

In short, Seoul simply worked harder and more aggressively than its rival. The KOC was highly motivated by what the Olympic Games could offer Seoul and the Korean peninsula in particular: a step toward reunification of the Korean peninsula or improved relations with its once paternalistic ruler, Japan. South Korea was willing to take on the economic risks that host cities confront, all the while recognizing its political and economic possibilities. The games were meant to display the economic growth and national power of South Korea, for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations with both communist and non-communist nations.

Moreover, the classic Olympic Games were meant to serve as a respite from politics, though the modern games serve as anything but: they are filled with political and economic agendas, boycotts, blacklists, terrorist threats, medal counts, and doping scandals. For South Koreans, though, hosting the Olympic Games would not only serve as a means to display their athletic prowess, but hosting would also serve as a mechanism to gain economic and political legitimacy within the international community. "It should come as no surprise, then, that in bidding in 1981 to host the summer games of 1988, the Korean government headed by President Chun Doo Hwan had in mind a variety of economic and political objectives," concluded one close observer.⁵ If nothing else, an international event as large as the Olympics would draw notice to the continued threat of North Korean hostility, which the Hwan administration viewed as the highest security threat to the

¹ Christopher R. Hill. *Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta 1896-1996*, 2nd ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 166.

² Ibid., 168.

³ Ibid., 168.

⁴ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 180-181.

⁵ Jarol B. Manheim, "Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy," *The Western Political Quarterly* 43, no.2 (June 1990), 280

games.⁶ Adding even more incentive for Seoul to win the bid, hosting the Olympic Games would signify Korea's arrival as an economic contributor to the international community.⁷ There was even a state sponsored assassination attempt on Hwan's life that killed eighteen senior South Korean officials when a bomb was prematurely detonated.⁸

Proceedings became even more complicated when North Korea demanded a role as co-host of the games in 1986. Intense negotiations followed between the IOC and Olympic Committees of the North and South to seek a solution. Few nations involved in the Olympics movement had formal relations with North Korea, but the IOC always encouraged cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang. IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch, moved perhaps by longstanding beliefs that the international Olympics was a vehicle to promote peace, sought an acceptable arrangement. He offered North Korea the opportunity to host table tennis, archery, and some cycling and soccer events above the 17th parallel.⁹ Some South Korean officials were even willing to extend to the North more opportunities to host Olympic competition, but Samaranch insisted the North's unconditional acceptance of the committee's first offer before furthering negotiations.¹⁰ When negotiations proved fruitless after Pyongyang refused to accept the IOC's proposal, North Korea isolated itself from Olympic competition and called for its allies to do the same.

Despite North Korea's opposition and refusal to work with the IOC and KOC, the willingness of Olympic officials to negotiate with North Korea demonstrated that they were doing their very best to appeal to the North Koreans. As a result, the USSR, multiple Eastern European countries, and various other Communist states chose to participate freely in the Seoul Olympics. In fact, Moscow and other eastern bloc nations ignored North Korea's boycott request. China sent a team to the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, and even its most trusted ally Cuba was recently named host of the 1991 Pan American games under the condition that they would attend the 1988 Olympics.¹¹ However, North Korea would ultimately demonstrate its disdain by ordering two highly trained espionage agents to bomb the KAL flight 858 on November 29th 1987, which killed all 115 persons on board, mainly South Korean men on their way home from projects in the Middle East. The confession by the surviving saboteur revealed Pyongyang's plans to disrupt the Olympics at all costs.¹² Seoul was inevitably forced to take extensive precautions to ensure the safety of the impending arrival of Olympic athletes and spectators, as well as to prevent further acts of violence.¹³

The threat of boycotts subsided as the games drew closer, although, there remained doubts in the international community concerning whether Seoul would be able to ensure the safety of the Olympic athletes. The fear of further acts of terrorism clouded the opening of the Seoul Games on September 17. Both China and the Soviet Union, however, sent athletes, and their governments assured the United States that North Korea would make no effort to disturb the Games.¹⁴ Amidst the age of Olympic boycotts, Soviet and Chinese participation in the games certainly represented the

⁶Directorate of Intelligence, "South Korea: Terrorist Threats to the Seoul Olympics," Central Intelligence Agency, May 3, 1988, CREST CIA Records, CIA-RDP90T00100R000201120001-7.pdf301.69 KB, accessed 7 May 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90t00100r000201120001-7>.

⁷Jarol B. Manheim. "Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy," *The Western Political Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (June 1990), 282.

⁸Directorate of Intelligence, "South Korea: Terrorist Threats to the Seoul Olympics."

⁹Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 165-166.

¹⁰Directorate of Intelligence, "North Korea-South Korea: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games," Central Intelligence Agency, December 12, 1986, CREST CIA Records, CIA-RDP86T01017R000706930001-5.pdf, accessed 7 May 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t01017r000706930001-5>.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Directorate of Intelligence, "South Korea: Terrorist Threats to the Seoul Olympics." Central Intelligence Agency.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴ Alfred E. Senn, *Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies That Shaped the Games* (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), 228.

end of Cold War tensions by sending a diplomatic message to the rest of the world that the two sides, East and West, were ready to attempt to return to the original ideals of the Olympic Games.

To fully understand how the Olympics served as a vehicle for democratization in South Korea, an understanding of the political, social, and economic climate of Korea in the years leading up to the games is necessary. ROK President Park Chung Hee, who recognized how the Tokyo Olympics served as a turning point in improving Japan's international image during the post-war years, placed the initial bid to host the games in 1979. Park sought to do the very same for Korea as the 1964 games had done for Japan, as he admired the Japanese model for using the Olympics to promote economic growth. Tragically, Park was unable to see this plan play out as he was assassinated in 1979 just before South Korea began its official push to host the games.

"For nearly all its existence since the liberation from Japan and the division of the country in 1945, South Korea had been dominated by strong rulers exercising virtually unchecked powers," wrote journalist Don Oberdorfer.¹⁵ Following the assassination of Park in 1979, the means by which his successor Chun Doo Hwan acquired the position of leadership in South Korea can be defined as a coup d'etat in all but name. Although South Korea saw immense economic growth during the reigns of Park and Chun, public discontent with authoritarian rule increased, and from 1980-1987 protests in the name of democracy would send South Korea down a new path from which there was no turning back.

Park's death left an absence of leadership in the South Korean government, and, in early 1980, South Korea came under partial martial law. Consequently, politicians against military rule and student demonstrators began to demand that martial law be lifted and direct presidential elections be established. Meanwhile, Chun was safeguarding his rule by enhancing his personal network within the armed forces from his post as chief of the Defense Security Command. In mid-April he was named acting KCIA director, a position that provided him immense new authority. It also convinced the United States that Chun planned to seize the presidency, a move the global superpower did not support.¹⁶ The number of demonstrators began to rise to the tens of thousands and poured outwardly from universities into the streets of South Korean cities. As tensions increased, so did the likelihood that Chun and his administration would use military resources to put an end to the protests. Chun also ordered the arrest of a political rival, New Democratic Republic Party leader Kim Dae Jung, which would obviously add fuel to the fire. Chun ordered the Army to invade Jung's house as allowed by martial law, and combed it for political information as the political adversary was imprisoned. Soldiers also arrested several of his secretaries, bodyguards, and close political allies.¹⁷

After three days of arrests and attacks by Korean Special Forces, the citizens of Kwangju, a city in the southwest of the ROK, began to retaliate against Chun's crackdown. Over 30,000 citizens of Kwangju gathered to keep troops out of town, and by the time the city was retaken, initial reports had 170 citizens killed. These atrocities fueled unending and severe opposition to Chun and his allies in the military.¹⁸ Despite Chun's initial position of using the military as a last resort, full martial law had been reinstated by 1981, as universities closed and censorship of the Korean press was enforced.

Because of the censorship of the Korean press under the martial law of Chun, the United States' position was understood by many to be acquiescent and supportive, even though American officials repeatedly urged a negotiated settlement between the rivals. A government-controlled radio

¹⁵Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 161.

¹⁶Ibid., 124.

¹⁷Ibid., 127.

¹⁸Ibid., 129.

station head in Kwangju reported that the United States supported Chun's use of special operation forces in Kwangju. American officials demanded a retraction of the report, but it was never given.¹⁹

The situation in Kwangju served as the first and most influential of many demonstrations by those who opposed authoritarian rule. By the mid-1980s there began a worldwide trend of the democratization of authoritarian regimes, most famously in the Philippines. In 1986, the United States grudgingly supported the "people power" movement that removed Ferdinand Marcos from power; intriguing many South Korean citizens. IOC President Samaranch made very clear that the games in Seoul might be moved elsewhere in case of widespread protests such as the ones in Kwangju in 1980 and 1981. Korea's leaders knew that the IOC would have little problem finding a more experienced and willing city to host the games on short notice if they used military intervention to quell student demonstrations.²⁰ A reversal of the IOC's decision in favor of Seoul would be a disaster for South Korea and its leadership.

In 1986, the Korean public was infatuated with the political arrangements of the Chun administration. Early in Chun's reign, the authoritarian leader promised to return South Korea to a democracy after his one term as president. In April of 1986, Chun returned from a trip to Europe and was convinced that a parliamentary system of government was best suited for South Korea. Those opposed to authoritarian rule in Korea viewed this as a threat and as a means for Chun to hang on to power as his term was coming to an end in 1987. The opposition felt Chun could then easily control an electoral college that would allow him to choose his successor.

As the end of Chun's presidential term neared, those skeptical of Chun grew uneasy with anticipation to see if he would remain true to his promise to the public. Anything short of direct presidential elections would be reason enough to pour into the streets, just as they had in Kwangju. Only this time in May 1986, the demonstrations began in the city of Inchon, site of General Douglas MacArthur's surprise invasion in 1950.²¹ The anti-Chun demonstrators, who number over one million, came mostly from Korea's higher education institutions, although occasionally they were joined by industrial workers.²² The location was no doubt a symbolic message from the opposition whose anti-Chun and anti-American sentiments stem from the Kwangju uprising and the belief of some that the American government was using Chun as a puppet to fulfill its own Cold War purposes.

Demonstrations at Inchon were countered with a tank-like vehicle that spewed pepper spray. By April of 1987, Chun banned any consideration of constitutional revisions until after the 1988 Olympics.²³ This meant that the next president would be selected by an electorate that would be easily controlled by Chun. On June 10th, 1987, Roh Tae Woo was officially nominated to run for president by the Democratic Justice Party, and hours later additional violent protests erupted across the country. It was clear that the Korean public did not approve of Roh as Chun's successor. In fact, "he was seen by much of the public as 'the bald man with a wig,' meaning Chun in disguise--just another general who would continue dictatorial rule," commented Don Oberdorfer.²⁴

The demonstrations of 1987 became known as the "June Resistance" and represent a key turning point; a visual shift from authoritarian rule to democratic rule can be seen as the Korean middle-class contributed more support to the protests. During the last two weeks of June, the demonstrations were the largest single story in the American press, surpassing the Iran-Contra affair.

¹⁹Ibid, 130.

²⁰Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 170.

²¹Ibid, 165.

²²Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 161.

²³Ibid, 166.

²⁴Ibid, 167.

The Reagan administration was under constant pressure to take a stand, but clearly struggled with how to intervene without causing a coup that would undoubtedly restore military rule once again. Ultimately, the United States chose to intervene through the issuance of a personal letter from Reagan to Chun that can be summarized as a plea for Chun to remain committed to the peaceful transfer of power, break free from the nostalgia of old politics, restore free press, promote negotiations, and support fair elections in the name of national unity.

As word of an American letter spread, ever more demonstrators poured into the streets prompting Chun to further contemplate military intervention yet again. However, as Chun grew closer to mobilization, he changed his mind, deciding to focus on amicable negotiations as opposed to using the military to put an end to the protests. One could easily speculate that Chun's decision to negotiate with protestors was influenced out of fear of losing the Olympics to another host city.

For the first time, a serious discussion took place among members of the ruling party about the public demand for direct presidential elections on June 21st, 1987 during the National Assembly's day-long caucus.²⁵ Surprisingly, newly inaugurated President Roh Tae Woo agreed to the opposition's demands for direct presidential elections, which would be used as the basis of his political campaign. On December 16th, 1987, Roh Tae Woo would win the presidency of South Korea in an election reminiscent of the American election of 1860.

Furthermore, the 1988 Olympics played a crucial role in the establishment of democratic rule in South Korea. The "June Resistance" was widely covered by international media who were obviously present in preparation for the upcoming games. "The presence of the international media and their coverage of South Korea (as the next Olympics host country) and its politics gave added impetus to student demonstrators and opposition politicians, and international mass media reports conferred legitimacy," concluded two scholars who studied the demonstrations.²⁶ Thus, many newspapers were able to report that Korea truly was a democracy that provided basic liberties such as free press. Out of fear of losing the Olympics altogether, the South Korean government decided not to use troops against protestors.²⁷

Despite tensions on the streets of South Korea, the last thing the government wanted was for the IOC to rescind its decision to host the games. If South Korea had been unable to peacefully resolve the protests, then most likely the IOC would have no other choice but to withdraw from the city. Therefore, it is quite likely that the Korean public knew how significant the Olympic Games would be to its ultimate goal of bringing democracy to the Korean peninsula. People understood how eager the Chun administration was to host the Olympics in Seoul as part of his campaign to improve the international opinion of South Korea. With the world watching, the public used the Olympics as a shield to push for direct presidential elections. Chun's administration would have undoubtedly used military intervention to stop the protests had the upcoming Olympics not have caused qualms. This is likely, as Chun used Korean Special Forces during the Kwangju incident when the thoughts of hosting the Olympics were in its infancy. As stories of the "June Resistance" filled the pages of American and international newspapers, Chun came under a microscope, and it is certainly no coincidence that the impending arrival of the Olympic games created a reluctance to use military intervention to placate the "June Resistance."

In the end, the Seoul games passed without violence, and there seemed to be a shift in media focus from politics to the struggle against performance enhancing drugs, as Canadian Ben Johnson astonished the world by sprinting 100 meters in 9.79 seconds, which would be a new world record.

²⁵ Ibid., 171.

²⁶ J.A. Mangan and Gwang Ok, "Seoul'88 – Media, Politicians, Public: Confrontation, Cooperation and Democratic Consequences," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 29, no. 16 (2012): 2276–2292.

²⁷ David R. Black and Shona Bezanson, "The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratization: Lessons from Seoul and Implications for Beijing," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004): 1245–1261.

However, in a major scandal, the IOC disqualified the sprinter from competition and negated his records, after Johnson tested positive for anabolic steroids.²⁸ In a sense, the doping scandal proved advantageous for Seoul since it drew attention away from the tense politics surrounding the Olympics. Although the games today are mostly remembered for the Ben Johnson controversy, the historically significant story is the political benefit the games had for South Korea.

During an era when the credibility of the Olympics was tarnished due to boycotts, blacklists, terrorist threats, medal counts, and doping scandals, Seoul gained international legitimacy. South Korea was also able to overcome decades of human rights abuses that prompted the sometimes violent and even deadly demonstrations. The Olympics assisted the citizens of South Korea in successfully installing a government that transfers authority from one regime to another, peacefully, through democratic elections. The 1988 Olympics can be considered an immense success particularly in the political and economic sense. Politically, the games served as the catalyst that brought democracy to the country. As a result, the newly elected president Roh Tae Woo was able to develop diplomatic relationships, outside of the traditional democratic ones, with other socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Economically, growth rates grew eight to ten percent, and there were no signs of a serious economic downturn.²⁹ In the beginning, while it was evident that the Korean government sought economic stimulation and political legitimacy; the Korean public had a plan of their own and were after something far more progressive.

²⁸ Guttman, *The Olympics*, 170.

²⁹ National Intelligence Council, "*South Korea After the Olympics.*" Director of Central Intelligence, August 23, 1988.

Alexander the Great's Use of Myth on Campaign

Chad Leitch

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Who is the most famous person in all of history? That question remains up to debate, but an argument could easily be made for Alexander the Great. At the age of 20, Alexander was able to become king of Macedonia following the death of his father Philip II. While he might not be the youngest monarch in history, it is what Alexander did after becoming king that made him so famous. He carried out his father's planned invasion of the Persian Empire, but he did not stop there. Before Alexander defeated the Persians, he ventured into Egypt, and after he defeated the Persians, he went on to India. Conquering all of these lands allowed Alexander to create one of the largest empires ever seen in the ancient world by the time of his death at the age of 32. In such a relatively short amount of time, Alexander the Great accomplished so much. How was Alexander the Great achieved this especially considering his young age throughout the campaign? Obviously, there are many reasons why Alexander accomplished what he did, but a notable reason was his use of myth.¹

Alexander learned much about myth as a boy and was enamored with it. He was fascinated by the heroes of myth and the accompanying stories of adventure. With this in mind, it is no surprise that Alexander made use of the myth he loved so much while he was on military campaign. One device used by Alexander was kinship myth. What is kinship myth? Figures that today we know to be mythical, such as Achilles or Heracles, were believed to be historical figures in the areas from where they originated, in this case Ancient Greece. Tribes and kingdoms of Ancient Greece would embrace myth and claim descent from these figures believed to be historical. Often times this was to achieve political gain. Ancient Greece is not the only society to do something like this, but the focus here will remain on Greek figures, because these were invoked by Alexander when he used kinship myth. Another way that Alexander made use of myth was to guide the travels of the campaign. Alexander used myth in determining routes that the army took during his campaign. For some reason there was a gap of several years between Alexander's uses of myth. He used it frequently at the beginning of the campaign until he reached the non-Greek world. Then we do not see any instances of myth use until he reached India where the myth he employed was dubious to say the least. In India, it becomes apparent that Alexander developed a new agenda for using myth in his campaign. A turning point occurred when he began to use myth, perhaps myth that he has created, to enhance his personal status and to further his personal goals rather than using already existing myth primarily as a tool for strategic political gain.

¹ Historians have written a lot about Alexander the Great and his campaign from many different angles. In particular, Alexander's use of myth has been discussed often because of how integral it was to some of Alexander's decision. The discussion is prominent in Lee E. Patterson, *Kinship Myth in Ancient Greece* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010). It is also necessary to look at some of the Macedonian uses of myth before Alexander's time to put some of his possible motives for later uses of myth into context. Here, the discussion of the Argead king list in William Greenwalt, "The Introduction of Caranus into the Argead King List," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 26 (1985) is crucial. Many other authors have also made contributions to this discussion in order to understand Alexander's uses of myth during his campaign. For more information on Alexander and his campaign see *Alexander the Great: A New History*, ed. Waldemar Heckel and Lawrence A. Tritle, (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) and *Alexander the Great: A Reader*, ed. Ian Worthington, (London, UK: Routledge, 2003).

In order to examine Alexander's use of kinship myth, one must understand how Alexander was supposedly descended from the figures he invoked. Two figures stand out among the myths used by Alexander. The first one is Heracles. Alexander was purportedly descended from Heracles through his father. Alexander, a member of the Argead royal house of Macedon which was founded by Caranus, was descended from the Temenids of Argos themselves descended from Heracles (Diod. 17.4.1). The second notable figure was Achilles. Alexander was descended from Achilles through his mother. He was a descendent of the Molossian kings of Epirus whose founder Molossus was the son of Neoptolemus, himself son of Achilles (Justin 11.3.1). Heracles and Achilles were the most evident figures in Alexander's use of kinship myth. However, it is known that he invoked Andromache once and possibly invoked Dionysus towards the end of the campaign.

An early and notable example of Alexander's use of myth occurred just before the start of his campaign into Asia. Alexander needed to thwart resistance from the rest of the Thessalian League in order to bring them back into the fold. To do this, he began marching to Larissa, the seat of the Aleudae, but the Thessalians had blocked the route because they controlled the Tempe Pass. Alexander worked around this by climbing Mount Ossa and coming down on the Thessalians from the rear thus ending the resistance.² He then rode on to Larissa to hold a meeting of the Thessalian League where the Thessalians agreed to Alexander inheriting his father Philip's title as archon of the Thessalian League. Even though the Thessalians rejoined him, Alexander decided to go ahead and invoke kinship diplomacy with them. Diodorus says, "First he dealt with the Thessalians, reminding them of his ancient relationship to them through Heracles and raising their hopes by kindly words and by rich promises as well, and prevailed upon them by formal vote of the Thessalian League to recognize as his the leadership of Greece which he had inherited from his father" (Diod. 17.4.1). Alternatively, Justin says, "On his way he had offered encouragement to the Thessalians and reminded them of the services rendered to them by his father Philip and of his kinship with them on his mother's side because of her descent from the Aeacids" (Justin 11.3.1).

It is unclear if Diodorus, Justin, or both are correct about which connection Alexander used, but it is clear that Alexander used kinship diplomacy for political purposes. Certainly Alexander needed the Thessalian League for its impressive cavalry in order to bolster his military might which had already been impressive enough to secure the Thessalians and its cavalry on sight, but he may have also used it to appear more appealing as a leader. According to Patterson, "Alexander saw kinship myth as a way of making his leadership more palatable and we have no reason to reject Thessalian credulity on this point."³ By establishing a common ancestor between the two, Alexander used kinship myth to re-secure an alliance with Thessaly where the Thessalians accepted Alexander as their leader because they want to believe they shared this common ancestor. Early on, Alexander was clearly using myth as a political tool to increase his power in the Hellenistic world.

As Alexander began his campaign, we see his use of kinship myth when he reached the famed city of Troy. Alexander employed kinship diplomacy with the Trojans by using a connection with them through Andromache, from whom he was descended through his mother. Strabo says that Alexander "provided for them on the basis of a renewal of kinship and because of his zeal for Homer.... On account of this zeal and of his kinship through the Aeacids, who had been kings of the Molossi, of whom Andromache, Hector's wife, as the story goes, was also queen, Alexander treated the Ilions kindly" (Strabo 13.1.27). The kind treatment referenced by Strabo may have been an exemption from paying tribute according to Patterson.⁴ Because Alexander loved myth, and Troy was a major part of the story of Achilles, one of the heroes Alexander tries to emulate, the Trojans,

² Ian Worthington, *Alexander the Great: Man and God* (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2004), 51.

³ Lee E. Patterson, *Kinship Myth in Ancient Greece* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 89-90.

⁴ Patterson, *Kinship Myth*, 90.

were treated well. This love of myth, especially of the Trojan War, also influenced Alexander's other actions while in Troy.

At Troy, Alexander offered a sacrifice to Priam, the king of Troy during the Trojan War. Arrian says, "He is also said to have offered sacrifice to Priam on the altar of Zeus Hercius, to avert his anger against the family of Neoptolemus, whose blood still ran in his own veins (Arr. 1.11). He also said that Alexander sacrificed at the Temple of Athena where he found several weapons preserved from the Trojan War, so Alexander left his armor at the temple and, in exchange, took some of the weapons that were there (Arr. 1.11). According to Diodorus, Alexander also visited the tombs of Achilles and Ajax among other heroes and "honoured them with offerings and other appropriate marks of respect" (Diod. 17.17.3). Historian Ian Worthington advances the argument that Alexander sacrificed to Priam in order to appease him so as not to jeopardize the Macedonian campaign. Worthington also claims that it cannot be ruled out that Alexander sacrificed to Priam to quell the fears of his men.⁵ Regardless, this action and all these others truly shows the hold myth had on Alexander. It influenced him greatly and can be seen in key decisions he made.

Another interesting case of Alexander's use and non-use of kinship diplomacy came at Soli and Mallus, two ancient cities in Cilicia near Issus where Alexander would defeat Darius for the first time. Soli and Mallus were very similar in that they were both of Argive origin. There are no reports of Alexander employing kinship myth when he arrived at Soli. In fact, Arrian says that Alexander "installed a garrison and imposed upon the town a fine of 200 talents of silver for its support of the Persian cause (Arr. 2.5). However, further to the east at Mallus, Alexander did make use of kinship myth. Arrian says, "In this latter place he found political troubles in progress, and settled them, remitting the tribute which the town paid to Darius on the ground that Mallus was a colony of Argos and he himself claimed to be descended from the Argive Heracleidae" (Arr. 2.6). The only differences between these two cities mythically speaking is that Mallus was of Heraclid origin and Soli was not.

The Heraclid origin of Mallus was what makes all the difference because of Alexander's emulation of heroes. Heracles, perhaps the most famous hero of all, was an idol to Alexander, a figure who set an example that Alexander tried to follow. Another difference between the two that may explain why Alexander sought kinship diplomacy with Mallus and Soli was that Mallus was farther east as noted by Bosworth.⁶ Alexander knew that he and Darius would fight their battle somewhere near Issus. Because it was farther east, Mallus was closer to Issus than Soli. This made it an ideal ally to thwart alliances with the Persians which would allow Darius to summon reinforcements to attack Alexander's rear. Thus one sees just how practical Alexander could be when using kinship diplomacy. If he did not need to use it or it benefited him in no way as with Soli, he did not bother with it. However, when myth proved useful, he used kinship diplomacy.

As Alexander began to move into the non-Greek world as he made his way into the Levant, Egypt, and on to Persia, there was a significant decrease in his use of kinship myth. In fact, Alexander did not use it again until India. Not that there were not opportunities for Alexander. At Tyre, the Tyrians worshipped a god named Melcart, who was widely equated with Heracles by the Greeks. In fact, Diodorus refers to him as the "Tyrian Heracles" when describing the incident where Alexander wished to sacrifice to him and he was barred from the city (Diod. 17.40.2). The Egyptians worshipped the god Ammon, who was believed by the Greeks to be their god Zeus. Alexander even claimed that the oracle at the Temple of Ammon at Siwa had declared him son of Zeus according to Plutarch (Plut. Alex. 27). Despite all of this, there is no evidence that Alexander made use of kinship diplomacy while in Egypt. Alexander even had ties to the Persians he could have used once he

⁵ Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, 72-3.

⁶ A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 58.

defeated Darius. Both had ties to Perseus, a descendant of Heracles, yet Alexander did not use mythological tools.

Most likely Alexander changed tactics because the mythological figures he would have been invoking meant nothing to these people. The Tyrians had no interest in allowing Alexander into their city because he wanted to worship Heracles (he assumed Melcart was a manifestation of Heracles). However, since Heracles meant nothing to the Tyrians, they just assumed he wished to worship Melcart. Only the ruler of Tyre had the privilege of sacrificing to Melcart at this time, so the Tyrians banned Alexander. After this, Alexander had no interest in using kinship diplomacy with them because he had been offended. He did not need to use kinship myth in Egypt because once he freed Egyptians from Persian control, they were ready to accept him as their ruler. He did not have an existing tradition to work with in Egypt, but it did not matter: he had already achieved his goals without kinship diplomacy. As for Persia, it was similar to the situation in Egypt. Despite their connection to Alexander through Perseus, the Persians did not believe in these figures; so trying to use kinship diplomacy would have done no good. Instead, Alexander tried to connect with the Persians by different means. He began combining Persian and Macedonian garb, he married the daughters of Darius and Artaxerxes III, and he even attempted to introduce proskynesis among other things. Alexander understood that kinship diplomacy would not work if the people he was trying to connect with did not understand, know, or care about whoever Alexander tried to invoke. Much as at Mallus and Soli, Alexander showed his practicality in using kinship diplomacy.

Following the death of Darius, but before Alexander defeated the Persians for good, there was an incident involving a plot to kill Alexander. Philotas, a friend of Alexander and son of Parmenio failed to report this plot because he did not view it as a threat. This ultimately led to his execution along with Parmenio. According to historian Lowell Edmunds, this represented a turning point in Alexander's campaign. Prior to this event, the campaign was in the Graeco-Macedonian phase, during which Alexander's reasons for the campaign can be attributed to avenging the Greeks for the wrongs the Persians committed against them during Xerxes' invasion. However, following this event, the campaign moved into the heroic phase.⁷ Now the driving force behind this campaign was simply Alexander's *pathos*, as Arrian puts it, his desire to keep going (Arr. 1.4). The notion of a turning point at this particular moment is important because soon Alexander would be moving into India where signs of kinship myth begin to show up again. However, this shift should be placed slightly earlier, when Alexander dismissed the troops of the League of Corinth. The dismissal came because the mandate of the League of Corinth had been filled despite Bessus still causing problems and claiming to be the Great King. In dismissing these troops, Alexander acknowledged that he had accomplished what he set out to do, at least in the eyes of the League of Corinth, and anything from here on out was simply unnecessary. Alexander was doing this for himself now which is why kinship myth makes a reappearance in this campaign and is different from before.

As Alexander moved into India, there is evidence in the ancient sources that he engaged in kinship myth with the Nysaeans. According to Arrian, "In the country on Alexander's route between the river Cophen and the Indus lay the city of Nysa, supposed to have been founded by Dionysus, at the time of his conquest of the Indians" (Arr. 5.1). Supposedly the people of Nysa approached Alexander and they invoked kinship myth with Dionysus. The evidence for this alleged connection with Dionysus is that the city of Nysa was named after his nurse Nysaea and that nearby Mount Merus (Merus is Greek for thigh and Dionysus was born from Zeus's thigh) was the only place in India where ivy grew. Arrian remained skeptical of this and maintained neutrality on the matter. Regardless, Arrian says that Alexander went to Mount Merus, saw the ivy, and then the Macedonians began to celebrate.

⁷ Lowell Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 12 (1971): 363.

The notion that the Nysaeans engaged in kinship diplomacy with Alexander by invoking Dionysus is problematic. It is very unlikely that Indians would know enough about these Greek figures at all to be able to invoke them. According to Patterson, there is evidence of Greeks in the Indus Valley before Alexander arrived, but there is no proof that they had any contact with the Nysaeans or any other Indians.⁸ This makes it likely that Alexander invented this myth of Dionysus in India. Patterson says that the influence of Euripides' plays *The Bacchae* and *The Cyclops* could have influenced Alexander by allowing for Dionysus to have potentially traveled to India and for Alexander being able to claim descent from Dionysus respectively.⁹ By creating this myth that Dionysus founded this city in India, Alexander was able to claim he has surpassed a god once he goes further than this city. This is particularly notable considering Alexander was potentially believing in his own divinity at this point. Creating this myth allowed Alexander to enhance his own status by surpassing Dionysus.

There is precedent for the creation of myth to aid an agenda in Macedonian history. Caranus, the supposed founder of the Argead royal house, was introduced into the Argead king list sometime during the fourth century. Scholar William Greenwalt suggests that Caranus was introduced as a way to diminish the importance of Perdiccas I without compromising the prestige of the entire royal house.¹⁰ There was a rivalry between three branches of the Argead royal house who were descended from the three sons of Alexander I. The introduction of Caranus would have been used by the descendants of Menelaus and Amyntas to prevent Perdiccas II's namesake from being used to justify a superior claim to the throne. Greenwalt also suggests that the eventual rise of Amyntas III, grandson of Amyntas to the throne would have solidified the acceptance of Caranus as the founder of the Argead royal house.¹¹ Regardless of how Caranus was introduced, it is clear he was a fabrication introduced later. While Alexander would not have known this, it is evidence that introduction of new myths were possible—meaning it is likely Alexander fabricated his use of kinship myth in India.

Another instance of Alexander's use of kinship myth in India came when he encountered the Sibi. An aboriginal tribe in the Indus, the Sibi sent an envoy to Alexander to surrender and invoke kinship diplomacy much like what happened at Nysa. According to Diodorus, "It is said that Heracles of old thought to lay siege to this 'rock' but refrained because of the occurrence of certain sharp earthquake shocks and other divine signs, and this made Alexander even more eager to capture the stronghold when he heard it, and so to rival the god's reputation" (Diod. 17.85.2). Curtius says "The Sibi claim that their ancestors were members of Hercules' army, that these had been left behind when they fell ill and had settled where they themselves were now living" (Curt. 9.4.2). Despite these two accounts, some of the ancient sources, such as Plutarch, make no mention of these claims of kinship or even the visit to Aornus.

The claim of kinship through Heracles with the Sibi was another instance where Alexander may have fabricated kinship myth. In relation to this incident and at Nysa, Strabo says, "That these are fabrications of the flatterers of Alexander is clear, especially because the historians do not agree with one another, with some speaking about but others simply not recording them" (Strabo 15.1.9). However, Patterson notes the possibility that Alexander was reminded of Heracles by the characteristics of the local culture and is happy to promote his presence there for his own glory.¹² By doing this, Alexander would be able to succeed where Heracles failed if Diodorus' account is to be

⁸ Patterson, *Kinship Myth*, 98-9.

⁹ Patterson, *Kinship Myth*, 100.

¹⁰ William Greenwalt, "The Introduction of Caranus into the Argead King List," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 26 (1985): 48-9.

¹¹ Greenwalt, "The Introduction of Caranus," 49.

¹² Patterson, *Kinship Myth*, 103.

believed. Alexander would have once again surpassed a god, as he did when he reached and then went beyond Nysa. However, the dubiousness of these events suggest they were created simply to enhance Alexander's status particularly in the matter of Alexander's own supposed divinity.

Alexander would be forced to turn back towards home while in India following a revolt by his men. Much to his displeasure, Alexander began leading the army towards home even though he had no original intent of doing so. In fact, an invasion of Arabia had been one of his goals as he traveled back westward. However, these plans would be cut short, as would Alexander's life. In such a long campaign that covered a long period of time and such vast distances, many factors drove Alexander's success. Myth, which was such an important part of Alexander's life before the campaign, remained so as Alexander journeyed across the world.

Clearly Alexander used myth as a political tool during the beginning of the campaign, just as others before him had done. However, as time wore on, Alexander increasingly invoked myths for which there is existing tradition and, as such, this seems to only serve to enhance the status of Alexander. His campaign would not have become what it was or became as famous as it is had Alexander not made use of myth during the campaign.

Supporters of the Japanese Empire: Medical Doctors and the Colonization of Asia

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As soon as Japan took over Manchuria in 1931, its scientists began conducting biological and chemical warfare tests on animals and humans throughout the territory. Backing the scientists were high-ranking officials back home, who had no qualms with the scientists experimenting on humans. This arrangement would last until the Japanese surrendered in 1945.¹ With such horrors being committed by the scientists, several questions arise: What justified their actions? How were they able to distance themselves from their fellow human beings? Can we compare Japanese actions to those of the Nazis? This paper seeks to explain why the atrocities occurred, using the framework of racism that developed during the Meiji Era. It suggests that a discourse surrounding the racism developed through the exchanges of Japanese doctors and their confrontation with the West. These ideas then led to the atrocities committed in the name of Japanese medicine.

Pertinent to this study, the debates surrounding the Final Solution in Germany yield ways to understand Japan's atrocities. Scholars have long debated the cause for the Final Solution in Germany. Why would the Germans allow the top officials to experiment and murder people? Scholars have proposed several theories, but one claim stands out: Detlev Peukert put forth a particularly insightful argument about German scientific racism. The Germans conceived of a utopian society that could be achieved through a burgeoning military state promoting the conquest of reason and science over religion. Subsequently, a crisis emerged: in the absence of religion: death still existed, and science could not console. People embraced racism to cope with this existential crisis by focusing upon the *Volkskörper* or the heritable body of the German race. Individuals must die, yet, the German race could continue forever if it stayed healthy. This meant those unfit to contribute to the German race must be eliminated, which was why, according to Peukert, the Nazis embarked upon a program to obliterate the traces of the mentally ill and the races deemed inferior to Germans.²

Peukert's analysis of scientific racism can help us understand not only the Germans, but the Japanese as well. Both countries underwent rapid changes in technology and science all while confronting the rise of social Darwinism in the 1800s. They would go on to develop programs which experimented upon and killed other races thought to be inferior. Nationalism stressing the necessity of ethnic and racial purity also impacted both countries and fed motivation for the elimination of other ethnicities. Connecting the two countries to Peukert's ideas shows that the horrors in Germany were not exceptional.

¹ Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up* (New York: Routledge, 2002), xxix-xxx.

² Detlev Peukert, "The Genesis of the Final Solution from the Spirit of Science," in *Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945*, ed. David F. Crew (New York: Routledge, 1994), 274-275.

Historian Kenneth Pyle argues that Japan's relation with German is seminal:

...exposure to German economic, political, and legal thought, and particularly the German Historical School of Economics, helped nudge Japan in a conservative direction, providing its social scientists and bureaucrats with the technologies of collectivism, nationalism, and authoritarianism.³

Pyle's interpretation covers a wide array of subjects, but he does not include within his discussion the effects from the militarized medicine of Meiji through World War II doctors. He believes in the exceptional nature of Germany's movement toward Nazism and is clearly influenced by German historians' usage of modernization theory to explain the exceptional nature of German history.⁴

My study does not hold to the exceptional nature of these developments, nor does it assume that there was anything inevitable about the path to genocide. The atrocities seen in the 1930s and the 1940s in Germany and Japan could have happened anywhere. But simply put, the necessary tools were present for Germans and Japanese to commit to genocide.

Presenting a more recent interpretation of the German-Japanese relationship, Hoi-eun Kim explores the reciprocal nature of the exchange of ideas between Germany and Japan in terms of medicine. This transference of ideas influenced modernization in both countries.⁵ Kim's account focuses on the German side of the relationship and employs a multitude of German sources with few Japanese writings.

This paper contributes to the study of Japan's and Germany's relationship by applying Peukert's scientific racism to the Japanese. It specifically focuses upon the military medical establishment within Japan and its influence upon the Japanese government. From the Meiji period on to World War II, Japanese officials and scientists stressed the need to develop their country's medicine in accordance with Western standards. Japan's research infrastructure reached high international standards and made major contributions, especially within subfields like bacteriology. Making these advancements possible, the National Diet and Central bureaucracy always had funds for medicine-based programs, including sending students to the West.⁶ This study focuses upon the writings of Mori Ōgai, one such student who went west and contributed heavily both in terms of medical research and in literature. His literature-based writings provide information on the shift from Tokugawa to the Meiji era, especially in terms of changing notions of racism. For World War II, this study explores the case of Ishii Shiro, an ultranationalist responsible for much of Japan's research into biological warfare. Key Japanese doctors constructed a racist narrative related to colonial people that allowed the Japanese to distance themselves and commit atrocities across Asia.

As for the construction of this paper, I first focus upon the development of medicine in Japan during the Meiji era, exploring the influence of German medicine on Japan by focusing upon Leopold Müller, Erwin Baelz, and the students who went overseas to Germany to study medicine. After discussing the students, this study moves to pre-World War II and explores the military biological warfare development inspired by Ishii Shiro.

Doctors and laypeople had a strained relationship during the Meiji Era. The Japanese considered scientists as mere conduits that took knowledge from the West rather than those that

³ Quoted by Erik Grimmer-Solem, "German Social Science, Meiji Conservatism, and the Peculiarities of Japanese History," *Journal of World History* 16, no. 2 (June 2005), 190.

⁴ Grimmer-Solem, 191.

⁵ Hoi-eun Kim, *Doctors of Empire: Medical and Cultural Encounters between Imperial Germany and Meiji Japan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 13.

⁶ James Bartholomew, "Modern Science in Japan: Comparative Perspectives," *Journal of World History* 4, no. 1 (1993): 109.

developed new learning. Funding came from the state because of the lack of capitalism within Japan. Therefore, science relied heavily upon the state for money.⁷ Science became reliant upon the state; science and state entered a symbiotic relationship.

Japanese doctors needed to radically transform the medical industry of Japan at the request of the government and found inspiration from Germany. The first German doctor and military physician Leopold Müller arrived in 1871 and encountered a less than ideal group of Japanese students. Müller found the Japanese lacking in medical knowledge. Even when students had little knowledge of a foreign language, they would try to read difficult, specialized texts without fully understanding the material.⁸ Not until the 1870's, with the arrival of more government funding did the Japanese treat learning German medicine seriously. At that time, the government passed a measure to establish a commuter program at Tokyo Medical School to increase the nation's number of doctors. The program required Japanese assistants to Germans to teach the courses that took students three years to complete. A result of these two programs was to divide research-oriented, high class physicians from ordinary, clinical physicians.⁹

Erwin Baelz was the first civilian physician to be sent to Japan, where he set up a private practice, so he could interact more with the Japanese government. Despite having the practice, Baelz still taught courses through which he became concerned about the institutionalization of German medicine. He began to worry about the extreme reliance on German theoretical lectures and an emphasis on scientific aspects of medicine. Once 1900 arrived, Baelz retired voluntarily after seeing so many of his fellow Germans replaced by Japanese, trained in the Western medical tradition.¹⁰

Influenced by German doctors and seeking further Western medicine, the Japanese embarked on overseas study. The Charter Oath of 1868 mandated that "knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, so that the foundations of the Empire may be strengthened."¹¹ As a result, Japan sent its doctors, many of samurai background, overseas to study Western technology, medicine, and ideas.¹² According to James Bartholomew's research, "in 1880, some 79% of scientists were of samurai origin; in 1900, 54% still came from the former samurai population."¹³ That scientists were of samurai origin was not unusual for they received a strong education. Morality, a sense of duty to the government, and intensive training in reading and writing made up the samurai's education.¹⁴ Samurai, with the government's best interests at heart, became the vessels through which to understand Western culture and impart it to the Japanese government. With this mindset, the Japanese tried to utilize Western medicine to make it able to withstand Western imperial forces. Baelz documents how these students set up newspapers to disseminate Western ideas to the public, showcasing a desire to implement Western ideas among the Japanese.¹⁵ The Japanese who went overseas wanted to modernize and remove the backwardness of Japanese society to make it a competing power with the West.

After fully implementing German medical techniques into its school system, Japan sent many of its students to Germany, which provided ample opportunity for Japanese scientists to study the West. The average age of these students was 32.7 years old. Once in Germany, the Japanese met with both awe and frustration. Japanese students immersed themselves in German culture by visiting cultural hot spots, like the theatre, without the moral restrictions of the Meiji government. However,

⁷ James Bartholomew, *the Formation of Science in Japan* (Ann Arbor: Yale University, 1989), 1.

⁸ John Z Bowers, *When the Twain Meet: The Rise of Western Medicine in Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1980), 67.

⁹ Kim, 44-45.

¹⁰ Kim, 50-52.

¹¹ Ardath W. Burks, ed, *The Modernizers: Overseas Students, Foreign Employees, and Meiji Japan*. (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 207.

¹² Burks, 154.

¹³ Bartholomew, "Modern Science in Japan: Comparative Perspectives," 102.

¹⁴ Burks, 255.

¹⁵ Baelz, 21.

German people constantly watched the Japanese students for they had not seen such people before now. Due to this constant surveillance and perhaps a condescending attitude by their hosts, many students began to feel inferior to Germans. Some even said Japan needed to change to a European lifestyle with European nutrition and clothing.¹⁶ In comparison to American contemporaries, the Japanese had a much harder time adjusting to German culture. Many of the Americans who studied within Germany came from a German ethnic background and adapted easily into German culture.¹⁷

In 1884, Mori Ōgai, a medical student and member of the Army Medical Corps, went to Germany to study military hygiene. Ōgai wrote about his experience in a personal diary.¹⁸ He recorded what the Japanese Minister of War said to him:

Discussions about hygiene are meaningless to people who go about with geta thongs between their toes...Learning isn't limited to reading books. If you carefully observe how Europeans think, how they live, and what their manners are, your trip abroad will have been warranted.¹⁹

The Japanese chauvinism toward “backwards” people originated in fact in their treatment by Western powers. This outlook would soon be transferred to colonized people; the Meiji rulers thought of the subjects as “...possessed of their own identity by a ‘conscience or self-knowledge.’”²⁰ After learning about the error of bowing low to Europeans, Ōgai wrote about how,

...in Europe, youths who have received any education at all learn from a dancing instructor how to stand, sit, pay their respects, and kneel politely so that, after having lived among Europeans for some time, Japanese find the crude manners of their fellow countrymen unbearably funny.²¹

He marked a distinction between the West and Japanese. Japanese people not exposed to the world lived a backward life frowned upon by the modernizing elite. The more cosmopolitan echelon wished to emulate certain behaviors to better their people in the world's eyes.

Comparing their country unfavorably to the West, Japanese intellectuals urged an emphasis on development. A document by the name of “On Reform of the Way of Heaven” attributed to Yokoi made its rounds through the people loyal to the shogunate. There Yokoi made the following statement:

... today there is a movement-indeed, since the beginning of time there has never been a greater one-toward renovation of political rule, and thus many foreign countries are striving to understand, to discover, and to attain a high level of culture on the basis of natural principles. However, Japan alone huddles to its isolated small islands... and so cannot achieve this. Its fall is inevitable. We must at once sweep away the great evils of narrow-mindedness and deep-rooted abuses, must, guided by

¹⁶ Kim 63, 72, 91-94.

¹⁷ Thomas Neville Bonner, *American Doctors and German University: A Chapter in International Intellectual Relations 1870-1914* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1963), 24-25.

¹⁸ Karen Brazell, “Mori Ōgai in Germany. A Translation of Fumizukai and Excerpts from Doitsu Nikki,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 26, no. 1/2 (1971): 77.

¹⁹ Brazell, 82.

²⁰ Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 19.

²¹ Brazell, 81.

the idea that we are ‘eternal as heaven and earth,’ see through distorted opinions and must be intent on our land becoming the greatest in the universe.²²

Spurred by intellectuals, the Japanese were aware of western development and sought to produce similar advances within their own society. These intellectuals understood the development of Social Darwinism, which allowed for a rearrangement of society that fit well with the culture’s view of the hierarchical relationship among peoples. On January 19, 1904, regarding the Russo-Japanese war, Erwin Baelz wrote “the Japanese must not forget that they are trying to assume the leadership of the yellow races, and that many of them are inspired by thoughts of dominating the Far East.”²³ Baelz urged that Japan not forget its cause to lead the East out of backwardness and instead usher in a new future in which it relies heavily on Western ideas.

Alongside of Social Darwinism, Japanese intellectuals studied anthropology. Edward Morse’s ideas on Darwinian evolution, Hermann Roesler’s social constitutionalism, and of course German philosophical thinkers impacted the development of Japanese intellectuals. Morse laid the foundation for Japanese physical anthropological study and taught the Japanese to stress the physical rather than other areas of anthropological science. Political science came to be studied through these influences as well.²⁴ The questions that the Japanese started to ask concerned the origins of the Japanese people. They wondered about their relationship to the Ainu and Okinawan people, how the imperial family came about, and how the unique Japanese culture developed. Tsuboi Shogoro led the development of Japanese anthropology through his creation of *Jinrui-gaku no Tomodachi*, an anthropological association that published its own journal. Tsuboi also taught cultural anthropologist Torii Ryuzo, another leading anthropologist during the colonial age. The Japanese government employed anthropologists to conduct ethnographic surveys of potential colonial lands that became crucial in understanding Taiwan, Korea, and China. Japanese became important to the dissemination of information in these areas, and many of the older people still speak Japanese.²⁵ Even as the Japanese borrowed ideas from the West, they formulated them according to the Japanese agenda.

The government’s primary motive for studying Western medicine was to establish a superior military. Thanks to the specialization of medicine brought about by the doctors’ passionate study of Western medicine, the Japanese could implement hygiene within its military. Hygiene became part of the morality of the Japanese.

For bureaucrats, military officials, and pedagogues alike, hygiene became a concept that not only linked but intrinsically intertwined rules of cleanliness with those of morality, the health of the body with that of the mind, the individual with society, and Japan with other modern nations.²⁶

Western medicine became the way the Japanese would organize their morality, justifying their sense of superiority. They could exhibit perfect bodies—not only physically but also mentally ideal—to colonized subjects; thus, proving their own superiority.

22 Mori Ōgai, *Saiki Koi and Other Stories*, ed. David Dilworth and J. Thomas Rimer (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1977), 82.

23 Baelz, 243.

24 H. J. Jones, *Live Machines: Hired Foreigners and Meiji Japan* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 75.

25 Jerry S. Eades, “Anthropologists of Asia, Anthropologists in Asia: The Academic Mode of Production in the Semi-Periphery,” in *Asian Anthropology*, ed. Jan Van Bremen, Eyal Ben-Ari and Syed Farid Alatas (New York: Routledge, 2005), 82-83.

26 Sabine Frühstück, *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 25.

Ishii Shirō, a Japanese medical doctor with high ambition, sought to display his superiority over colonized subjects. Playing into fears about the nature of teaching medicine first set out by Erwin Baelz, Japanese medical schools did not offer courses in medical ethics. The focus was directed to hands-on instruction and clinical experience, as the medical educators believed their students already to behave in an ethical manner. They thought they impressed upon their students the goal of healing, rather than experimenting upon patients. However, sometimes professors would teach medical ethics to a select group of students in an informal manner. None of the graduates underwent the Hippocratic Oath, nor was there a Japanese equivalent of the famous vow.

Shirō graduated in 1920 after quickly going through school and joined the military as a doctor. In 1927, he acquired a doctorate at Kyoto Imperial University. After graduating, Shiro was posted by the army to work at the Kyoto Army Medical Hospital, where he then used his military connections to advocate for biological warfare development in Tokyo. Initially, he made little headway, but a shift in government in 1930 allowed him to gain traction for biological warfare research. At this time, Ishii attracted the attention of Koizumi Chikahiko, who was a prominent military scientist and nationalist. Koizumi also fancied himself a philosopher, believing the call of the doctor was to tend to the country itself, rather than cure individual illnesses. Through this partnership, the department of immunology would be developed. Through this department, Japan would contribute much to the study of immunology.²⁷ From these beginnings, Ishii had the resources necessary to develop camps, where he performed biological research on hapless prisoners.

In 1931 after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, Shiro went on to form the Ping Fan camp located near the city of Harbin in China. In the camp, the staff performed experiments upon the prisoners, like tying them to logs and studying the effects of long durations in cold conditions. Shirō tried to ease the ethical doubts of his staff. He said:

Our God Given mission as doctors is to challenge all varieties of disease causing microorganisms; to block all roads of intrusion into the human body; to annihilate all foreign matter resident in our bodies; and to devise the most expeditious treatment possible. However, the research work upon which we are now about to embark is the complete opposite of these principles, and may cause us some anguish as doctors. Nevertheless, I beseech you to pursue this research, based on the dual thrill of (1) a scientist to exert efforts to probing for the truth in natural science and research into, and discovery of, the unknown world, and (2) as a military person, to successfully build a powerful military weapon against the enemy.²⁸

Doctors working with Ishii at the prison camp justified the atrocities citing nationalism and the utility of their research for the Japanese army, while distancing themselves from their subjects by holding onto the ideal of finding the truths of natural science.

Japan's colonial aims became clear with the publication of *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as the Nucleus*. This collection of volumes, published in 1943 and aimed at Japanese officials, outlined the policies to be implemented by the government. The documents lay out the rationale behind policies enacted against colonized people. According to the report, all countries adopt a racialized version of the world that connects to each countries' nationalism.²⁹ With this document, the Japanese government exposed its policies to be racially-based towards colonized people. Its justification for such policies came from the impression that other countries were just as

²⁷ Harris, 15-16, 18-21.

²⁸ Harris, 56-57.

²⁹ John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 263-264.

racist and nationalistic. Doctors utilized this narrative to perform experiments upon colonial subjects.

German and Japanese doctors, harnessing scientific racism, developed discourses that allowed them to commit atrocities during World War II. During the late nineteenth century, Japan studied Western medicine through German instruction. This experience transformed Japanese ideas about learning medicine. The Japanese fully implemented Western style medicine within Japan and contributed to highly specialized fields of research. Thanks to the doctors, the government could utilize this form of medicine to wage war, and it sought to fund more research and development of biological weapons. This led Japanese doctors like Ishii Shiro to perform cruel experiments upon colonized peoples that echoed the horrors committed by the Germans on the Jews. To justify such behavior and persuade those against the research-induced atrocities, the Japanese needed a discourse, an understanding of how these seemingly horrible acts contributed to a greater good. The doctors, since they were scientists, provided a narrative that stressed the inferiority of the colonized people, while emphasizing the need of pursuing unrestricted research. They stressed these ideas to their staff to make sure they would carry out the experiments. The government could also use the doctors' reasonings to justify its stance on colonizing Asia.

The preceding research is meant as an initial foray into a complicated topic. Further research must be completed to truly understand the racism that developed within Japan. This will require the further declassification of governmental documents and sensitive, skilled scholars.

All the Reckless Start in Texas: Texas and its Revolution

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Tanner Skym is a senior from Antioch, Illinois. He wrote this paper for Dr. Mark Hubbard's HIS 4940 Early American Republic. After graduation, Mr. Skym hopes to become a historian with a 2nd job as an Elvis Impersonator. (Thank you, thank you very much.)

Introduction

The Republic of Texas was established in 1836 when Texas received independence from Mexico. Anglo Americans and Tejanos, or Mexican-Americans, had settled in this province and finally received their long-awaited freedom from Mexico after fighting a war, known as the Texas Revolution. This conflict began due to the increasing number of American immigrants swelling into the territory starting in the 1820s. Land opportunities in Texas and a craving for Manifest Destiny drew the settlers. President John Quincy Adams endorsed the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819; this treaty granted Florida to the United States, along with a border between New Spain and the United States, but Adams failed to include the southwestern portion of the United States. Instead, he recognized Spanish sovereignty over Texas; this angered Anglo-Americans with territorial aspirations.

Mexico eventually allowed colonization in the territory of Texas in the Mexican Constitution of 1824. Stephen Austin and many other leaders led a small group of colonists into the new territory; settlers paid a small fee per acre, and, in return, Austin and these leaders ensured good conduct in the settled areas. Anglo-American immigrants to Texas had a strong desire for land, as well as a plan to spread slavery. Most of the immigrants were from the South, bringing a strong democratic ideology and a skepticism of the Mexican government. Mexico believed that these immigrants were trying to persuade the American government to purchase Texas from Mexico, resulting in increased tensions. The Mexican administration failed to supervise the Texans; this promoted a rise in opposition.

The ensuing revolution broke out following the battle at the Guadalupe River in 1835. The revolution would last almost a year and end with the capture of President Santa Anna and the Treaty of Velasco, which granted Texans their independence and prompted more friction between Mexico and the United States. Ultimately, it was the Anglo-American's avarice for land and slavery, compounded by aggressive self-determination and anti-Mexican sentiment, which led to the Texas Revolution for Independence.¹

Americans Move to Texas

The immigration and colonization of Texas originated from Mexican leaders adapting concepts from their northern neighbor, the United States. According to historian Eugene C. Barker,

¹ Eugene C. Barker, *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835: University of Texas Research Lectures on the Causes of the Texas Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965) and Theodore Reed Fehrenbach *Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans* (Boulder, CO: Da Capo Press, 2000) highlight the idea of Texas being included in the westward expansion of Manifest Destiny, along with conflicts between superior and inferior races. Past research focused upon Anglo majority in Texas settlements. They failed to view minority opinion. Barker concentrated mostly upon Stephen Austin, while Fehrenbach viewed the Anglo majority.

Mexican leaders believed that since a republican government and free immigration had been crucial factors in the development of the United States, they could benefit Mexico as well. Inspired by this ideology, the Mexicans adopted a federal constitution in 1824, which invited immigrants from around the world.² With this decree from their Constitution, Mexico's Congress approved Stephen F. Austin's contract, allowing him to settle three hundred families in Texas around abandoned missions near San Antonio. The Mexican government endorsed the contract, believing that the colonists would be assimilated by the native citizens of San Antonio.³ Austin and his father Moses had planned to venture into Texas since 1819, but could not due to the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, initiated between America and Spain to prevent conflicts over Florida and other Spanish territories. The treaty proclaimed;

The Two High Contracting Parties agree to cede and renounce all their rights, claims and pretensions to the Territories described by the said Line: that is to say.—The United States hereby cede to His Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all their rights, claims, and pretensions to the Territories lying West and South of the above described Line; and, in like manner, His Catholic Majesty cedes to the said United States, all his rights, claims, and pretensions to any Territories, East and North of the said Line, and, for himself, his heirs and successors, renounces all claim to the said Territories forever.⁴

President John Quincy Adams had renounced the United States' claim to these territories in favor of Spain, which would eventually grant the territories to Mexico. This decision angered many Anglo-Americans who had planned to settle in the area, believing it took away their rights to settle Texas and other parts of the Southwest. Mexico eventually granted access to properties in Texas, which attracted the Austins and a group of Anglo-Americans settlers. In 1837, an Episcopal minister named Chester Newell traveled to Texas to conduct research on the recent troubles.⁵ The resulting study, *History of the Revolution in Texas, Particularly of the War of 1835 & '36*, penned in 1838, concludes that Austin's goal was, "establishing the Anglo-American race... to the South and West, in the then all, but impassable barrier between the civilized and free States of the North and the remains of despotism and barbarism of the South."⁶ Newell explained that Americans immigrated to Texas for many reasons, especially to help improve conditions and to gain wealth from the new lands that they purchased from Mexico. Historian Joe B. Frantz explains that, "[t]hey moved in for that most fundamental of motives, greed, as signified by the presence of nearly free land."⁷

Land in the United States became quite expensive in the early 19th century. In America, during that period, the price of American land, endorsed by Congress at around two dollars an acre was higher than most were willing to pay.⁸ The *Missouri Advocate* compared land values in the two republics; the company declared that the United States gave land that was worth nothing, while declaring that Mexico planned to provide far more valuable land to settlers at almost no cost.⁹

² Barker, *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835*, 10.

³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴ "Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819," The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, <http://www.sonsofdewittcolony.org//adamonis.htm>, accessed November 27, 2017.

⁵ Lawrence L. Brown, "Newell, Chester," <https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fne20>, accessed 16 April 2018.

⁶ Rev. C. Newell, *History of the Revolution in Texas, Particularly of the War of 1835 & '36* (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1838), 13.

⁷ Joe B. Frantz, *Texas: A Bicentennial History* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1976), 49.

⁸ Barker, *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835*, 17.

⁹ Andrew Clayton, "Continental Politics: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Appeal of Texas in the 1820s," in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early Republic*, eds. Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew Whitmore Robertson, and David Waldstreicher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 307.

Cheap Mexican land inspired more greedy Anglo-Americans to settle in Texas. The editor of *The Advocate* claimed that, “Mexico... does not think of getting rich by land speculation, digging for lead, or boiling salt water, but by increasing the number and wealth of her citizens.”¹⁰ In addition, Stephen Austin feared the United States would acquire Texas and introduce its more expensive land system.¹¹ This fear inspired Americans to act quickly and generated a huge demand for property in Texas. As many were southern slaveowners, they brought their slaves along. However, the colonization committee denounced slavery. They proclaimed slavery “dishonors the human race,” and proposed to embargo the slave trade. Yet they could not overlook the rights of property, so settlers in return had to accept the agreement that children arriving into the territory were free around the age of fourteen.¹²

Mexico Responds and Tensions Soar

The Mexican government had equivocated on the issue of slavery, one year restricting slavery and another year allowing it. Historian Theodore Fehrenbach, author of *Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans*, states that at one point, when trying to decrease the number of American immigrants, General José Tornel wanted Mexican President Vicente Guerrero to sign a law abolishing slavery in the republic. At the same time, Mexican officials exempted Americans from the law. Fehrenbach explains that, “the whole Mexican legal attitude towards slavery was confusing in the extreme.”¹³ Uncertainty persisted about the status of slaves. With the high rate of Anglo-American immigration into Texas and the introduction of slavery in the territory, tensions grew between the Mexican government and the new settlers.

There were many factors during the 1820s and the 1830s that increased these tensions. One of Mexico’s mistakes was assuming that these self-disciplined Anglo-Americans had planned to become Mexican citizens. The Mexicans permitted Anglo-Americans to create their own separate communities; however, what the Mexican government did not expect was that the Anglo Americans brought along their political views, religious beliefs, and teachings, which they refused to abandon.¹⁴ Being arrogant Anglo-Americans, they planned to stay that way and had no intention of becoming citizens of Mexico. Fehrenbach argued that, “[t]he real, underlying cause of the Texas Revolution was extreme ethnic difference between two sets of men, neither of whom... had any respect for the other.”¹⁵ To an extent, this was true: there were many differences between the Mexicans and the Anglo-Americans. Mexico certainly created some of the problems.

Barker studied the Mexican judiciary in Texas, which was not even created until 1834. The Judiciary Act passed in Mexico, Baker concludes, was defective and lacked sufficient courts. This resulted in injustices for the colonists, it created wariness between them and the Mexican judiciary system, and it caused “recurrent confusion and insurgency, accompanied at times by palpable disregard of the state constitution.”¹⁶ The weaknesses in the Mexican judiciary system would unintentionally commence a rebellion in their province.

In late 1826 and early 1827, a group of self-important men declared themselves to be an independent republic, called Fredonia. This Anglo-American group acquired treaties from Native American tribes, including the Cherokee. They terrorized and ruined the works of empresarios, or

¹⁰ Ibid, 18.

¹¹ Ibid, 18-19.

¹² Eugene C. Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin: Founder of Texas, 1793-1836* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1925), 55.

¹³ Fehrenbach, *Lone Star: A History of Texas*, 165.

¹⁴ Ibid, 167.

¹⁵ Ibid, 168.

¹⁶ Barker, *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835*, 25.

colonization agents, throughout the Texas territory, and the rebellion would not be crushed until it clashed with Austin and his Mexican troops. George P. Garrison, in his book, *Texas: A Contest of Civilizations*, noted that if the colonists had sided with the Fredonia uprising, it would never have been suppressed, and that “[i]n such a case, there are three or four different turns that the history of Texas might have taken.”¹⁷ The Fredonian Rebellion, according to Randolph B. Campbell in *Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State*, “had the immediate effect of a public relations triumph with the Mexican government for Austin and other Anglo-Americans.”¹⁸ The Fredonian Rebellion eased tensions for a time, but it revealed that Anglo-Americans were becoming very egotistic in their rapacity for land.

Throughout the late 1820s, more Anglo-Americans immigrated into Texas. On this land, they embraced the southern ideology and grew cotton; this cash crop developed immediately and increased the demand for slaves in Texas. As stated previously, the Mexican government had contradictory positions on the topic of slavery; officials permitted it one year and banned it another. Slavery in Texas had been threatened in 1829 on Mexican Independence Day, when President Vicente Guerrero declared slaves to be emancipated throughout the Mexican Republic. Many feared this action, especially Stephen Austin, who believed that slavery was of great importance to the colonization of Texas. Austin made his pro-slavery position clear in a letter he wrote to John Durst:

Mexico has not within its whole dominions a man who would defend its independence, the union of its territory, and all its constitutional rights sooner than I would, or be more ready and willing to discharge his duties as a Mexican citizen; one of the first and most sacred of those duties is to protect my constitutional rights, and I will do it, so far as I am able. I am the owner of one slave only, an old...woman, not worth much, but in this matter I should feel that my constitutional rights as a Mexican were just as much infringed, as they would be if I had a thousand, it is the principle and not the amount, the latter makes the violation more aggravated, but, not more illegal or unconstitutional.¹⁹

This argument convinced political chief Ramon Musquiz to side with Austin. Together, the two appealed to the governor, who in turn, protested to Guerrero. In response, Guerrero declared that his prohibition of slavery exempted Texas. Though he appeased the colonists, the rest of Mexico disapproved of this decision; Guerrero was overthrown in 1829 by Anastasio Bustamante. Bustamante, in opposition of Guerrero, had been suspicious of the colony of Texas.

The Mexican government grew increasingly apprehensive about the ever-increasing population of Texas, eventually passing the Law of April 6th in 1830. Scholar Joseph L. Clark has branded this law the Stamp Act of the Texas Revolution. He observed that it gave the government power to seize land, prevent further importation of slaves, and slow immigration to Texas. Mexican officials issued passports to enter the colony to regulate and cut immigration. Clark reported that Lucas Alaman, the secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Manuel Teran, commandant of the Eastern Internal States, claimed that, “the purpose of the law was to ‘save Texas from the imperialistic designs of the United States,’” the original plan disregarding any loyalty from the colonists to the Mexican government.²⁰ The Mexican government wanted to Mexicanize Texas, but the Anglo-Americans and their strong American ideals ignored this request. These newcomers had brought with them “a certain missionary arrogance”; they did not understand the prevailing institutions or

¹⁷ George Pierce Garrison, *Texas: A Contest of Civilizations* (La Crosse, WI: Brookhaven Press, 2001), 169.

¹⁸ Randolph B. Campbell, *Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 110.

¹⁹ Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin*, 216.

²⁰ Clark, *A History of Texas: Land of Promise*, 132.

practices.²¹ The arrogance of the Anglo-Americans once again brought more pressure on their relationship with Mexico.

In Washington, President Andrew Jackson grew increasingly interested in Texas. Jackson wrote that he has “long since been aware of the importance of Texas to the United States... and of the real necessity of extending our boundary west of the Sabine.”²² When Jackson became determined to occupy Texas, he sent Joel Poinsett to convince Mexicans to recognize the Rio Grande River as their northern border, but these efforts raised suspicion. Poinsett tried to purchase the land, only to reawaken Mexican opposition. These impressions spurred only greater distrust in the United States-Mexican relationship.²³ In an effort to improve this scenario, Jackson replaced Poinsett with Anthony Butler with high hopes for Butler to succeed in his negotiations and bring Texas “into his outstretched arms.”²⁴

Unfortunately, Butler failed to acquire Texas, and Jackson decided to send Sam Houston. Houston obtained a passport and came to the Texas border to visit the territory that was occupied by Native Americans to learn more about their nature. Impressed by the potential of the region, he decided to immigrate and make peace with the tribes; he settled in Nacogdoches. While he was making peace, he sent word to Washington that many Anglo-Americans would prefer American occupation over Mexico.²⁵ “If Texas is desirable to the United States, it is now in the most favorable attitude perhaps that it can be to obtain it on fair term—England is pressing her suit for it, but its citizens will resist, if any transfer should be made of them to any other power but the United States,” he wrote.²⁶

Austin Takes Action

Although the Mexican government tried to prevent Anglo-American immigration into Mexico, Stephen Austin worked hard to exempt his territory. He eventually found a loophole through Mexico’s ruling involving Article 10 of the Mexican Constitution. This stated that no changes could be made to colonies that had already been established. Austin insisted that his contracts were equivalent to one colony, therefore satisfying the prerequisites of Article 10.²⁷ The Mexican government accepted his reasoning, and immigrants were allowed for another year into his colony. Troubles, however, began in other Anglo-American colonies, more specifically, Anahuac.

Colonel Juan Davis Bradburn, a Virginia-born officer in the Mexican army, accepted runaway slaves that had escaped from Louisiana into Anahuac, an action that essentially freed the slaves.²⁸ When two lawyers, who sought to re-enslave these runaways entered his territory, Bradburn arrested them on charges of giving false information. Anglo-Americans, outraged with this decision, traveled to Anahuac; they threatened Bradburn and his Mexican troops, demanding freedom for the two lawyers. The Anglo-American force used violence to release the captured men, and a fight occurred at Velasco, one of the last skirmishes prior to the Texas Revolution. This interference at Anahuac sparked flames to a revolution. Any Anglo-American involved in this predicament could be

²¹ Frantz, *Texas: A Bicentennial History*, 60.

²² Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832* (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), 202.

²³ *Ibid.*, 219.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 289.

²⁵ Thom Hatch, *Encyclopedia of the Alamo and the Texas Revolution* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc. 1999), 116.

²⁶ Sam Houston, Donald Day, and Harry Herbert Ullom, *The Autobiography of Sam Houston* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 79.

²⁷ Campbell, *Gone to Texas*, 118.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 120.

accused of treason if captured.²⁹ At the same time, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna created political instability in Mexico by leading a revolt against Bustamante and his government. This revolt prevented the Anglo troublemakers from receiving any punishment; in response, the Americans supported Santa Anna's revolt. Santa Anna succeeded in overthrowing the government, and he himself took office.³⁰

Meanwhile, in 1833, Stephen Austin and other delegates of Texas came together to frame the constitution for a new Texas state government. Austin traveled to Mexico City to argue for statehood, insisting Texas met the requisite qualifications. He believed that Texas had the right to self-government. He felt that the people were responsible to be independent and create their own state organization. He wrote to the *ayuntamiento*, or town hall, of San Antonio urging the people to unite. Austin asked for, "a measure to organize a local government independent of Coahuila, even though the general government withholds its consent," and he ended with *Dios y Teras*, which translated to "God and Texas."³¹ The government took this as "exceedingly rash" and arrested Austin, accusing him of recommending revolution among the Anglo-Americans. The imprisonment of Austin stirred fear among the Texans. Santa Anna took full power in the government of Mexico and began to prepare plans for an invasion of Texas. In a letter he wrote about taking Texas back for Mexico, Santa Anna defended Mexican sovereignty. He proclaimed that, "perhaps in good faith, that the only effect of fanning the fire of war in Texas would be a political change in accord with their opinion." Santa Anna then assailed the Texans, lamenting that, "[t]heir shortsighted ambition must be a terrible lesson to them."³²

Santa Anna noted the aggressiveness of the Texans and their craving for independence, rooted in American ideology; he planned to put out the flames of this uprising rumor. Stephen Austin returned to Texas after being released from prison in 1834 and at a meeting on September 8th, filled with anger, he told the Anglos that "[w]ar... is our only resource. There is no other remedy but to defend our rights, ourselves, and our country by force of arms. To do this we must unite, and, in order to unite, the delegates of the people must meet in general consultation and organize a system of defense."³³

Sam Houston supported Austin's cause. He wrote in a letter to James Prentiss that he believed Texas should become a sovereign state. Houston favored independence and added "if Mexico had done right, we could have travelled on smoothly enough."³⁴ However, Mexico failed to do so, and an army formed with Austin as the commander-in-chief, and the aggressive Texans declared war on Mexico to fight for their rights given in the Mexican Constitution of 1824. *The Richmond Enquirer*, declared that citizens "will have fighting to do, and that before very long... to defend their lives, liberty, and property, from the tyranny and oppression of a military despot—Santa Anna."³⁵ This newspaper advanced the strong American ideology of the Texans, declaring that "[o]ne brave United States rifleman can put ten of the cowardly slaves of Mexico to flight—yes, he can do it with a Bowie knife."³⁶ Another edition even mentioned that "Mexico will now feel how painful and mortifying it is to see one of its provinces revolted against her." The article also warned

²⁹ Ibid, 120.

³⁰ Campbell, *Gone to Texas* was the first study of slavery in Texas. His recent studies of Texas are focused more upon the minority views compared to Barker and Fehrenbach who aimed primarily at the Anglo Americans' thoughts.

³¹ Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin*, 370-371.

³² "General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna Defends Mexican Sovereignty over Texas," 1837 in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. 1, 7th ed., eds Thomas Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Boston: Wadsworth, 1995), 209.

³³ Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin*, 412-413.

³⁴ Houston, *The Autobiography of Sam Houston*. 83.

³⁵ "Texas In Revolution," *The Richmond Enquirer*, October 23, 1835.

³⁶ Ibid.

the other provinces of Mexico of the hostile Texan army, powered with restless ambition.³⁷ The bellicose Anglo-Americans showed how eager they were to defend their slavery and liberties from the Mexican government.

Conclusion

The Texas Revolution began as a conflict of greed and aggression. Anglo-Americans entered the country on the promises of free or cheap land, bringing their slaves and their strong Southern ideology. At first, the Mexican government welcomed the Anglo-Americans into Texas, hoping that they desired to become Mexican citizens. Some accepted citizenship, but most refused. Throughout the late 1820s and 1830s, Mexico failed to govern the colonists and tensions soared due to controversial decisions, such as abolishing slavery. Other events, including the Fredonian Rebellion and Andrew Jackson's speculation about the possibility of purchasing Texas, increased this tension between the Anglo-Americans and the Mexican government. The government then tried to prevent more Anglo-American influence by banning immigration into Texas. As the Mexican government descended into political anarchy during the 1830s, the Anglo-Americans planned to fashion their own sovereign state. Attempting to ease tensions, Stephen Austin traveled to Mexico to negotiate. The settlement failed and instead, Austin was arrested on suspicion of encouraging Texan independence. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna took over Mexico with his own revolution, then threatened to take back Texas from the Anglos, causing fear among them and eventually calls for war. In these events, one can see the Texas Revolution emerging directly from the Anglo-American's desire for land and slavery in Texas, as well as their ideology and desire for self-determination.

³⁷ "Texas," *Richmond Enquirer*, September 9, 1836.

Review of *Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Tupac Amaru*, by Sergio Serulnikov (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

William D. Campbell

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The ancient empires of the Americas had fallen. The native peoples of Central and South America had been overthrown and their wealth plundered, their new conquistador overlords now reigned supreme. However, the Spanish dominance over the Americas was by no means unchallenged. For much of the colonial history of Latin America, the indigenous people of the Americas would rise to oppose the Spanish, inciting bloody riots and wars on a regular basis. While resistance often proved fleeting, isolated, and did little to challenge the status quo, some exceptions managed to rock the Spaniards to their core. One of these revolutionaries, Tupac Amaru II, caught the attention of Professor Sergio Serulnikov, professor of history at University of San Andrés in Buenos Aires.

In 2013, Serulnikov published *Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Tupac Amaru*, an account of what many, including the author, regard as one of the largest and most successful Indian revolts in colonial Latin America, which took place in 1780-1781 in Spanish Peru. Led by a mulatto merchant named Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui, who adopted the name of a legendary Inca king who also rebelled, this revolt was unique mainly in the size and organization. Unlike many Indian uprisings against Spanish rule, which were generally small, isolated incidents started by local disputes, Amaru II's movement reached out to all natives of the Andes, calling them together into a unified rebellion against the Spanish. For two years, from 1780 to 1781, Amaru waged a vicious campaign that terrorized the *Peninsular* elite before he was eventually captured and executed. Though Amaru died, the fighting would continue for another year under his son and cousin.

Serulnikov offers an excellent and in-depth account of the rebellion, though he does not limit himself to the events of that specific war. Serulnikov broadens his work to include examination of various smaller uprisings that predated and ultimately led to Amaru's own. He asserts that it was not just a single case of a charismatic leader rallying other groups to his cause, but rather a diverse collection of movements uniting into an organized movement. These various anti-Spanish movements demonstrated a huge variety of ideologies, approaches, and goals, and Serulnikov takes time to go into all of them. He structures the book to analyze these various revolts, the consequences of them, and how they fed into Amaru's movement.

Moving into the technical side of things, Serulnikov's writing is accessible and engaging. Each section is a chapter of a larger story of how the Andean revolt came to be, the war and its development after Amaru's death, and the long-term consequences of it. While the writing is very detailed, the chapters themselves are short, ranging from 4 to 18 pages, allowing for a quick, though highly informative read. The source material is primarily geared towards political and military history (specifically in Latin America), yet it still functions as an enjoyable read for more casual historians.

In the book's forward, historian Charles F. Walker claims that Sergio Serulnikov has provided the best overview of the Amaru rebellion available, praising him for his "sharp eye for comparisons and his fine pen," an assessment that certainly holds water. *Revolution in the Andes*

masterfully presents a complete and in-depth overview of one of the most infamous episodes in colonial American history.

Review of *Selma*. Directed by Ava DuVernay, 2015; Los Angeles, Paramount Pictures, film.

Deronte L. Johnson

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The film *Selma*, depicting the historical events surrounding the passage of the 1965 Voting Right Act, was released in 2015, the fiftieth anniversary of the violent voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. The actors and actress in this movie would go on to win awards such as the Golden Globes and an Oscar for their performances in the movie. Written by Paul Webb and directed by Ava DuVernay, *Selma* takes us back to a time in 1965 when Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and other civil rights leaders orchestrated a campaign for the right to vote, a drive met by very violent resistance from police in Selma, supported by Alabama's governor, segregationist George Wallace. This violence, which was televised and broadcasted all over the world, fully displayed the epic race problem in America. Pressure from Selma pushed President Lyndon Johnson to introduce the historic Voting Rights Bill of 1965, which was met with resistance from Southern Democrats.

This movie emphasizes Dr. King's great political skills. DuVernay and Webb dramatically reveal Dr. King's strategy of using his nonviolent movement and march-into-harm's-way approach as a means of moving public opinion. King knew that the events at Selma would be televised and broadcast all over the world. A clash with police would perfectly articulate the ugliness of Jim Crow. This was a great move by Dr. King, and it is very effectively depicted by DuVernay and Webb. While many historians would argue the passage of the Voting Rights Act resulted from the support of key Republicans in Congress and northern Democrats, both the director and writer focus instead on how Dr. King planned for the protest to become increasingly violent to gain support from whites and key religious figures. Thus, King is the agent of change. The film is all the more impressive when one considers that it does not use real quotes from the speeches of King, as permission to use them was restricted. Even in the absence of King's soaring rhetoric, the film manages to mine real drama from the events of 1965.

Although Webb and DuVernay show how Dr. King's political skills drove the nation, the president, and the Congress to support such as bill, the movie *Selma*, in my view, leaves out the key role played by President Johnson. Early on in the movie, we see King discussing Civil Rights with Johnson. The president insists in the scene that Dr. King wait on the Voting Acts bill of 1965. This is basically inaccurate, and, in fact, several historians have come out against the way that Johnson was portrayed in the movie.

Despite this issue, overall the director and writer both produced a great historical film on King and his fight for Civil Rights in Selma. Even without King's speeches, Webb and DuVernay still manage to bring out the historical aspects of the events depicted and the struggles that led to passage of the voting rights legislation. The movie equates the clash of King's nonviolence with the Alabama State Troopers to the president's use of the bully pulpit. Dr. King used a violent event to show the world that something needs to be done, just like a president would go before the nation on television and speak of something important to sway public opinion. In short, the movie *Selma* does a great job of showing how Dr. King met violence with nonviolence so that violence and brutality could be shown to millions.

Review of Caroline E. Light. *Stand Your Ground: A History of America's Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense*, by Caroline E. Light (Boston: Beacon Press, 2017).

Jermaine L. Jones

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Stand Your Ground: A History of America's Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense by Harvard Professor Caroline E. Light offers a historical view of the evolution of America's gun rights ideology from basic self-defense promised to American citizens in the Second Amendment, to the beginning of the gun rights movement, to the NRA and the current gun lobby in Congress. The book explains how the controversial issue of stand-your-ground has been a leading justification for some gun rights activists today to arm and defend themselves against threats and not face prosecution for using deadly force.

Light uses historical references to give readers an understanding of how gun advocates justify the use of stand-your-ground today in America. These justifications have become so prevalent that stand-your-ground self-defense laws have been adopted in thirty-three states today, with over thirteen million civilian citizens currently registered and licensed to carry concealed firearms. She also goes into the idea of "good guys and bad guys with guns." Light argues that faith in "good guys with guns" relies on the entrenched belief of certain Americans that "bad guys with guns" are a threat to all. Because of this belief, there has been a sharp increase in the number of firearm sales over the last 10 years.

Light also traces the history of white America's attachment to racialized, lethal self-defense by unearthing its legal and social complexities. She reviews the history of the "castle laws" of the 1600s, which gave white men the right to protect their homes and the right to claim justifiable homicide in certain situations. She also reviews the brutal lynching of "criminal" black bodies during the era of Jim Crow in America. Light notes how today the NRA has become so radicalized that it has evolved from being a sporting organization for responsible gun owners to one of the most powerful lobbies in the country. Finally, she brings light to the rise of mass shootings in schools and public places and the question of gun control for citizens that are not responsible gun owners. This is really brought home in her discussion regarding stand-your-ground and situations deemed as "life-threatening," such as with the tragic fate of Trayvon Martin in the George Zimmermann case.

Light's study provides a critical historical view of the evolution of American citizens' right to bear arms, as originally stated in the Second Amendment to the Constitution. It also shines a light on the mindset of American gun owners and how the notion of guns rights evolved over many years. Again, the issue of stand-your-ground is one that definitely deserves serious examination today. Light's book gives a great perspective on the history that led to present day events.

Review of Wada Haruki, *The Korean War: An International History*, by Wada Haruki (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

Hunter N. Worthey

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Most people today know little about the Korean War. In fact, it is often referred to as the “forgotten war,” since it tends to be overshadowed by World War II, just preceding Korea, and the Vietnam War, which broke out in the decade following. Into this vacuum steps Japanese scholar Wada Haruki with a new global study of the Korean War, a work that treats the war in all its international complexities. We are fortunate that Frank Baldwin has provided a fine translation of the book from its original Japanese. In his study, Haruki mines sources from China, Russia, the United States and Japan. Ultimately, he argues the war was really two essential conflicts: a civil war in Korea and a Sino-American war.

The civil war amounted to a bitter battle between North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung and Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee, basically a war between the North with Communism and the South leaning toward the West. Haruki goes into great detail about how each of these leaders failed in unifying the two parts of Korea. Rhee, a particularly greedy, aggressive leader, almost lost United States support in the process. Meanwhile Kim Il-Sung insisted on doing things his own way, refusing to listen to Mao or Stalin who were giving him advice. In particular, he failed to listen to their instructions to draw back troops when the United States finally got involved. Kim underestimated the military power of the United States. The Sino-American War, meanwhile, helped lead to the Yoshida Doctrine and the conclusion of the US- Japan security treaty. Haruki argues that Japan outsmarted the United States by arranging that America agree to protect Japan. With U.S. protection, Japan could focus on building its economy back up after the destruction of the Pacific War.

Haruki also brings to light new perspectives on the relations between different world leaders, especially Kim, Stalin and Mao. Haruki reveals many details of the Korean War that most scholars would not think of, such as how the Korean War was international in scope, as it was not just the two Koreas, America, and the People’s Republic of China: many other nations were involved.

This book is extremely useful as it helps readers get a better understanding of the “forgotten” Korean War. In these days when North and South Korea dominate the news, most recently with talk about reunification, we owe it to ourselves not to forget the Korean War.